I invite the Auditor General for Scotland to brief the committee on the section 23 report, “The Gathering 2009”.
Official Report · Committee
Section 23 Reports
“The Gathering 2009”
Speakers
Choose an MSP to read only their contributions- Mr Black 23
- George Foulkes 20
- The Convener 15
- Cathie Craigie 8
- Anne McLaughlin 7
- Graeme Greenhill Audit Scotland 6
- Bill Kidd 5
- Murdo Fraser 3
- Willie Coffey 2
- Mr Robert Black Auditor General for Scotland 1
- Barbara Hurst Audit Scotland 1
- Nicol Stephen 1
The record
92 contributionsThank you, convener. The report was published today, so I have the opportunity to introduce it to the committee.As I am sure members are well aware, the gathering was an event that evolved to become one of the major features of the homecoming Scotland 2009 programme. It comprised a clan gathering, Highland games and a pageant. A private sector company—The Gathering 2009 Ltd—developed, organised and delivered the event, which took place over two days in July 2009.The gathering attracted public sector grant support amounting to about £490,000 from organisations that included VisitScotland, the City of Edinburgh Council, Scottish Enterprise Edinburgh and Lothian and the Scottish Government. The Scottish Government also provided a loan of £180,000. The event cost £2.4 million to deliver but earned only £1.9 million in income. There were losses of £516,000, and unpaid creditors were owed £675,000.In exhibit 2 on page 7, we summarise the contribution from public funds, which came to just more than £490,000. The amounts that were eventually written off by public sector creditors, which are described in exhibit 6 on page 18, totalled £291,508. The total outlay from public funds was therefore of the order of £782,000 although, of course, the public sector funders are included in the creditors and some of that money might come back when liquidation proceedings have been concluded.In the report, we consider the financial arrangements and the governance of the event and we concentrate on the role that was played by public sector bodies. I emphasise that the report does not include in any way an audit or full investigation of the financial affairs of the private company that was involved, which I am not empowered to examine.The report is in two parts: in the first part we consider the organisation and delivery of the event and in the second we describe the results and what happened next. I will offer a few comments on organisation and delivery. In August and September 2007, EventScotland, the City of Edinburgh Council and Scottish Enterprise Edinburgh and Lothian each provided £100,000 of initial funding to support the gathering. The bodies and the company agreed indicators of progress that would trigger grant payments, including sale of a minimum number of tickets and submission of a budget. A payment schedule was agreed, which spread the payments from each of the funders over the life of the event.The Scottish Government provided £100,000 in December 2008, and the Heritage Lottery Fund provided £10,500 to support an education programme, which took place prior to the main event. In response to the slow sale of Highland games tickets to the local Scottish audience, EventScotland provided a further grant of £80,000 in June 2009 from its homecoming Scotland budget, to support additional marketing of the event.In early 2008, the public sector funders, together with the company’s directors, formed a steering group to look after their interests and to maximise the economic benefit of the gathering. The Scottish Government did not join the steering group on the award of its grant in December 2008. The steering group had a purely advisory role and had no authority to enforce changes or to impose sanctions in relation to how the company should deliver the event, so to that extent its ability to look after funders’ interests was limited.The company provided the steering group with financial projections, and financial matters were discussed at each meeting. However, the quality of the financial information could have been better. For example, provision of actual income and expenditure incurred in the run-up to the event would have helped to provide assurance about the accuracy of the overall financial projections.In May 2009, the company informed ministers that it had cash-flow difficulties. In response, the Scottish Government provided support to the company in the form of a short-term loan of £180,000. The steering group members were not informed of that loan. At the same time, other public sector funders responded to the company’s cash-flow problems by bringing forward grant payments to help to alleviate the pressure on the company. The payment schedules are summarised in exhibit 3 on page 12 of the report.I turn to the second part of the report, which looks at the event’s financial results and what happened afterwards. In its final projections prior to the event, the company described three possible scenarios based on pessimistic, more likely, and optimistic numbers of ticket sales, excluding the passport sales. The most pessimistic scenario was based on 30,000 ticket sales and forecast a deficit of £223,000. The most likely scenario was based on 40,000 ticket sales and forecast a deficit of £49,000. The most optimistic scenario forecast a surplus of £118,000, based on 50,000 ticket sales. The company, however, reported a loss of £516,000, which was significantly worse than the most pessimistic scenario.The event’s costs were within 1 per cent of budget, but there was a significant shortfall