Following a report from the Auditor General for Scotland, the committee decided to take evidence on the "Review of Cairngorm funicular railway". I welcome to today's meeting Sandy Brady, the acting chief executive and director of strategic planning at Highlands and Islands Enterprise; Douglas Yule, operations director at HIE; and Keith Bryers, head of property and infrastructure at HIE. Mr Brady has indicated that he would like to make some opening remarks.
Official Report · Committee
Section 23 Reports
“Review of Cairngorm funicular railway”
Speakers
Choose an MSP to read only their contributions- Sandy Brady Highlands and Islands Enterprise 86
- Hugh Henry Lab 67
- Douglas Yule Highlands and Islands Enterprise 59
- George Foulkes Lab 51
- Nicol Stephen LD 27
- Keith Bryers Highlands and Islands Enterprise 15
- Willie Coffey SNP 11
- Anne McLaughlin SNP 6
- Bill Kidd SNP 3
- Murdo Fraser Con 2
- Cathie Craigie Lab 1
The record
330 contributions · showing 1–200Cairngorm funicular railway is a unique Scottish visitor attraction and one of the most challenging projects ever undertaken by Highlands and Islands Enterprise. The project's planning, construction and operation have been thoroughly reviewed by Audit Scotland. HIE accepts in full the findings of that review. In particular, we note that although HIE followed accepted practice on project appraisal and management when the funicular was designed and built, those standards have now moved on. Our current procedures are more rigorous, as the review indicates.We are pleased with the review's conclusion that the funicular succeeded in creating employment and achieving the wider economic benefits that it was designed to deliver. It has triggered significant further investment in Aviemore and Strathspey, created a year-round operation that provides continuous employment at CairnGorm Mountain Ltd, and attracted a greater number of visitors to the area.Today, as the owner of the operating company as well as the railway, HIE faces the further challenge of devising a suitable business model to ensure the future viability of the attraction as a business in its own right and a driver of the wider economy. We have worked with external consultants for much of this year to prepare for that purpose a detailed options appraisal, which our board is due to consider on Tuesday 8 December.The history of the funicular goes back more than 15 years and is, naturally, quite complex. My colleagues and I have reviewed the available documentation thoroughly and will do our best to recall the key issues from the early 1990s right through to the present. We are happy to answer questions that the committee may have on the historical or current aspects of the funicular.One final, further point that I should make is that Keith Bryers and I worked for HIE throughout the period in question. For part of the period, from 1999 to 2001, Douglas Yule was employed by Morrison Construction Ltd, which was one of the contractors on the project. Keith Bryers and I will therefore try to cover any questions that relate to that period.
Can I just clarify something, Mr Brady? Will the board consider a new business plan next Tuesday?
It will consider a series of options that arise from the independent work that we commissioned from Johnston Carmichael.
Right. When will your new business plan be ready?
I suspect that the business plan will be implemented at some time following the board meeting, during the course of 2010.
How close are you to having a considered business plan?
The business plan will be prepared in the light of the HIE board's decision on which of the three options it wishes to take forward. They have not yet been debated by the board.
So it will be some time next year before we are able to see a business plan.
That is correct.
Okay. You said that your procedures are now more rigorous. Does that suggest that your previous procedures were not rigorous?
The procedures at the time were different. They were appropriate to that time, but a number of steps that are now undertaken in project appraisal were not undertaken then. The Audit Scotland review looked at those and at current best practice and concluded that the procedures were appropriate and of the standard that was expected at the time when the funicular project was put together.
In the light of what we now know and the standards that now pertain, could it be suggested that a less-than-rigorous approach was taken at the time? You said that the procedures were different, but was the approach less rigorous?
It was equally rigorous. The documentation that goes back to that period is considerable. Not only had we to satisfy the Secretary of State for Scotland that we should commit such a sum of money to the project, but we had to apply for European funding under the objective 1 programme, and both of those processes in the project appraisal were exceedingly rigorous.
Have the reasons that justified the investment changed? Do we now have a different set of reasons for continuing it or are the fundamental aspirations the same?
The aspirations are the same. We always saw the investment in the Cairngorm funicular as part of a series of investments in the Strathspey and wider Highland area. We have invested heavily in the redevelopment of the Aviemore centre, which is part and parcel of that, and we now have the Cairngorms national park in the area. We have always seen those three elements together as the three legs of a stool, if you will—the investment in the skiing facilities, the investment at Aviemore, and the investment in the national park.The project built on the momentum that was created in the area by the investments that were made in the 1960s. A skiing development and an all-year-round tourism industry were created in the Strathspey area during the 1960s, and we saw the further investment that was required during the 1990s as taking that momentum forward.
Was that economic investment in infrastructure, which you hoped would boost jobs and tourism, properly balanced against environmental issues?
We believe that it was. At the beginning of the 1990s, a two-year piece of work was done by the Cairngorms working party, which was a multidisciplinary group that the secretary of state set up to look at the balance of recreational, environmental and economic interests in the wider Cairngorms area. The working party's report in 1993 indicated that it favoured the continuation of the balanced approach, and much of that thinking was incorporated in the subsequent move to a national park, but it recognised that downhill skiing was a key part of the attraction of the Cairngorms area, that it had been in place since the early 1960s, and that it was part and parcel of what went on there.Clearly, there are significant environmental pressures and concerns, because we are operating in a high mountain environment. As the owner of not just the funicular but the Cairngorm estate, we have tried hard to be a good landowner and to recognise, with our neighbouring landowners, the natural heritage value of what we have in the Cairngorms.
