Parliament Workbench
Data: Official Report to 18 Nov 2026

Official Report · Committee

Section 22 Reports

“The 2014/15 audit of NHS 24: Update on management of an IT contract”

Wednesday 2 December 2015 Public Audit Committee About 10:30–11:15 Committee business 139 contributions · 10 speakers

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The record

139 contributions
Paul Martin Lab The Convener · Glasgow Provan
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Agenda item 3 is consideration of three section 22 reports: “The 2014/15 audit of NHS 24: Update on management of an IT contract”; “The 2014/15 audit of NHS Tayside: Financial management”; and “The 2014/15 audit of NHS Highland: Update on 2013/14 financial management issues”. We propose to take each report in turn. We will receive an opening statement before members then have an opportunity to put questions individually on those statements. I understand that the Auditor General for Scotland has a brief opening statement to make on NHS 24.

Caroline Gardner
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Thank you, convener. Again, Fraser McKinlay will lead on my behalf in briefing the committee. Nick Bennett, who is at the end of the row here, is the appointed auditor for NHS 24, on whose annual audit reports my report is based. He will help us to answer any questions that the committee may have.

Fraser McKinlay
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First, it is worth briefly highlighting that the external auditors of the three health boards gave unqualified opinions on the 2014-15 accounts, which means that they were satisfied that the accounts provided a true and fair view and that there were no significant errors in them. However, we have prepared the section 22 reports because we believe that there are issues of significant public interest that have been highlighted in the auditors’ reports to the Auditor General, and the Auditor General felt it important to bring those to the attention of Parliament and the public through this committee.

I will turn first to the report on NHS 24. I am sure that the committee will be well aware of the issues arising from the implementation of a new information technology system in NHS 24. In October 2014, the Auditor General reported under section 22 on some of the issues in NHS 24 but, due to legal action that was under way at that time with one of the external IT suppliers, Capgemini, the report was fairly brief. Now that the mediation process has been completed and the legal action has been withdrawn, we are in a position to give you a fuller update.

NHS 24 started work on the future programme back in 2009. It was originally due to go live in June 2013, but it was subsequently delayed to October 2013 and then postponed due to the new system’s failure to meet critical patient safety performance measures.

Since then, through the legal process and subsequently, NHS 24 has worked with both suppliers involved—Capgemini and BT—to develop the system and try to resolve the patient-handling performance issues. The board agreed at its February 2015 meeting to a two-phase approach to implementation. The first phase was implemented on schedule in October. As I am sure the committee will be well aware—it certainly will have been so since we laid the section 22 report in Parliament—the board has subsequently decided, because of concerns over the system’s performance and patient safety, to delay implementation until 2016, particularly to ensure patient safety over the winter period.

Clearly, the programme’s costs have increased significantly—total costs have risen by 55 per cent to £117.4 million compared with the outline business case cost of £75.8 million. The cost covers the 10-year contract period, and the increases are due to the changes in the contract specification and the costs associated with the delays.

The board continues to incur significant costs in running the existing systems. NHS 24 incurs about £450,000 in additional costs for each month that the future programme is not operational. If implementation is not successful, double-running costs will increase still further during 2015-16.

NHS 24 has included the cost of implementing the future programme in its financial plans. However, given the scale of the challenge, the auditor’s view is that delivering the financial targets will be difficult and will largely depend on achieving significant in-year efficiency savings.

We would be delighted to answer any questions that you have on the report.

Paul Martin Lab The Convener · Glasgow Provan
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You refer to contract management in paragraph 15. A challenge that we always face when we consider section 22 reports is whether anything could have been forecast or foreseen. My contribution is along similar lines to Mary Scanlon’s during the previous agenda item. We have been referring to IT reports in this Parliament since it was formed in 1999. The lack of specialist knowledge comes up in every single report. Surely those who were planning the IT system’s requirements should have been able to recognise that they did not have the necessary specialist knowledge and that they would have to go through the appropriate procedures so that they did not have to rely on the private contractors. If a company were running the programme, it would be bankrupt. It would not have public money to keep on pumping into it. Is there an issue concerning those who are managing the project?

