Parliament Workbench
Data: Official Report to 12 Nov 2026

Official Report · Committee

Section 23 Reports

“i6: a review”

Thursday 16 March 2017 Public Audit and Post-legislative Scrutiny Committee About 09:00–10:00 Evidence session 147 contributions · 10 speakers

Speakers

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The record

147 contributions
Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
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Under agenda item 2, we will take oral evidence on the Auditor General for Scotland’s report entitled “i6: a review”. I welcome to the meeting the Auditor General for Scotland, Caroline Gardner; Mark Roberts, senior manager at Audit Scotland; and Catherine Young, audit manager at Audit Scotland.

Before I invite Caroline Gardner to make an opening statement, I want to put today’s evidence session into context. At our previous meeting, the committee took evidence from the Scottish Police Authority and Police Scotland on the SPA’s 2015-16 accounts. It is clear that challenges remain in ensuring that the expected savings from police reform are actually generated.

The report that we will consider today looks at i6, which is the national information technology system that was intended to replace a number of IT systems that were used by the police. The report states clearly:

“The failure of the i6 programme means that some of the benefits of police reform that should have arisen from implementing it, have been, at best, delayed.”

Given what we know about the Scottish Police Authority and Police Scotland’s finances, that is very concerning.

Today, we want to examine why that programme failed and whether that failure could have been avoided. The report does not cover IT developments in Police Scotland since the termination of the i6 contract, so we will focus on what lessons can be learned from that failure.

I invite the Auditor General to make an opening statement.

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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In June 2013, the newly established Scottish Police Authority signed a contract for £46.1 million with Accenture to deliver a national information technology system for Police Scotland. The system, known as i6, was intended to replace more than 130 IT and paper-based systems inherited from Police Scotland’s predecessor forces, and to transform how Police Scotland records, manages and analyses information. The system was planned to go live in September 2014, with full national roll-out by August 2015.

In July 2016—three years after signing the contract—the Scottish Police Authority and Accenture mutually agreed to terminate the contract for the i6 programme. The contract was signed by the SPA, but day-to-day management rested with Police Scotland.

The i6 programme failed because of disagreement about the scope of the programme, the interpretation of the contract and the extent to which Police Scotland’s requirements were met by Accenture’s solution. The disagreement arose despite an 18-month procurement process, which we found had followed good practice and included intensive engagement with potential bidders. The disagreement surfaced almost immediately after the signing of the contract in June 2013, and permanently damaged trust, relationships and confidence between Police Scotland and Accenture. The signing of a contract variation agreement in April 2014 reset relationships and put the programme on a more positive footing, but that proved to be temporary.

One of the factors that contributed to Accenture being awarded the contract was its experience of delivering an IT system to the Guardia Civil in Spain. Initially, it was believed that the majority of the i6 system could be based on that system. As time went on, however, it became clear that a significant amount of the system would have to be built from scratch.

The approach to software development that was used in the i6 programme meant that Police Scotland finally received the i6 system for full user testing in June 2015. At that point, Police Scotland identified fundamental problems with the system. In August 2015, Accenture indicated to the i6 programme board that its confidence about meeting the revised go-live date of December 2015 was at 91 per cent. However, following an analysis exercise, Accenture revised its estimated go-live date to April 2018. At that point, the SPA, Police Scotland and Accenture undertook an options appraisal exercise to agree the best way forward.

Following that exercise, the SPA and Accenture entered into negotiations and agreed to terminate the programme in July 2016. They agreed a settlement of £24.65 million. That figure included a refund of all the money that had been paid to Accenture—a total of £11.09 million—plus an additional payment of £13.56 million.

As you said in your opening remarks, convener, the failure of the i6 programme means that some of the benefits of police reform that should have come from it have been, at best, delayed. There are also wider implications for the modernisation of the justice system.

Our audit concentrated on the history of the i6 programme and the factors behind its failure. I have asked the auditors of the SPA to monitor information and communications technology developments as part of the annual audit process. That is particularly important given the emphasis that is placed on the use of technology in the recently published draft policing 2026 strategy. I also put on record my intention to publish in May this year a report on the lessons to be learned from this and other ICT projects that I have reported on.

Alongside me are Mark Roberts and Catherine Young, who have worked on the project. As always, we will do our best to answer the committee’s questions.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
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Thank you very much. Colin Beattie will open the questioning.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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Sadly, we have become accustomed to public sector IT projects that do not deliver. In your report on i6, you say:

“The process for procuring a supplier for the i6 system followed recommended good practice.”

