Item 2, the first substantive item on our agenda, is to take further evidence on the section 23 report “Managing ICT contracts”. I welcome from Registers of Scotland Sheenagh Adams, keeper of the registers of Scotland; Catriona Hardman, deputy keeper and accountable officer; Iain Campbell, chief information officer; and John King, registration director.I think that I am right in saying that Ms Adams does not want to make an opening statement.
Official Report · Committee
Section 23 Reports
“Managing ICT contracts”
Speakers
Choose an MSP to read only their contributions- Sheenagh Adams Registers of Scotland 34
- Iain Gray Lab 15
- Mary Scanlon Con 10
- Iain Campbell Registers of Scotland 9
- Tavish Scott LD 9
- Catriona Hardman Registers of Scotland 5
- Willie Coffey SNP 5
- Colin Beattie SNP 4
- Sandra White SNP 3
- Colin Keir SNP 3
- John King Registers of Scotland 1
- James Dornan SNP 1
The record
99 contributionsThat is right, convener.
I will kick things off, then. We asked Registers of Scotland to give evidence to the committee as a result of the Audit Scotland report, which looked at information and communication technology contracts in the public sector. It looked at three contracts in particular, one of which was the Registers of Scotland contract. The committee was very keen to hear from Registers of Scotland some of what had happened and to look forward and see what lessons had been learned. We picked on Registers of Scotland because the figure involved was the highest of the three contracts. Audit Scotland looked at the strategic partnership agreement that Registers of Scotland had with BT. Initially it was expected to cost £66 million over a period of years, but in the end it cost around £113 million—almost twice as much. Despite that initial cost, the contract proved itself incapable of providing the service that Registers of Scotland required. Indeed, it ended up with the termination of the contract 20 months early and the adoption of a different strategy.I will kick things off by asking generally what Registers of Scotland feels went wrong and why so much money was spent on a project that ended up unable to deliver what it was supposed to.
Our view is that the partnership agreement was probably always the wrong type of contract for Registers of Scotland because it put all the eggs in one basket with one supplier. The contract was for literally everything to do with information technology and telephony, and it was for a very long period of time.Although we are a reasonably big public sector organisation—at the time we entered into the contract, we had about 1,400 staff, which is now down to about 1,000—compared with our supplier, we are a very small organisation.Clearly, there were governance issues. That was partly due to the fact that governance arrangements were provided for in the contract and tied BT and ROS firmly together. In some ways, that meant that the ROS board and the ROS management team did not have a clear line of sight to the overall contract. The contract was designed in such a way that the intelligent client function sat with the supplier rather than with the public sector body, which meant that ROS did not have the in-house skills to challenge the supplier and make sure that what was being proposed was fit for our business needs.It was always intended that the contract would cost more than the initial estimated sum. At 2012 price levels, the initial cost estimate was around £78 million—that figure is mentioned in the Audit Scotland report. Up to 1 April, £112 million has been spent. With such a long contract, it is not possible to envisage at the beginning what will need to be spent. The overall assessment of the contract would be that some of it has worked. BT has provided our basic services right across the board in IT and telephony over the eight years of the contract. BT will now leave on 30 November; we have brought forward the termination date. Services have continued to run, we have had a desktop refresh, and we have delivered our automated registration of title to land project and several other successful projects. Only two projects did not come to successful fruition. One was the e-settle project; the other was the content management system. Both projects, which were in Audit Scotland’s section 22 report, were cancelled. The e-settle project would have required considerably more investment to get it to a usable level and it was not capable of being updated to meet the changes that, by that time, we knew were coming in as a consequence of the Land Registration etc (Scotland) Act 2012. We cancelled the content management system on value-for-money grounds.In summary, we think that the contract was the wrong approach. None of the current management team was in post in ROS in 2004 when the contract was signed. Obviously, we have the benefit of hindsight—I am sure that our predecessors thought that they were doing the right thing. However, our assessment is that the contract was not the right thing, as both ROS and BT were looking for different things from the partnership.
You mentioned size, which is an interesting point. The Audit Scotland report looked at different ICT contracts. You are right to say that Registers of Scotland is by far the biggest of the public bodies that were audited. Audit Scotland clearly thought that most public bodies were too small to have the expertise needed to procure such a contract. I think that you are saying that even Registers of Scotland, which is at the big end of the scale, found that quite difficult.A way round that for the public sector is for outside support to come from the Scottish Government. How is it that problems with the strategic partnership agreement could develop over 10 years but there was no support from the Scottish Government to resolve them? Did Registers of Scotland ask for help? Was that help made available?
We asked for help when we were developing our automated registration of title to land project. The project was running late, and we sought advice from the Scottish Government about how best to handle discussions with BT. It gave us helpful advice on how to escalate issues in the BT hierarchy. Obviously, ARTL was delivered and it is functioning and being used by customers, but that was the only part of the contract that had a built-in late delivery payment clause. We levied a late delivery payment on BT of almost £1 million. The Scottish Government was helpful in that process.We also had help from the Scottish Government on doing post-project reviews of the two cancelled projects—e-settle and the content management system. Iain Campbell and Catriona Hardman are working with Scottish Government colleagues to develop the central Government digital strategy.
