Parliament Workbench
Data: Official Report to 18 Nov 2026

Official Report · Committee

Section 22 Reports

“The 2018/19 audit of NHS Lothian: Delay to the opening of the Royal Hospital for Children and Young People”

Thursday 16 January 2020 Public Audit and Post-legislative Scrutiny Committee About 09:45–10:45 Committee business 149 contributions · 10 speakers

Speakers

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The record

149 contributions
Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
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Item 3 is consideration of the section 22 report, “The 2018/19 audit of NHS Lothian: Delay to the opening of the Royal Hospital for Children and Young People”. I welcome our witnesses: Caroline Gardner, the Auditor General for Scotland; Leigh Johnston, senior manager, performance audit and best value, Audit Scotland; and Chris Brown, a partner at Scott-Moncrieff.

I understand that the Auditor General has an opening statement.

Caroline Gardner
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Thank you, convener. My report summarises the circumstances surrounding the delay to the opening of the Royal hospital for children and young people, the department of clinical neurosciences and the child and adolescent mental health service in NHS Lothian. The report is not an investigation into the causes of the delay, but it aims to clarify the facts as we currently know them.

The Scottish Government announced a non-profit distributing funding route for the project in 2010. In 2014, NHS Lothian appointed Integrated Health Services Lothian to design, build, finance and maintain the project. Total costs were estimated at £230 million, which was made up of construction costs of £150 million plus enabling and equipment works of £80 million that were outwith the agreement with IHSL.

The hospital was originally due to open in July 2017, but it has been delayed by a series of technical and contractual disputes. In February 2019, with Scottish Government approval, NHS Lothian signed a settlement agreement with IHSL, and an £11.6 million payment was agreed. In February 2019, the independent tester—Arcadis NV—issued a certificate of practical completion and the hospital was handed over to NHS Lothian. However, in June, final compliance checks revealed that the ventilation system in the critical care department did not comply with current guidance, leading to the decision not to open the hospital on 9 July as planned.

Since then, two reviews that were commissioned by the Cabinet Secretary for Health and Sport have been published. The first report, which was produced by KPMG, focused on governance arrangements. It set out a picture of confusion and human error in relation to the interpretation of the relevant specifications and guidance, together with missed opportunities to spot and rectify that error. NHS National Services Scotland, which produced the second review, carried out a series of checks to ensure that the relevant technical specifications and guidance had been followed. It identified a range of issues to be addressed.

It is estimated that the additional work that is required to ensure that the new hospital complies with the relevant specifications and guidance, as well as the work to keep the current site open while that happens, will cost an additional £16 million. A public inquiry will be held to examine those issues and those at the Queen Elizabeth university hospital in Glasgow. My report aims not to pre-empt that inquiry but to set out a factual account of what I currently understand about the situation, based on the reviews that were carried out by KPMG and NHS National Services Scotland, and on NHS Lothian’s annual audit report, which was produced by Chris Brown of Scott-Moncrieff.

My report is not the result of a full investigation into the project; instead, it identifies a number of issues for consideration to ensure that lessons are learned for future projects of such nature. Those include the clarity and application of the relevant guidelines and how they were managed, the contractual implications, the roles and accountability of all the parties involved and the effectiveness of oversight and scrutiny.

As usual, my colleagues and I will do our best to answer the committee’s questions.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
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Thank you very much, Auditor General.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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I am conscious that a public inquiry is under way, and we do not want to second guess what it will find, but there are some issues on which we could get a little bit more texture. Auditor General, in your report, you say that

“A series of technical and contractual disputes”

took place during 2017. Can you give us a wee bit more detail on those disputes?

Caroline Gardner
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Certainly. Chris Brown might want to pick up on that question, based on the audit work that he carried out at the end of the 2018-19 financial year.

Chris Brown Scott-Moncrieff
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There were a number of contractual disagreements between NHS Lothian and the contractor on issues relating to the hospital’s specifications, such as its drainage and ventilation systems.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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How did those arise? When it is said that they are “disputes”, does that mean that the contractors were not building according to the specification, the health board found out about it and there were disputes about how to rectify matters?

10:00

Chris Brown Scott-Moncrieff
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That was the nature of the disputes. The health board’s contention was that the contractor was not building in accordance with the specification. The contractor’s view was different. That resulted in quite a protracted dispute, which eventually went to a formal dispute resolution process. That ended in a settlement agreement, resulting in the health board paying £11.6 million to the contractor.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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If the contractor did not build according to the specifications, why did the health board have to pay out?

Chris Brown Scott-Moncrieff
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The health board, based on the legal and technical advice that it was given, took the view that it did not have strong enough grounds to challenge that issue with the contractor.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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It had strong enough grounds to raise disputes with the contractor, but not strong enough to win a dispute.

There must have been a process—in accordance with the contract, presumably—for the disputes to take place, to be discussed and to be escalated.