Early on, HIE identified a number of risks including climate change and, if required, reinstatement costs. What plans were put in place to deal with those risks? How did HIE plan to tackle them at the time?
We tried to do so in a number of ways. One of the greatest risks was the financial cost of constructing the funicular railway. There were some parallels with the gondola at Aonach Mòr, but a funicular railway had not been built in Scotland before. We were aware that it was a ground-breaking development and that we would learn a lot of lessons as we went along. We took a considerable amount of professional advice and, in the way in which we constructed and procured the railway, we tried to learn from the experience of other skiing resorts in Europe. We were very much aware of the fact that we were breaking ground.Turning to other risks, we considered the impact on the environment. A key part of that was the section 50 planning agreement, which was drawn up in obtaining planning consent. The parties to that included ourselves, Scottish Natural Heritage and the Highland Council, as the planning authority. A key part of the agreement was the closed system for non-skiers at the top of the funicular, which was a considerable environmental benefit of the funicular. We effectively replaced an ageing chairlift, at the top of which there was free and unfettered access to the Cairngorm plateau. As a result of the funicular being built, that access has been removed. One of the key things that we have achieved—which is in line with the Cairngorms working party's view—is the re-establishment of the long-walk-in principle, so that people who wish to go to the plateau can no longer take mechanised uplift to a very high level.
You said that the procedures that were in place were appropriate at the time, but that current procedures are more rigorous. What approach do you take now when you assess risk in major capital projects? How does your current approach differ from the way in which risks were assessed and dealt with 15 years ago?
One of the most important differences is in the use of gateway reviews. That technique has been widely introduced across the public sector over the past five to 10 years. Gateway reviews, as such, were not in place when the Cairngorm funicular project was brought forward. Were we doing a similar project today, it would undoubtedly go through that process, which is a cool, dispassionate and objective look at the project from its inception and initial planning, through the appraisal stage and on to the construction period. It ensures that the project's benefits are realised. We recognise that we would have a more focused team to deliver the project. The work was done by a number of officers, who worked on the project as part of their wider portfolio of work. These days, we would install a senior responsible owner, who I suspect, for a project of such a scale, would work virtually full time on the project. We would probably also go for a project board, members of which would challenge the team procuring the project to ensure that we were on track to deliver what we were trying to achieve.
How robust were the visitor number estimates on which the business case was based?
We estimated that the non-skier visitors would probably number around 165,000 per annum. The figures were examined by independent consultants, who took views from comparable attractions elsewhere. In reality, we more or less achieved those figures in the early years of the funicular, although they have drifted slightly downward since then. One of the challenges that we face is to re-establish the attractiveness of the funicular for the non-skier.The numbers of skiers are considerably lower than we hoped for. I guess that the numbers are explained by the availability and quality of skiing conditions on the mountain. Looking back at the Cairngorm figures over a long period, we note that there have been some bumper years and some very poor years. Unfortunately, we have suffered more of the poorer years within the past five to 10 years than we have done historically. The numbers of people who come in each year are subject to factors that are beyond human control. We depend on snowfall and on the quality and length of the season that we can generate.
That is why I am surprised that, when construction started in 1999, HIE did not review the project again, because by then you knew that skier numbers were declining. Why did you not take that into account?
We considered the skier numbers closely in the 1997 appraisal when we decided to commit funds to the project, and the issue featured as part of the discussion of the European funding. A period of about 18 months then elapsed before construction began on the funicular. One finding of the Audit Scotland review is that we ought to have paused at that stage to re-evaluate the assumptions. We did not do so. We were up against some tight deadlines, notably the deadline imposed by the European funding. When the final agreement on that funding was reached in 1999, we proceeded immediately with the funicular.Looking back at the skier numbers, one can see a pattern that perhaps suggests that we were not enjoying the numbers that we had enjoyed in the 1980s, but it was by no means clear at that stage that there was a long-term pattern. Although the debate on climate change has continued, the important point to stress is that what matters at Cairngorm are the winter weather conditions, which can change remarkably from year to year. There is no reason why we will not have a good year again in the future, but it seems that the incidence of poor years is higher than it was back in the 1980s.
You said that one thing that stopped you reviewing the assumptions was the pressure to meet deadlines to qualify for European funding. If you had not been under that pressure, would you have done things differently and reviewed the case?
It is difficult to say. There was a momentum to the project. We had been given every political encouragement by the Secretary of State for Scotland. He wished to support the project and see it happen, particularly as the Government had committed £8 million to the redevelopment of the Aviemore centre and saw the two developments as very much complementary. The effect of the European funding deadline was to squeeze the number of construction summers that we had on the project, broadly from three to two. If we had not had that deadline, we might have had a slightly longer construction period, but that is conjecture. We dealt with the situation that was before us. We had to try to open the funicular within the window of two summers, and that is what we did.