There is a sense in the Audit Scotland report that there was little support either during the procurement process and in the early stages or throughout the course of the partnership agreement. Is that not the case?
Our understanding is that Registers of Scotland received external support on the procurement and on deciding what kind of partnership arrangement to go for. Financial advice was provided by Grant Thornton which, funnily enough, was our external auditor until recently. Deloitte provided advice on strategic matters, and Pinsent Masons—which was McGrigors—advised on legal matters. Clearly, there was a lot of external input.It is not clear to me what discussions there may have been with Scottish Government colleagues. Registers of Scotland is a non-ministerial department. We are not part of the Scottish Government; we are part of the Scottish Administration. We now work closely with Government colleagues and we shared the lessons learned from our experiences with the Government back in May 2011.
You said that the ROS board at the time—I appreciate that you and the other witnesses were not part of the senior management team or the board then—did not have oversight of the project. Are you saying that nobody had that within the organisation? Was there not some kind of project board or partnership board, or some internal body that had responsibility for the project?
It was structured within the contract. There was a partnership and change group, which was made up of Registers of Scotland and BT staff and took day-to-day responsibility. Things then had to be escalated to a partnership board, which again was made up jointly of Registers of Scotland and BT staff and which the keeper chaired. I have chaired it since I became the keeper. However, there was little visibility up to the main Registers of Scotland board. In addition, no delegated budgeting was in place at the time in Registers of Scotland and, because projects were running behind time, the information coming to the board was that we were underspending on the contract, not that things were escalating and not being delivered.Obviously, there were reports on particular projects. Certainly, until about 2009 the focus was on ARTL. Once that was delivered, e-settle came to the fore. It was only when we were very much into e-settle and it was into its test phase that it became clear that it was not going to deliver what we needed.
There is a suggestion in the submission that you helpfully provided for the committee that the project board was bypassed and that issues came straight to the organisation’s main board.
Not to the main board; they would have gone up to the partnership and change group and, to an extent, to the partnership board and different groupings. Catriona Hardman led a review of governance to learn the lessons of the past. We brought in new arrangements that are now operating and which will cover all projects, whether they be IT-related or business-related projects, once BT has departed.
It would be helpful to hear a bit about that.
We started to put changes in place to improve governance in the partnership as long ago as 2010, once e-settle was halted. Over the past two years, we have had much better project planning, execution and oversight. That has been helped by building up our own IT expertise, which clearly makes the process much more effective.As Sheenagh Adams has said, there is now much better financial transparency in projects and, most important, there is much better oversight by the board and senior managers. In the past, ROS expected innovative IT to give us business benefits, but we have realised that that was the wrong approach and that IT must align with ROS’s strategic aims, and now the board and senior managers have regular oversight of the IT programme. As Sheenagh said, governance of IT projects now escalates via me, as the accountable officer, to the board.It is also worth noting that, in the past two years, we have developed a key risk register that is looked at by senior managers and ROS’s board on a monthly basis and which includes all our IT risks going forward. For example, we monitor in the register the transition back to ROS, and we will add in risks that relate to all our future programme of work.
What is your view of the Audit Scotland report? Do you think that it is fair and accurate?10:15
I welcome what I think is a fair and accurate report. We expressed concern to Audit Scotland about its scope because we felt that it would have been helpful to the committee and the wider public sector had it looked at a broader range of IT relationships and contracts and found examples of good practice to show people what such practice might look like. However, we think that, as it is, the report is useful.
Personally, I think that what we have found is very worrying, particularly given your future tax-collecting responsibilities. Do you agree that the higher collection costs are and the more money is written off on IT contracts, the less revenue Governments have to spend on essential public services?
Of course, we want to—and will—avoid wasting money. Indeed, I can give the committee a very good example of where we have avoided such waste. We took on responsibility for the crofting register outwith the scope of the strategic partnership agreement. Having failed to reach agreement with BT, which said that developing the register would cost in the region of £1 million to £2 million, we went out to tender and have delivered the crofting register ahead of schedule—it goes live on 30 November—for £600,000. That has resulted in a considerable saving for the Scottish Government, which has been funding the development.
Is it a considerable saving against tens of millions of pounds of loss?
I am sorry, but it is not tens of millions of pounds of loss. The two projects that were written off totalled less than £7 million. Obviously, the money that has been spent overall has kept our IT services, the phones and everything else running for eight years.
Before I come to my substantive question, I wonder whether you can tell me the level of compensation for BT. The report says that the figure is being negotiated. How much taxpayers’ money will BT receive in compensation?
We will be paying all the inescapable costs that we are contractually liable to pay. Some of that will be in relation to the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006, some to third-party contracts and some to the so-called compensation element. We have made provision for a total of £2 million in our current accounts, which have just been laid before Parliament, but we expect the figure to be less than that.