Chris Brown Scott-Moncrieff
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Yes. That was exactly why NHS Lothian went through the dispute resolution process; that is exactly what that did.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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And yet its grounds were not strong enough.

Chris Brown Scott-Moncrieff
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The conclusion of the process was that the health board considered that it did not have strong enough grounds to pursue the issue through legal redress.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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Either the specification was right or it was wrong. Is it not as simple as that?

Chris Brown Scott-Moncrieff
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No, I do not think that it is as simple as that. One of the issues in relation to the situation on which we are reporting is that, in a major construction project, defining exactly what is the responsibility of the public sector procurer and what is the responsibility of the contractor in some of the contracts is very complex.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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If you take a very simplistic view, either the specifications are according to what was agreed and what was in the contract or they are not.

Chris Brown Scott-Moncrieff
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It depends on the level of detail that the specification goes into. Different contracts and funding routes require different levels of detail in relation to the specification that the public sector provides for major construction projects.

If a public sector organisation simply describes the operational requirements that it wants to achieve in relation to a building, it may be up to the private sector contractor—the builder—to define exactly how that will be provided, in the detailed specification. One of the issues is that there has been some ambiguity and uncertainty in the project as to exactly which party is responsible for the detailed specifications for some aspects of the new hospital.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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Even if the health board specified only its expected outcomes, and the contractor was largely left to put in place whatever—according to regulation—would provide those outcomes, if those were not right, in simple terms, you would think that the health board would be a strong position.

Chris Brown Scott-Moncrieff
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The purpose of the contracting model is to achieve that outcome. The public sector specifies what it is looking for and the contractor interprets that specification and designs something that meets those requirements. That is the intention, but that just has not happened in this situation for aspects of the new hospital.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
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Willie Coffey wants to ask a supplementary question on that point.

Willie Coffey SNP Kilmarnock and Irvine Valley
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Page 15 of the Auditor General’s report points towards that issue. It seems to suggest that there was an inconsistency in two documents about air ventilation levels.

One part of the specification said that four complete air changes an hour were required and another part of the specification said that it should be 10 an hour. I am no expert, but I can see why that would give rise to some confusion. It seems to me, without pre-empting or guessing anything, that that might explain why there was an inconsistency. I suggest that both parties should have spotted that.

Caroline Gardner
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You are right to identify that as another source of confusion between the parties involved, but it is a different issue from the one that Mr Beattie has been asking about and Chris Brown has been answering. That is the issue that was identified in late June 2019, which led directly to the decision to delay the opening of the new hospital. We do not yet know in enough detail what the differences were between the contractor and NHS Lothian in the period that Chris Brown has been describing. We do know that the advice that the board took from technical and legal experts was that the risks of going ahead with legal action on the contract outweighed the potential benefits that the work was likely to achieve. The settlement agreement and the payment of £11.6 million were the result of that.

Mr Coffey is right that one of the overarching points in my report concerns the confusion about the application and status of the relevant standards and guidance, and about the roles and responsibilities of all the parties involved—it is not just about actions in NHS Lothian.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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The report says that the

“technical and contractual disputes throughout 2017”

were

“over and above what would generally be expected on such a project”.

Why? What is the reason for that?

Caroline Gardner
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I am not sure that we know the reason for that. We know that they were and that that led to the dispute resolution process. I am not sure whether Chris Brown can say more about it.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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The disputes clearly could not be resolved through the established channels, but why was that?

Chris Brown Scott-Moncrieff
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That is one of the issues that the health board is looking at now—it has commissioned a review from its internal auditors into the root causes of the issues that led to the delay in opening the hospital. Maybe that review will answer some of those questions.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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Is the contractor meeting any part of the shortfall in funding that is required to make everything right?

Caroline Gardner
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If we return to your original question, we know that the settlement agreement that was reached in 2018 and the £11.6 million payment that NHS Lothian made reflected the relative balance of responsibilities that were seen to be in place at the time. If we then look at to the events of June and July 2019, which is when the other problems arose that led to the delay in moving to the hospital and the announcement of a public inquiry, we do not know the outcome of that yet.

As Chris Brown said, the board has asked its internal auditors to look at the circumstances in the board. We are waiting to hear about the start of the public inquiry that the Cabinet Secretary for Health and Sport announced. That will include work to understand better the contractual implications, which is one of the questions that I have raised in my report. That is a big and important question to which we do not yet know the answer. However, we know that NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde has announced that it intends to take legal action against the contractor responsible for the Queen Elizabeth university hospital.

Caroline Gardner
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It is.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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Interesting. Exhibit 4 of the report shows a breakdown of the

“Estimated costs resulting from the 2019 delay”.

That includes

“contingency for further remedial action”

of £2 million. Are you confident that that figure will be enough to cover any “further remedial action” that is needed? Is the figure based on anything?