At the time, who owned the Aviemore centre?
I ask Douglas Yule to answer that.
In the late 1990s, it was owned by a company called Aviemore Mountain Resort Ltd, which was a predecessor of the organisation that subsequently acquired it—Aviemore Highland Resort Ltd. That consortium owned the centre until recently; it changed hands again within the past 12 months.
In the organisations that owned the centre in the late 1990s and subsequently, which individual or company was the driving force? Would we recognise any of the names?
The main consortium that carried out the redevelopment of the Aviemore centre was Aviemore Highland Resort Ltd, which involved Macdonald Hotels, David Sutherland and the Tulloch Group, and HBOS and HIE as investors.
So Macdonald Hotels has been a consistent player all the way through.
Only from the time that it acquired the interest in Aviemore Mountain Resort from the previous owners, which was in the late 1990s.
Hello, Mr Brady. I am a bit new to all of this. Am I correct in thinking that you are acting chief executive of HIE?
That is correct.
Why is there no substantive chief executive?
The substantive chief executive is Sandy Cumming, who is currently recovering from Bell's palsy, which he has had since August. He is about to return to work on a part-time basis and hopes to resume his duties some time in the new year.
How long have you been acting chief executive?
Since 10 August.
And how long have you been with HIE?
Since its establishment in 1991.
So you know the background to the issue.Throughout the papers, there is talk about the high altitude, but surely there are funiculars at much higher altitudes in the Alps.
There are indeed funiculars at much higher altitudes. The Cairngorm one runs from roughly 2,100ft at the bottom station to about 3,600ft at the top, so by Alpine standards it is not particularly high. It is the climate and environmental factors that make the difference. The degree of exposure, particularly to wind and chill, on the Scottish mountains means that the conditions are comparable with those at a higher altitude in Europe—at 6,000ft, 7,000ft or 8,000ft in the Alps, for example.
Did you, anyone from HIE or anyone connected with you have a look at how things were done in the Alps or anywhere else in the world?
Yes, we did. Back in 1992-93, we conducted several reviews of possible alternatives to replacing the aging chairlift system. Our consultants at that time—which I think were led by CairnGorm Mountain Ltd—considered comparators from elsewhere in Europe and North America. They looked at more modern chairlift systems with two or four chairs, at gondola systems and at funicular railway systems. On balance, they recommended the funicular railway system.
That was recommended by the consultants.
That is correct.
You then decided to go to tender. What kind of tender was it?
I ask Mr Bryers to give you the detail of that.
In addition to the visits that Sandy Brady mentioned, a number of staff, including me, visited several funicular installations in Europe to learn from them when we were putting together the tender proposals for Cairngorm. The tendering for the funicular package was based on three lots: lot 1 was the train, lot 2 was the civil engineering works and lot 3 was the buildings. Those were all procured through the Official Journal of the European Communities, as was required at the time, on a competitive basis. I think that four different funicular manufacturers tendered for lot 1.
What form did the tender take? It was not a fixed-price tender.
No, it was not a fixed-price tender. It was a design and specification tender.
Why did you not opt for a fixed-price tender?
I cannot remember exactly why.
That is a crucial point. If you had opted for a fixed-price tender, you would not have overrun on costs as you did.
One of the things that we struggled with at that time was the fact that our professional advisers on the procurement indicated that they thought it highly unlikely that any contractor would commit to a fixed price because of the uncertainties involved in the type of construction.
So you did not even try.
We had advice from our consultants that the best route to go down was the competitive tender. I am not sure whether we tried a fixed price—I can check that for you. I think that the advice was that that was not appropriate for a project around which there were so many construction unknowns.
How many tenders did you receive for the three packages?
As I mentioned, we received four tenders for lot 1. I think that we received about 14 expressions of interest in the civil engineering works at the initial interview stage, which was narrowed down considerably to a much smaller number. I think that about four companies submitted tenders for the building works.
In each case, did you accept the lowest tender?
We do not consider only price when we are considering tenders nowadays; we consider price and quality. In that sort of contract, quality means the ability to comply with environmental protection measures, to build within very restricted timescales and to deal with the weather. All those things are put into the mix when we consider who offers the best deal. The lowest price was not always the most appropriate criterion.
Can you remind me who offered the best deal for each of the three lots?
For lot 1 it was an Austrian company called Doppelmayr, which is now known as the Doppelmayr Garaventa Group, and for lots 2 and 3 it was Morrison Construction.
That is a coincidence.
The aim was always to award the civil engineering and building work as one package, if possible, to avoid two contractors trying to do a job on the same site.
In each case, was the Morrison Construction bid the lowest or did the company just offer the best deal?
As I recall, it offered the lowest bids.
The lowest in each case?
I think that that is correct, yes.
Where was the major cost overrun?
The major difficulty probably related to the replacement of the proposed steel beams on the rail track with concrete beams. Morrisons made that proposal with its tender. Construction of the tunnel was another challenging engineering issue, given the weather conditions, the altitude and the various environmental considerations.
Morrisons proposed changes to both those aspects of the original tender specification.
That is correct.
