Yes. There are two no-detriment principles—actually, there are kind of three, but the framework has two.
The first no-detriment principle is that, when a tax is devolved to Scotland, Scotland should not be made better or worse off just from the devolution of that tax. That implies that we take off the block grant the amount of revenues that are devolved to that tax.
The way that I have interpreted that is that the spirit of that principle means that, in the years ahead, Scotland should not be worse or better off if things continue on as they were going to anyway, so if the Scottish economy performs in line with the United Kingdom economy, Scotland should not be made worse or better off under the devolution. That seems to be the spirit of that first no-detriment principle.
The second no-detriment principle is that, if a policy decision is made in Westminster, it should not make Scotland better or worse off if it is for an area of devolved competency. Likewise, if a policy is made in Holyrood, it should not have an adverse or positive impact on the budgetary position of the UK Government.
In my presentation that I summarised in my submission, I gave examples of where those two principles could conflict. One of the reasons behind that is the difference in the relative size of the tax bases in Scotland and in the rest of the UK. For example, income tax revenues in Scotland are about 15 per cent less per person than they are in the UK as a whole so, to satisfy the first no-detriment principle, there would need to be a mechanism whereby if Scottish revenues grew in line, in percentage terms, with revenues in the rest of the UK, Scotland would be no better or worse off. If revenues went up by 10 per cent in Scotland and 10 per cent in the UK, you would want a mechanism that meant that Scotland did not suffer detriment, under the principle that it should not suffer detriment because it was growing in line with the UK.
A mechanism that does that can be designed. An amount would be taken off the block grant in year 1 and in subsequent years that would be indexed to the percentage growth in revenues in the rest of the UK. If revenues have gone up by 10 per cent in the rest of the UK, the initial block grant reduction is increased by 10 per cent. So 10 per cent more would be taken off the block grant than was the case originally. That means that, if revenues here go up by more than 10 per cent, Scotland gains, but if it is less than 10 per cent, Scotland loses and if revenues in Scotland grow in line with the UK, Scotland does not lose. That satisfies the spirit of the first no-detriment principle.
However, suppose that there was a change in tax policy in the rest of the UK and that was the reason why tax revenues rose by 10 per cent. That 10 per cent of additional revenue in the rest of the UK would be put into the Barnett formula, so Scotland would get more under the Barnett formula and then have an additional amount taken off its block grant. In that circumstance, Scotland would gain from a tax increase in the rest of the UK. That is not a detriment to Scotland, but it is a detriment to the rest of the UK, because Scotland would be gaining from additional taxes that are being paid in the rest of the UK and not in Scotland. That would not satisfy the second no-detriment principle.
It is hard to explain this verbally and easier to use a written example. Different methods of adjusting the block grant satisfy different principles. The methods to satisfy the first principle of there being no detriment from the act of devolution do not satisfy the principle of no detriment from policy action and vice versa. In the presentation that I sent to the committee, there are some worked examples that show that problem. Both principles cannot be satisfied, so it is a choice as to which principle is prioritised.