Oddly enough, Police Scotland does not seem to have done anything wrong. It followed the recommended procedure, but at the end of the day that did not work. Is there a problem with the procedure? Is the “recommended good practice” not up to snuff?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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I will ask Mark Roberts to comment in a moment, but I think that we can say that in this case Police Scotland did follow good practice and that there were some real benefits from that, although the programme ultimately failed. The quality of the contract that it entered into meant that there was no direct loss to the public purse, and Police Scotland was able to settle with Accenture in a way that recovered the payments that it had made, plus a significant sum in compensation. That reflects the benefit of a thorough procurement process, even though it did not work through in this case.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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Is the public purse actually facing an opportunity loss, rather than a financial loss?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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Indeed it is. The loss is of the wider benefits that the system was intended to achieve in terms of savings to policing and operational benefits to police officers and staff. We say in the report that there was no single reason for the failure, but it is certainly clear that the procurement approach that Police Scotland took in this case was not one of the reasons for the failure.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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Paragraph 8 on page 6 of your report shows

“Deloitte as the external experts on procurement and managing commercial contracts

Eversheds as legal advisers

Exception UK as technical advisors.”

That must have cost quite a bit. Do we know how much those external consultants cost?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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I do not have the figure here. My colleagues might, or the committee may want to pursue that with the SPA. Colin Beattie asked earlier about good practice. Good practice indicates that it is important for the client—Police Scotland, in this case—to make sure that it has access to the necessary professional skills. In this case, legal skills, procurement skills and information technology skills were the right ones. The committee might recall that one of the problems with the NHS 24 system was that the contract itself did not stand up to challenge when things went wrong. That did not happen in this case, which is clearly positive.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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Even with all that external support, however, the project still did not work; even following good practice, it did not work.

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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It did not work. As we say in the report, there was no single reason for that. I will ask Mark Roberts to talk the committee through what we think the underlying factors were.

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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As the Auditor General said, strenuous efforts were made during the procurement stage to bring in external expertise and to learn lessons from experience. There was a large amount of engagement with potential bidders. The process kicked off in 2011 with large-scale meetings with potential bidders that gradually focused down to the preferred bidder. There was also intense discussion with potential bidders; there were around 160 dialogue workshops to discuss the technical requirements of the system.

One of the other factors that we draw out in the report is the waterfall approach to the development of the system. Although it was widely used at that time, we have clearly heard that that approach to software development or system development would not be recommended these days—there would be much more focus on an agile approach to development. There was therefore a methodological issue that meant that it was quite hard for Police Scotland to see the scale of the challenges that were facing the programme until quite late in the overall timeline.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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I am still looking at the external support. Paragraph 19 on page 10 talks about the Scottish Government’s gateway team, whose external reviews

“suggested that delivery confidence was either amber or green”

throughout the programme, and its recommendations were adopted by Police Scotland. Again, how could that be? Even at a relatively early stage, there were indications of some problems, although Accenture gave assurances that they were being managed. However, here we are again with an external party doing the necessary box-ticking exercise, and it still did not work.

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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As you can imagine, we looked at that issue quite closely in this exercise, particularly given our experience of other large IT projects and the problems that they have encountered. Our conclusion in this case was that, because Accenture was giving strong and positive assurances to the programme board about its ability to deliver i6, and because the waterfall approach that Mark Roberts has described meant that the system could not be tested until the whole system was in place, it would have been difficult for the gateway reviews and the other reviews that were taking place to raise stronger concerns than they did. The reviews identified some areas for improvement that were acted on, which is another positive action from Police Scotland, but we feel that the way that the system was designed to be delivered, and the assurances that Accenture gave, made it difficult for the reviews to reach different conclusions.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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Are we saying that, no matter what we put in place, if a company such as Accenture in effect lies, there is no protection against that?

09:15

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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I cannot speculate about what underlay the assurances that Accenture gave to the programme board. I can tell you—and we say in the report—that the programme board strongly challenged the assurances that it got from Accenture through the process.

The approach to developing such a system is likely to be different in the future. For example, we have talked about the agile approach, which means that we test as we go along rather than have a wholesale development that is handed over to the user at quite a late stage in the process. The agile approach should enable problems to be identified and tackled earlier than happened with the i6 programme. There is clearly an issue with the internal resourcing and delivery capability of any large contract under the waterfall design approach, particularly in the case of IT systems, which tend to be quite a black box, even to people with expertise in technology.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
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Looking in the round at how things worked, is there an aspect that we can learn from to try to protect ourselves for the future? Is there something that we can do better in order to get an earlier warning that there is a problem?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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I will ask Mark Roberts to comment in a moment but, as we say in the report, the programme was happening at a time when there was a great deal of political and professional scrutiny of the establishment of Police Scotland. A number of things were also going on around the establishment of the Scottish Police Authority—I have reported on some of the disagreements and tensions.

A previous IT performance management system had failed before the establishment of the i6 programme. There were also some high-profile challenges for policing around, for example, stop and search, armed officers and control centres. All of that probably had the effect of increasing the focus of both the SPA and Police Scotland on ensuring that the i6 system worked, which might have introduced the optimism bias that is often a factor in similar large projects. Mark Roberts can give you a flavour of what he saw from the inside of the audit work.