Having won the contracts out of 14 companies in one case and four companies in the other, Morrisons persuaded you to change the specification.
That was done as part of a cost-saving exercise.
A cost-saving exercise?
We agreed to merge the two lots and to seek savings because Morrisons had won the two contracts. A package of changes was made, which included reducing the specification of the buildings, removing the proposed middle station building and considering suggestions from Morrisons about how it could tackle this unique project. That was undertaken in partnership with the company and with our professional advisers at the time.
Had Morrisons constructed a funicular before?
Nobody had constructed the civil works for a funicular before, but the funicular manufacturers had constructed many funiculars, which is why they were visited in the years before the railway was constructed. It was important for the selected civil contractor to feed into the tender documentation for the award of the train works, so that the two could merge.
There are funiculars elsewhere in the world.
Absolutely.
Yet Morrisons had never been part of any of that construction elsewhere in the world.
It had not, and nor had any other tenderer for the civil or building works.
I want to clarify an issue that has developed in the course of questioning. Lots 2 and 3 were awarded to Morrisons. HIE's chair, who was present at board meetings in 1996 and 1997 when the project was discussed, was Sir Fraser Morrison. HIE's chief executive left in September 2000 to go to Morrisons as its director for corporate development. You tell us that Mr Yule joined HIE from Morrisons. Might some members of the public perceive an unhealthy relationship between Morrisons and HIE?
That is possible. Media coverage in 2000 implied that. We are happy to found on the review that Audit Scotland conducted as part of producing the section 23 report. The documentation that was provided to the Minister for Enterprise and Lifelong Learning in 2000 when the public concerns were expressed is available. He satisfied himself that no impropriety whatever was involved.
Why is the relationship so close and why does such movement take place between the company and HIE? Is it because there is not much choice of expertise in the area? Were Morrisons and the people associated with it so way ahead of the expertise that was available in the rest of Scotland that going for them was a no-brainer?
That question is difficult to answer, but I will do my best. At the time, Morrison Construction was without question one of the leading construction companies in the Highlands and Islands. It had expanded from a small family firm into a major national and international player. The company had done well at obtaining contracts in the Highlands and Islands, the rest of Scotland and beyond throughout the 1980s and 1990s. It is no surprise that Morrison Construction has been responsible for a significant proportion of the infrastructure investment in the Highlands and Islands in the past 20 years.
The contracts were not awarded only on the basis of price; Mr Bryers tells us that they were awarded on other factors. Once they were awarded, Morrisons suggested that certain changes had to be made. However, Morrisons had very close connections with HIE—for example, Sir Fraser Morrison was chair of the HIE board and Morrisons recruited the HIE chief executive, who would have known the fine detail of what was being discussed. Is it just a flight of fancy to suggest that there was an unhealthy relationship?
It would be very unfair to the integrity of the individuals involved. Sir Fraser Morrison left as chair of HIE in 1998, before the contracts were let. We had moved on: we had a new chair at that time and a different board. Iain Robertson, the HIE chief executive, left in September 2000. I have no doubt that he was a good friend of Sir Fraser Morrison and that Sir Fraser sought to recruit somebody who was bright and able into his company. Those matters were entirely separate from the procurement of the funicular railway.
I just want to check one thing. You said that the documentation was provided to the enterprise minister in 2000. Was that Henry McLeish?
It was Henry McLeish.
Thank you.
Continuing on the theme of the funicular's construction, you state in your written submission to the committee that Morrisons and Doppelmayr won the competitive tenders, but you go on to say:"Partly because of the shorter construction period than originally envisaged—spanning only two summers rather than three—construction costs rose".I am no expert in construction, but normally when construction is done in a shorter period of time the costs at least remain stable. There is only a rise if construction goes on and on. Can you explain the reason for that?
Yes, indeed. I will ask Keith Bryers to kick off, then I will come in.
Essentially, we were trying to do a three-summer job in two and a half summers, because we lost half of the first summer through the European regional development fund delays, following the judicial review. We also had an ERDF deadline, which meant that we had to complete the job by the end of December 2001. By the time the job started, the contractor had a huge amount of work to do in less time than we had originally envisaged. The construction took place in a very constrained environment, in terms of getting materials up the hill, because the type of access road that you would usually expect was not available. The construction company had the use of an access road, but it was very constrained. The company installed a cable crane, but that was subject to a number of delays and the tonnage that it could take up the hill was restricted—helicopters had to be used to move concrete up the hill. All those things caused the project costs to increase.
Before I bring in Willie Coffey I want to clarify something that relates to the previous questions. Mr Yule, which post did you hold with Morrisons before you joined HIE?
I was development manager with the Morrisons developments division, which was located in Inverness in the Morrison Construction group offices in Harbour Road.
Did you have any involvement with the funicular?
No, none whatsoever. When I came to HIE in August 2001, I was specifically excluded from any discussions, meetings or decisions on the funicular or Morrison Construction for the subsequent 12 months.
