That is helpful, convener. Perhaps I should say in introduction that anything that I say here today is purely what I think. I have advised all sorts of people over the years, and none of them is to blame for what I have to say today.
You were right to preface your question by trying to state what the purpose of further devolution is. In my view, the purpose of further devolution is to give this Parliament the range of powers and responsibilities that will enable it to reflect a different set of preferences in Scotland for, among other things, the mixture of taxation and spending; and if Scotland takes a different view from the rest of the UK on that, the Scottish Parliament should be able to implement that in a way that preserves the risk-sharing benefits of being part of the UK, which is important in understanding the nature of the devolution settlement.
The obvious argument for the devolution of income tax is that, first, the Parliament even today has some influence over it, although it has never exercised it; and, secondly, it will be required to set a Scottish rate of income tax under the Calman scheme, with which I was associated. There is certainly scope to go further than that.
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The challenges to going further are as follows. First, income tax is a redistributive tax. It is the only substantial part of the taxation system that is redistributive across income groups. Rich people pay the most of the income tax; I cannot remember whether I quoted the numbers in my evidence, but it is well known that the vast majority of income tax receipts come from higher-rate taxpayers. That means that the tax is redistributive across social groups and is, therefore, also redistributive across geography because rich folk tend to live in one place and less well-off folk tend to live in another. At the moment, when income tax is shared across the UK, the pooling of income tax is redistributive across the UK.
Therefore, the first and most interesting question is whether, over the long run, the complete devolution of income tax would be to Scotland’s fiscal benefit. That is the first question that requires to be asked. The view may be taken that it is sufficiently important to devolve income tax that Scotland would be willing to give up any potential upside—or, if there were any, any potential downside—to sharing income tax. However, if it does so, it should do so with its eyes open and with an understanding that what it is doing is ceasing to pool and share that salient element of taxation resource across the entire UK.
The second challenge is more complex and perhaps more amenable to technical solutions, although it would nevertheless require to be addressed properly before a wise Parliament would argue for the complete devolution of income tax. The question is not a partisan question, although it is often presented as such. If income tax is devolved in Scotland, what happens to income tax in the rest of the UK and who makes that decision? Let us use England to mean the rest of the UK—I intend no offence to people in Wales and Northern Ireland, where the principle is the same, by omitting them from this example. If income tax became a Scottish tax, would it also become an English tax? If it was an English tax, which members of Parliament should decide on it and why? Unless that question is properly answered, I do not see that a sensible scheme for the devolution of income tax can be devised.
The third question that requires to be answered is this: what would be the effect on the Barnett formula? Let us imagine, for the sake of argument, that the Barnett formula remained unchanged from what it is today and that income tax was devolved. If the UK Government decided to increase income tax in the UK to spend on a reserved service such as social security, Scots would get the benefit of that tax rise through additional social security payments without paying any contribution. Equally, if the UK Government decided to increase income tax to increase the national health service budget in England, Scotland would get a commensurate benefit in the form of a consequential based on its population share without paying the commensurate tax rise. This is perhaps a technical challenge, but how can one devolve income tax and preserve the Barnett formula as it is currently constructed?
Those are the challenges that would have to be addressed if the whole of income tax were to be devolved, but those challenges do not require to be addressed under the scheme of the Scotland Act 2012, which is due to be implemented in 2016.