Another £2 million, then.As the report makes clear, two projects have been cancelled; the Scottish Government was unable to provide all the advice and support that was sought; the business case and benefits “were not clearly defined”; the “Governance arrangements were not effective”; there were “weaknesses in financial control”; there were “insufficient in-house” specialist “skills and experience” to deliver ICT; the “Government provided limited support”; there was a six-year gap between the reviews to highlight and address any difficulties; there were 400 changes; and, according to paragraph 70 of the report, “there is currently no mechanism to ensure that”lessons are passed on. Among the reasons that we asked you to come to the committee were the scale of the losses and the fact that you are going to be a tax collector. When I came along today, I was hoping to hear a bit more about how you were addressing these points but, as soon as the convener asked his first question, all we got was that it was BT’s fault. Given that BT has no right of reply, I am concerned about the comment cited in paragraph 16 on page 4 of your own submission that “a ‘partnership’ contract is extremely difficult to make work in an environment where the two parties have fundamentally different motivations. BT is there to maximise profit, while RoS wants a good service at a reasonable price.”That is a very critical point to make about a major organisation that has no right of reply to this committee.Prior to that, you say:“the Partnership arrangement was fundamentally unsuitable for a public body.”This and any other Government will work with the private sector. Instead of giving me confidence that you have learned the lessons and are now moving forward, you sound as if you are simply blaming all these issues and problems on a private company that has no right of reply. Is that fair?
It would not be fair and it is not what I have done. I have not said that I blamed BT; instead, I said that I thought the contract to be inappropriate in scale and extent. We work in partnership with a whole range of bodies, but it was wrong for ROS to go with a single supplier for everything for such a long period of time with a contract that did little to ensure speedy delivery or good value for money.The comments about the different motivations in partnerships came from Gartner, which is an international consultancy that is regarded as a world expert on such matters. That was its assessment of the matter, not mine—although I do not disagree with it. We have learned our lessons from this. As Catriona Hardman has made clear, we have introduced new governance arrangements; we have firm delegated budgeting right across the business; and we have brought in our own experts in the shape of Iain Campbell and his team.As far as tax collection is concerned, we are already collecting stamp duty land tax for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. That arrangement has worked well; indeed, it uses our automated registration of title to land service, which was one of the partnership’s successful results. I think that we can assure the committee about what we have been doing.I will ask my colleague Iain Campbell to comment on the number of change control notices, which you referred to.
I think that at the previous meeting Iain Gray pointed out that the figure of 400 was mentioned in the Audit Scotland report because it was highlighted in one of our internal audit reports. That number is not helpful; it does not indicate anything in any material sense. Indeed, at the previous meeting, the Auditor General and one of her colleagues pointed out that the number refers to change control notices. The contract bound Registers of Scotland to use a change control mechanism for essentially any change, barring such trivial issues as forgotten passwords and the like. For the avoidance of doubt, I point out that the change control notice did not change the nature of the contract, except in a handful of instances. In 99.99 per cent of cases—396 of the 400, let us say—the mechanism was used for small changes and modifications to, for example, locations of equipment and the system’s behaviour, small upgrades, improvements in usability, changes as a result of changes to legislation such as fee orders, and the buying of new equipment. Given that every single one of what are actually normal activities in an organisation were covered by a CCN, that number is of no use to us in measuring adequacy or problems in the relationship.Having read the internal audit reports of our previous exercise, I feel that the number was brought up to illustrate the clumsiness of the operation of the change control notice system. Our organisation was suffering because of the administrative load and general eviscerating effect of having to generate one of these notices for relatively minor elements of our day-to-day existence. Internally, we were not happy with that aspect, and I think that that number was used because it projected into the minds of readers in the organisation the amount of hassle and effort required—the treacle, if you like, through which the organisation had to wade—to get anything done. That is what that number indicates, and some of the interpretations that were made of it at the previous meeting were not helpful.
We can only read from what is in the Audit Scotland report. I asked whether you thought the report was fair and accurate, and Ms Adams said that it was. We are not experts; we scrutinise what Audit Scotland says and how taxpayers’ money has been spent—and, indeed, wasted.This will have to be my final question, because I know that many members want to come in. I still feel that you are blaming your partner in the contract unduly. You were an equal partner in signing and agreeing to the terms and conditions of that contract; even if you discovered five or 10 years down the line that it did not suit you, it was still equally your contract. Is it right, fair or justified for you to blame a contract that you fully, openly, honestly and transparently agreed to with BT? Is it fair, if the contract does not work out in your favour, to blame a contract that you agreed to, and indeed to blame a company that has no right of reply here today?
The keeper has made it patently clear that we are not blaming BT. You asked whether it would be fair to do that. It would be unfair were we doing that, but we are not.
It is quoted.
Yes. The submission is quoting Gartner, the consultancy, which came to the conclusion that the alignment was not good, as BT’s interests did not match those of ROS in a way that would produce value for money. It is in italics in that paragraph to indicate that it is a quote from Gartner.
I do understand the italics. I am aware of the difference.
The keeper made it clear that we are not blaming BT. I do not see how she could have made it clearer.
Paragraph 14—this is not in italics, Mr Campbell—states:“RoS now believes that the Partnership arrangement was fundamentally unsuitable for a public body. Some of the reasons for that view are set out below.”And please do not insult me on a committee.