Mr Brady, you said in your opening remarks that you thought that the planning of the project at the initial stages met all the standards in place at the time, and that, of course, standards move on, but I want to challenge you on something.We read in the Audit Scotland report that the budget for the project had to be reforecast, which led to the setting aside of a sum of only £8,000 for contingency in a project budget of about £15 million. Most industry standards recommend that a figure of around 15 per cent of the overall budget is set aside. I am not aware of any other standard that would recommend setting aside a contingency of less than 1 per cent, or of any project that would do that. How can you say that that met standards at the time?
It is to do with the timing. In the project envelope of £14.5 million at the outset, there was a significant contingency. Lots 1 and 2, which Mr Bryers has described, came in from the competitive tender process very much on budget and were let. The challenge arose when lot 3—the buildings—came in at significantly more than was available in the planned budget. At that point, we had to drain down the contingency in recognition of the fact that the buildings were going to cost significantly more. With hindsight, I have to agree with you that having a contingency of £8,000 is not the way in which we would normally approach the situation. However, it was to do with the timing of how we let the lots.Subsequently, as the facts have shown, the cost of the funicular railway project came out at £19.5 million in all—a third higher than the original envelope. We recognise that that is regrettable and have said so since we announced the figure and in our responses to the Audit Scotland report. However, that is what it cost to put a funicular railway on a Scottish mountain for the first time ever.
But do you still stick to your point that, as costs rose, setting aside a ridiculously small amount for contingency reflected good practice at that time?
It did not reflect good practice at the time. We had a significant contingency in place, but the requirement to find further funds for lot 3 of the project caused us to drain down that contingency. When lot 3 was let, the contingency had declined to around £7,000 or £8,000.
What measures did the company employ at that point to try to meet those escalating costs? Members have asked about the various tendering mechanisms that were used and whether they were fixed price or variable. The costs ultimately escalated to—I think—£26 million, all told. How did you deal with those mounting costs at the time? What measures did you deploy to try to keep the costs in line?
The construction cost of the funicular railway was £19.5 million, and the original funding envelope was £14.5 million; so, in round figures, the extra cost was £5 million. The key focus was on trying to ensure that, when lots 2 and 3 were merged by Morrison Construction Ltd, we sought the savings to which we have referred. That resulted in a reduction in the specification of the buildings, the removal of the middle station and so on. We did everything that we could. We took legal advice at the time on how the thing had been set up, as the third lot was let. However, the challenge remained that we could not find a contractor who was able to undertake lot 3 for anything close to the £4.2 million that was allocated for it. The reality is that we worked very hard throughout the construction process to try to find ways of ensuring that the overrun was contained. We did our best and got it down to £5 million, or 33 per cent. We note that Audit Scotland picked up that point in the section 23 report and concluded that HIE had done everything reasonable to contain the costs, given that we were faced with a situation in which there was no prospect of stopping short once the works had started—effectively, we needed to complete all three lots to have a functional railway.
Effectively, with the costs escalating as they did, there was no real protection within the model to contain costs. It was ultimately going to cost what it was going to cost, was it not?
That is a fair comment.
The cost was just escalating to whatever level it was going to reach and that was it, frankly. Obviously, the public purse had to pick up the tab.Can I move on to the next question, convener?
Before you do that, I want to ask a question about the costs. In response to Willie Coffey, Sandy Brady said that the construction overrun was £5 million. However, the total cost of the project came to £26.75 million. What other support was provided to the operator that resulted in the additional £7 million beyond the £19 million?
Those costs relate to the funding of the operations of CairnGorm Mountain Ltd. I ask Douglas Yule to say a bit about that.
I am sorry, convener; unfortunately I do not have the detail on the £4.7 million.
The funding—
Sorry, but it is not £4.7 million; it is £7 million. The budget figure was £14.61 million. Sandy Brady said that the construction costs rose to £19.54 million. However, the notes that we have say that the total cost became £26.75 million, with the public sector contributing more than £23 million. In other words, the additional £5 million took the construction costs up to £19 million, but why is there another £7 million somewhere in the total costs? What was that for?
That related to the costs of the operation of CairnGorm Mountain Ltd over the period since the completion of the funicular. The funding for that came from the public sector—from ourselves and from Highland Council—and from Bank of Scotland, which was the company's banker.
Would such costs not be annual revenue costs? How many years' operating costs are contained in the £7 million?
That would be the accumulated deficits from the operating costs over the period from 2001 to the present day.
So £26.75 million is what the funicular has cost to the present day. Is that correct?
Broadly speaking, that is correct.
Okay. We can check that out.
My question arises from the convener's questions. Do you know Alan Blackshaw from Newtonmore?
Indeed we do.
Do you know that Alan Blackshaw has written to Sir John Elvidge about the funicular?
Yes. Mr Blackshaw has written to a number of people about the funicular over a long period.
In his letter to Sir John Elvidge, Alan Blackshaw claims that HIE had authorisation to spend £12.356 million of public money and that it spent beyond that without any authority. Do you accept that?
Authorisation for the construction costs was sought from the Secretary of State for Scotland at the time. As cost escalations on the project came in, we kept our sponsor department within the Scottish Executive fully informed. Each of the escalations was authorised.
Who were they authorised by?
By the Scottish Executive.
Do you have documentation to prove that?
Yes, we have documentation. Audit Scotland saw that documentation as part of its section 23 review.
