Thank you, convener. The report looks at Transport Scotland’s management of the Forth replacement crossing project, including the construction of the Queensferry crossing. I will summarise the findings under three areas: the need for a new crossing; the management of the project; and demonstration of whether the intended benefits of the project have been achieved.
First, the Government identified a clear need for a replacement crossing. Corrosion of the main cables of the Forth road bridge would have meant restricting traffic on it from 2017, and ministers made a timely decision to ensure that the road connection between Edinburgh and Fife was maintained. Transport Scotland’s decision to build a new cable-stayed bridge was cheaper than repairing the old one or building an alternative type of crossing or tunnel. Its design was intended to be easier to construct and more reliable and resilient. Exhibit 2 on page 10 of the report sets out the key features of the new bridge.
Secondly, at £1.34 billion, the Forth replacement crossing project is one the biggest public sector infrastructure projects that Scotland has seen. On such a large and complex project, there are many opportunities for things to veer off track, and it is to Transport Scotland’s credit that they did not. In part 2 of the report, we highlight the good practice in the procurement process that helped to deliver value for money. The team had the right mix of skills and experience and it invested in the external expertise that it needed early in the project. From start to finish, the team demonstrated strong, consistent leadership and communicated well with contractors and stakeholder groups. It was strong on budgeting, governance, quality assurance and risk management. We think that there is a lot that the wider public sector can learn from how the project was managed, and we have recommended that the Scottish Government and Transport Scotland should share the lessons as widely as possible.
The Queensferry crossing opened eight months later than first expected and 10 weeks later than the contract end date, but we concluded that the reasons for that were reasonable and that Transport Scotland managed the changes effectively to minimise the effect on time, cost and quality. There is still some work to complete on the new bridge, which is to be expected on a project of this kind. Our only criticism is that Transport Scotland could have communicated that better to manage the public’s expectations, and it should continue to keep the public updated on progress.
Thirdly, it is too early for some of the project’s wider benefits, such as improving public transport across the Forth, cutting journey times and boosting economic growth, to be demonstrated. We set out progress against each of the eight project objectives in exhibit 9 on page 36, but more detail is needed on how success will be measured in future. Transport Scotland now needs to produce a clearer plan for how it will measure the success of the project’s wider benefits. It plans to carry out a full post-project evaluation later this year, and we will continue to review progress through our audit work.