in income. The income of £1.9 million was 19 per cent lower than the income that was projected in the most likely scenario, which was largely a result of fewer ticket sales and sales of more concessionary tickets than was originally expected. Ticket sales amounted to 32,400 and there were 7,400 passport sales, which gave people access to the Highland games on both days.Despite the financial losses, in September 2009 an external economic impact assessment of the event reported that the event had delivered additional tourism revenue of £10.4 million to Scotland as a whole, which resulted in a return on the public sector investment of 1:21. I must emphasise, however, that we have not validated that independent economic assessment.The scale of the losses meant that the company was unable to pay its creditors, leaving the company at immediate risk of insolvency. Given the positive economic benefits that have been reported as being provided by the gathering, ministers were keen to protect the reputation of the event to allow further economic benefits to be generated for Scotland through future gathering events. They therefore asked officials to consider options regarding the company’s future, including its potential sale.A key issue of concern was whether potential purchasers would, realistically, consider buying the company, given its level of outstanding debts. Two reasons were given for that. First, there was a low probability of recovery of the debt and secondly, there was an attempt to avoid the liquidation of the company and to safeguard the reputation and future of the gathering.The permanent secretary in the Scottish Government decided to write off the Scottish Government’s £180,000 loan. He also passed on his judgment that the debt could not be recovered to other public bodies that had incurred debts through the provision of services to the gathering, so that they could also consider writing off the amounts that were owed to them. As a result, the Scottish Ambulance Service, Lothian and Borders Police and Historic Scotland also wrote off £112,000 between them. Those actions were all in accordance with the “Scottish Public Finance Manual”.At the start of October 2009, the Scottish Government approached the Royal Edinburgh Military Tattoo and the City of Edinburgh Council about the potential purchase of the company. The council reported that Destination Edinburgh Marketing Alliance—sometimes called DEMA—might be interested in taking on the gathering event. Following initial discussions with the council, DEMA stated that it would be interested in delivering future gathering events and the council confirmed that to the Scottish Government. However, those discussions did not include consideration of DEMA taking on the current liabilities of the company.In mid-October 2009, the council issued a press release on behalf of DEMA, which indicated that DEMA would take on the company’s remaining private sector obligations and, with the council and other public sector bodies, would develop the assets and intellectual property rights to organise future events. The press release was misleading, because DEMA had not agreed to take on the outstanding private sector liabilities of the company. It was also issued before all the facts were known, as due diligence—in other words, checks—was still being carried out and a valuation of the intellectual property had still to be finalised.12:00
The press release created an expectation among creditors that they would be paid, which could not at that time be guaranteed. DEMA subsequently confirmed that, as a private company with limited resources, it could not take on the financial liabilities of the company. The City of Edinburgh Council then commissioned its own valuation of the intellectual property, which reported in January 2010 that it had a value of between £40,000 and £100,000. That was, of course, significantly less than the amount of the outstanding debt. The council subsequently told the Scottish Government that it could not purchase the company or the intellectual property due to budget constraints, and the company went into voluntary liquidation on that day.There are probably some important lessons for all public bodies in the report and they are captured in the recommendations on page 4. A number of public organisations were working together with each other and with a private company, so communication was more complex than it might have been had a single public sector body been operating with a single private company. In such circumstances, it is important that the bodies involved should ensure good communication between the joint funding bodies, consider carefully the role, membership and reporting lines of steering groups and the like—including the balance between advisory and decision-making roles—and get a clear remit established. They should certainly ensure that accountability for spending public money is always clearly understood, with an explicit statement of the degree of financial risk that is being assumed by each partner. It is important that the bodies involved should set out in advance a clear expectation for financial reports and add those to the key performance indicators that are required to be met for payments to be released, and, when a relevant company history exists, they should consider the circumstances in which due diligence checks on private sector companies should be undertaken prior to offers of funding being made available.The team that undertook the detailed work is with me. Together, we will do our best to answer your questions.