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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The programme board rigorously considered the option of terminating the contract as early as October 2013, which was three months after the contract had initially been signed. However, there was an agreement between Police Scotland and Accenture to continue the process and try to make it work. As the Auditor General said, there was a great deal of determination on both sides to deliver the system. That resulted in the signing of the contract variation agreement in early 2014, which was within the first year of the programme. There was willingness to consider the option of terminating the contract, but the ultimate decision was to carry on and to try to make it work. As with any major programme of work, there were always likely to be difficulties and challenges, but it was thought that they could be overcome. However, some of the early problems and their impact on relationships flowed through the course of the whole programme.

Liam Kerr Con North East Scotland
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Good morning. I will follow on from Colin Beattie’s questions about the start of the process. The report is clear that Police Scotland appears to have followed recommended good practice, and we can accept that Accenture will have gone into the contract not to fail but in good faith. However, I am interested in the role of the external experts who were advising Police Scotland. Things started to go wrong within weeks. Does not that suggest that the advisers—Deloitte, Eversheds LLP and Exception UK—bear some culpability for what happened?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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To go back to my response to Mr Beattie’s question, the contract was robust enough to enable Police Scotland, at the end of the process, not only to recover the payments that it had made but to receive a significant sum in compensation. In my experience of similar cases, that is exceptional. Something clearly went badly wrong, and we have identified a number of things that we think contributed to that, but Police Scotland’s contract was as strong as it could have been in protecting the organisation from the direct consequences of what went wrong. There was clearly an opportunity cost in terms of the savings and operational improvements that were intended to be made, but the contract itself was robust.

Liam Kerr Con North East Scotland
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I accept that the contract was robust in the sense that it allowed Police Scotland to recoup indemnities if something went wrong. However, in terms of its scope and all parties’ understanding of what they were signing up to, it appears to have been significantly deficient. Is that right?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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It is certainly true that there was significant disagreement between the two parties about what the contract was intended to deliver. One of the underlying factors involved Accenture’s experience of delivering a system for the Guardia Civil in Spain, which it thought would provide a very strong basis for the development of i6. That was a significant factor in the decision to award Accenture the contract. In practice, however, some of the things that were set out in the contract—this contributed to Police Scotland’s ability to recoup the payments that had been made—differed significantly from the Spanish experience. Mark Roberts might want to add to that.

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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The crux of the disagreement focused on a very small part of the contract. The contract referred to the user requirements that Police Scotland wanted the system to deliver. Accenture believed that it had presented a solution that would meet those requirements. It quickly emerged that, despite—as the Auditor General mentioned—an 18-month competitive dialogue process, there was a gap between the two perspectives. However, another clause in the contract said that the user requirements took precedence over the contractors’ solution, which enabled Police Scotland to say, “What we say about our user requirements must take precedence, and we want you to deliver that.” Accenture’s position was very much to say, “You have agreed with our proposed solution, and that is what we will deliver.”

Liam Kerr Con North East Scotland
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Does not that suggest that there was a significant degree of ambiguity in the contract that the parties signed?

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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We could certainly interpret it in that way.

Liam Kerr Con North East Scotland
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When I was in professional legal practice, I was paid to make sure that there was no ambiguity in my clients’ contracts. Does the ambiguity in this contract suggest that the failing—or a failing—lay with the professional advisers who had been engaged?

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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We have not looked into that in detail; the committee would have to discuss it with the SPA and Police Scotland.

Liam Kerr Con North East Scotland
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To stay on that point, Colin Beattie quite rightly asked how much was paid, and I accept the answer that you gave, Mr Roberts. How much was paid specifically to Accenture? Was that money recouped as part of the penalty that was required from the firm? I suspect that it was not.

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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We do not have the detail that would allow us to break down the payments that Police Scotland made to the external consultants as part of its client team. As the Auditor General said, the settlement agreement contained an additional payment, over and above the moneys that had been paid directly to Accenture. That reflected some of the additional costs that Police Scotland had incurred, such as estimated staff costs, hardware costs and software licence costs, but I do not know whether it included estimated costs for the third-party advisers.

Liam Kerr Con North East Scotland
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I wonder whether that should be investigated.

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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The committee could consider the matter with the SPA.

Liam Kerr Con North East Scotland
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I will move on in the process timeline. At the start, as we can see, there was apparently an 18-month window in which Police Scotland was getting a great deal of advice—potentially very expensive advice—and it tried, as I suspect all the parties did, to put in place something that worked. There was then a contract variation, to which the same rigour does not seem to have been applied. Would it be fair to say that?