Caroline Gardner
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It is an estimate, as contingencies always are. We cannot give the committee any assurance about whether it is enough, but we have had no indication so far that it is not enough. Does Leigh Johnston have anything to add?

Leigh Johnston Audit Scotland
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The figures came from the Scottish Government, which was keen to point out that they are estimated figures at this point. We will not know the full and total cost that is required until the work is done and the facility is ready to open.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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The obvious concern about that is that NHS Lothian is already in a tight financial situation. Will it be expected to pick up that cost? Has the Government indicated whether it will bail the board out on that?

Caroline Gardner
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The Government has indicated that it will cover the additional costs incurred by delaying the move.

Caroline Gardner
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Yes. The board has paid the £11.6 million that was agreed in February 2018. One of the reasons why I wanted to produce my report was to clarify those figures, because there has been a lot of speculation in the press about what has happened to the costs overall. The original total cost was expected to be £230 million. The total additional cost so far, from the February 2018 settlement and the £16 million that Colin Beattie referred to, is £27.65 million.

So far, we expect the increase in cost to be about 12 per cent, which is significant but not overwhelming in relation to the original cost envelope. In relation to the overall amount that NHS Lothian spends, again, that is a relatively minor figure. The bigger questions are what impact the delay is having on patients and staff in Edinburgh and what we can learn to make sure that no health board ends up in this position again.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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Is the Scottish Government picking up all the additional costs in relation to running two sites, the additional maintenance costs at the existing site and so on? I want to be clear about that.

Caroline Gardner
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It is our understanding that the Government will meet the £16.05 million figure that you have identified from exhibit 4 in our report, which shows the additional costs as a result of the delay and the need for double running in the meantime.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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So any financial difficulties that NHS Lothian has that arise from its day-to-day operations will not be impacted by the delay in the opening of the new hospital.

Caroline Gardner
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No, they will not—we know that NHS Lothian has significant financial challenges, but the costs associated with the delay should not add directly to those.

Anas Sarwar Lab Glasgow
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Good morning, Auditor General. I am keen to understand the level of Government oversight of the project. Given the similarities between this project and the project to build the new Queen Elizabeth university hospital in Glasgow, with regard to not only the constructor but some of the outcomes, why were adequate lessons not learned? Can you give us a quick overview of your understanding of the level of Government oversight of the project to build the new Royal hospital for sick children?

Caroline Gardner
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I will ask Leigh Johnston to answer that, and I will come back on the lessons-learned question.

Leigh Johnston Audit Scotland
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The Scottish Government sat on the programme board. Although we say in our report that the Government did not often attend the meetings, it always got the minutes.

There were lots of other opportunities for oversight throughout the project. We say in the report that the Government kept in touch and had dialogue throughout the process. There were many opportunities for members of the board and people in the Government to talk about the project and the on-going risks, which were often to do with the finances involved.

Caroline Gardner
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In relation to the timeline and the opportunity for lessons to be learned from the Glasgow project, with hindsight it looks as though there was an obvious opportunity, but if you look at the dates, you will find that the picture is not as clear as that.

The Queen Elizabeth university hospital opened in April 2015, and services were fully transferred across between then and the summer of 2016. We were not aware of any problems with it until around August 2018, when we found out that the glass panels had crashed. It was after that that the problems with infection started to emerge. By then, the contract to build the Royal hospital for children and young people in Edinburgh had already been agreed and construction had started. There is evidence that, once the problems started to emerge, the programme board asked IHSL for assurances that its work was in line with standards and that the problems were being addressed, and it received those assurances. It is not a straightforward case of saying that there were things in Glasgow that should have triggered extra work in Edinburgh.

However, as I say in my report, there are significant similarities with what was found in the inquiry into the Edinburgh schools after the problems at Oxgangs primary were first identified. Professor Cole’s report, which was published in February 2017, raised questions that are very relevant to projects such as that to build the new Royal hospital. I think that it would be well worth exploring the extent to which those questions were fully recognised and responded to by NHS Lothian, in Glasgow and in other big construction projects.

Anas Sarwar Lab Glasgow
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I will come back to the issue of the water supply and infection. It is important to note that there was an overlap in the timelines, which meant that it was difficult to learn lessons at an early stage.

In general, do you think that there was adequate Government oversight of the project to build the new Royal hospital?

Caroline Gardner
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As Leigh Johnston said, there was significant involvement over and above involvement in the programme board. I will give you a flavour of that. There are quarterly meetings between a representative of the Government’s health finance and infrastructure team and NHS Lothian; NHS Lothian provides an annual report to the chief financial officer, giving a more general update on projects; and there is dialogue on specific issues as they come up. There is a lot of engagement and, as colleagues have indicated, it was not until late 2017 that problems with the build started to emerge.