Thank you, Mr Black. I know that committee members have not had a lot of time to look at the detail of the report, so it is inevitable that our questions will be relatively superficial, but we may have a chance to come back to the matter at a later date.I will pick up on a couple of points. I am astonished, but perhaps not surprised, that the permanent secretary wrote off the loan. That is an extremely generous gesture with our money, but it is not the first that we have come across from the permanent secretary—he gave a nice gesture to Dr Malcolm Reed when he left Transport Scotland and we do not know what gesture was given to Guy Houston when he left.I want to examine how we got to this situation. It is a scandal that, at a time of scarce financial resources, public agencies such as the Scottish Ambulance Service and, I think you said, the police, are left out of pocket by what looks like a catalogue of mismanagement and incompetence. On the loan that was given, I refer to page 10 of your report: you can perhaps help me to confirm my understanding or otherwise. The report states:“From April 2009, the financial information provided did not include figures for actual income and spend to date, but was based on forecasts of total income and spend for the event. It was, therefore, not possible to compare outturn figures with budgets, at any point in time, to provide assurances as to the accuracy of the financial projections.”So, at April 2009, we could not assess the accuracy of the financial projections.Paragraph 25 of the report states:“Some steering group members told us that the financial projections were difficult to understand but they did not doubt the reliability or accuracy of the figures”.How they could say that when the information was not available is beyond me.The report continues:“The group challenged the financial information, discussed the information presented and, where necessary, asked for revisions”.We then had a situation in which“The Minister of Culture, External Affairs and the Constitution asked Scottish Government officials to advise on the practicalities of underwriting the company’s cash flow”.He did that after meeting the company in April 2009. At that time, if I read the report correctly, the financial information did not include figures on actual income and spend to date, but in the same month, the minister met the company and, following the meeting, he asked his officials to advise on the practicalities of underwriting the cash flow.The report states:“The Scottish Government did not complete robust checks of the company’s ability to repay the loan, or seek information from the other steering group members regarding the company and the event’s status.”That is a shocking dereliction of duty. The Government threw public money around with gay abandon as if it mattered not a jot, and it did not bother to find out whether the company could repay the money. If I read the report correctly, the Government did not even tell two Government agencies—EventScotland and Scottish Enterprise, which is a non-departmental public body—that it had given a loan to the company. Why there was such secrecy on the part of either the minister or his officials is beyond me.However, worse than that, because the public agencies were not told of the loan, when they were pressed by the company because of the financial problems, the agencies—not so much the City of Edinburgh Council, but EventScotland and Scottish Enterprise—brought forward payments to help the company out, not knowing that the Scottish Government had already given it £180,000, which the permanent secretary subsequently generously decided to write off. It is absolutely disgraceful that money was dished out to people in that way without due diligence and proper checks and scrutiny.You might not be in a position to tell us the answer, but I wonder whether ministers put pressure on officials to bail out the organisation because ministers were concerned about the political ramifications if the event did not go ahead.
You covered a number of points. With help from my team, I will do my best to provide what information we have on those issues. You started with a comment on paragraphs 24 and 25 of the report, on the quality of the financial information that was available. It strikes me that that was an important issue in the spring of 2009 because it meant that the actual cash-flow position of the company was unknown at that time. The team was advised that the steering group members found that the financial projections “were difficult to understand”. That was undoubtedly a significant shortcoming.Secondly, you mentioned the April 2009 meeting that involved the Minister for Culture, External Affairs and the Constitution. That meeting was arranged to discuss the broadcasting issues, but we were advised that, during the meeting, the directors also brought up the cash-flow problems. That is as much as we know about what happened at that meeting.On the Scottish Government’s loan of £180,000, the Scottish Government believed that the income from ticket sales was being collected by WorldPay, and that it would not be released until after the event. The loan was therefore intended to be a short-term solution to alleviate the company’s cash-flow problems. We have not examined the company’s books—obviously—to determine the financial position in June 2009 when the loan was offered, so it is not possible for us to say whether there was a clear risk at the time that the loan would not be repaid.With the benefit of hindsight, it is fair to say that the Scottish Government could have completed a more thorough assessment of the company’s ability to repay the loan, and that it might have been possible to have a fuller dialogue with the company and other steering group members, to try to get as much factual information as possible. However, it is also important to place on record that clearly time was not on anyone’s side by the summer of last year, because the event was committed to and was about to proceed. The Scottish Government, I guess, would have taken the not unreasonable view that in order to allow the event to proceed it should assist the short term cash-flow problems of the company that was delivering the event.
