Item 2 on our agenda is on the section 23 report “The Gathering 2009”. I welcome Lord Sempill and Jenny Gilmour, who are directors of the company The Gathering 2009 Ltd. Members will be aware of the exchange of correspondence with the Presiding Officer and of the advice that we sought from him. Before we begin the oral evidence session, I make it clear that, as liquidation procedures are on-going in the courts, members should refrain from saying anything that has the potential to prejudice that court process, as advised by the Presiding Officer in accordance with rule 7.5 of the standing orders, on sub judice.I believe that Jenny Gilmour would like to make an opening statement on behalf of herself and Lord Sempill.
Official Report · Committee
Section 23 Reports
“The Gathering 2009”
Speakers
Choose an MSP to read only their contributions- Jenny Gilmour The Gathering 2009 Ltd 166
- Lord Sempill The Gathering 2009 Ltd 144
- The Convener 102
- George Foulkes Lothians) (Lab 70
- Nicol Stephen Aberdeen South) (LD 58
- Mr McAveety 31
- Murdo Fraser Mid Scotland and Fife) (Con 11
- Bill Kidd Glasgow) (SNP 11
- Anne McLaughlin Glasgow) (SNP 9
- Mr Frank McAveety Glasgow Shettleston) (Lab 1
The record
603 contributions · showing 1–200Thank you for inviting us. The gathering was undoubtedly the centrepiece of homecoming 2009—for many, the gathering was homecoming 2009. The Gathering 2009, which was incorporated as a limited company prior to the year of homecoming and independently of it, had a clear mission: to create the world’s biggest ever clan gathering and highland games in Scotland and to develop future gathering events and extend the gathering brand. While the previous Scottish Executive-led homecoming project continued to misfire throughout 2006 and 2007, costing the taxpayer a reported—in the press—£1.5 million, The Gathering 2009 was forging ahead with its own global promotion.Before VisitScotland and EventScotland took over the homecoming project and before any homecoming events were announced, The Gathering 2009 team had spent 12 months cultivating sales at overseas highland games and clan society meetings. Overseas clan activists saw the gathering as a once-in-a-lifetime experience. It was the reason why they came to Scotland in 2009, despite the unforeseen global banking recession that hammered international tourism. International clan members travelled in their thousands. They also stayed far longer than average tourists, spent more per head and dispersed across Scotland as a natural outcome of connecting with their clan homelands.There was no blueprint for an international clan gathering on such a scale in Scotland. As is the nature of events, there were risks inherent in its income, from sponsorship to ticket sales and other revenue-generating streams. It is important to point out that the gathering was a purely entrepreneurial undertaking that secured seed funding and sponsorship from Scotland’s private sector during its launch phase. That support allowed us to develop the business plan over a year during which we benefited from advice and assistance from VisitScotland, EventScotland, Scottish Enterprise and the City of Edinburgh Council—the organisations that later comprised the public sector funding partnership and the steering group. They signed off on our budget scenarios and the key performance indicators that we had to meet to secure the release of funds.The steering group met monthly from mid-2008 as both an advisory and planning platform for public sector stakeholders. The steering group enabled due diligence and governance to be applied at every stage of the project, both financially and logistically.On opening our box office in May 2008, we saw a phenomenal rate of sale for the gathering passports from overseas. In fact, 65 per cent of the total passports sold were purchased from overseas and from 32 different countries. Shortly afterwards, however, the global recession impacted badly on our income projections, with sponsorship agreements collapsing and passport selling somewhat stalling as consumer confidence hit a 30-year low in the United States, our primary overseas market.With our revenue streams diminished, cash flow was compromised as our credit card payments were held by WorldPay. That had a serious impact on our ability to manage deposit payments for infrastructure. At one point, WorldPay was holding more than £250,000 of our revenue. We talked to our bank Adam & Company—which, like WorldPay, is wholly owned by the Royal Bank of Scotland—to ask whether it could help us with either extending our overdraft and/or asking WorldPay to release some of the funds. WorldPay refused.We therefore had to inform our steering group partners of the situation, and the issue escalated to the point at which we presented a proposal to the