10:15

However, we say in the report that the roles of the respective parties are not clear enough. Exhibit 1 sets out the roles and responsibilities of all the parties. The first thing to note is that there are a lot of them. Secondly, it is clear that the independent tester, for example, did not think that it was their role to look at whether the specs were right, whereas IHSL and, in particular, NHS Lothian thought that that was the role of the independent tester. Therefore, no one fulfilled that role.

Anas Sarwar Lab Glasgow
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Let us look at exhibit 1 again to get an understanding of the similarities between the Queen Elizabeth and Lothian projects. Are you aware of whether the same people—not roles—were responsible for Scottish Government oversight of those projects?

Caroline Gardner
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Leigh Johnston will be able to give you a bit more detail on that. My sense is that it will have been the same team—the Scottish Government health finance and infrastructure team—that was responsible for the projects. I do not think that we can tell you whether it was the same individuals.

Caroline Gardner
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Leigh might be able to add to that.

Leigh Johnston Audit Scotland
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I do not have much more to offer. It will have been the same health finance and infrastructure team in the Scottish Government that had oversight of the Queen Elizabeth and Lothian projects.

Anas Sarwar Lab Glasgow
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If it was the same team, would the same person be responsible for the team?

Leigh Johnston Audit Scotland
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Yes.

Anas Sarwar Lab Glasgow
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The programme board had day-to-day responsibility for managing the project. You said that the Scottish Government was a member of the programme board, but quite often did not attend its meetings. Do you know how many meetings were held and how many times the Scottish Government failed to attend?

Leigh Johnston Audit Scotland
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I do not; I would have to look into that.

Leigh Johnston Audit Scotland
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Yes, I can look into it.

Anas Sarwar Lab Glasgow
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Excellent. Did the same team represent the Scottish Government on the programme boards for the Lothian and Queen Elizabeth projects?

Caroline Gardner
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We cannot answer that for you. The report looks at NHS Lothian; we have not looked at the Glasgow project, so I am afraid that I cannot give you any detailed information about that.

Anas Sarwar Lab Glasgow
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Would a team from the same area of responsibility in the Scottish Government sit on the programme board? Would that be how it worked?

Caroline Gardner
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We would expect those people to be from the health finance and infrastructure team. We do not know whether they were the same individuals.

Anas Sarwar Lab Glasgow
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Great.

What were the reporting mechanisms for the project team that was responsible for project activities and was located on the site? Was there a Scottish Government representative on that team, as there was on the programme board?

Caroline Gardner
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No.

Anas Sarwar Lab Glasgow
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If there was no Government representative, what were the reporting mechanisms from the project team to the board and the Government?

Caroline Gardner
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The direct reporting line was from the project team to the project board. The project board’s role was to oversee the project in its entirety on behalf of the NHS Lothian board. The reporting line will have been to the board and then to the Government, in the ways in which we have described.

Anas Sarwar Lab Glasgow
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Were there individuals from not just the Scottish Government but elsewhere who sat on the programme board and the project team?

Caroline Gardner
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The project team members were members of the programme board, as we say in the report.

Anas Sarwar Lab Glasgow
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Do we know whether any of same people—from the Scottish Government or elsewhere—sat on the Lothian programme board and project team and on the programme board and project team for the Queen Elizabeth project?

Caroline Gardner
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I would be surprised if that was the case. The programme board was established by NHS Lothian for its project, and I cannot see any reason why there would have been cross-membership with the Glasgow project.

Anas Sarwar Lab Glasgow
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There are three names listed under “Professional advisors” in exhibit 1. Were any of the three also professional advisers on the Queen Elizabeth project?

Caroline Gardner
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Again, we have not checked that, Mr Sarwar. This report focuses on NHS Lothian.

Caroline Gardner
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There is. We will see what we can do, but the report focuses on NHS Lothian and not on the two projects together.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
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Anas, I sound a little warning, as the Auditor General has indicated that legal proceedings are going on. Auditor General, will you clarify who is involved in those proceedings? Are the proceedings between NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde and the contractor?

Caroline Gardner
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NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde has announced that it is taking legal action against the contractor for the QEUH.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
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We should tread carefully with our questions, because some of these issues will be sub judice.

Anas Sarwar Lab Glasgow
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No problem.

Arcadis NV was the independent tester. Is it a regularly used independent tester for new hospital projects across the Scottish national health service?

Caroline Gardner
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That is one of the functions that Arcadis NV commonly provides not only to public sector clients but, more generally, to big construction companies. As I say in the report, and as I have said this morning, one of the questions is whether people understand the role of the independent tester and for whom it works.

Anas Sarwar Lab Glasgow
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I will step back to the project company. Are you aware of what checks were done on Brookfield Multiplex before it was commissioned to carry out the hospital project? For example, has it ever built a hospital, other than the Queen Elizabeth, in the United Kingdom?

Caroline Gardner
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At this stage, we have no concerns about the process that NHS Lothian went through in putting together the tender and making an appointment at that level. Does Chris Brown want to add anything about the contractor?