It is important to put the matter in context. The EKOS Ltd report, “The Gathering: Economic Impact Assessment” concluded that the overall impact of the event had been positive for the economy. However, I concur with the convener; Audit Scotland’s report shows a cavalier attitude towards public money on the part of the Government and some of its agencies. That is a serious matter.If I heard you correctly and read your report correctly, the press release on 15 October 2009 was misleading. It was issued before all the facts were known and, most important, it created a false expectation among creditors that they would be paid. I presume that the consequence was that creditors did not take action that they might otherwise have taken to protect their position. You suggested that creditors did not commence winding-up proceedings against the company at that point. It might be that if creditors had taken such action they would be financially no better off than they have ended up being, but we cannot know that for sure.What concerns me is that, according to your report,“Council officials and the Scottish Government worked jointly on the press release prior to its release.”It is extraordinary that the City of Edinburgh Council and the Scottish Government seem to have colluded to issue information in a press release that potentially had a negative impact on private and public sector creditors, who might have taken action to protect their position if they had not received misleading information. Can you tell us who in the Scottish Government was responsible for signing off the press release? The matter requires more rigorous investigation.
Your question would be best directed to the Scottish Government. We do not have knowledge of the detailed discussions that took place between the Scottish Government and representatives of the council and DEMA. My conclusion in the report is unequivocal: the press release was misleading and may well have had the sort of consequences that you outlined.
Can you shed light on whether creditors would be in a better or worse position if the press release had not been issued and they had taken action at that stage?
That would be speculation. I am not sure that we are in a position to answer your question.
I think that the City of Edinburgh Council entered into an arrangement with a creditor who had threatened to take action. Is it the case that an out-of-court settlement was reached and that there was a confidentiality agreement with the creditor?
Yes. That is correct.
Therefore, at least one of the creditors who threatened to take action potentially received some financial benefit. However, the rest of the creditors, who received assurances as a result of the press release and decided to do nothing, are out of pocket.
It is true that the council responded to a particular creditor, who had advised in October 2009 that they would instruct solicitors to commence winding-up proceedings. That followed through into an out-of-court settlement to meet an obligation to the creditor.
There might be questions that other people need to ask of the council.12:15
The steering group of the three original public sector funders—EventScotland, City of Edinburgh Council and Scottish Enterprise Edinburgh and Lothian—had a quarterly meeting to follow up what was happening with the development of the company and the events that were due to take place. I do not know whether it is within your remit to comment on whether the funders carried out their duties at those meetings sufficiently to be aware of what was taking place with the company.On the £180,000 loan from the Scottish Government, I assume that someone did not just turn up at the minister’s door, asking him for £180,000. With the backing of the steering group, would it not be considered reasonable to ensure that, having gone so far, the event could continue? As it turns out—although this is something that no one could have known at the time—the external assessment is that Edinburgh in particular but Scotland as a whole benefited financially from the event. Would it seem reasonable that the minister should have considered that the loan was in good standing, because the company was being controlled not only by Red Sky at Night but by the steering group?
As I think I said in my introduction, the steering group had a purely advisory role, so it had no formal authority over the company whatever. It was a group that came together, really under the auspices of EventScotland, which is part of VisitScotland, to look after the interests of the public sector funding parties involved. The group met regularly and received reports, but it is clear from the audit that the quality of the financial information that it was getting was not as strong as it might have been—that is probably the central point that it is worth making.On your other point about whether it was reasonable for the Scottish Government to provide the extra short-term loan to achieve the event, that is a matter that would best be directed to the Scottish Government.
You are probably right. You said that the financial advice that the steering group received at its regular meetings was possibly not of the best quality. Does that mean that somebody was not carrying out their duties properly in reporting back the financial situation?
My general answer to that would be that, with the benefit of hindsight, the steering group should have constituted itself in a way that would have made it very clear to the company what financial and performance information should have been provided. It did have an arrangement whereby certain targets were to be delivered, which were important for triggering the release of funds, so a duty of care was exercised there, but the quality of information provided, particularly in relation to finances, was not as good as it might have been. I wonder whether the team can expand on that more fully.
