The first petition is PE306, from Thomas Minogue. It calls for a system to be set up that requires members of the judiciary to declare whether they are freemasons. The committee agreed to ask the Minister for Justice to consider establishing a system that would require members of the judiciary to declare membership of any group or society in which there is deemed to be a perception of secrecy. The minister reiterated his position that he is not convinced of the need to introduce such measures.I draw the committee's attention to further correspondence that has been received from the petitioner. Members should note that the minister will be giving evidence to the committee on 4 March on the Judicial Appointments Board for Scotland. I invite the committee to consider the options and decide what action to take.
In his recent letter to the committee, the petitioner states that he is aware of "specific examples of cases where difficulties have arisen". We should ask him for details of those, at least as a starting point. We will have an opportunity to revisit the issue when the minister comes before the committee to talk about the Judicial Appointments Board next month.
With regard to the Speculative Society of Edinburgh, which Mr Minogue mentions in his letter, the letter from Jim Wallace's private secretary says:"The Minister had enquiries made about this body for another purpose a little time ago. He is satisfied that it is simply a debating society with membership drawn from the Judiciary and other professions. He does not believe that the decisions of Scotland's Sheriffs and Judges are in any way influenced by their membership of this organisation."That has always been my position and I believe that it is the position of the committee. I want to place on record the fact that no member of this committee has suggested that judges are influenced by their membership of societies. We have questioned the effects of the perception of membership of any secret society and whether it might be a good thing in the interests of transparency to get the matter out of the way by having judges make a declaration. I believe that such a course of action has been taken in England and Wales but that the minister has decided not to pursue that path. However, it is for the committee to decide whether to end the matter at this point or take it further.I am not happy simply to leave matters as they are. I cannot see what would be wrong with asking sheriffs and judges to declare that they are or are not members of a secret society.
We do not have anything other than the correspondence that you have before you. If we wanted to take the matter further, that is the kind of research that we might want to be done.
If we are going to ask sheriffs and judges to make any sort of declaration, we have to be sure that we know what we are talking about. What type of societies would we want to ask about? Sporting societies? Cultural societies? Do we have a list of the relevant societies?
No one is suggesting that the organisations are illegal or improper. We have no evidence that the matter is a problem. Mr Minogue tells us that he is aware of "specific examples of cases where difficulties have arisen over the question of Sheriff/judicial membership of the Freemasons."It is therefore up to him to write to the Executive to make those cases known and to copy the committee into that correspondence. In the absence of that, I do not think that the committee should go on a fishing expedition to see what we can discover. MSPs have declared that they are members of the freemasons, but their membership does not matter in relation to their position as elected public officials. That is why we have the register of members' interests and so on. We have to be aware of the different role of judges in that regard. They are public figures, but they are not elected. In the absence of evidence that the judges and sheriffs are freemasons or that that has influenced their decisions, I am not sure of the basis on which the committee would wander into this matter. Further, coming up with a list of organisations is fraught with difficulties. What would be the rationale for one organisation being in and one being out? Like the minister, I do not think that the Speculative Society of Edinburgh is anything more than a dining club and a debating society. I have never been at one of its meetings, but I am sure that there is nothing sinister about it. A degree of paranoia is creeping into this matter and we should be careful about that.
We must divide this into two parts. First, does judges' membership of undisclosed societies, clubs and organisations have a real and identifiable effect on the decisions for which they are responsible? I have not seen a shred of evidence to suggest that that is the case. However, the petitioner suggests that he has such evidence. I will wait and see what that is. Secondly, where it might be thought that, or a perception might arise that, one is influenced by an external club, organisation or society, there is a duty to disclose such affiliations so that such an impression may be discharged. This bears on the way in which we as members of the Parliament are required to operate, and it is reasonable to expect that people in positions of authority in public life should operate similarly. I do not believe that there is a problem, because no one has shown me that there is a problem—but the fact that some people think there is a problem results from less disclosure than might be useful. I do not use the word "appropriate" because, ultimately, the judgment must be that of the sheriff or judge. If we cannot trust the people whom we place in these very important positions of authority, the whole structure of our society and the systems that surround it breaks down. It will never be possible to audit everything in this regard; it will never be possible to identify all of the influences that play upon people. It is simply a matter of encouraging judges to be as open as possible. I use the word "encouraging", not the word "legislating", because I do not believe that that can be done.