Chris Brown Scott-Moncrieff
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All of that happened before we took over as the health board’s external auditors. In addition to an internal audit review of project management and governance, a series of key-stage reviews were completed by the Scottish Futures Trust in the run-up to financial close for the project. We expect that those reviews would have covered the issues that Anas Sarwar has described.

Anas Sarwar Lab Glasgow
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Do we know whether Brookfield Multiplex had ever built a hospital in the UK before it built these two hospitals?

Chris Brown Scott-Moncrieff
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I do not know the answer to that off the top of my head.

Anas Sarwar Lab Glasgow
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Okay.

The Auditor General said, quite rightly, that there was an overlap in the two projects starting. The concern about the ventilation system is less about how the problem could have been prevented at the construction stage and more about why it was realised so late on in the process—at the opening stage—that there was an issue with the ventilation system.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
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Is that a question specifically about the ventilation system at the hospital in Glasgow?

Anas Sarwar Lab Glasgow
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No. I am talking about the hospital in Edinburgh. There is clearly a link between the water supply and the ventilation system, given that water supplies the ventilation system. If there was a concern that the design of the ventilation system was flawed, why was that issue highlighted so late in the process, which meant that NHS Lothian and the health secretary made their decision so late?

Caroline Gardner
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That question is right at the heart of the circumstances that I am trying to pull together. The issue that led to the immediate decision in July 2019 to postpone the move to the new hospital was the identification, not by the independent tester, to which you referred, but by the third-party tester—the Institute of Occupational Medicine—that the air change rates that were being achieved in some parts of the critical care department were not in line with Scottish health technical memorandum 03-01, which relates to ventilation systems. Once that was known, the issue was escalated very quickly to the health board and to the Government. In the end, the cabinet secretary took the decision to postpone the move and to commission the two reviews to which I referred briefly in my opening statement.

In its review, KPMG was asked to look at governance and the sequence of events. As I refer to in my report, it identified that there was an inconsistency in the project tender documentation between what SHTM 03-01—the ventilation guidance—says about air change rates for critical care areas and what had been included in a document called the environmental matrix that the board prepared. There were inconsistencies between those two documents and within the environmental matrix. Although the environmental matrix was not a direct part of the contract between the board and the construction company, it was referred to throughout the life of the project, and it appears that the discrepancy was not recognised formally until July last year—right at the end of the process.

As I say in my report, and as KPMG identified, at some point between 2012 and 2015, the environmental matrix was changed, so somebody knew that there was a discrepancy and tried to clarify it. There is no evidence that the issue was ever escalated to the project team or the project board. What happened there is at the heart of the sequence of events and the question whether the discrepancy could have been spotted and corrected in good time.

It is important that I say that that issue is strictly about the air change rates; it is not about saying that the ventilation system could not operate safely but about saying that, instead of delivering 10 air changes per hour, the system was designed and installed to deliver four air changes per hour. Ten air changes per hour, for some of those critical care areas, is what is in the guidance or standards. The contractor initially said that it was able to correct that, but then very quickly—a week later, I think—came back and said that it could not. That has led to the delay in the work that is required to pick that up.

NHS National Services Scotland has carried out a range of wider checks and has recommended some improvements that could be made. However, I understand that they do not involve failures to comply with standards; they are improvements to the health and safety of patients, staff and other people who use the hospital.

The confusion around the standard itself, and the way in which that worked through the tender documentation and the contract used by all the players that we set out in exhibit 2, is at the heart of what happened. That plays back to Professor Cole’s recommendation about really strong and independent inspection and oversight of such projects as they are being built, not just at the end of the process.

That was a long answer, but I hope that it was useful.

Anas Sarwar Lab Glasgow
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Thank you; it was very helpful.

I have a final question. Is Health Facilities Scotland the responsibility of NHS Scotland, or is there a health facilities part of individual boards as well?

Caroline Gardner
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It is part of NHS National Services Scotland.

Liam Kerr Con North East Scotland
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To finish off Mr Sarwar’s line of questioning, can you expand on the specific role of the Scottish Futures Trust in respect of the project. Assuming that it had a role, at what point did that finish?

Caroline Gardner
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We summarise the role of the Scottish Futures Trust in exhibit 2 on page 10 of the report. It developed the non-profit distributing model that was used at the time of the project as a way of bringing revenue financing into large construction projects, particularly in health and education. It produces standardised project documentation, as well as guidance and support for the bodies that carry out these big projects, and it provides support during the programmes. It is not accountable for the projects. That accountability remains with the individual body, whether it is NHS Lothian as in this case, the City of Edinburgh Council as in the schools case, or bodies right across Scotland.

Liam Kerr Con North East Scotland
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I understand. Thank you.

We have looked at exhibit 2, on page 10, which indicates that a certificate of practical completion was issued in February 2019. However, later on, we discover that significant work was still required at that point. That raises the question of why the certificate of completion was issued in those circumstances.