So why has Mr Blackshaw got this wrong?
I could not hazard a guess on that. Mr Blackshaw is a passionate observer of the Cairngorm funicular project. He was a board member of the local enterprise company back in 1997, when the project was approved. He has been a long-term critic of the procurement of the funicular. We respect his views, but we simply do not agree with them.
Could you provide documentation to the committee to confirm that all the expenditure was properly authorised by ministers?
Yes, we could do that.
You said that you respect Mr Blackshaw's views but you just do not agree with them. Would it be reasonable to say that he has been proven to be correct?
I do not think so. Mr Blackshaw is one of a number of people who have been critics of the Cairngorm funicular project from its conception, right through its planning and construction and up to the present day. Just as a number of people were disappointed with the decision to proceed with the funicular, the funicular project also has many supporters. A large number of businesses in the Strathspey area believe that the Cairngorm funicular investment was vital to regenerate the local economy. Thousands of Scottish skiers—some of them of international standard—are very grateful for the continued investment that has been made in the area over the past four or five decades. Any development project in an environmentally sensitive area such as the Cairngorms is bound to attract both supporters and detractors.
Let me return to the issue of the cost overruns that developed. You said that you kept the Scottish Office fully informed and that approval was given by the Scottish Office at each stage as problems developed. Is that correct?
The Scottish Office approved the £14.5 million envelope for the project. As the escalations came in, we kept the department notified. Its view was that the escalations were a matter for the HIE board, which had to decide whether it wished to commit resources to them.
So no further approval was sought from the Scottish Office or from ministers either for extra funding or funding for such a significant overrun.
No authorisation for further funding was sought. HIE assured Scottish Executive ministers that the funding could be found from within HIE's envelope of resources. The Scottish Executive expressed itself satisfied with that and said that that was a matter for the HIE board.
So ministers—at the Scottish Office, I presume—did not contribute any more funding, and all the cost overruns up to the £26 million were fully met by HIE. Were ministers content to bear the financial implications of that use of what was a substantial draw-down from a limited budget?
The £26 million includes a £1 million contribution to the project from Highland Council and several millions from the company's banker, the Bank of Scotland. As a result, the total cost to HIE was around £22 million or £23 million. If you want details, we will produce a very precise table showing exactly how those figures are made up.
That would be helpful. You said, however, that the bank contributed several millions.
That is right.
But if the project's total cost was £26.75 million and the public sector contributed £23 million, that leaves a gap of £3.75 million.
HIE contributed £23 million and the Highland Council £1 million.
All right. The public sector contributed £24 million. That still leaves a gap of £2.75 million, which was contributed by the bank. That is hardly "several millions".
We will confirm the figures for the committee but I have to say that £2.75 million sounds to me like several millions of pounds of private sector money.
It is a couple of million rather than "several millions". I am not going to engage in semantics, but I think that the figure is probably on a different scale.
What's a million between friends?
With regard to the jobs that it was hoped the project would create, the Audit Scotland report says that there was an estimate of £11,000 net grant equivalent cost per job as a result of the project. What did that figure turn out to be?
We have not done the calculation in those terms. It was a Treasury formula that was in use in 1997. The formula, especially the way in which net grant equivalent is calculated—which, I should say, is what allows you to do the calculation that you have referred to—is no longer in use.We have focused on trying to understand whether the economic benefits that we set out in support of the project at the outset have been realised. As the Audit Scotland report points out, we have commissioned an independent review of the project's real economic benefits for the Strathspey area and the wider Highlands and Islands.The original project approval paper proposed an output of something like 135 jobs from the project; according to the most recent review, which was undertaken in 2005, employment of 232 full-time equivalents has been achieved in the Badenoch and Strathspey area, falling to something like 174.5 full-time equivalents at the wider Highlands and Islands level where, of course, displacement begins to come into effect. We—and, as its report suggests, Audit Scotland—are very satisfied that the scale of economic benefits that we sought from the project have, in fact, been realised.
That is interesting. So the net economic benefit is entirely separate from the net grant equivalent cost per job that the benefit creates, no matter how high that cost gets.
At the time, cost per job was an important factor in the way in which we looked at all kinds of projects. However, I point out that it is a static thing. We have managed to keep those jobs on the hill for eight years now; if the funicular railway continues to operate for the remaining years of its design life that level of employment benefit will have persisted in the Strathspey area for the best part of 25 to 30 years. Given those terms, the scale of investment is not inappropriate.
Perhaps I can help with the figures. When the initial budget was £14 million, the cost per job was £11,000; however, as the outturn cost was £27 million, the cost per job became about £22,000. That is simple arithmetic. Are you saying that, regardless of that value and no matter how high that cost goes, the net economic benefit to and impact on the area have still been worth while?
The point is that the costs of the Cairngorm funicular have been borne and the railway exists. All the scenarios for taking the resort forward require us to take a hard look at the use of further public money, whether revenue support or capital investment, with regard to the on-going benefits that those jobs bring to the area each and every year.
We accept that the funicular is now there. However, we are not investigating whether it should continue to be there and what the financial implications of that might be; we are looking at the process and other historical aspects of the development.