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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There was not such an in-depth process, but, as it involved a variation of the existing contract, that seems reasonable. I think that, once Police Scotland knew more about where the issues were, it concentrated on where attention needed to be paid. The process involved adjusting the existing contract rather than starting the contract discussions from scratch again. For example, Police Scotland took on responsibility for data migration, which Accenture had previously been going to deliver. They were adjusting the existing contract on a relatively small scale to try to pick up some of the problems that existed—

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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That was being done by Police Scotland, with advice from its external advisers, in discussion with Accenture.

Liam Kerr Con North East Scotland
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Do you know who those external advisers were?

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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They were the same advisers who had been involved from the start, as listed in paragraph 8 on page 6 of the report.

Liam Kerr Con North East Scotland
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Again, the contract variation did not work. Does not that suggest that somebody was poorly advised?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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I am not sure that I would follow that interpretation; Mark Roberts will want to come in again on that. The fact that Police Scotland was able to agree a contract variation indicates the strength of the contract that it had entered into. The revised contract embedded the user requirements—as Mark Roberts described—which filled the gap between what Police Scotland had interpreted as the user requirements in the original contract and what Accenture thought that its solution would deliver. The contract variation did not change the cost, although it did change the delivery milestones and the delivery date. It clarified Police Scotland’s user requirements at no additional cost. You are right to say that that did not work, but it was a best-endeavours attempt to enforce Police Scotland’s user requirements in the contract at that point. Again, the issue is the confidence in, and the capability of, Accenture to deliver those requirements within the cost and the broad timescales that had been agreed. Is that a fair comment, Mark?

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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That is a fair reflection of the situation.

Liam Kerr Con North East Scotland
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I have a final question. Has any person or group really been held to account for those failures? I accept that there are a number of moving parts but, at a number of points, the ball seems to have been dropped. Who dropped the ball, and what has happened to them?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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The formal solution was that the parties agreed to terminate the contract, and Accenture made a significant payment that refunded the £11 million that it had received in milestone payments together with £13.5 million as compensation for staff time and other costs that had been incurred. In a direct sense, therefore, the penalty fell to Accenture.

As the committee knows, there has been a number of personnel changes in Police Scotland and the SPA since they were established in 2013. The broader questions might therefore be better addressed to those bodies.

James Kelly Lab Glasgow
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I will touch on some of the project management issues. You said that there was a waterfall approach that basically involved going through all the phases of the system build and then handing it over to Police Scotland to do the user testing. How many phases did that involve? What was the timescale from the start of the project to when it was handed over to Police Scotland in June 2015?

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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The project kicked off with a high-level design phase very soon after the contract was signed. In broad terms, there were four further stages. The detailed design, functional design and product testing stages were performed by Accenture, as would be the case with any contractor in a programme management set-up, and the final stage was user acceptance testing. The system was handed over to Police Scotland only at the final stage so that it could see what the system was doing. That happened in the summer of 2015—as you will recall from the Auditor General’s previous answers, the system as a whole was initially expected to go live in September 2014, so Police Scotland did not see it until some nine months after the original go-live date.

During the course of the programme, dates slipped. Waterfall methodology involves one stage following another, but some of the phases that were originally envisaged as sequential began to overlap. The i6 programme board presented that to Accenture as a significant challenge: it asked why the stages had to overlap, given that that would generate additional risk. The overlapping was an attempt by Accenture to keep the programme moving and on track.

James Kelly Lab Glasgow
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It has been a long time since I worked in software development, but I cannot for the life of me understand why someone would sign up to an approach that involves the developer going through the design stages and the build stages—which I assume would involve internal testing—and handing the system over only once that is all completed. Have Police Scotland or its external advisers been questioned on why the waterfall approach was accepted?

09:30

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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We asked programme managers who were around at the time why that approach had been adopted. At the time, it was very much regarded as the accepted approach. Accenture provided demonstrations to Police Scotland during the course of the programme, but there was no full handover of the code so that Police Scotland could really get into the nitty-gritty of it.

It is clear—indeed, the chair of the Scottish Police Authority has said publicly—that such a programme will not be undertaken in that way again, and that a much more modular and agile approach to development will always be adopted in future. At that time, however, people were determined to use the waterfall approach.

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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We are not aware from looking at the board papers that there was any challenge from people asking whether there was an alternative development methodology. Catherine Young might have more detail on that.

Catherine Young Audit Scotland
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In the latter part of the programme round, there was some discussion about whether to develop some of the modules in an agile fashion. However, as Mark Roberts said, there is no evidence that such an approach was fully considered, given that both parties had already agreed to the waterfall approach. The modular approach was growing in popularity, but at the outset the waterfall approach was used.

James Kelly Lab Glasgow
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Was it accepted that Accenture would set out the approach that it would adopt and Police Scotland would sign up to that?