I am sure that my colleague did not in any way intend to insult you. We just want to clarify our position.As I said, we are not blaming BT. The view of the management team, which was not around at the time—and, obviously, the world has moved on considerably—is that it was the wrong type of contract for Registers of Scotland. We did not have, either at the time or subsequently, sufficiently skilled and expert staff who would have been able to make good use of it, if it had been able to work, but we feel that the fundamental issue is the nature of the contract.Our new IT strategy means that we will be delivering our IT through a mixture of in-house experts working with small and medium-sized enterprises, which will, I hope, be keen to work for us. Certainly in the case of the company that John King has worked with on the crofting register, that has gone very well.In no way are we criticising BT, just as we would not expect it to be at a public forum criticising us. As I said earlier, we have had successes in the partnership. The delivery of ARTL was one, although it had its problems, and we have successfully delivered services to our customers across Scotland over the whole period of the partnership. We are now undertaking our registration work more quickly, more accurately and with fewer arrears than there have ever been in the past. We continue to have very high levels of customer satisfaction and we have very good relationships with our customers.
I am intrigued by the argument, which in many ways has gone full circle over 13 years of devolution, that it is better to procure such services through a combination of in-house IT and small organisations, which you just described. Is that now the logical position that you take in this context? You mention in your submission the wider Scottish Government IT strategy and various working boards, groups and so on. Is that the approach that you now take and will you be advising the Scottish Government on it as well?
That is the approach that we want to take in our organisation, for our business needs. We are a specialist user of IT services as we are the only land register organisation in Scotland. Where it is appropriate for us to share with other parts of the public sector, we will do that. We will feed our views in. Both Catriona Hardman and Iain Campbell are contributing to that. Iain, would you like to give your professional view?
My professional view is that I find it difficult to believe that an organisation that is many times larger than a small-fry organisation such as Registers of Scotland could possibly be aligned with it. How could it ever be aligned? We would be just one of the many clients of a large organisation, as any other agency of our size would be. In any relationship, it is not a good starting point when one partner is bigger than the other. It is not a good starting point in personal relationships and it is not a good starting point in business relationships. There should be equality, or at least a complementary quality in the skills and experience of the two organisations.We are switching, where possible, to using smaller organisations. They will jump through the fieriest of hoops for a larger organisation. We are a public body and we have public money to spend. The private sector lines up to get public money. The private sector thinks that public money is easy money. It is much harder for small companies to exercise control over public bodies than it is for larger organisations. Personally, my trust lies with smaller organisations much more than with larger organisations. I think that smaller organisations—
We get the point, but given your professional expertise in IT, I presume that you accept that the principles are the same no matter what your business is—whether it is Registers of Scotland, the health service or some other part of the public sector. This is the Public Audit Committee and we are responsible for looking at the audit of public money. We are constantly told that the principles are the same in terms of the provision of services in the public sector.You have just said that your approach to providing IT services is demonstrably different from that in any other part of the Scottish public service. Do you accept that?10:30
Other parts of the public sector take a mixed approach. That was recognised in the McClelland report on procurement in relation to IT.
I do not think that that is true. Other parts of the public sector are being told to procure on a Scotland-wide basis with the big providers and companies that you have just criticised.
That works sometimes, but it depends on what we are doing. Obviously I expect to work with the rest of the public sector in getting access to the internet or desktop supplies and that kind of thing, but it has to be horses for courses. Catriona Hardman might like to add to that.
When we are talking about a big contract for infrastructure, we are probably looking at larger providers—
I am not talking about that; I am just talking about IT.
The situation is probably mixed. If you are looking at the provision of broadband services, you will be looking at a larger supplier. The problem was that ROS put all its eggs into one basket with the partnership. BT provided all our services, so we were in a bit of a straitjacket. We could not pick and choose and decide to go somewhere else to get a different bit of IT. BT provided everything—it kept the lights on, and it also provided our IT development. ROS is a public organisation that has evolved a lot during the past eight years, so that simply did not work. Life has changed, and highlighted in many of the reports that we have obtained was that one of the main problem areas was the length of the contract. A public body would not now expect to go for a huge one-stop service for bespoke software or an IT package. We would now be looking at getting a much more generic service.I am not an IT expert but I know that the whole ethos has changed. We entered into a partnership because that was the name of the game. We had big bespoke registration services and for that we needed a big supplier that would provide us with everything. As I said earlier, we expected that just having innovative IT would somehow change how ROS worked—that was a fundamental error, in my view. As I said, I have only been at ROS for the past three years, but I think that that is what happened.
I think that you are right, but what you describe is not the way in which Government procurement is going. I take your point that, although ROS is part of the public sector, it is not directly a Government body. It is part of the public administration in Scotland, but it is not a ministerial body. I am nevertheless intrigued to see the very clear difference between your approach to IT procurement and the one that we are constantly being told is the right one for Scotland.I also take your point that ROS was able to procure the crofting register for £600,000 as opposed to a higher cost, but the Public Audit Committee needs evidence that demonstrates that the ROS approach will provide procurement savings to the public sector in a manner that is quite different from the one that we are being offered by any other chief executive—or keeper—who comes along to talk to us.