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I apologise for my late arrival, which was the result of traffic problems.I want to follow up on Willie Coffey's questions about the cost per job. If we take the total public sector contribution, which I understand is roughly £23 million, and divide it by the net amount of employment that it is estimated will be created, we end up with a figure per job of £131,000. Do you think that that is an accurate assessment of the return?
I do not think that it is an accurate assessment of the return; it is a figure that one can come up with by doing the arithmetic that you described. We would have to take economic advice on what the costs are in relation to the benefits over time. Cost per job is a concept that implies that a job is created at one point in time and that is it, as if we would be happy regardless of whether the job went away after one year, 10 years or 15 years. Although cost per job was one of the criteria that we employed in our appraisal processes in 1997, in line with Treasury guidance, the means by which projects' economic impacts and outcomes are assessed is now more sophisticated.I come back to the point that the funicular project creates the equivalent of 232 full-time equivalent jobs in the Badenoch and Strathspey area each year that passes, and has done since 2001. Our hope and expectation are that it will continue to do so. If it is viewed in those terms, the investment remains quite reasonable.
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But as you will appreciate, the difficulty that we have, as the Parliament's Public Audit Committee, is that our role is to ensure that public funds have been properly spent and value for money for the public purse has been obtained. The business case set out that the net grant equivalent cost per job would be £11,000. We do not know what the outturn is because you have not done the calculation. I have suggested to you that, on one reading, it could be as high as £131,000. You dispute that, but you are not able to give me an alternative figure.When we took evidence from Audit Scotland on the issue, it told us that it felt that it was unfortunate that HIE had not calculated the outcome cost and no longer used such a measure, so you will appreciate the difficulty that we have in trying to understand whether, from an employment creation perspective, the project represents good value for the public funds that have been spent on it.
I accept those points. We do not work things out on that basis any more, so I can only return to my point that it is important to look at a facility that has now been in place for eight years and realise that it has created a stream of benefits over that period. The real value of that investment is the stream of benefits that it will create over the lifetime of the asset. To date, the indications are that, in relation to capital costs of £19.5 million, the stream of economic benefits has been, and will continue to be, well worth while, provided that the funicular railway can operate as a summer and a winter attraction.
You said that your processes for considering investment decisions are now more sophisticated. Are those processes entirely consistent with practice throughout the Scottish public sector, including practice in Government projects?
Yes, entirely. We have spent a lot of time and effort over the past five to 10 years on ensuring that that is the case. Our own internal team has worked closely with Audit Scotland to try to ensure that. We have taken a great deal of professional advice. Every project officer in HIE goes through considerable project appraisal training to ensure that they apply consistent and up-to-date standards when they consider the exceedingly diverse range of portfolio projects with which we are faced, which include hotel upgrades, investment in fish-processing facilities and the development of tourism facilities.
I am not sure that I am entirely confident about what you say. This is not a criticism of you, but the huge overruns in some of the major projects that continue to be developed by public agencies in Scotland mean that I am not sure that we could say with any degree of certainty that that higher level of sophistication is leading to better performance on staying within budget. However, that is not an issue for you; it is a wider problem that the committee has encountered.
I will turn the question round. If you were establishing a project of this nature today, using the new, more sophisticated evaluation techniques that you use now, 10 years on, and which are consistent with the approach that is taken across the public sector, what is the maximum capital investment that would be justified by the number of jobs that were created directly and indirectly as a result of the project?
These days, we commission an economic impact assessment of each major capital project in which we are involved, to work out what all the benefits would be—the construction jobs, the direct employment impacts, the indirect and induced impacts and so on. That information is in the mix, so we have a clear estimate of the benefits that would be realised from the project. That approach has been applied to a string of large-scale projects in the Highlands and Islands on which we are working.Next, we look at the cost envelope for the project. These days, we are involved much more in partnership funding of projects than was the case at the time of the Cairngorm funicular project. The economic impact assessment and the cost envelope are brought together, but we do not operate with fixed ratios of one to the other. We look in the round at the economic benefits that we expect to get from a project and at how we will ensure that those benefits are driven out in reality, if the project is implemented. We then consider whether we can justify the level of funding that we have been asked to provide, either individually or in partnership with other public agencies.
So there is no longer a maximum figure.
There is no maximum figure. We do not apply a cost per job in those terms.
When did your approach change?
Probably around the turn of the decade, when we started to look at projects on a different basis. In particular, we tried to relate economic benefits in the round to the cost envelope.
As the Public Audit Committee, we might be concerned about that. What to you may be more sophisticated may to us be completely open ended. You can put any amount that you wish into a scheme. There is no relationship between capital input and job creation.
That is a fair comment on an issue that troubles us on marginal projects, in particular. In some cases, the amount of money that is requested from us is significant but the economic impact assessment indicates that, rather than creating jobs directly, a project will have benefits that are modest or largely indirect, requiring other people to do things—for example, tourists to spend money. We regard such projects as marginal. They are the projects on which we spend the most time agonising over the decision, to ensure that, when we commit funds that could be used for other purposes, we do so with full knowledge of what we will achieve.
Do you no longer have a red light, alert or requirement for Scottish Government or Treasury approval of projects of this nature? Have such controls been removed?