Scottish Government that provided detailed options for additional event funding, assistance in negotiating with WorldPay or a loan. At all times, we provided Scottish Government officials with cash-flow budget projections, as requested. Their decision was to offer a loan, and we entered into a contractual agreement with the Scottish Government.As has been stated previously and in the statement by Minister Russell, the leading agency of our public sector steering group, EventScotland, was fully aware of the loan. Its explanation for not informing the steering committee is given in paragraph 34 of the Audit Scotland report.We would also like to underline that at no point leading up to the event, or at the time when the loan was offered, was The Gathering 2009 Ltd trading insolvently.Come the hour, many elements contributed to the significant financial underperformance. Undoubtedly, the global economic meltdown was a major contributor, as was the swine flu virus, which many people have forgotten about but which at that point was escalating to alert level 5. We also had adverse weather on the Sunday morning, which impacted on walk-up sales and our secondary revenue streams.Another significant issue was that our public catering provider, Supreme, reneged on a signed contract and to date has refused to provide tens of thousands of pounds that are owed to The Gathering 2009 for a percentage of takings. The Gathering’s liquidators, Campbell Dallas, are pursuing that through the courts. It is also important to point out that the gathering was not a one-off event and that many income streams were predicated on post-event merchandise sales and future gathering brand events. Almost immediately after the event, we knew that we faced a significant shortfall and promptly informed EventScotland and the Scottish Government. From August to October 2009 we were in constant negotiation with the Government and the banks to help us alleviate the situation. For our part as directors, our driving force during that time was to ensure the best results for our creditors. We looked at many different scenarios, including private funding, bank loans, overdraft facilities and company voluntary arrangements in order to find a solution. We would like to state now that at all times the First Minister and his staff worked tirelessly to reach a settlement that would ensure that the event and its integrity remained viable.During that time, we had three separate financial analyses done of the gathering, which included two Insolvency Practitioners Association valuations to provide a market value for the event. At the end of October 2009, when it looked like we were out of options, we were told that a solution had been found and we were called to St Andrew’s house to read an approved tripartite news release by the Scottish Government, the City of Edinburgh Council and Destination Edinburgh Marketing Alliance that detailed the purchase of The Gathering 2009. That was released to the media, and on national news that evening the deputy leader of the council confirmed the agreement. Sadly, someone had forgotten to tell the leader—
That was Steve Cardownie.
Yes.
Hold on please, George.
I just wanted to know who it was.
The resulting very public spat and media storm saw another two months of uncertainty and another IPA valuation, which ultimately resulted in a call on 27 January 2010 to say that the deal could not go ahead. The next day, we had to call in the liquidators and, as we have said, the company is still in the liquidation process.From then until now, we have fully engaged and complied with all requests for information. I have had detailed and lengthy discussions with Audit Scotland to assist it in producing the report that has been placed before the committee by the Auditor General for Scotland.Jamie Sempill and I would like to express our deep and heartfelt sadness at the situation that this has placed our creditors in. Without the hard work and commitment of those creditors, many of whom I have worked with for more than 15 years—and, ironically, whom I lead, as I am the biggest private creditor—we would not have been able to put on such a magnificent event.We also want to say that, despite the financial failure of The Gathering, we are incredibly proud of the event that we created and the legacy that it has around the world. We only hope that the debate will diminish soon, and that the event can be seen for its huge and on-going potential to harness the love and passion that people around the world have for Scotland and its people.
Thank you for your statement. Did George Foulkes want to clarify something?
No, I think that Jenny Gilmour confirmed that Steve Cardownie, the deputy leader of the council, had agreed but had not informed the council leader, Jenny Dawe. Is that right?