Caroline Gardner
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That is an important question, and it is not one that we can answer directly. As you can see from the timeline in exhibit 3, on page 12, the issuing of the certificate of practical completion followed very quickly the signing of the settlement agreement between NHS Lothian and IHSL and the payment of the settlement payment—the £11.6 million that we have talked about. Arcadis NV then did the final testing and issued the certificate of practical completion.

It was known at that point that significant work was still required, both to fulfil the settlement agreement and more generally to reach the point at which opening the hospital would have been possible and safe. There is no question in my mind—I think that KPMG reached the same conclusion—that that left very little time for rectification of those problems and almost no time as a contingency if things went wrong. We say that in the middle of page 12. That is a very important question to explore further.

Liam Kerr Con North East Scotland
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Thank you.

I will stick with exhibit 3. Colin Beattie asked about early 2017, when it became clear that the hospital would not open in July 2017. Throughout 2017, there was a series of problems, as we have investigated. Were there problems with the project prior to that date? If so, what were they?

Caroline Gardner
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Chris Brown tried to answer Mr Beattie’s question earlier. It involved a range of issues to do with the way in which the hospital was being delivered and how far that matched up to the contract that had been agreed between the two parties. Chris, will you outline the 2017 problems a bit further?

10:30

Chris Brown Scott-Moncrieff
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We did a bit of work on those as part of our audit last year. We looked at the settlement agreement—the £11.6 million that was paid in February. We looked at the basis for that payment, what the governance was like around approving and agreeing it and whether there were big issues around value for money. It was a high-level review and we looked into all those areas. There was the governance that we would expect to see around the process. The delay was the result of a lengthy dispute resolution process: three specific issues were in dispute between the health board and the contractor, which were around drainage systems, heater batteries and fire detectors. As I said to Colin Beattie, the health board was unable to convince the contractor that it was the contractor’s responsibility to address those issues. On the basis of the legal and technical advice that the board was given, it felt that the risks of pursuing legal redress were greater than the risks of making a payment and getting the hospital finished. The board went through all the processes that we would expect to see in relation to governance, taking legal and technical advice and consulting the Scottish Government. The dispute was around those three main areas, and it was well documented through the programme board and the health board.

Liam Kerr Con North East Scotland
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I will make this my final question at this stage. Going back to the start, is there evidence of anyone anticipating the significant issues that could arise when a clinical neuroscience facility was attached to a sick kids initial business case? At that point, had there been any planning?

Caroline Gardner
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You will have to ask that question of either the NHS Lothian board or the Government. We have not looked at that issue. As you said, those decisions go back to 2010 and 2012.

Liam Kerr Con North East Scotland
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I will ask the question. Auditor General, do I take it from that answer that, at the moment, you have no evidence to suggest that that planning took place?

Caroline Gardner
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I have not looked for that evidence. As I said, the report is not a performance audit into what has happened at the Royal hospital for children and young people. It was an attempt to pull together for the committee what is known at this stage from the annual audit work, the KPMG review and the NHS National Services Scotland review. It is a synthesis, but we know that some questions are outstanding.

Bill Bowman Con North East Scotland
link

We have been talking about some of the reviews that have been carried out or that are about to be carried out. In paragraph 34, you say that NHS Lothian is asking its internal auditors to carry out a review in two phases—the second being dependent on the first. The first phase will

“produce a timeline of the key events and decisions”,

consider “the scope and remit” of advisors and look at “the root cause” of the issues.

It sounds as though some of that information is already in your report. Can you say more about the detail of the review, how closely you will monitor it and who the internal auditors are?

Caroline Gardner
link

The internal auditor is Grant Thornton. I ask Chris Brown to talk you through the questions on what we know about the review and how we are keeping in touch with it.

Chris Brown Scott-Moncrieff
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The review is being monitored by the audit and risk committee in the health board. The review is due to report to the audit and risk committee on 24 February, and the phase 1 report is due to be finalised by 24 February. It will build on the work in the KPMG report and the work in the section 22 report, to understand the root causes behind the issues that led to the delay in the opening of the hospital. Those are the issues that are flagged up in the Auditor General’s report around the discrepancies between the environmental matrix and the health technical memorandum, what impact that had on the completion of the project and the governance and scrutiny that existed around those areas.

Bill Bowman Con North East Scotland
link

I state for the record that I used to be a partner at KPMG, whose report has been mentioned.

Turning to the reviews that were carried out by NSS and KPMG, I note that you state:

“The KPMG report sets out a picture of human error and confusion over interpretation of the relevant specifications and guidance and missed opportunities to spot and rectify that error.”

How many of the characters that that refers to are still involved in NHS Lothian? What comfort would you take from their saying that they will act on a report that comes to them now?