On the financial projections that were coming in, we were obviously anticipating the overall income and expenditure figures for the whole event when it reached its conclusion. What we were saying is that it would have been beneficial if actual income and expenditure figures to date were being reported to the steering group. If then, for example, income was running below expectations at a particular point in time, that would have allowed people to challenge whether the overall projected income was likely to be accurate. If that process had been gone through, it would have perhaps strengthened the quality of the financial monitoring and the extent to which the steering group could challenge the information.
Does that suggest that a positive spin was being put on how things were developing—basically, that everything would be all right on the night?
I am not sure that we are in a position to read the minds of the people involved. I am sorry about that.
It just sounds a bit like that.
I am sorry about that.
No, that is fine. Thank you.
Paragraph 31 of the report tells us:“The Minister of Culture, External Affairs and the Constitution asked Scottish Government officials to advise on the practicalities of underwriting the company’s cash flow”.Was that in May 2009, when the company directors informed the minister that the company was experiencing cash-flow problems?
There was a meeting between the Minister for Culture, External Affairs and the Constitution and the company directors in April 2009. As I think I mentioned earlier, that meeting was primarily for them to discuss broadcasting issues. At that meeting, the company directors mentioned cash-flow problems and that led to the offer of a short-term interest-free loan in June.
The steering group was not told about that in April, May or June. When was it told about the arrangement?
I am not sure that the steering group was aware of the loan until after the event took place.
It was not aware of it until after the event. Okay.Paragraph 33 of the report states:“The Scottish Government does not normally provide loans to private companies and officials did not seek professional advice on its legality.”However, the third line of paragraph 31 says that“Officials sought advice from the finance directorate”.Did that not include advice on whether the finance directorate thought that it was legal to provide the loan?
The key point is that the loan was awarded under section 23 of the National Heritage (Scotland) Act 1985, which gives the Secretary of State the power to make payments to anyone whose activities appear“likely to promote the development or understanding of cultural or scientific matters.”That act precedes devolution by some considerable time, but the legislation must still be extant in some form or another that allows the Scottish Government to use it. Further questions on that matter should be directed to the Scottish Government.
Convener, we would have to find out if that power transferred to Scottish ministers, and if there is a difference between a payment and a loan. I accept that the question should be directed elsewhere.
That is a significant point. Is there a difference between a payment and a loan? Was that legally competent?There is also some good business advice in the report. It states that“The Scottish Government does not normally provide loans to private companies”,so any private company that wants to get a loan from the Scottish Government would be well advised to wrap a bit of tartan round it and it will be okay, because the Scottish Government will find a reason to give it. It beggars belief.
I just have a couple of points. The minister at the time was Mike Russell, was it not?
It was.
You keep telling us that we will have to ask the Scottish Government to answer our questions, so who is the accountable officer?
The accountable officer in relation to the budget would be the permanent secretary.
So we will need to move quickly before he leaves.
He has already left.
Has he?
Yes. A new permanent secretary has assumed office.
Can we call the other one back?
Yes.
We can.Paragraph 6 of the report states:“The company owned the event and, as a result, its directors legally carried the associated financial risk, benefiting from any profits made but also bearing the consequence of any losses.”I am absolutely certain that if the event had made hundreds of thousands of pounds, the company would not have distributed any of it back to the Scottish Government; it would have gone to Jamie Sempill and Jenny Gilmour. Why were they not asked to bear the losses?
The company was established in the normal way, as a company limited by the share issue. Each of the directors owned one £1 share, so they have limited personal financial liability to the company’s creditors, which reflects the share investment.
Is that of £1?
That is our understanding.
So the Scottish Government loaned those people money, the council gave them money and EventScotland approved them, knowing that if they made a lot of money, they would keep it, but if they lost money, they would be liable for only £1. Is that right?
I cannot say what would happen to any profits that the company made, but it is certainly true that the financial losses of the two directors would be very small. The main consequence to them would be a loss of reputation by being associated with a company that had gone into liquidation.