I assume that that is the case. The next day, Jenny Dawe went on the record as saying that the agreement was not in place. You would have to ask the City of Edinburgh Council and its officers about that discussion.
I have some general introductory questions. Has either of you ever managed an event of this scale before?
Not of this magnitude. The event was unprecedented in Scotland.
I was involved in an event of this kind in South Africa, but in a totally different context. I worked on behalf of a large brewer, and we spent a substantial amount of time putting together what is probably the biggest musical roadshow that has ever been undertaken in Africa. It ran for five years, using the funding of the South African Breweries Ltd.
But you have never had personal responsibility for funding and organising something on the scale of the gathering.
Not as part of my personal endeavours.
Jenny, you said that this was a purely entrepreneurial project and that you had received seed funding from the private sector. How much was that funding?
We received £30,000.
Although you say that the event was a purely entrepreneurial project, that money is insignificant when matched against the funding that came in from the public sector.
I agree, in the first instance. However, after that, we accrued more than £200,000 of private sector sponsorship, and the initial seed funder also became one of our main sponsors.
So, you received £200,000 of private sector sponsorship.
I think that the total was close to £230,000.
Again, that is less than the public sector put in.
Yes, it is.
So, although it was a purely entrepreneurial event with seed funding from the private sector, it was largely funded by the public sector.
In ratio terms, yes.
You say that you had a contractual agreement with the Scottish Government. At what point was that contract signed?
I am not sure of the exact date—I think that it is in the report—but I believe that it was in May.
What were the conditions or terms of that contract? What was the Scottish Government obliged to give you, and what were you obliged to give back to the Scottish Government?
The terms of the contract were that we would be given £180,000 as a short-term loan to offset our cash-flow scenario, and that we would return that money after the event.
So the contract was signed after the problems started to develop. It was not signed at the inception of the event.
No, it was meant to alleviate the short-term cash-flow situation that arose because of WorldPay.10:15
We will return to the WorldPay issue later.Neither of you had managed, sponsored, run, or taken responsibility for an event of such a scale, although Lord Sempill indicated that he was part of a large project in South Africa that was funded by South African Breweries Ltd. From the information that we have been given, it appears that your financial projections showed that the event would make a loss if it did not attract the most optimistic gate numbers, so you went into the event with a reasonable anticipation that it would be loss-making.
Or profit-making.
Or profit-making in the most optimistic of scenarios.
Yes.
However, as business people, presumably you do not just base your assumptions on the most optimistic of scenarios. You realised that there was a significant chance of the event making a loss.
It would have been remiss of us if we had not looked at three scenarios. Obviously, the event was two and a half years in the future and many factors can affect an outdoor event of such a scale. However, we projected and focused on making the event very successful.
When you went into the contractual agreement with the Scottish Government, was it aware that only in the most optimistic scenario would the event make money and that other scenarios indicated that it could quite easily make a loss?
We provided detailed information to the steering group and the Scottish Government.
Did that detailed information include the most up-to-date figures?
Yes.
Did those up-to-date figures indicate that you were on course to make a profit or a loss at that point?
That is a difficult statement to make, because most of the income revenue streams were predicated on the day, so everything was a future projection.
It was the most optimistic analysis. I presume that you have seen the report that the Scottish Parliament’s Economy, Energy and Tourism Committee commissioned. That report is critical of the projections and the analysis in relation to the homecoming, and it also looked at the impact of the gathering. What is your opinion of the criticism of that economic analysis?
It was only criticism. I do not recall that Dr Riddington offered up hard evidence in figures.
So you think that the report lacked evidence.
I would have thought that that would have been the brief and that Dr Riddington would have applied his methodology to producing figures that he could compare. I do not think that he did that, although I might be wrong.
That is fine.What information did you use to develop the financial projections?