Fraser McKinlay
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We absolutely recognise and share that frustration. You took evidence just recently from the Scottish Government on “Managing ICT contracts: An audit of three public sector programmes” and I think that you have the chief information officer coming next week as part of your witness panel on that issue.

It is enormously frustrating that we continue to see the same mistakes being repeated. I had a conversation with my team yesterday about whether there was anything more or different that we could do as auditors because, as you say, we have been saying the same things a number of times. I would also say that the responsibility lies with the people who are planning and managing the projects. It is surprising that, at the outset of such a significant IT programme, some of those lessons were not learned. As you say, we see lots of the same issues repeated here to do with experience, optimism bias and a whole bunch of stuff. It is disappointing and problematic that NHS 24 has to spend such a lot of public money on getting the system fixed.

When we reported previously, it looked as though the project would be delivered. Of course, now we know that it has not been delivered. The other point to make to the committee is that Nick Bennett and his team, with my team in Audit Scotland, will continue to keep a very close watch on what happens with the new system. Some specific review work is under way and we expect to see that reported on soon. We will look to see what the detailed plans are for implementing the system. Clearly, the Auditor General has the option of reporting back to the committee.

Paul Martin Lab The Convener · Glasgow Provan
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The issue for me is having a clear pathway to who is responsible for how the contracts are prepared and for the recruitment. Would that be the chief executive or the digital team? Who are the individuals or individual responsible?

10:45

Fraser McKinlay
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Ultimately, the accountable officer for NHS 24 is accountable for everything that happens in the board. That is where I would start. Clearly, there is then a question about the way in which significant public sector IT projects are supported by the wider environment, and that is where the Scottish Government and the digital team come in. We also have NHS National Services Scotland, which has a big procurement function and is experienced in IT, so there is a wider system question about how we bring the experience in the system to bear on big contracts such as this one.

Paul Martin Lab The Convener · Glasgow Provan
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Do you accept my point that, if this was a private company, it would be bankrupt? We cannot keep pumping public money into something that is clearly not working, but that is what has happened here. People have said, “There’s public money, so let’s just prop it up.” That is what is going on here, is it not?

Fraser McKinlay
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I will ask Nick Bennett to come in and offer a view. I suppose that the specific answer to your question is that it depends on the private company. Some private companies might have gone bankrupt, whereas some bigger ones might also have had to throw money at the problem. I do not think that it is necessarily the case that the private sector always gets this stuff right.

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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NHS 24 is a special health board and is relatively small compared with some of the other health boards. A project that costs a forecast £117.4 million is considerably above its annual expenditure.

Mary Scanlon Con Highlands and Islands
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I am trying to understand this. Paragraph 7 states:

“It subsequently became apparent that there were flaws within the contract documentation, including the performance measures specified in the tender negotiation documents not appearing in the final contract agreement.”

Who drew up the contract documentation? Whose fault is it? Was the NHS at fault? Did it not specify clearly what it wanted? Was Capgemini at fault because it did not meet the specifications that were in the contract? I did not quite understand the comment that

“there were flaws within the contract documentation”.

Will you clarify that?

Fraser McKinlay
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Again, I will ask Nick Bennett to come in in a moment. Basically, I think that there was a gap and a difference in understanding between NHS 24 and the contractor about what it was supposed to deliver, and when—

Mary Scanlon Con Highlands and Islands
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I apologise for interrupting. Should that not have been sorted out before? If someone is going to build a house, they will come to an agreement about where the bricks will go before they start. Should that not have been sorted out before any money was paid over?

Fraser McKinlay
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Yes, it should. Absolutely. I think that what happened was that some of the stuff in the original tender documentation about performance standards had not been transferred into the contract documentation. That is what NHS 24 discovered, but that came to light only when it was trying to implement the system in 2013. NHS 24 was saying, “This isn’t working like we said that it was supposed to,” and Capgemini was saying, “Well, actually, it’s working like it says it is supposed to in the contract.”

Mary Scanlon Con Highlands and Islands
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If there were flaws in the documentation, the project should not have gone ahead until they were ironed out. The accountable officer should have said, “Let’s get this straight so that we know exactly how we are going to spend the money before you make a start.”

Fraser McKinlay
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Again, I agree. The problem was that they did not identify that there were flaws until much later in 2013, when they tried to implement the system.