Caroline Gardner
link

We are not aware of any disciplinary action having been taken or of any grounds for disciplinary action at this point. That is very much the purpose of the internal audit work that Chris Brown has been outlining for you. We are assured that the board is taking very seriously both the problems that have emerged and the need to understand the root causes of them, and the cabinet secretary provided assurance to Parliament in her statement before Christmas that she and her officials are keeping a close eye on how that is being done, to ensure both that good employment practice is followed and that proper accountability is delivered.

Bill Bowman Con North East Scotland
link

We have seen Grant Thornton’s work elsewhere, and I think that its work will be done in a particularly forensic way given the potential for litigation around it. Do you expect it to be almost at the expert witness level?

Caroline Gardner
link

Grant Thornton is acting as the internal auditor, so I assume that its starting point will be the usual process of doing everything that it can to evidence and document the facts and the sequence of events. What happens next will depend on what it finds.

Chris, do you want to add anything?

Chris Brown Scott-Moncrieff
link

No, I do not think that I can add anything to that.

Bill Bowman Con North East Scotland
link

You say that NHS Lothian has drawn up action plans in response to the NSS review. Can you give us any more detail on the progress that is being made and the timescales?

Caroline Gardner
link

The action plans were published shortly after each of the National Services Scotland reviews were published. They are very detailed, in my view, and very specific. They are clear about what action will be taken and about timescales and responsibilities, and they are being monitored by the board. I think that that will be part of what Chris Brown looks at when the audit work picks up again in NHS Lothian, and I am certain that it will be part of the process that the Scottish Government goes through before it decides that it is safe to open the new hospital and transfer services during 2020.

Bill Bowman Con North East Scotland
link

When might we hear from either of you again on that?

Chris Brown Scott-Moncrieff
link

We will definitely pick that up as part of our audit. We usually report towards the end of June, but we can bring forward aspects of our reporting if we need to do that.

Willie Coffey SNP Kilmarnock and Irvine Valley
link

On the ventilation issue that is discussed on page 15 of your report, did KPMG try to identify who or what was responsible for the inconsistency between the matrix and Scottish health technical memorandum 03-01 regarding the need for four or 10 air changes per hour?

Caroline Gardner
link

KPMG did not identify who was responsible for that, but it did identify questions about the clarity and the application of what have been referred to as the standards, which are actually formal guidance. When they were translated into the tender documentation, an error was introduced to the environmental matrix, which contained a different standard for air change rates from what is in SHTM 03-01.

In any case, there are questions about which standard should apply where different types of accommodation overlap in the hospital. For example, in a utility area that is within a critical care unit, should the critical care air change rate of 10 air changes per hour be applied or should the utility room air change rate of four air changes per hour be applied? KPMG suggested that that could be made clearer in order to make it more likely that everybody will agree on how the standards should apply in practice.

Willie Coffey SNP Kilmarnock and Irvine Valley
link

Somebody changed the wording, though, inserting the words “for isolation cubicles”, and people then thought that the standard applied only to those. Did KPMG try to find out who made that change?

Caroline Gardner
link

KPMG was unable to identify who did that. It happened sometime between 2012 and 2015, because there is a version dated 2015 that is different. I assume that the internal audit will try to identify who did it. It may not have been someone within NHS Lothian—we do not know.

Alex Neil SNP Airdrie and Shotts
link

Earlier, Chris Brown said that NHS Lothian decided, on the basis of advice, not to pursue legal action against the contractor because it was not clear that it would win the case. Given the experience of the national health service in procuring hospitals, and wider procurement issues in Government, is there not a lesson to be learned? It should be made very clear in contracts who is responsible for what—whether the contractor, the customer or a third party is responsible for various things. The contract was possibly to blame.

Caroline Gardner
link

Of course contracts should be as clear and enforceable as they can be. I do not want to give the impression that every public sector construction contract runs into problems. For example, we know that the new Dumfries hospital was delivered very successfully, on time and on budget. The committee sees the things that have not gone well.

I am not an expert in the field—I am an auditor, not a procurement or construction expert—but we know that such projects are very big and complex. Healthcare projects are particularly complex, given all the clinical and technical requirements that need to be built in. A question that the public inquiry will have to answer is whether there were failings in the Lothian contract, or whether there were failings by either of the parties in the way that it was delivered.

The cabinet secretary has announced a new centre for healthcare procurement excellence, which is intended to pull together expertise and experience of such procurement. Obviously, building a hospital on such a scale is something that most healthcare professionals will do only once or twice in their career—they will not do it routinely—and we need to build that expertise. Mr Neil’s question is at the heart of the matter, and I cannot answer it, but we need to recognise the complexity while also recognising that something went wrong in this case.

Alex Neil SNP Airdrie and Shotts
link

Is there another dimension to the matter, with the involvement of the Scottish Futures Trust through the NPD model? We have ended up with a hospital that has not opened and is not operational, and yet NHS Lothian is in the contractual position of having to pay £1.35 million a month, even though it could be many months, as I understand it, before the hospital is occupied. Surely we must never again get into a position where we are paying for something that has not been delivered.