We used a variety of information. We put a lot of research into the project as early as late 2006. As the committee is aware, I travelled to the United States extensively, primarily to the large highland games that are held there, so I had a fairly good idea about gate projections. I researched costs and the potential charges that we were thinking of making for the tickets at the time across three fairly well-recognised highland games in the United States. I also knew the local games circuit here reasonably well.We had the advantage, as Jenny Gilmour mentioned, of having quite lengthy discussions with individuals from VisitScotland and other organisations who supplied us with tourism data that showed, for instance, what one could expect an average visitor would spend at a highland games, which we used as our calculation.If we had to take a stab in the dark on anything, it was on footfall. However, right from the word go, I was confident that we would get a minimum of 30,000 people; the issue was how much higher than that we could go. In hindsight, when we put all the projections together, the events that occurred in the latter part of 2008 were way in the distance and we could not have foreseen what impact that economic meltdown would have and how it would affect the end result.
I presume that your projection of 30,000 was the minimum number of people that you required to break even.
Yes. When Jenny Gilmour and I started working on the costs that we felt would be incurred in putting on the event, we had to take stabs in the dark to a large extent. It was the first time that an event of such scale had taken place on Holyrood park or that anybody had ever thought about marching the best part of 8,000 clanspeople up the Royal Mile. Also, a lot of important parties—namely, Historic Scotland and the City of Edinburgh Council—had to come back to us with costs and I have to tell you that some of those costs did not arrive until a month to two months prior to the event.
The infrastructure costs for an event of such scale were massive. We had a highly experienced production team working on the management of the event. The team worked on costings from a year and a half before the event took place, so we constantly examined those costings and analysed the budget and spend.
How many of the 30,000 people that you projected as necessary for the event to break even were anticipated to come from overseas and how many did you anticipate from Scotland?
I always had confidence, which proved correct, that we would get more than 5,000 people from overseas and that the rest would come from within the United Kingdom.
What was the breakdown for those who came from within the United Kingdom? How many did you anticipate coming from Scotland?
I have that figure recorded somewhere. If you want total accuracy, I would prefer to give it to you post the committee meeting. The reality is that the majority of clanspeople are likely to be resident in Scotland, so it had quite a large representation. However, the United Kingdom—specifically, England—is still far and away the biggest tourist contributor to Scotland.
It would be helpful to get that information. Was the projection purely based on what you describe as clanspeople?
No, no. I am talking about the day sales. As you are aware, attendance broke down into two different types of visitors: those who came from overseas, who bought into a product called the passport; and those who just rocked up during the event itself. Obviously, the majority of the latter were local.
Even forgetting what subsequently happened, I am not sure that the gathering made a huge impact on the consciousness of the public in Scotland. Notwithstanding the fact that people may have been put off coming from abroad by economic recession and fears about swine flu, it did not seem to make any impact at all in Scotland.
That is your opinion, but I think that it did.
We can exchange opinions, but I would rather deal in fact.
I do not think that it is a fact.
Do the facts of the numbers sustain your contention?
I said earlier that we would have more than 5,000 from overseas and I suspect that it was closer to 7,000 over the weekend. If we take away that 7,000 from the 47,000 footfall that we recorded, that means 40,000 people from here came to the event over the weekend, which is more than most football matches in Scotland.
Very significant numbers attended the first event.
Was the steering group aware of your financial projections?
Yes.
At all times?
Yes.
And was it aware of any shifts in analysis?
Yes.
So the steering group was fully informed at every step of the way. Did it make any comment on the realism of your projections?
We had very detailed discussions with the group. The members were aware of working in events in Edinburgh and the Lothians, and in Scotland, so they advised us, and we took on board many of the things that they said. The discussions were very constructive: we were trying to make the event the best that we possibly could, so when they suggested, for example, that we did not charge for the literary auditorium because it might be seen as a double sale, we took that on board. Sadly, we should probably have carried on with that, because every single session was over capacity and a huge number of people were disappointed that they could not attend.
At what point did you start to indicate that the event would run at a loss?
We did not know that it would run at a loss until after the event.