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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There was an agreement between Accenture and Police Scotland—or rather, the organisations that preceded Police Scotland, because that process was going on prior to its establishment. The original business case was agreed by what was then the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland; the entire procurement phase predated the establishment of the SPA and Police Scotland.

James Kelly Lab Glasgow
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Was there any visibility of, or transparency around, Accenture’s internal testing before the handover to Police Scotland?

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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As I said, there were demonstrations of what the system was doing. Police Scotland’s programme management team visited Accenture’s development centres in Newcastle and Mumbai. However, as I said, there was no detailed handover of the code.

James Kelly Lab Glasgow
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Did Police Scotland know whether Accenture was doing proper testing?

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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It knew that Accenture was doing testing. There was quite a lot of challenge from the programme board about Accenture’s methodology for testing, which the board thought did not reflect industry standards. Accenture was saying, “This is our testing methodology, which we have used elsewhere in many cases, and that is what we will use,” but there was tension around the approach.

James Kelly Lab Glasgow
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With the exception of the system demonstrations, which basically involved getting people in a room like this one and firing stuff up on a screen, was there no visibility of the actual results of the testing?

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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There was not, as far as we are aware.

Catherine Young Audit Scotland
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A number of flaws were identified at the product test stage, and there was a lot of disagreement between Accenture and Police Scotland about how critical the errors were. There was a lot of challenge from board members about the errors. When the programme moved into the user acceptance stage, some of the errors that had been found at the product test stage were unresolved.

There was also a lot of challenge about the methodology not being standard industry practice. A new programme manager for the Police Scotland side had a significant IT background and was able to get in and look at the coding. Board minutes show a lot of discussion about how the detailed coding did not meet standard industry practice.

James Kelly Lab Glasgow
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That does not sound very satisfactory.

It is clear that the waterfall methodology has serious flaws. How confident are we that the waterfall approach is not being used for other IT projects in the public sector, and that a more robust approach is being taken? That would involve the products being handed over in phases to allow users to test them more robustly as each phase is completed, which would give them more confidence in the products overall.

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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As I said in my opening remarks, I am planning to publish a report in May that looks across the range of IT projects on which I have reported over the past few years. It is certainly true that an approach such as the waterfall method, which was widely used five to seven years ago, is now much less commonly used, and we are seeing much more use of the agile approach. However, in some of the reports that I have produced, we have raised concerns that the agile approach is being used by people who do not fully understand it or are not properly trained in it. I will pull all that together in my May report, which should give the committee some assurance about the current position.

Ross Thomson Con North East Scotland
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I want to follow the same line of questioning. According to the report, there was a year and a half’s worth of dialogue but even so, at the end of the day, the functionality of Accenture’s programme never met Police Scotland’s requirements. That is a fairly fundamental issue, and I am trying to understand exactly how it came about. Was Police Scotland clear from the outset about its technical requirements for the system?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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Yes. I will ask Mark Roberts to come in, but the user requirements specified in the contract were the basis of Police Scotland’s ability to achieve the settlement that it did achieve when the plug was pulled.

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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Police Scotland was—and probably still is—confident that its user requirements set out exactly what it wanted the IT to do, and Accenture responded with a solution that it felt met those requirements, with some qualifications, and believed that Police Scotland had agreed to that. Accenture felt that going beyond its solution there had been what it described as a continual elaboration of requirements—in other words, the scope was getting bigger and bigger. At the same time, however, Police Scotland maintained that it had not changed its user requirements.

As I said in answer to Mr Kerr’s question, there was a precedence clause in the contract that said that the user requirements were paramount. That is what Police Scotland continually referred back to, and that is what was at the heart of the difference between Police Scotland’s feeling that it was clear about what it required and Accenture’s feeling that there was continual expansion of the scope of the programme.

Ross Thomson Con North East Scotland
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That is very helpful. So Police Scotland had been clear about its requirements and expectations from the outset.

On page 8 of the report, you talk through the procurement process and the early design stage. It says in paragraph 14 that, in November 2012, as part of that long process—we know that procurement can take time—

“Accenture scored highest against the technical and implementation criteria”.

However, it did not score the highest on cost. Was there a failure in due diligence on the procurement side?

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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When we spoke to people, it was made very clear to us that Accenture’s experience of delivering a system to the Spanish police force, as the Auditor General has described, was a very important criterion, albeit that that was a simpler system. That was reflected in the weighting assigned in the procurement scoring exercise. At the same time, it was made very clear that, although cost was an important factor, the quality of the system was what Police Scotland really wanted. That is why the technical and implementation criteria were very important in Accenture’s securing the bid.

On the question whether there was a failure in due diligence, as we have said in the report—and as the Auditor General has said—we think that Police Scotland followed best practice even though that did not manifest in a successful outcome, as we have discussed. Nevertheless, the procurement process was robust.