Our assessment of the approach that we are taking shows that we expect to make at least 30 per cent savings on the service costs of our IT provision each year in future. That is a reasonable estimate; we hope to achieve more than that. We certainly hope to make savings on the development of the crofting register. We are taking this approach because we want to get it right. We have learned our lesson and we do not want to be sitting in front of the committee in future.
I agree; I appreciate that. When the issue came to the committee previously, some fairly serious questions were asked about the role of your external auditors and the way in which they did not discover what was going on. Has ROS changed its external auditors since then?
Yes. The contract with Grant Thornton has now ended, and Audit Scotland has now come in as our external auditors. Because we have Pricewaterhouse Coopers as our internal auditors and have had contractual relationships with others who are on the Audit Scotland list, Audit Scotland, by default, had to become our external auditors.
Are your internal auditors the same ones as when the problems happened?
We have been working closely with our internal auditors, who have helped the management team to consider the issues.
One of the findings of the Audit Scotland report was that the internal auditors missed the problems.
Well, obviously, I mean—
I am just asking. You would be entirely justified in changing your internal auditors as well, would you not?
The extent of the problems with the partnership came to light only when we assessed that the e-settle project was going to fail. That was in 2010. There was not really anything to miss. Obviously, the auditors were aware of all the actions that we had taken on ARTL.Our internal audit arrangements are out to tender. Our audit committee is entirely non-executive, and its members have all been helpful in working with the management team to ensure that the lessons have been learned and that we have new systems and procedures in place for the future.
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I have several questions. I will start by asking a bit more about the in-house capability.Your approach goes against the general trend in the private sector, where technical capabilities tend for the most part to be contracted out, except for those that are for maintenance of legacy systems, for example. You seemed to indicate—correct me if I am wrong—that the in-house IT capability will also be used for procurement. It seems to me that that might be a bit of a knee-jerk reaction to your experience with BT. You seem to be focusing on using smaller IT providers. Do you have a due diligence process for that? I have considerable experience in IT procurement and I have never seen any evidence that there is any advantage, or disadvantage, to using a small provider over a large provider unless the small provider has a highly specialised capability. I am interested to know how you handle the process.
To give an example, in developing the crofting register, we used the Scottish Government’s framework arrangements. We work closely with the Scottish Government procurement directorate. We have our own procurement team, which has the superior rating and has just, yet again, improved. We will use a small team of internal experts, some of whom will do development work themselves. Others will work with the contractors that we will use.Some of the small companies that we will use will be third-party contractors that will come over to us at the end of the BT contract. They are companies that BT has used to do some of the work, particularly on maintaining services. Some BT staff will come over to us as well.I ask Iain Campbell whether he wants to add anything, as he will lead on that work.
You made a number of points, Mr Beattie. Correct me if I do not cover them all, please.The TUPE legislation mandates that, at the end of the contract, the new provider of the service takes on the staff who currently provide the service. That day-to-day service provision is coming to us anyway. That continuing commodity service—I do not want to belittle it, but I will use that phrase—will be provided in-house because it has to be transferred to somewhere. We believe that, by transferring it in-house, we will have much more control over it. I will return in a second to why we think that that is important.The in-house expert team that we are building will be used for the design and development of new systems. Although, as Sheenagh Adams said, much has been done over the past seven to eight years under the partnership, Registers of Scotland, which I joined a year and a half ago, is a coiled spring of business process improvement.John King’s registration department, which accounts for 900 of our 1,000 headcount, is absolutely desperate for business process improvements. It is doing such improvements anyway, but is struggling with the IT. The nature of the contract and the arrangements in it made it difficult for his department to change and do new things to improve its processes.In my opinion, we have a lot of catching up to do in relation to the degree to which we can be efficient and improve our business processes. We need to take control. Handing that over would be fine if it were business as usual, but it is not business as usual; we are catching up and are making significant improvements. The process needs tighter and finer-grained control than one would get if one were to have a contractual arrangement with an external party.As I think Sheenagh Adams said, we will use the normal Scottish Government framework arrangements to get the suppliers for the smaller pieces of work. I will try to answer your question. One could discuss endlessly the suitability of small companies versus that of large companies for various activities, but I would rather talk about granules of work and whether they should be small or large. One lesson that we feel has been learned during the contract is that the approach of taking on a single large granule of work that involved doing so much for the organisation over eight years was fatally flawed. It is not possible to have control over such a large piece of work, and it is delusional to think that, at the start of such a project, one would know what would be required later on; it would be delusional to think that even halfway through the timescale. Business, regulatory and legislative environments change, as do people and fashions. Everything changes. We have to have smaller granules of work.I think that Tavish Scott was heading in the direction of asking about big contracts versus small contracts rather than big providers versus small providers. One can take a risk view. If one takes on a big granule of work, one is committed. One puts on the fount of sincerity, writes the spec and it is a case of, “Forward, chaps! Off we go!”—to oblivion, most likely. If, on the other hand, one has small granules of work, the monetary and emotional investment, and individuals’ career investments, in those small granules are smaller, so when those granules fail—and they will; that is the normal course of human existence—it is easier to say, “Hmm, that was a failure. Let’s push that to the side. Let’s do something different. Let’s replace it with something else.” Very little time and money will have been lost because it was a small granule, and none of us will have lost face. Behaviourally, psychologically, financially and in risk management terms, that is a much better solution.