So when you asked the Scottish Government for a loan, you were still anticipating at that point that there would be a profit.
Everything was in place for the event to go ahead, and therefore, if we hit all our income streams, it would have either had a slight shortfall or made a profit.
So the suggestion that we have heard—that from an early date in your planning and development the financial projections were showing that the event was likely to run at a loss—is not true.
Can I—
Unfortunately, we could not obviously state that it was going to run at a loss. Most of the income streams are predicated on the day; we would not have known what they were until the day.
Sorry, Lord Sempill—did you want to come in?
I just wanted to reiterate what Jenny Gilmour just said.
In your planning and development process, and in preparing the financial projections, was it the case at an early date that those projections were showing that the event would run at a loss?
It could run at a loss.
It could run at a loss, but I would like to pick up on a point that we made at the beginning of the meeting. The Gathering 2009 Ltd was set up to run more than one event. We had, between us as directors, taken on the reality that we may have to carry through a loss on our business. We already had a good overdraft in position with our bank, and we felt that, provided that we remained in that overdraft position, we would be safe going forward.Secondly, there were secondary income streams post the event that were critical to the company’s performance in the future. When we drew a line under the event on the day, we felt that although we may have been showing a loss, we could, provided that it was within the figures that we had in our budget, live with that going forward.
So you were providing information to the steering group on your financial projections, and it was aware at every stage of what you were anticipating. You were giving the group information that was showing at every stage that there was a possibility of a loss, but you were also giving it information that was showing that there was a possibility of profit.
Correct.
So you were giving it two scenarios all the way through, with detailed figures in relation to each scenario.
Correct.
From April 2009, there were three different scenarios.
Okay. Did you give any opinion to the group at any stage on what was the most likely scenario?
That is a difficult analysis to make, which is why we created three projections.
Right. But no one asked for your opinion on which was the most likely.10:30
At all the meetings that we had, the issue of footfall was probably the biggest discussion point. Everybody who has been in the event business in Scotland would support us in saying that the weather plays a huge role. In our case, we were reasonably fortunate on day 1. I do not expect any of you to remember this but, at 12 o’clock on the night prior to the gathering, there was a storm in Edinburgh with unbelievable rainfall. I dreaded having to open the gates the following morning, primarily because I thought that the storm would rage on through the night. However, we were fortunate that sunshine broke out the following morning and, although it was wet underfoot, the crowds came. The Sunday proved the point. It was dull and overcast with slight drizzle and, frankly, the park was empty until about 11.30, when the sun started to break quietly through the clouds. We could not guarantee to the committees in the run-up to the event that it would be X or Y, as that was always impossible to call.
So the steering group was fully informed of your financial projections at every stage and it was aware of potential losses and profits.
Correct.
I want to follow up on some of the convener’s questions, just to get clarity. You had three financial scenarios for the outturn—pessimistic, likely and optimistic. On the most likely scenario you were scheduled to run at a loss, but you said that you believed that that was acceptable, as the company would perhaps run on into the future. On the most optimistic scenario you would have made a surplus of £118,000, and on the most pessimistic scenario there would have been a loss of £223,000. If the optimistic scenario had occurred and the company had made a profit, would any of that have gone back to the public sector funders?
With the contract that we had in place for the loan, yes.
So there was an element of repayment.
Yes.
Yes.
Even with the most pessimistic scenario that you had forecast, would the company still have been solvent?
Yes.
Yes.
So all the creditors would have been paid, even on the most pessimistic outcome.
Yes.
Yes.
The actual loss was substantially more than that predicted in the most pessimistic scenario—it was more than double that amount.
Yes.
Yes.
How could that not have been foreseen?
When we came to the event, many factors influenced spend on the day and the number of people who came through the gate. Very soon after the event, we had to cease spending and accruing any more credit, so we could not market the post-event merchandise, which resulted in a significant shortfall.