Ross Thomson Con North East Scotland
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Following on from that answer and Colin Beattie’s earlier point—and, indeed, going back to the point that Police Scotland had been clear about its requirements—I wonder whether it would be fair to suggest that during the process Accenture had in any way been misleading with regard to its offer and what it was advising it could produce for Police Scotland. Given that, at the end of the day, the user requirements and what Police Scotland wanted were significantly different to what it got, is it fair to suggest that Accenture misled Police Scotland?

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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A fair reflection might be that Accenture had underestimated the complexity of the system. A repeated theme throughout the challenge presented by the programme board was the extent of knowledge of policing and the specific requirements of the Scottish policing environment of the people who were getting involved from the Accenture side. That issue was raised repeatedly by the programme board.

Ross Thomson Con North East Scotland
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In response to Colin Beattie’s questioning on this subject, the Auditor General said that the SPA board provided challenge. What kind of challenge did the board present to Accenture at the time, and how robust was it?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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It was the i6 programme board that provided the challenge. I will ask Catherine Young to talk you through it, as she is the one who has spent an awful lot of time reading the board minutes and talking to people about what happened at the meetings.

Catherine Young Audit Scotland
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At the initial stage when a gap between the requirements and the contractor solution was identified, there was a lot of discussion about the fact that neither party had picked that up in any of the 160 dialogue sessions. It all came back to the interpretation of the requirements.

The search function was quite a significant issue at that stage. The Accenture solution said that it would do one thing, but the requirement was different, and that was picked up only at the very early design stages. Because the requirements obviously took precedence in the contract, Police Scotland’s standpoint was that the solution must fulfil those requirements.

Throughout the other stages of the programme, the challenge was around the quality of information that the board was receiving from Accenture, and there were questions around the test strategy and the methodology that were being employed. I should also point out another layer of governance, which related to day-to-day contract management. I believe that, at that point, there were more discussions around the detail of those issues.

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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A lot of concern was also expressed about the timeliness of documentation, because an awful lot of material was being provided to the programme board at the very last minute. As Catherine Young has said, the quality of the documentation was another focus of challenge.

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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Finally, for completeness, I should point out that, after the quite early deterioration in relationships, the programme board asked Accenture to express its confidence in delivery as a percentage instead of simply using red, amber and green flags, and those percentage ratings were challenged quite strongly by the programme board.

Ross Thomson Con North East Scotland
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I have another question on that point. As the report highlights, there was a breakdown in trust and confidence at a very early stage. If there was no trust and no confidence in Accenture’s ability to deliver at such an early stage, why did we continue? Why was something not done earlier? If it was never a workable relationship, how could it ever have been made productive?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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That is a very good question, and one that we touched on in our earlier answers. A great deal was riding on the programme both for the police in Scotland and for Accenture. You are right that problems emerged very soon after the contracts had been signed, but Accenture was very concerned to deliver the system, which was seen as important for it globally. For the police, there was real concern to demonstrate that it could deliver an IT system that fulfilled its requirements in order to boost confidence in the new policing arrangements in Scotland and because of its importance in achieving the financial savings and the operational benefits that had been foreseen in the business case.

That is one of the areas where we think that lessons might be learned about not allowing such pressure—such optimism—to colour the decisions that are being taken when problems start to arise. That does not mean that we think that the actions that Police Scotland took to try to bring the contract back on track were not appropriate, but there is a question whether the plug could have been pulled sooner.

Ross Thomson Con North East Scotland
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That takes me neatly to my last question. Paragraph 26 on page 11 of the report mentions the

“failure of a previous police ICT project in 2012”

You would have thought that lessons had been learned. However, that paragraph finishes by saying that there might have been

“misplaced optimism about the prospects of success”.

It sounds to me like there has been misplaced optimism throughout the whole process. Is it fair to suggest that a lot of this was done on a wing and a prayer, with eyes closed and people hoping that it was going to get better, only it never did?

09:45

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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I do not think that that is fair. There was an element of optimism—and you are right to point to that paragraph and sentence in the report—but it was not naive optimism. Police Scotland and the programme team did what was required of them and did it thoroughly, against a backdrop, as Mark Roberts has said, of a complex but real disagreement with their contractor about what the system was going to deliver.

It is unusual in the public sector for the client not only to recover what they have paid but also a sum in compensation, and that compensation reflects the fact that Police Scotland followed good practice in procurement. The project itself was undermined by the difference in view about what the system should deliver.

Alex Neil SNP Airdrie and Shotts
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This has been going on for four years now. The original plan was for the project to save about

£200 million or thereabouts over a period of time. Does the compensation element include compensation for not realising all or part of the £200 million savings that would have been realised had the project been handled properly and competently?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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First of all, Mr Neil, it is good to see you back.