We must be fairly careful with this issue. There is no evidence of a significant problem. Judicial appointments are governed by one very important factor—that the holder of that office is required to take the judicial oath, whereby he or she undertakes to do right unto all manner of people without fear, favour or prejudice. That is a very solemn and important oath, and there is no evidence that any holder of judicial office has failed to adhere to its terms. In the absence of any further evidence, this matter should end here. If evidence had been available, it would have been forthcoming by now. Also, any judge—at whatever level—who had knowledge of an individual through shared membership of an association would decline jurisdiction over any case or action to which that person was a party. When I sat on the bench, on two occasions an accused person who was known to me came before the court. I declined to deal with the case.
Perhaps I should not say whether they were accused or witnesses. Clearly, it was important to decline jurisdiction in that case and to make it clear to all parties that I was doing so because I was aware of certain circumstances pertaining to the individual. I do not think there is a problem; we could pore over the entrails of this matter for a long and weary time without finding any difficulty. We should not take this any further.
To clarify, the petitioner referred to "specific examples", and I firmly believe that he should be given the opportunity to tell us about those. However, I am sceptical about what he will say.
I heard what members said about that evidence, and I agree with most of what Stewart Stevenson said. However, I do not wish to personalise this to one person's experience. If the committee were to take this further it would do so because it thought that it would be good to explore whether there should be a general declaration for judges and sheriffs because of their positions of authority. I hold the opinion that that would be good. However, I am unhappy to proceed on the evidence of one or two particular examples, and I am not necessarily influenced by one person's anecdotal evidence. Although I feel that it is good to proceed, I do not feel so strongly about it that I would push committee members to change their minds. If the committee were to proceed, it would be best to get more independent advice. I accept Duncan Hamilton's and Alasdair Morrison's point that we need a more scientific basis on which to proceed, which would give us some kind of broad-based evidence on which to continue.
With all due respect convener, this is not a scientific process. The committee has a letter from an individual from Dunfermline who anecdotally says that he is aware of what he describes as "difficulties that have arisen". I assume that there is a process through which he can raise those difficulties. Where will it end for the committee if it takes evidence from one individual who claims to have identified difficulties about others' alleged or perceived membership of an organisation? I share Bill Aitken's view that, until we have something concrete on which to work, we will be engaged in a futile exercise. Mr Minogue is welcome to send a written submission to the committee—as many witnesses do—and it would be eminently sensible if he did so. I would be happy to read it. The committee regularly declines invitations from individuals and organisations that want to give evidence. However, I am in your hands as regards Mr Minogue.
You used the phrase "with all due respect" as though you were disagreeing with me, but I agree that if we proceed it will not be because of the petitioner's evidence. I want to proceed because the committee has another way of establishing whether it would be generally good or bad to have such a declaration. The petitioner's one or two cases will not persuade me, so to that degree I agree with your point. However, your point is different from that of Stewart Stevenson and Scott Barrie, who would like to hear from the petitioner. I do not know whether that takes us any further forward.
This is becoming circular. The committee has no evidence but would like to find out whether the suggestion is good. However, the only evidence would come from someone whom the committee thinks does not have much evidence and who has not provided the committee with any evidence. The Executive, which is ultimately responsible for the administration of justice, says that there is no problem. It also says that it has no evidence from Mr Minogue or anyone else, and the committee has no evidence. The Executive says that it does not know whether there is anything for the committee to look for, or how to go about looking for it. This is a waste of time.
I propose that we take no further action, but we should write to Mr Minogue advising him that, if he has concrete evidence that he wishes to put to the committee in writing, we will consider it with a view to reopening the issue.
There is no dissent from that. On 4 March, the Minister for Justice will be coming to talk to us about judicial appointments. We can think about whether we want to raise the issue with the minister on that day.
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