What due diligence was done on those two people and the company? Until the matter arose, Jamie Sempill called himself Lord Sempill, but I have never seen him around the House of Lords. He is not a member of the House of Lords, is he?
I understand that he is the 15th Lord Sempill and so he has a seat in the House of Lords.
I am sure that he does not. I have never heard of him.
He was a hereditary member of the House of Lords in the 1990s.
What due diligence was done on the two people?
EventScotland undertook some due diligence of Red Sky at Night when the gathering idea was presented to it. Obviously, there was no company history as the company was new, so EventScotland had nothing much to exercise due diligence work on. Therefore, it looked at Red Sky at Night, because Jenny Gilmour was a director of that company and also a director of the Gathering 2009 Ltd. It has a fair amount of experience of helping to contribute to that kind of event. I understand that Lord Sempill has a more general marketing background. He is very high up in the Standing Council of Scottish Chiefs—he is convener of it. I understand that he spends a fair amount of time in America, where gathering-style events are also popular and that he has many contacts in that area.
So Nicol Stephen and I could set up a company and get hundreds of thousands of pounds of grant from the Scottish Government and the council. Is that right?
No.
That is unlikely.
It would be unlikely that you would get that, George.
As you say, only certain people would get it.I want to make another point. The EKOS report stated that the event delivered significant economic benefits to both Edinburgh and Scotland. If that is the case, we must bear it in mind, as Murdo Fraser said, but how do we know that many people did not come from Europe and America because the pound was low? Their coming here might have had nothing to do with the gathering or the homecoming.
We did not validate the EKOS work in any way. That is another question that would possibly be best answered by the Scottish Government.
What is EKOS?
It is an independent consultancy.
Does Jamie Sempill have anything to do with it?
No.
That is good.
I want to ask briefly about two things. First, would the event have gone ahead if the Scottish Government had not given the loan? What would have been the consequences? Would they have been worse for everyone concerned if the Scottish Government had not given the loan? I am trying to work out why it thought that it had to give the loan.Secondly, paragraph 27 of the report explains why the company had a cash-flow problem. It states:“The company had contracted with WorldPay to process advance sales of ... tickets ... WorldPay was withholding income ... until after the event had taken place”.Is that similar to what happened to flyglobespan?
The report says that that was in the contract that the organisation set up with WorldPay.
So the company knew about it.
The report says that the company was contracted.12:30
Okay. It may not be an issue for this committee, but it is concerning when companies face difficulty and have a cash-flow problem because whomever they contracted to take care of internet sales is hanging on to the money. My main question was, what would have happened if the Government had not provided the loan?
Clearly, we are in the realms of speculation, but it is possible that the company would have run out of cash and would have been unable to meet its obligations. If so, it would have been trading unlawfully. It is not impossible that the company would have had to fold before the event. Given the advanced stage that the project had reached, with many tickets having been sold and many commitments having been made by providers of goods and services, it is understandable that the Scottish Government should have done as much as it could to ensure that the company got to the event.As the report indicates, the loan was made to the company on the understanding that WorldPay would release the cash to cover the company’s obligations. It is normal policy for organisations such as WorldPay to pay over the receipts after the event. I imagine that that would have been factored into the company’s thinking when it was preparing its business plan. However, as the report outlines, at one point in the history of the project there was a shortfall in income streams, so that the company had what it considered to be a short-term and, therefore, temporary cash-flow problem.
We have not had time to read the report, as it has just been published, but I cannot help thinking that the main mistakes came early on and that the Scottish Government had little option other than to provide the loan to the company. It is just unfortunate how it all turned out in the end.
I wonder why the report has come to us on the day of its publication. I would like to find out how that came to be, as I do not recall another occasion in the lifetime of the Public Audit Committee when it has been asked to examine a report that has been released and put on the table that very morning. I do not recall the matter being on the committee’s agenda previously. There is plenty of opportunity for the committee to consider the report in depth. The danger is that members will rush to scandalous judgments and pick out key aspects of the report that reflect their point of view.As Mr Black said, the project’s costs were within 1 per cent of the budget. That is hardly a scandalous dereliction of duty. The reported revenue benefit to Scotland of £10 million, although unaudited, is hardly a scandalous dereliction of duty either. Members need time to reflect on some of the lessons that have been learned from the project before rushing to judgment on some of the conclusions that have been drawn.