Mary Scanlon Con Highlands and Islands
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At that point, who discovered that there were flaws?

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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The discovery came because there was a difference of opinion between the contractor and NHS 24. The contractor believed that it had supplied the system that it tendered for and NHS 24 felt that there were patient safety requirements that had not been met. At that stage, the differences between the contract that was intended and the contract that finally went out were identified.

Mary Scanlon Con Highlands and Islands
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Convener, I hope that I am not straying on to dangerous ground, but I understand that the matter has been in court. I think that it was at the High Court. Has any decision been made? Have judges made any ruling? It seems that NHS 24 is left with brokerage of over £20 million, costing it about £500,000 a year in additional costs. Were any costs found against Capgemini or did the High Court find in favour of Capgemini, with all the costs falling to the NHS and the public purse?

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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As part of the overall agreement, the legal case was withdrawn by NHS 24.

Mary Scanlon Con Highlands and Islands
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It would not have withdrawn the case if it thought it was going to win. Why did it withdraw it? I am sorry, but I have not followed the case in detail.

Fraser McKinlay
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It is very complicated. At paragraph 9 of the report, we try to set out a little bit of what happened. NHS 24 went through a whole series of contractual processes because in a contract such as this one there are escalation procedures. In June 2014, NHS 24 served what is called a default notice, which could have led to NHS 24 terminating the contract. However, instead of doing that, NHS 24 decided to go into mediation, to undertake some diagnostic work and to work with the contractors to try to salvage the project. That was the judgment that the board made at the time—it decided to try to build on rather than lose the £37.9 million that had been invested by that point.

Mary Scanlon Con Highlands and Islands
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So NHS 24 had already spent £38 million. Am I right in saying that Capgemini is still working on the project and that BT has been brought in as well?

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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Yes, both suppliers are part of the project.

Mary Scanlon Con Highlands and Islands
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I am just trying to understand—apart from the £21 million Scottish Government loan that NHS 24 has been lumbered with, will something satisfactory come out of the project?

Fraser McKinlay
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That is the million-dollar question. We will need to keep a very close eye on it.

Mary Scanlon Con Highlands and Islands
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It is a bit more than a million-dollar question—the convener is saying that it is quite a few million.

Fraser McKinlay
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Indeed. It is a several-million-dollar question. When we wrote the section 22 report, we envisaged having this conversation with you about a system that was up and running. That would have been bad enough, given how much it had cost and the significant overruns and so on, but that is not where we are. It is even more problematic and worrying for us that NHS 24 has spent what it has spent to date and is running up costs of £450,000 a month in keeping the current systems going.

NHS 24 has worked hard with the supplier and our sense is that, contractually and in its relationship with the supplier, it is in a better place than it was. However, clearly it was a big decision that was not taken lightly to in effect pull the plug on the system once it had gone live in October—for all the right reasons, I have to say. If there were concerns about patient safety, you would expect NHS 24 to make that decision.

Mary Scanlon Con Highlands and Islands
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The system is only 55 per cent over budget, compared with the common agricultural policy payments system, which is 300 per cent over budget, so, realistically, it is not too bad. However, it is still a serious issue within the NHS. Do you have a crumb of comfort to offer? Will the flaws in the documentation and arrangements between Capgemini, BT and NHS 24 be solved in the months ahead?

Fraser McKinlay
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We are not in a position to say that today. I can say that NHS 24 is taking the issue seriously.

Fraser McKinlay
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Indeed. It has responded as we would expect. The chief executive has asked for a detailed review to be undertaken. Nick Bennett, as the auditor, will get sight of that review report soon, we hope. We should then have a better understanding of what happened at go live. When the detailed implementation plan—for when NHS 24 wants to try to reimplement the system in 2016—comes through, we will be looking carefully at that as well. However, given the history of the project, it would be a brave man or woman who would give any assurance on how it is all going to end up.

Dr Richard Simpson Lab Mid Scotland and Fife
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You have answered one of my questions. The costs are £450,000 per month, so when the system was abandoned in October, those costs started again and they will run until the system comes in and they may even run a bit beyond that. We are not going to get the system until the spring—it is going to be another four, five or six months—so NHS 24 will require another £3 million or £4 million of brokerage.