We need questions and answers to be a little more succinct, Mr Campbell.
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What is the definition of an intelligent client?
It is someone who has a professional background in the subject that they are looking at, who has a wide range of experience in different types of settings and who has kept their professional knowledge up to date. We look to solicitors, doctors and accountants to do that, and that is what we are now trying to do with our IT function—to have staff who are professionally qualified and who have experience. Previously, that was seriously lacking in Registers of Scotland.
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Does that definition of an intelligent client include users as well as IT people?
Yes—users have to have an understanding, too. We are working with Iain Campbell’s team to improve our ability, as senior managers in the public sector, to understand the intelligence around IT issues. It is not going on a training course that makes you an intelligent customer; it is something that you gain through experience and through working with your colleagues.
I would like to add something—I will keep my remarks short.It is not just IT skills that are required—hard-nosed business skills are required, too. The public sector is not very good at hard-nosed business skills. Normally, the hard-nosed business skills are on the other side of the table. The larger and more powerful the company, the more slick and polished it will be at those hard-nosed business skills.
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I think that you have had your fingers burned and you are reacting to that.One comment that was made was that when the supplier—BT, I presume—had a problem, it would go straight to senior management and bypass the team on the ground that was supposedly managing the project. How could senior management think that that was the right process to be followed?
That does not happen now, and it has not happened while we have been leading on the project. A lot of that was to do with the relationships that had built up. Previously, the senior managers in Registers of Scotland had worked with their counterparts in the supplier for quite a long time, and people just used those business relationships.10:45
To come back to what you said, and to reassure Mary Scanlon, we are not saying that it is BT’s fault. We will have an on-going business relationship with BT, as it will continue to provide support for the specially written software that has been used during the partnership, which we will continue to use for a period of time. We will have a relationship with a big supplier as well as with a range of smaller suppliers.
Having listened to what has been said, it seems to me that the original contract that was drawn up eight years ago has been the nub of the problem that ROS has faced. You can give me a straight yes-or-no answer on that.I know that none of you was around at that time, but were staff and management involved in the day-to-day running of the contract?I do not think that I would have drawn up an eight-year contract. If I was looking for insurance or something, I would be looking for a bidder every three or four years.I just want to confirm that the problems lie in the particular way in which the contract was drawn up in 2004.
That is our assessment, as the current management team.
What lessons have you learned, and what has been put in place with regard to management skills and the culture of ROS?
A range of things have been done. We have revisited our governance structures. Catriona Hardman led on that work, as she said, and we have new governance arrangements in place under which future programmes will be directly accountable to her as accountable officer and not to a hybrid committee that is made up of the supplier and the business.We have trained our staff on managing projects, offering refresher training for those who have qualifications and training for people who have perhaps not had it before. That includes training for us as senior responsible officers within projects and programmes.As we said earlier, we have brought in delegated budgeting. With regard to staff with skills and experience, we have brought in Iain Campbell. His predecessor, who came in and then left, was professionally qualified and had a range of experience. Iain has brought in a small team of staff with real qualifications, experience and know-how.Unfortunately, we lost our finance director, who left to pursue an academic career, but we have a new finance director who has experience of managing and of being involved in the financial control of major IT and investment programmes in the public sector.We have legal services people such as Catriona Hardman. Our legal services directorate contains primarily staff who are on secondment from the Scottish Government legal directorate and who have the skills to help us work with our external legal advisers to look at commercial arrangements.As I said, we have a new ICT strategy that focuses on how we develop our IT and ensures that we do it in manageable chunks in a way that provides good value. We will continue to work with our stakeholders on that; we have a stakeholder forum that meets regularly at which we share our views and our thinking on that.
I am quite happy with that answer—the witnesses have answered all the questions that I wanted to ask, convener.
I have some experience on the software engineering side, and in project management and specification and so on. Listening to that story reminded me of some of the fatal mistakes that have been made over a number of years—
By you?
No, not by me—by others. Laughter.If someone goes into an electrical shop and does not fully articulate what they want, they are likely to come out with a tumble dryer when they really wanted a washing machine. I do not know whether that daft analogy is relevant, but it sounds like that type of story. In the early days, staff in the organisation were not capable of articulating its requirements. That is not to blame BT, which as the vendor probably did its best to help the organisation understand what its requirements were. What happened has been a common fault in IT procurement projects over the years and was probably the root cause of the difficulties. Like me, however, I think that other committee members will wonder how on earth it took such a while for that to dawn on anybody and why there was no earlier intervention to try to correct or rescue the situation.I wonder about the organisation now. You guys are giving us the impression that you fully understand what went wrong and that you have taken proper steps to ensure that it does not happen again. The role of the intelligent client was mentioned, but at no time should the vendor become the intelligent client: you are the client and you should be telling the vendor what you need. If you cannot do that, you get somebody in—but not somebody from the vendor; that is a bit like asking a car salesman to sell your car.The other point that has caused a bit of discussion was the change request aspect, for which Mr Campbell offered an explanation. However, most software development projects get thousands of change requests, so I do not think that that is really a big issue. Although it was highlighted in the Audit Scotland report, it is not a big issue; the main issue is the failure to articulate requirements at an early stage. The work that the Public Audit Committee has done over the years has shown that that is a common thread.What I am looking for from the witnesses is some sense that you fully understand what happened and that systems and people are in place in the organisation to ensure that the situation is corrected and does not happen again.