It would probably help if I mentioned a couple of lines in our budget, just to clarify why the loss was substantially greater than we ever thought it could be. Spend per individual on the day was far lower than we had anticipated. As I said, we based the figure that we used in our budget on years of research by VisitScotland. It was based on expenditure of £8 per head, but that figure worked out to be closer to £6 per head.Another issue was programme sales. As I said, we were convinced that we would have 30,000 people. I believe that we were reasonably conservative. We thought that the event was significant in how it was placed and marketed and we believed that, realistically, we would sell somewhere in the region of 15,000 brochures, but the reality is that we sold about 7,000. In our budget, we had 15,000 brochures at £5. Losing 8,000 brochures at £5 each is a big chunk. All the guesstimates that we made at an early budgetary stage were considered by all the members of the various steering groups. At the time, we all felt that the figures were reasonable.
I hear all that you say, but my difficulty is that you have given us three outcomes, one of which was the most pessimistic, but it was not pessimistic at all. In fact, the reality turned out to be far worse than your most pessimistic scenario. That suggests a rather serious failure in your financial planning.
I am happy to accept that criticism, as that is the reality. We put the budgets together, as does every company, with the best management foresight that we could use and with the maximum input. I repeat that a project of this scale involving what we were trying to do had not been done before. We took our best shot at the time, with a lot of input. Unfortunately, as you point out, we called it wrong.
I wish to clarify a couple of figures. You talked about the brochures, and said that you had anticipated that there would be 30,000 people at the event.
I return to the earlier point. I said that we would have at least 30,000, and that is what we based most of our revenue streams on.
So you based your revenue streams on the most pessimistic scenario.
No—the point is that each scenario catered for the footfall that we put into it, but we based all our raw cost assumptions on having 30,000 people, to use our worst-case scenario. If there were 30,000 people, how many brochures would we realistically expect to sell? We felt that 15,000 was a reasonable shot.
Based on projections of 30,000 people, your budget outturn showed a deficit of £223,000.
Yes.
If, based on having 30,000 people, you anticipated figures—
That was required to order the programmes. We had to assess how many we thought we could sell.
You said earlier, Lord Sempill, that 40,000 people attended over the weekend, yet ticket sales were 32,400.
Forty-seven thousand people attended over the weekend.
Forty-seven thousand? So 15,000 did not pay.
No—the passports are delineated out of the budget and are separate from footfall and walk-up. The passports would be double-counted, because they came on the second day.
So it was not 47,000 people.
It was: 47,000 people came through the gate—that was the gate figure.
But some of them possibly attended twice.
Yes, and then we had the performers—
The number of people who attended was presumably 32,400 or fewer—not all of them necessarily attended on both days.
No—32,000 is the actual number of people who paid on the day. The passport holders come on top of that, and they are double-counted. There were also the performers and complementary tickets. There is a breakdown, which takes the 47,000 figure down to the 32,400 figure. That gets us to the number of unique payers who came through the gate on the day.
I wish to confirm a couple of points. Do you have the Auditor General’s report in front of you?
Yes.
Paragraph 6 says:“The company owned the event and, as a result, its directors legally carried the associated financial risk, benefiting from any profits made”.You said to Murdo Fraser, however, that you were not going to benefit fully from any profits made. What is the position?
If we had had to return the loan, we would probably have reached about parity.
I am talking about before the loan—the loan comes later. When you set up the company and agreed the arrangements with the steering committee originally, you were going to benefit from any profits made.
Yes.
Correct.
Yet you were not legally required to pay back any of the money that was given to you by the public sector.
No—that was funding.
That was not clear in the answer to Murdo Fraser’s question.
I am sorry.
That paragraph in the report continues:“but also bearing the consequence of any losses.”
Yes.
That is obviously what we are talking about now. Red Sky at Night Ltd, of which you are a director, Jenny, is an events company. Is it still in existence?
Yes.
Is it profitable?
Possibly not this year.