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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My understanding is that the system will not go live before the end of June 2016.

Dr Richard Simpson Lab Mid Scotland and Fife
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When I was involved in dealing with IT projects—not at this scale, I am glad to say—that involved developing software systems, we used an iterative process. In other words, you started with a basic goal, which you agreed with the contractor, and then started to develop it, using your clinicians to test the system as you went along. That was before you got to beta testing, which is the point at which the final system is being tested before launch. I therefore find it astonishing that we have got to this point in this particular situation. I understand the original problem, which was that the tender documents and the contract documents did not match, but I do not understand what happened subsequently. In terms of your overall view of information and communications technology, what systems are used to try to prevent this final thing that has happened?

Fraser McKinlay
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Like you, we do not fully understand what happened subsequently, either. For us, the challenge is that, at the time the report was written, the iterative process of testing that you describe had taken place—the system has clearly been around for a long time and a lot of work has been done on it. One of the things that the board will now be examining is why that process did not pick up some of the stuff that became quite clear over a particular weekend of operation, once the system went live.

As you know, it is difficult to fully replicate a live environment, so systems can be fully tested only once you press the button. However, what has been striking about this situation is that some of the performance issues were so significant that it is surprising that they were not picked up sooner. You would expect teething troubles and the odd glitch, but the fact that NHS 24 got to the point of pulling the plug on the system altogether within a few days clearly shows that something went wrong in the testing process. However, we do not know what that was yet.

Dr Richard Simpson Lab Mid Scotland and Fife
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Paragraph 25 of your report mentions several reviews of the programme: a gateway review; an independent review by Ernst & Young; and an independent lessons learned review by PricewaterhouseCoopers—I do not know who paid for all of those, by the way. It is astonishing that, even with all those reviews, we are still constantly being faced by ICT problems.

Mr Bennett made the point that this is a small board with a focused purpose and, I suspect, almost no experience in ICT whatsoever. To me, the fault lies right at the top. Why was a contract of this sort not reviewed by the most senior part of the digital section of the Government? The gap between the contract and the tender was such a fundamental error that it should have been picked up by the chief information officer—we can ask him about it next week. You must be concerned about the situation. If it happens with one project, it could happen with another. We are handing these projects out to the nine special boards that we have—we are a tiny country, yet we have nine special boards. If each of them tries to run an ICT project in these circumstances, we will be faced with these problems again and again.

Paul Martin Lab The Convener · Glasgow Provan
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I advise colleagues that we are supposed to be focusing on the Auditor General’s report. There will be some policy issues that we can take up with the Government representatives and possibly other people. We need to be careful.

Fraser McKinlay
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First of all, it is worth saying that some of the arrangements that we described to you in relation to our last ICT report were not in existence when this all kicked off in 2009. I absolutely agree that, if you have relatively small organisations without the experience of doing things at this kind of scale—as Nick Bennett said, the system is costing more than NHS 24 has to spend every year—you would expect a degree of external support and help to be not only offered but required. I am sure that that is one of the things that the Government will be considering.

Nigel Don SNP Angus North and Mearns
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I would like that point to be expanded on, Mr McKinlay. We have already considered ICT contracts in general and have asked the Government about the arrangements—particularly the governance arrangements—for them. I think that several of us went on record as saying that the arrangements seemed extremely complicated. It is tempting to say, looking at these cases, that the arrangements might not be working incredibly well. Richard Simpson has already picked up on paragraph 25, which seems to show large bills being run up with consultants of one sort or another telling us things that are probably pretty obvious, because we can see them anyway.

On reflecting on all of that, of which the issue that we are discussing is but a small part, I wonder whether the Scottish Government’s ICT structure is appropriate or whether it is beginning to look inappropriate. If it is inappropriate, is that because of its complexity? Is the issue perhaps that we just do not have the skills and we believe that the contractors should have the skills and the Government should not? What is the audit perspective on all that?