That is exactly our assessment of what was wrong, in that we did not have access to expert advice on and knowledge of how systems work. The arrival of Iain Campbell, with the team that he brought in, has enabled us to make the decision to terminate the partnership contract early and get out two years in advance. We now understand the nature of the technical issues that we were not in a position to understand or to think about before. That has made a huge difference for us. Obviously, a departure two years early will save about £3 million a year in service costs.We have now demonstrated that we can develop and deliver IT projects well. John King has been working on the crofting register and was involved in work with the supplier. I ask him to say a few words about how that went.
I very much echo Willie Coffey’s sentiment. One of the key issues that I have experienced in an operational management role for new IT is around requirements. The great benefit that I have seen, particularly with the crofting register, is the intelligent client function, which Iain Campbell’s team has provided and which is essentially about taking an operational requirement, putting some technical language around it and then interacting and discussing what the requirements are in a way that an IT company can understand.I emphasise that the crofting register required a highly complex piece of IT. It is not unlike the land register, so there is a large spatial element to it, a textual element and a public-facing element. It is unlike, for instance, a stamp duty land tax system or a land and buildings transaction tax system, because it is a much more complex piece of work. The company Informed Solutions started work in March this year and the crofting register is now ready; it will support the commencement of the new crofting legislation later this year. One of the big reasons why we have been able to deliver that in a short period of time is the intelligent client function, which can help us to work more effectively with a particular IT company.
That is more encouraging than what I have heard previously, or what I read in the report. Before you get a piece of software running for an organisation, it is dangerous to commission it on a promise of what it will do. You have to see it working and functioning at some stage if you can, either with a client who has bought the same thing or by commissioning it in stages, to which I think Mr Campbell referred. I have not heard about software granularity for a wee while, but that is a wise step for this business to take.
I have a quick supplementary question following on from Colin Beattie and Willie Coffey’s point about the intelligent client. It is a critical point. You may not be an intelligent client—you may not have been able to live up to Audit Scotland’s expectations in that area—but we cannot question the intelligent client status of the Scottish Government. The key messages section on page 6 of the Audit Scotland report says:“The Scottish Government was unable to provide the three public bodies with all the advice and support they sought”.How can things be done better in future? As regards your capability to collect the stamp duty tax in 2015, you may not have all the expertise. According to Audit Scotland, when you asked for help from the Scottish Government, that help was not there. Do you feel, given your experience—I want to move forward positively—that that intelligent client function and additional support should be in the Scottish Government?
We need a dual approach. We want our own in-house intelligent client function—someone who understands our business. We would welcome it if they could work with colleagues in the Scottish Government so that they can bounce ideas off one another and so that the Scottish Government can act as—
I think Mary Scanlon’s question is whether you are getting that help now, as it appears that it was not there in the past. Do you feel that you are getting that help now?
Certainly since the e-settle failure we have had regular dialogue with the Scottish Government that has covered finance, procurement and legal issues. As Sheenagh Adams said, ROS as a NMD was aware that we had to rebuild our own IT expertise and put our own house in order. I do not think that there was any assumption that IT staff would come from the Scottish Government, but in all other overarching aspects of the partnership we have had regular dialogue with it.We clearly had help from ISIS—the information systems and information services division in the Scottish Government—in arranging the project reviews for the two failed projects. That was really excellent, useful work. We have also had dialogue with the centre for excellence on the two delayed gateway reviews, so we have regular dialogue in those areas.We are now using some of our new expertise to feed into central Government IT strategy and the Government’s thoughts on that; of course, we are working with the Government on the land and buildings transaction tax, too.
I recognise that the core of the problem may well be the contract that was written a long time ago. Clearly, I have some sympathy with the imbalance with a much larger partner over a period of time. However, as far as I can see, that does not really explain the points that are made in paragraphs 30-31 on page 11 of the report about the individual projects lacking“detailed costs, benefits and milestones”and about“No progress updates on the programme as a whole”being “provided to the ... Board”.Why did that happen? Can you assure me that changes have been made to ensure that it does not happen in the future?