But it has assets.
Yes.
What sort of assets?
Very little in cash, because Red Sky at Night and I combined are the biggest private creditor of The Gathering 2009 Ltd.
I see. I want to clarify another point. In reply to a question, Lord Sempill said that this was the first time that anyone had done this. Maybe that is because most people thought that it was a daft idea that would not make money because people would not turn up to it.
It has to be a possibility that some people thought that, but let us not forget the purpose of the homecoming, which I believe was put in place by the previous Scottish Executive. It was to run a year of events in Scotland, which—
But homecoming and the gathering are two separate things. We could have had homecoming without the gathering. Homecoming was the Executive’s idea, but the gathering was your idea—you came up with it.
If I may, sir, I just point out that the original remit of the homecoming was to attract people of Scottish descent or people with an affinity for Scotland to come home during 2009. I propose that probably the greatest connection is that of people of Scottish descent who are involved in clan activities.
We are not going to get into that argument. I want to move on to cash flow and financial difficulties, but Anne McLaughlin has a question first.
Jenny, you talked in your opening statement about the reasons for the financial failure. We should emphasise the word “financial”, because I agree that the cultural impact was significant, and we should never underestimate the international impact. I think that you said that people from 32 countries came to the clan gathering.As a former event organiser—I did not work on events of the scale of the gathering, but I certainly worked on outdoor events—I am well aware that we are very much dependent on the weather. Any taxi driver in Glasgow or Edinburgh is aware of that, too. People’s habits are determined by the weather, to an extent.You also talked about being unable to rely on post-event sales because of what you could not have foreseen. I wonder whether you can give us a bit more information. You said that swine flu was one of the reasons. Will you go over again the reasons why you believe that the event failed financially and explain again what prevented you from making the post-event sales?
To answer your last question, when we reached the point at which we were aware of the significant shortfall, we could not, as directors, make that any worse, so we could not accrue any more credit. In order to realise the post-event sales, we would have had to market quite extensively. That was in our planning, but we could not do it, so we lost the revenue from CDs and DVDs and the significant future brand events that we hoped to plan. All of that had to be put on hold.
Because legally you were not allowed—
As directors, we were aware that it was essential that we did not accrue any further credit, because of the holding pattern that we were in, in terms of our negotiations.
I understand why you were unable to accrue any more credit. If you had been able to do that and you had managed to realise money from post-event sales, what impact would that have had on the overall figures?
It is a question of adding on sales of things such as CDs and DVDs. We had projections that took us through to Christmas, and there would therefore have been a major return on that. We had income of £60,000 to £80,000 in our budget for CD and DVD sales, and we had significant orders for the DVD.
Okay. Thank you.
I am relatively new to the committee discussion on the subject. Forgive me, but I am trying to get further clarity. My first question is for Lord Sempill. In terms of your financial projections at the outset, how many passports did you put down under expected sales?
We wanted to sell 8,100 passports. Right up until late 2008, we looked very well on track for that. We eventually sold 7,500.10:45
Just over 7,200.
Seven thousand five hundred. The figure of 8,100 was a specific one; it related to the number of people who can be seated on the castle esplanade for the tattoo, which has a maximum capacity of about 8,500. We felt that we could sell 8,100 passports across the globe—that was the projection.
And were different figures given? Earlier, you mentioned spend per visitor at the gathering, whether for overseas visitors or for people from Scotland and the UK. Was there a differential in spend per head between American visitors and Scottish residents who popped along on the Saturday?
I am not certain that I can answer that question. Obviously, the spend on buying the passport was a given, then there was the spend at the event itself. We have taken the total footfall at the event, but we could break out that figure. We are aware that the vast majority of those who came long distances spent the best part of two weeks in Scotland, of which only two to three days were spent in Edinburgh. I am sure that their spend outwith Edinburgh on hotel accommodation and travel was used in the EKOS report on the gathering. That report confirmed that £10.4 million came into the Scottish economy on the back of the gathering.