11:00

Fraser McKinlay
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The audit perspective is what we said in the report—the report is very recent, so that remains our view. The arrangements are still pretty new. If the arrangements for delivering IT projects were effective, we would expect them to be managing such things. We are not yet in a position to say whether those arrangements are right or wrong or whether they are working—because they are relatively new—but clearly we would expect the governance of digital things in this country to avoid stuff such as this happening in future. The frustrating thing is that the report gives yet another example of where those arrangements have not worked.

Nigel Don SNP Angus North and Mearns
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What fraction of ICT contracts do not work? There is a risk that we focus on the ones that we see as a failure in some sense. I presume that quite a lot of contracts out there have worked.

Fraser McKinlay
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That is a good question, but I am not sure that I have the answer to it. As auditors, we tend to be professionally sceptical—that is how we describe it. When things go so badly wrong, that approach is obviously in the public interest. It is a fair question and I will take it away and see what we can dig out.

Nigel Don SNP Angus North and Mearns
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Thank you. In fairness to those concerned, it might be nice to know how many contracts have gone well, because I suspect that it is quite a large number.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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Paragraph 9 mentions the board’s decision

“not to jeopardise the £37.9 million investment already made.”

I have considerable past experience of quite large IT projects, and I know that it is a classic error to continue to throw bad money after good. Was the board’s decision at that point reasonable?

Fraser McKinlay
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That is a great question. Obviously, we have the benefit of hindsight and, as you say, sometimes the best decision that a board can make is the decision not to not proceed with something and just take the hit. I will ask Nick Bennett to say a little more about the circumstances at the time, but I genuinely think that that is a question for the board. It took a judgment, based on all the information that it had, that the system could still be made to work.

In that context, it is worth saying that what NHS 24 is trying to achieve is a good thing. No one argues that the future programme is ill conceived as a concept. I guess that the board was seeing a significant prize, because the new system will be an important part of not just how NHS 24 operates but how the whole NHS system operates. It is part of managing the pressures in that system, which we discussed earlier. We should not underestimate the scale of a decision to pull the plug on the programme at that time.

Nick Bennett might have a bit more detail on that.

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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NHS 24 had taken on a future programme director, who was quite experienced and who undertook a full risk assessment in relation to whether the board should proceed with the system. The risk assessment was comprehensive, so I would not be critical of that decision at the time.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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Was the board aware of the potential increases in costs at that point? Did it take those on board?

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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The board had already incurred £37.9 million of costs, so there were additional costs that are included in the figure of £117.4 million, which represents the full 10-year cost of running the service. Therefore, at that point, the board knew that there would be additional costs to be incurred.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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Did the board know that the total would be £117 million compared with £75.8 million?

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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No—not at that particular time.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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So the board took the decision without actually knowing how much it would cost to go forward.

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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At that stage, the board did not anticipate that the cost would be £117.4 million.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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How much did the board anticipate that the cost would be?

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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I do not have those figures to hand.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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It would be interesting to know that. About the only good thing in the report is that services to patients were not affected.

The last sentence in paragraph 10 says:

“A review of the contractual obligations is currently on going”,

and paragraph 14 says that the auditor’s opinion is that

“the financial implications remain significant and on going.”

What is the risk going forward? Is there any clue as to whether there is a financial risk or a performance risk?

Fraser McKinlay
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I think that my answer would be, yes, there will be both those things. Nick Bennett has reported and will continue to keep a very close eye on financial risk specifically in relation to the project and the knock-on impact that that will have on the board and its ability to continue to break even at the end of the year. Clearly, the brokerage repayment schedule is an additional pressure that the board will have to live with and deal with. Of course, we have already said that we know that the board will incur additional costs in running the existing system and, presumably, in doing whatever needs to be done to get the new system up and running. That is absolutely a financial risk.

As you said, it is not so much that we think that there is a performance risk in terms of how the service is being delivered, because it is managing to keep going as it has done. The performance risk is probably more one of opportunity cost, because what the future programme was designed to deliver is not being delivered yet. As Nick Bennett said, we do not expect it to be delivered and operational within the next six months. The longer that goes on, the longer we do not have a system that can help to provide a better service.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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Paragraph 7 refers to flaws in the contract documentation. Who actually had responsibility for the contract negotiation?

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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At the time, it was NHS 24.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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Did NHS 24 do it itself? Did it get any outside lawyers, for example, to review the contract details? As far as I can see, the issue is not just that bits were missed off in the specifications of what was to be delivered, but that there were flaws in how the document was put together in relation to the delivery terms and all the rest of it.