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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Secondly, we are talking about £200 million of financial savings plus other operational benefits across a 10-year period, the phasing of which is set out in appendix 1 of the report.

The information that we have been able to obtain from the SPA is that the compensation payment was not for the benefits forgone but for staff time and other direct costs such as software licences and hardware maintenance that had been incurred, and it was the result of a negotiation between the SPA and Accenture rather than a precise figure. In short, therefore, the information that we have is that it covers those direct costs rather than benefits forgone.

Alex Neil SNP Airdrie and Shotts
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Should it have included benefits forgone?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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That is a question that you will have to ask the SPA.

Alex Neil SNP Airdrie and Shotts
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As Auditor General, do you think that it should have included that element to protect public money?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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That is clearly my main concern about the programme. As I have said in the report and in my opening remarks this morning, the project was a central part of police reform with regard to the savings that were intended to be achieved and, much more significantly over time, the improvements in the way that police officers and police staff carry out their work and the way in which the whole criminal justice system can operate.

Those benefits have been delayed at best, and there is currently no plan for when and how they will be achieved. I am not in a position to say whether it was ever feasible for the SPA to negotiate compensation for that opportunity cost from Accenture, but the question now is how we go about achieving those benefits in future.

Alex Neil SNP Airdrie and Shotts
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Were there any restrictions in the contract that would have prevented compensation being claimed for savings forgone when things broke down?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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I would be surprised if there were restrictions of that sort. The contract was about what would be delivered at what price rather than the compensation arrangements if it were not delivered.

Alex Neil SNP Airdrie and Shotts
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Do we know whether the SPA asked for any element of compensation to cover the savings forgone, or did it just forget about it, ignore it or not raise it? Did Accenture say, “No way”?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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As it was a commercial negotiation, you would need to ask the SPA about the content of it.

Alex Neil SNP Airdrie and Shotts
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When do you think that Police Scotland is going to be in a position to put a plan in place to recover the situation and get a computer system that realises those savings?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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I have said in my report and on the record that it is urgent that it does so. It has forgone having those benefits in place now, based on the original delivery dates.

The policing 2026 strategy that was published a couple of weeks ago is centred on much better and more flexible use of IT to help police officers be out and about doing their work on behalf of all of us across Scotland. Currently, there is no plan and no date for achieving those benefits. It is something that the committee might want to explore with the SPA and Police Scotland.

Alex Neil SNP Airdrie and Shotts
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It is definitely something that we will want to follow up.

Finally, you said that you would publish the lessons to be learned from this episode. When are you going to do that? Can you give us any indication this morning of what the three or four main lessons are likely to be?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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We are working towards a planned publication date of May. As I said in response to Colin Beattie, that report is intended to pull together lessons learned from all the IT projects on which I have reported during my time as Auditor General. I would prefer to hold off on commenting until that report is published, but many of the examples will be familiar to members of this committee.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
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What was the Scottish Government’s role in all this?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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Mark Roberts might want to pick that up.

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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As we have discussed, the Scottish Government provided us, at various points before the awarding of the contract and in the early stages of the post-contract timeline, with gateway reviews of certain aspects of the programme. For example, it looked at governance arrangements and made recommendations in that area.

In the first year of the programme, after the awarding of the contract, the then deputy chief information officer in the Scottish Government joined the programme board to provide additional support. That individual has a commercial and software development background, and he supplemented the existing programme board by providing external challenge and expertise.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
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We have seen the same thing happen in the national health service: the Scottish Government sends in troubleshooters after problems arise, which is clearly the right thing to do. However, did the Scottish Government have any formal responsibilities in this area, and were those understood by both Police Scotland and Accenture?

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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The contract was signed between the Scottish Police Authority and Accenture. Although I am sure the Government was aware of what was going on, it did not, over and above its membership of the programme board, have any direct involvement in the day-to-day management or the scrutiny of what was happening.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
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You have outlined the political context and say that the Government had no day-to-day role in the scrutiny of what was happening, but at that point there was a lot of pressure on Government to make a success of the legislation, which had passed through Parliament not long before. Was there any indication from the research that you did in your audit that the Scottish Government could have taken a more proactive role in trying to facilitate a better relationship or a more profitable contract?

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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We have not seen any evidence to suggest that that was explored in any great detail. It was very much the case that the set-up was going to be maintained and day-to-day programme management handled within Police Scotland, with ultimate oversight through the Scottish Police Authority and—even more indirectly—through ministers.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
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Do you know how often reports went to ministers?

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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I am sorry, but I do not.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
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Paragraph 20 of your report states:

“The i6 programme had difficulties almost immediately”.

We have all been in a situation in which, looking back on a project’s lack of success, we have thought, “Actually, there were teething troubles right at the start. Maybe we should have called a halt to it or looked for an alternative at that point.” Was there any indication in your audit that that option had been considered?