Your opening statement addressed areas where you eventually had financial problems. In most of your target areas, such as overseas sales, brochure sales and post-event sales, you did not reach the target.
Correct
So cumulatively, you arrived at—
In terms of income, each budget line shows where the significant loss came. Obviously, we kept our expenditure within 1 per cent of our projections for the day. We could expend a lot of time and energy on that area to get the correct figures.
In your opening statement, you referred to the homecoming theme, which was clearly an issue for the former and present Scottish Government, so we all have a commitment to making homecoming successful. You had concerns about the lack of clarity for homecoming Scotland, and saw the gathering as a key element that needed to be brought to the fore to try to fulfil the potential of homecoming. Could you amplify that argument, because I have not heard it before?
In 2006 and 2007, no events were in place. There was a break before VisitScotland and EventScotland took on board the planning of the project, so there was a bit of a hiatus. At that time, we were out there developing and selling not only the gathering but the concept of homecoming. We were getting it out into the diaspora countries. People were already starting to engage with the concept. We did a lot to promote not only the gathering but the ethos of homecoming. We started to create excitement. The many visitors from, for example, New Zealand and Australia needed a lead time. The gathering was a once-in-a-lifetime event for them; they invested huge amounts of money into coming across for the event and homecoming.
Page 13 of Audit Scotland’s report “The Gathering 2009” refers to the financial projections. The report states that the final financial projections were presented to the steering group on 15 July 2009. Am I correct in saying that those budget projections did not include the £180,000 loan from the Scottish Government?
Yes.
So you were looking purely at the budget, rather than cash flow. Did you give cash-flow projections to the steering group at any stage?
I am not sure that we definitely did so—I think that we did. We also gave them to Scottish Government officials, when we were looking at the loan.
When did you give cash-flow projections to the steering group?
I would have to look back at the agendas to identify the months in which we did that, as the number of meetings escalated in the run-up to the event. However, I can give you the information.
Did you give cash-flow projections on 15 July, when you presented the final financial projections?
I am not sure—I would have to look back at the agenda for the meeting.
In response to an earlier question from me, you said that cash-flow projections were given to the steering group at every stage. Now you seem to be uncertain.
Not cash-flow projections but budget projections.
So cash flow was not part of your budget projections.
We were not asked to provide that information.
So the steering group did not ask for it.
No.
These are important distinctions. It would be valuable to the committee to have as soon as possible the detailed information that I have requested.
We need to move on. When did it first dawn on you, as directors, that you could not manage your cash flow without financial assistance?
In April 2009.
You said that the problem was caused by WorldPay’s failure to release funds, but was that not part of the contract with WorldPay?
Yes.
So you knew that that would happen.
Yes.
We clearly understood the reality of our contract with WorldPay and accommodated that in our budgets. However, as Jenny Gilmour said in her opening statement, we started to suffer shortfalls in areas such as sponsorship and various other income streams that we were trying to get together. That put more pressure on us financially.One of the first things that we did was to look for another credit card supplier. We went to PayPal, which agreed that it would be happy to release funds to us as they came in. Subsequently, it looked at the situation much more closely and declined to do that. That left us in the situation of still being in bed with WorldPay. Because both WorldPay and our bankers were owned by the Royal Bank of Scotland, we thought that it would make sense for us to approach the Government, to see whether it could help us to release the funds.
In this meeting
Everything on 15 Sep 2010 →- 10:00 Decision on Taking Business in Private Procedure · 1
- 10:00 Section 23 Reports Evidence session · 603
- 10:00 Section 23 Reports Committee business · 28
- 10:00 Section 22 Report Committee business · 7
The type of each item (debate, statement, questions, members’ business and so on) and the times shown are worked out by this site from headings, the chair’s opening words and the Official Report’s running timestamps. They are not the Parliament’s own classification. Text: the Scottish Parliament Official Report.