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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External lawyers were involved by NHS 24, but I think that the internal procurement processes were not comprehensive enough. It did not undertake a complete read-through of all the key documents, and the sign-off and checking were inadequate.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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Are you talking about NHS 24?

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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Yes.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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NHS 24 did not read the documents.

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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A full read-through was not done, so NHS 24 did not identify the elements that were missing from the revised contract.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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Is it not a little bit odd that the contract was not read? I used to read my contracts.

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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It is a bit odd. A page turn should have been done on the various documents to make sure that they were complete and comprehensive, but that did not happen.

Paul Martin Lab The Convener · Glasgow Provan
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Can you clarify the cost of the contract? NHS 24 did not read through the contract document, but what was the cost of the contract that it signed for?

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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The total cost of the future programme is forecast to be £117.4 million.

Paul Martin Lab The Convener · Glasgow Provan
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Would it have been the accountable officer who signed off that contract?

Fraser McKinlay
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To be fair, £117.4 million was not the cost at the time. When the contract was signed, the outline business case was anticipating a cost of £75 million, but that is still a lot of money.

Paul Martin Lab The Convener · Glasgow Provan
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Would it have been the accountable officer who signed off the contract?

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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Yes.

Fraser McKinlay
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Yes.

Paul Martin Lab The Convener · Glasgow Provan
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The accountable officer signed off a contract document when neither he nor anybody else in the organisation had read through the entire document. Interruption. Can we have some order, colleagues?

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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I am not saying that the contract was not read through at different stages, but when the contract was signed, a page comparison was not done to make sure that some of the elements that were included in the original outline business case had been properly copied into the final contract document.

Tavish Scott LD Shetland Islands
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That is fascinating, Mr Bennett. Did the three reviews that you and Mr McKinlay described earlier find exactly the point that you have just made? Did they look into why that contract did not include those details?

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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I do not believe that that was picked up by those reviews.

Tavish Scott LD Shetland Islands
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So what did those reviews achieve, if anything?

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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I think that they highlighted the fact that there were weaknesses in the overall governance of the project. Changes were made as a result of that and more expertise was brought in. I mentioned that the future programme director was brought in, which was a positive development.

Tavish Scott LD Shetland Islands
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But the system is still not up and running and it is still costing £450,000 a month, so we may have brought in one new person, but it has not made any difference to delivering the project, has it?

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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Currently, that is the case.

Tavish Scott LD Shetland Islands
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I want to clarify the numbers. You said that the current estimated cost is £117.4 million. Is that the real number, as of today? Is that still the number that we are working from?

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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That was the forecast cost when the section 22 report was drafted.

Fraser McKinlay
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I do not have the exact date, but it was in October and it was before we knew that the plug had been pulled. As we said earlier, we anticipate that that number will go up, because we will not have the system for another six months or so, at best. That forecast was made on the basis of the system going live in October.

Tavish Scott LD Shetland Islands
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So there will be an additional cost of £450,000 per month from October all the way through to June—that is what Mr Bennett said. That is the current estimate; in other words, we are talking about an additional cost of at least £4 million.

Fraser McKinlay
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Is that right, Nick?

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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I think that that is subject to negotiation as well. I understand that the impact on the financial cost in 2015-16 will be £1.1 million.

Tavish Scott LD Shetland Islands
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Who is paying for that extra £450,000 a month? Is the Scottish Government paying that to NHS 24?

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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Again, I understand that negotiations are going on between NHS 24 and the Scottish Government about how that will be financed. There could be an extension of brokerage.

Tavish Scott LD Shetland Islands
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I just wanted to clarify that it is public money that is being used; the extra cost is not being paid by Capgemini or BT, which are the suppliers.

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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No.

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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I think that we will have to wait to find out what lessons are learned and the reasons for the delay before we can come to a conclusion.

Tavish Scott LD Shetland Islands
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Is this going to end up in court, given how far over budget the programme is? I do not understand why it came out of court. What did NHS 24 get for coming out of court? It does not have a system, the cost is £117 million-plus and it is no better off.