Certainly. In terms of the costs and benefits, there was no delegated budgeting in place in Registers of Scotland until I became keeper and I got the new finance director to bring it in. There was no accountability for expenditure on individual projects by the project manager. People thought that it was quite acceptable to get more money and to keep spending because the business-case process that was in place looked at the original project and then did a business case for any changes or add-ons to the project without relating it back to the main business case. That has been changed—a new business-case system has been brought in and is being closely overseen by the finance directorate, rather than sitting in the information directorate, as it did in the past.I mentioned the problems with the governance arrangements that were set out in the contract. That has been completely changed—the governance arrangements that are now in place are clearly within the management structure in Registers of Scotland, with all programmes and projects having a line straight up to Catriona Hardman, as accountable officer. I assure that committee that we have identified the issues and have made the necessary changes to ensure that such issues do not happen again.We have also brought benefits realisation actions into projects so that we have clear expectations of what projects are supposed to deliver, which we will measure throughout the projects. At the moment, they are being used in the transition project that is bringing control back from BT to ROS, and they are clearly working. Catriona Hardman chairs the project board weekly, and there are regular updates to the executive management team and to the board, when it meets, and they feature on our risk register. We have put all those things in place and are adhering to them strictly.11:00
Good morning. I think that most of my questions have been asked. You are obviously in dialogue with Scottish Government agencies. I would like to clarify something in the report—although I am sure that you have probably done it in another way during your depositions. The findings of independent assurance reports—gateway reports—are mentioned in paragraph 35 on page 12 of the Audit Scotland report, and paragraphs 42 and 43 bring up the same sort of thing. Information was brought forward by those reports but was—to be frank—not acted on. Can we have some form of guarantee that more credence will be given to those independent reports?
There is an issue with gateway reports, which is that they are provided entirely to the SRO for the project. There is no requirement under the projects in controlled environments—PRINCE—project management process for those reports to be shared with the wider management team. One issue that we identified was that the gateway 5 report on the overall partnership had been postponed by the SRO and that there was no mechanism to tell our chief executive or the accountable officer that that had happened. We have recommended to the Scottish Government that that be changed and it has agreed to do that, so it will be visible to accountable officers and chief executives that gateway reviews have been postponed for particular reasons.Regarding how we operate now, the SROs who receive gateway reviews share them with their management team colleagues. They are able, as an executive management team, to look at the issues in the gateway reviews—whether they be positive, negative or amber issues—and then to develop an action plan to monitor the issues, so that they do not lose sight of the recommendations that come from gateway reviews.
It seems that there has been a management breakdown—a severe one, if we are being perfectly honest.
Yes.
That takes me back to some of the things that have been said, partly by the committee and partly in your evidence. If you are saying that the management deficiencies have been cleared and that there are clear lines of communication not just between the Scottish Government, ROS and a third party but within your organisation, I might be able to see a way forward.
After the e-settle project was halted, we had the first delayed gateway review in 2010 and we implemented its recommendations. I had probably been in post about six months or so when we started looking at the gateway review. It told us to work within the partnership to see what value we could extract from it—which echoes what was said in response to some of the earlier questions. That we did, and we improved some of our practices as a result. We ran the gateway review again one year later, and its conclusion was that we had probably extracted all the value that we could extract from the partnership in its form then. By way of reassurance, once we have completed the transition of services back to ROS, we will ask the centre for excellence to work with us on a state-of-readiness gateway review, which I think will take place sometime in the new year. We will have looked at three gateway reviews over the entire programme since I came here.
Mr Coffey may ask a very short question.
Thank you for bringing me back in, convener. I forgot to ask our guests whether they are currently using any recognised project management software or systems to help them through the new process, and if so, what are they?
The PRINCE 2 mechanism is the standard in public sector organisations and is often the standard in large private sector organisations. It is used throughout the business and it will also be used within IT. IT development has not started in full flow yet; we need BT to exit the building, essentially, for that to start. There is a “Wizard of Oz” curtain between us and all of our IT, which will not be revealed until the end of November. At that point software development will start for real. Some prototyping and investigative work are happening just now so that we understand the lie of the land and so on, but the real work will start on 1 December. The standard methodologies will be used and some agile methodologies, as well.
So, back in Kansas you will be using PRINCE.
Among other methodologies—yes.
Thank you. I will close with one question to get to the heart of the main concern that has been expressed. On 7 November we are taking evidence from the Scottish Government on not ROS particularly, but ICT contracts. The evidence that you have given today will inform the questions that the committee asks the Scottish Government and I suspect that we will come back to the general approach to ICT contracts. Mr Scott has made the point that you have given very strong evidence of ROS’s view that working on smaller contracts with smaller companies is what works for you. Are you saying that BT is too big and powerful a company for a public body such as ROS ever to work with?
No—I would not say that, at all. We will continue to work with BT and have a contract with it. It has to support the specially written software that it has created.
That is a legacy of the partnership.
It is, but the problem for us was the partnership contract, because it tied us in, was for so long, was for everything and did not have specific and sufficient mechanisms within it to ensure speedy value-for-money delivery.
You also said that there was an imbalance in power and expertise between the client—yourselves—and the provider.
Yes. That was the nature of the contract, because the partnership contract was designed so that the supplier provided the intelligent client function. That was a fundamental flaw in the contract. It would not be for me to sit here and criticise and blame BT; our view is that it was the nature of the contract.
Thank you very much indeed.11:08 Meeting suspended.
11:15 On resuming—
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