Caroline Gardner
link

It is clearly deeply unsatisfactory. The question for me is less about the role of the Scottish Futures Trust than about the role of the independent tester and the issue of the certificate of practical completion back in February 2019. That is when the building was handed over to NHS Lothian and it became liable for the monthly payments. At that point, it was known that there was much more work to do and that time was tight for completing it before the planned opening in July. That was before the issues with the ventilation system were identified. It is really important that we are all clear about why the certificate was issued, given the problems that were known about at that point.

Alex Neil SNP Airdrie and Shotts
link

There may still be a need to look at the NPD contract, to see whether lessons can also be learned about that.

Caroline Gardner
link

The public inquiry needs to be wide ranging. I am conscious that when Professor Cole looked at the Edinburgh schools project, he found that the NPD vehicle was not a significant cause of the problems. It was much more about the oversight of the construction work and the assumptions that different parties were making about who was doing that.

Chris Brown Scott-Moncrieff
link

I have a brief comment. One of the complications in this particular project was that the funding model changed. It was originally a capital funded project, which is one of the reasons why the health board developed the environmental matrix, as that would normally be its responsibility under a capital funded project. The funding route changed from capital funded to NPD, but as the health board had spent money on developing the matrix, it took the view—again, I think, based on advice—that it should provide that information to the contractor to speed up the process of its developing a specification. The health board provided information that it would not normally provide under an NPD project, simply because it started off as a capital funded project.

Alex Neil SNP Airdrie and Shotts
link

Perhaps there is a lesson in that as well.

Chris Brown Scott-Moncrieff
link

Yes.

10:45

Alex Neil SNP Airdrie and Shotts
link

Has the public inquiry started yet? I know that this is like asking, “How long is a piece of string?”, because once a public inquiry starts we never know when it will finish, but do we have a rough idea of how long it will take?

Caroline Gardner
link

The Cabinet Secretary for Health and Sport announced before Christmas that Lord Brodie would lead the public inquiry. They were due to meet before Christmas to discuss the terms of reference and the timescales, with the intention of providing an update to Parliament early in the new year. We have not seen that yet and I know no more than that.

Alex Neil SNP Airdrie and Shotts
link

Okay. It will be difficult for the committee to reach any conclusions until we see the outcome of the public inquiry. A lot now depends on the public inquiry, for both Edinburgh and Glasgow.

Caroline Gardner
link

It does, and we know that public inquiry timescales are long—much longer than audit timescales.

Alex Neil SNP Airdrie and Shotts
link

Absolutely.

My final question is about the additional costs of £27.6 million. As things stand, how robust do you think that estimate is?

Caroline Gardner
link

Of that, £11.6 million is the settlement that was agreed and paid in February 2019.

Alex Neil SNP Airdrie and Shotts
link

What about the other £16 million?

Caroline Gardner
link

The other £16 million is the Government’s estimate, made in the latter half of 2019, of the double-running costs and the improvements that are needed for the facilities that continue to be used. As Leigh Johnston said, we are not in a position to give the committee an assurance that those costs will not be exceeded. So far, we have no information that they will be, so it is the best estimate at this stage.

Alex Neil SNP Airdrie and Shotts
link

You will presumably keep a close eye on that.

Caroline Gardner
link

As we do with everything, Mr Neil.

Liam Kerr Con North East Scotland
link

I have a couple of quick questions. Forgive me if I have missed this during the evidence session, but at paragraph 29 on page 17, your report states that the Scottish Government has appointed a new senior programme director to the project, who has a

“substantive role”

as

“Director of Strategy ... at NSS”.

Can you clarify whether that post holder works full time on the project?

Leigh Johnston Audit Scotland
link

They currently work full time on the project, but they were keen for us to point out that they will go back to their substantive role once the facility is fit for purpose and open.

Liam Kerr Con North East Scotland
link

I understand.

My final question is about progress on the disposal of the old sick kids site and the proposed distribution of the proceeds from that. I understand that the NHS holds some of those assets, but that a charitable endowment fund owns a considerable proportion of them.

Caroline Gardner
link

I cannot help you much with that at the moment. I only know what has been reported in the press. Can Chris Brown add anything?

Chris Brown Scott-Moncrieff
link

No. I cannot answer that question in detail.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
link

I thank the witnesses for their evidence. I now close the public part of the meeting.

10:48 Meeting continued in private until 11:09.

  1. 09:00 Decision on Taking Business in Private Procedure · 1
  2. 09:00 Section 22 Reports Committee business · 187
  3. 09:45 Section 22 Reports Committee business · 149

The type of each item (debate, statement, questions, members’ business and so on) and the times shown are worked out by this site from headings, the chair’s opening words and the Official Report’s running timestamps. They are not the Parliament’s own classification. Text: the Scottish Parliament Official Report.