Fraser McKinlay
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Those are all great questions, but I do not think that we are in a position to answer them today. It is more appropriate for questions about the decisions on such judgments to be directed to the board.

What we can say is that significant risk remains, both financial risk and risk in relation to the performance of the system. As Nick Bennett said, lots of discussions will be going on with the suppliers and with the Government. Exhibit 2 shows the brokerage repayment schedule. I expect that what that looks like in future will be part of the discussions—it might be necessary to rephase some of it. We need to continue to keep a close eye on the situation, because it is a very fast-changing picture.

Tavish Scott LD Shetland Islands
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I totally accept that.

It would have helped us—and it might also have helped to address your frustration—if the report had included as clear a line of responsibility as it was possible to achieve, because I find it very hard to work out who is responsible for what. You helpfully said to the convener that the accountable officer is the accountable officer, but there are many other people involved. What responsibility did the people who did the three reviews that Mr Don rightly referred to have? Did they just do a review and then go away? Did they have no responsibility for the terms of those reviews and what they did? I do not have the answer to any of those questions, but when it comes to learning from has happened, what is the point of carrying out three reviews if they do not take us any further forward? I wonder whether Audit Scotland might want to reflect on that for future reference.

Fraser McKinlay
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That is a helpful bit of feedback. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the review processes have not delivered a successful project but, as Nick Bennett mentioned, that does not necessarily mean that nothing useful came out of them.

Stuart McMillan SNP West Scotland
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I would like to highlight one positive point that the report makes, which Colin Beattie touched on. As paragraph 13 says, while the project has been under way there has been no risk to patient safety. That is a very important point to highlight for anyone who reads the Official Report or watches these proceedings online later.

Paragraph 7 highlights the flaws in the contract documentation, and paragraph 10 highlights the failings of Capgemini and BT in looking at the project. That highlights, once again, that the public sector can get things wrong but so, too, can the private sector. We are looking at NHS 24—that is the responsibility of this committee—but the two private sector organisations had a role to play as well, particularly in looking at the contract at the outset. There are failings on all sides; it is not just NHS 24 that is at fault.

Paragraph 17 of the report touches on the external appointment. Did the individual come from within the NHS or from elsewhere in the public sector, or were they from outside the public sector?

11:15

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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The appointment was of someone from within the NHS.

Stuart McMillan SNP West Scotland
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Did they have experience of IT projects or of any projects that were relevant to their taking on this particular project?

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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I am not aware of her specific experience, but she held a very senior position within the NHS.

Stuart McMillan SNP West Scotland
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There are clearly challenges for every organisation that undertakes an IT project of scale. Every organisation is different and has its own internal workings and culture. I understand that, when an organisation—whether it is NHS 24 or any other—is trying to introduce a new IT system, it can be difficult to get IT experts who have experience of the organisation’s culture so that, when the initial contract or proposals are being set out, the two can be married up at the very beginning. The private sector gets IT contracts wrong, but it has the benefit of being able to charge its customers more money to cover the cost of overruns; it is a different scenario in the public sector, as we all know.

After reading the report, and given the committee’s discussions of previous reports, I wonder whether NHS 24 is too small an organisation to undertake a piece of work of this magnitude on its own.

Paul Martin Lab The Convener · Glasgow Provan
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I ask the member to get to his question.

Stuart McMillan SNP West Scotland
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Do you have a view on that, or is it a policy question that you are not able to answer?

Fraser McKinlay
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It is a policy question. Thank you for giving me a way out.

As Nick Bennett said, in looking at the scale of the project compared to the size of NHS 24, you need to bear in mind that NHS 24 does a very specific thing and its requirements for the project were, therefore, very specific. It is not just a boilerplate solution that can be rolled out and plugged in again—it is not at all straightforward. I go back to the point that, when any organisation starts out on such an exercise, its capacity—in terms of people, skills and expertise—must be part of the process of deciding how it is going to do it. The argument is not necessarily about size; it is about undertaking a more robust risk assessment at the outset to see whether the organisation has all the things that are required to deliver a very big and complex IT project such as this one.