I am responsible for the timing of the publication of all reports in my name. There are two factors to bear in mind in relation to this report. First, members of the team had to work hard to allow me to lay the report before the summer recess; I am grateful to them for that. We have been up against a time limit.My second point is more significant and relates to general policy. From time to time, I must make reports on matters of some controversy, either in the Parliament or in public. As soon as a report is laid before Parliament on my behalf, it is a public document. If the report had been available in time to release with the agenda, for example, there would have been a significant risk of media coverage and speculation in advance of the opportunity that I have been given to present the report to you and to answer questions. It is right that the first audience for such a report should be the Parliament and the relevant committee; that is the procedure that I followed in this case. The disadvantage of that approach is that members do not have an opportunity to read the report in advance, but I am happy to appear before the committee at any time for it to consider it further. It is important that the Parliament, rather than the media, should be the first port of call for such a report.
I accept that explanation, but committee members are poring over the pages as we sit here, trying to pick out noteworthy points. It is difficult to do that when particular items stand out. The balanced overview that the Auditor General gave earlier painted a slightly different picture from that which some members have chosen to portray by picking out particular items, although it is entirely up to them to do so.I hope that we will get such a detailed and thorough analysis of the shambles and dereliction of duty that is going on in the Edinburgh trams project when the Auditor General comes to consider that.
Hear, hear.
By the SNP, you mean.
I think that George Foulkes wants to come in, but first I want to confirm some of the figures. We are talking about £490,000 of public funding, £382,000 that was written off by public organisations and £344,000 that is owed to private creditors. Is that correct?
That is correct.
So we are talking about £1,216,000—most of which is public, and £344,000 of which is private—for an event that was, according to all reports, largely ignored by the Scottish public. Those figures are accurate.
I am not clear on this: is there a plan to hold another one of these events?
I believe so, but I do not think that the Auditor General can go into that. If we decide to do anything, we can ask ministers or officials.
The Auditor General has made recommendations for the future.
We can take that up with the Scottish Government.
In his response to Willie Coffey, the Auditor General said that the team had worked hard to publish the report before the summer recess. Why did it have to be published before then? I too am finding it difficult to read the report—which is no doubt very good—while I am sitting here. What was the rush?
All our reports are produced as speedily as we can manage, so that the Parliament and the public can get whatever assurance we are able to provide. This report was no different from any other in that respect.
We are having an attack on the Auditor General.
No, we are not going to get into that. Points are being made and answered. Is there anything else that has not been covered?
The Auditor General mentioned that his team had not had time to validate the EKOS report. Does he plan—or have the power—to examine that report? The EKOS report said that the gathering generated £10.4 million of additional tourism revenue, so it should have run at a profit. That raises more questions around it.
Our colleagues in the Economy, Energy and Tourism Committee are undertaking an inquiry into homecoming Scotland 2009 and the gathering. I assume that they will have the opportunity to go into the detail of the EKOS report, which tries to put a nice gloss on what has been a financial disaster. We will leave it to that committee to pursue the matter. Is there anything else?
I understand that the reports are produced as speedily as possible, but was the Auditor General asked specifically to have this report ready before the summer recess?
No—the decision was entirely mine. The alternative would have been to hold off the report until after the summer recess. In view of the interest in the matter in Parliament and the time lapse since the event, it seemed reasonable to attempt to get the report to Parliament before the recess. That gave me the opportunity to present it in the first instance to Parliament, rather than the matter continuing to run with much speculation in the media.
I thank the Auditor General for the report, which we will no doubt come back to.
In this meeting
Everything on 23 Jun 2010 →- 10:00 Decision on Taking Business in Private Procedure · 1
- 10:00 Section 23 Reports Committee business · 157
- 10:00 Section 23 Reports Committee business · 92
- 10:00 Audit Scotland (Annual Report) Committee business · 14
- 10:00 Section 23 Report Committee business · 2
The type of each item (debate, statement, questions, members’ business and so on) and the times shown are worked out by this site from headings, the chair’s opening words and the Official Report’s running timestamps. They are not the Parliament’s own classification. Text: the Scottish Parliament Official Report.