Largely. We operate with the Scottish Government under a delegated authority regime. For most projects, that means that the decision is made at the hand of Highlands and Islands Enterprise.I will give you a simple example. One of the most significant investments that we have made in the past few years is in the European Marine Energy Centre in Orkney. Alongside a range of public sector partners, we have invested millions of pounds in the centre. We believe that the benefits of that investment are potentially huge for Scotland. However, if we were to apply a traditional test, looking at the number of people who work at the test facilities, the project would fail, as the cost per job would be too high. The real upside of the project is the economic benefit that it creates in the renewables sector down the road. In our impact assessments, we try to consider the potential positive impact on the Scottish economy of wave and tidal energy devices working well at the Orkney test centre. We must take a more sophisticated view of projects whose benefits are indirect, rather than simply looking at jobs on the project.
The counter-argument is that there was always discretion to go above the limit. However, you had to know that you were doing that, and there were checks to prevent you from doing it at delegated level. If you went beyond the standard assessment, you required approval from either the Scottish Executive or the Treasury.
Cost per job was never applied as a strict criterion project by project.
Exactly—that is the point that I am making.
At the end of each year, we reported the cost per job of all of our projects. Within the portfolio, some projects had a high and some had a low cost per job. Normally, self-catering tourism projects had a high cost per job, whereas fish-processing projects had a low cost per job. We accepted that there had to be a mix of such projects in the wider portfolio.
You are saying that that indicator has now gone—it is no longer considered or felt to be valuable.
That is correct.
Does Anne McLaughlin still want to pursue the issue of employment and economic benefits?
No, I have said all that I wanted to say.
Have the benefits that have come to the Highlands justified the investment? Have the benefits outweighed the costs?
We believe that they have. One benefit is employment directly within the project, which has been calculated. We also believe that the project has led to wider investment in many projects in the Strathspey area that we have not been directly involved in funding. We have increased confidence in the area—somewhere that surged forward in the 1960s and which had lost its place in Scottish tourism has been reinvested in. The facilities are modern and they attract new, younger visitors to the area. The range of attractions that we have in the area is also much greater than it used to be. Looked at in the round, we think that Badenoch and Strathspey, as one of Scotland's longest-standing tourism destinations, is now in a far better place because of the investment in the funicular railway, in the Aviemore centre and in other businesses.The creation of the Cairngorms national park has played a part in that. It has clearly been a step forward. It makes the area much more attractive, and it carries through the spirit of what the Cairngorms working party was looking for: a balance between recreational, economic and environmental issues.
We will move on to the decision to take over CairnGorm Mountain Ltd.
As we have discussed, in the period from the completion of construction through to your decision to take over the operating company and then the takeover some months later, very substantial losses were being made. Can you explain the extent of those losses and the action that HIE took as a result of those year-on-year losses?
During the past eight years, the losses were quite significant. The company had, of course, accumulated significant debt during the closure period while the funicular was being built and it did not come out of that in good financial shape, given that there was an extra year's construction period. The creditors at that time, who were us, the Bank of Scotland and Highland Council, were all working in quite close co-operation to try to help the company through this difficult period but, largely because of interest charges and the need to manage a new operation, the losses continued to escalate in that early period. As the period went on, the creditors all took a number of actions. A co-operative creditor arrangement was entered into in 2004, whereby the bank reduced the interest rate, Highland Council deferred interest on its loan and HIE adjusted the rent. In that co-operative manner, we were able to improve the business model and the return to the bank was pushed out for a number of years until sustainability was achieved.At the same time, the snow conditions were having a significant effect on the trading performance of the company. During that period, skier numbers fluctuated, but costs continued to rise and the overdraft limit continued to increase until, in 2007 and 2008, the bank began to exert a little more influence and pressure. At one point, it decided to change the interest rates unilaterally. That led us to further discussions with the other creditors, because we felt that that was a breach of the previous creditor arrangement.
That was an upward move, I presume.
Yes. We then went into further discussions about how we could sustain the company.
I will press you on that stage and the bank's decision to increase the interest rate, as I want to understand it all a bit better. Looking at the year-on-year losses, I see that the massive losses were in the early years. Am I correct?
Yes.
Around this time, for the first time, the company started to trade profitably for a year, although the position was still marginal in that there were some years in which losses continued to be made. Why, then, did Highlands and Islands Enterprise take radical action? Did the bank take the action that it did because it saw some value returning to the company? Was that a reason for the surprising decision to increase interest rates in a company that was trading so poorly?
It is difficult for me to answer for the bank's motivations. We knew that it proposed to increase the interest rates on the loans and, in fact, it did so unilaterally.
You must have discussed that with it.
We certainly did. It was a robust discussion.
Was an explanation given?
The explanation that the bank proffered was that it needed a better return on the long-term debt in the company. We reminded it of the creditor arrangement that we had gone into earlier with Highland Council and stated that we felt that the increase was a breach of that agreement. There were some strong discussions. In principle, our position was that, if the bank continued to raise the interest rate, we would reinstate the original rent, which would bring matters to a head. There were many strong, robust discussions on these issues. The outcome was a further year's moratorium on the interest rate.
When was that?
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