Fraser McKinlay
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No—it clearly did not. That is the conclusion that one comes to.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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Mr Bennett, I want to go back to the question of the contract, which is at the core of whatever has gone wrong. You said that it had not been read; you also talked about a page-turning exercise at the time of its signing, but those are two different things. Do you know whether the board members actually read and understood the contract before they signed it off?

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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I will outline what actually happened. The procurement strategy that NHS 24 followed had an output-based specification. Obviously, the key performance measures that relate to that contract are quite critical—

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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It is a specification that is based on the output that is to be delivered. The performance measures are important.

There were two errors in the procurement process. When the output-based specification was loaded on to the NHS 24 procurement software, some of the performance measures were omitted.

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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It was a copying error that happened during an upload to an IT platform.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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Is there no check on the system?

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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No check was done, no.

The procurement software forms the basis of the tender that is bid for. The problem was further compounded by the fact that there were also omissions in the final contract. Again, some of the performance measures had not been copied across to the final contract that was signed by NHS 24 and Capgemini.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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I find that quite incredible. Was nobody responsible for checking the contract and verifying that it said what NHS 24 wanted it to say?

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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The accountable officer is ultimately responsible but, as I said, the problem was that there was no complete read-through of the various documents to make sure that the copying and uploading had been done accurately.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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Would the external lawyer have been responsible for that? Would it have been delegated to them?

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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It could have been the responsibility of a number of individuals, including members of NHS 24 staff.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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So we do not know who was responsible.

Fraser McKinlay
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We are not absolutely clear, Mr Beattie, but the point that we are making is that neither is NHS 24. If someone had been responsible for the error, that would have been clear. If I understand Nick Bennett properly, the read-through should be a final check and balance, so that is not the only thing that went wrong; it just compounded a whole bunch of other stuff that happened up to that point. We should bear it in mind that this is a big, complex process, and the fact that it is output based means that there are no long lists of tasks for people to do; it is about delivering. In some ways, that is a good thing because it focuses everyone on what they are trying to deliver, but it means that performance measures and the expectations of all parties have to be crystal clear. That did not happen here, as became clear when NHS 24 tried to implement the process in 2013.

Paul Martin Lab The Convener · Glasgow Provan
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The auditors are not responsible for the actions that should have been taken. We will have the opportunity to decide whether to take further evidence on that.

Paul Martin Lab The Convener · Glasgow Provan
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I will just take a very brief question from Dr Simpson first.

Dr Richard Simpson Lab Mid Scotland and Fife
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NHS 24’s annual report said that it was committed to a 25 per cent reduction in senior managers. Does your audit demonstrate whether the senior managers who were got rid of had anything to do with the catastrophe? Catastrophe might be too strong a word, but did any of them have anything to do with the problems that we are now facing? It is all very well to say that you will cut a swathe through senior managers but what if you get rid of the people who are responsible for significant programmes, finance or whatever? Did getting rid of those people have any adverse effect?

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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That is probably a question for NHS 24.

Dr Richard Simpson Lab Mid Scotland and Fife
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Right, but the audit did not find anything that points to problems arising from the restructuring.

Fraser McKinlay
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We have not seen any causal link, and lots of other organisations are experiencing the same kind of reductions.

Fraser McKinlay
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The work that we have done has not identified any causal link.

Nigel Don SNP Angus North and Mearns
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We have talked about the read-through and an output-based specification. How many pages would an output-based specification run to? Surely it is not that many words.

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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I cannot remember the number of pages. It is a large document, though.

Nigel Don SNP Angus North and Mearns
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But the output-based specification cannot be that large. I have seen huge documents sitting on the table—I recognise that contracts are often very large—but the output-based specification would be one side of a piece of paper, would it not?

Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff
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I believe that it is an appendix to the contract.

Nigel Don SNP Angus North and Mearns
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Perhaps we need to ask to see it.

Paul Martin Lab The Convener · Glasgow Provan
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Thank you, colleagues.

  1. 09:30 Decision on Taking Business in Private Procedure · 1
  2. 09:30 Section 23 Report Committee business · 93
  3. 10:30 Section 22 Reports Committee business · 139
  4. 11:30 Section 22 Reports Committee business · 66
  5. 12:00 Section 22 Reports Committee business · 38
  6. 12:00 Section 23 Report Committee business · 12

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