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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As I said in response to an earlier question, there was consideration as early as October 2013—in other words, within three months of the contract being awarded—of whether to terminate the contract at that point. As we describe in our report, and as we have said today, there was genuine determination on both sides to try to make the project work. It was recognised that teething problems, to which you have alluded, were inevitable, and the parties involved were going to try to resolve those issues. However, it is clear with hindsight that, ultimately, that did not happen. Whether those involved could have pulled the plug earlier than they ultimately did is a moot point, given the context of the system being a very important element of police reform that was going to improve information management, sharing and analysis significantly across the national force.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
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Was there any ministerial involvement in the consideration of whether to terminate the project?

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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Not as far as I am aware. I think that that was done at SPA or Police Scotland level.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
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You have said already that the report makes it clear that the project was of global significance for Accenture. It is a big company and it was a huge contract. Do other countries have a public sector body, such as we might be lacking here in Scotland, that can guarantee good practice in IT?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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We have said in evidence to the committee before that the United Kingdom Government digital service is doing some interesting things. It is too soon for the National Audit Office to be able to give an assurance that the digital service is avoiding things going wrong—no approach will ever give you a blanket guarantee that things will not go wrong—but it has been investing in a centre of excellence that has up-to-date high-level digital skills, in training people more widely across public services, and in ensuring that the most up-to-date approaches are being used.

Some of that thinking is being picked up in the Scottish Government’s new approach to information systems. The chief information officer can tell you more about the approach that it is taking, but both approaches are an attempt to tackle the conundrum that Mr Neil has identified in the past, which is that it can be hard for the Government and for public sector bodies to attract the scarce and highly paid skills that are needed to make projects of that nature work well. The UK Government’s approach is one example that we have seen, and the report that we will publish in May will give other pointers to international good practice.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
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You have described what the UK Government is doing. Is any similar work happening in Scotland?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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You have heard from us and in evidence from the permanent secretary, the chief information officer and others about the approach that they are taking. We have said that we think that the approach that is being taken here in Scotland is definitely a positive move, although it is too soon for us to say that it is having the desired effect and is operating effectively and at the scale that is needed—especially given the range of opportunities for using digital technology to transform the way public services are delivered and reduce costs. There are moves being made, but it is too early to say whether they are fully effective.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
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To go back to the Scottish Government’s role, do you know the last point at which the Government provided public assurance on the project?

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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I would prefer to check when the final gateway review took place, and to put that information to you in writing. I would say that it was in 2014, but I will need to confirm that.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
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At various points, the Scottish Government said that delivery confidence was either amber or green. Given all the background disputes that are outlined in your audit evidence, why did it say that?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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We answered a question earlier about the value of the gateway reviews and the other external checks that were done. As we say in paragraphs 18 and 19 of our report, the Government identified some improvements but was broadly giving amber and green ratings for delivery confidence. That comes down to two things, the first of which is the waterfall approach that was being taken, which made it impossible to see flaws until the system was handed over for user testing much later. The second thing is the levels of assurance that were being given by Accenture at that point, which is a common theme all the way through: Accenture was expressing very high confidence. The approach to producing the system meant that it could not be tested by the users independently of Accenture until later on, so at that point the reviews were focusing on the processes that were in place and relying on the assurances that were coming from Accenture.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
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Would it be fair to say that the amber or green warnings were more about the Government’s confidence in the two parties trying to sort out a problem, rather than being ratings for actual delivery of the project?

Catherine Young Audit Scotland
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One of the earlier health checks—at the contract variation stage in April 2014—comments on the relationship challenges between the two parties, but that review focused very much on the programme management and contract management side of things. There was some discussion about whether Police Scotland or the SPA would oversee the contract management; the report recommended that it should be done by Police Scotland, and that an extra layer of governance should be built in with an IT scrutiny forum. That was one of the health checks that had an amber rating. At the next point, Police Scotland had taken on board that recommendation and put in place an IT scrutiny forum that included representatives from the SPA and Police Scotland. It moved to green at that stage.

I think that one of the final checks was in August. I think, too, that a technical assurance check was done very late on when the system was already going to fail. I do not have that in my chronology, but we can double check it.

10:00

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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It is probably worth stressing the point that the Scottish Government’s various reviews and health checks were technical processes. They considered the content of the contract and how it was delivered rather than being policy oversight of the establishment of the SPA and Police Scotland.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
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John Foley of the Scottish Police Authority said that there was no detriment to the public purse as a result of the i6 programme. Is that an accurate statement?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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It is accurate in relation to the direct cash costs to the SPA and Police Scotland. They recovered the payments that they had made to Accenture and a significant sum larger than those payments to compensate for staff time, software licences and hardware maintenance. In those terms, and bearing in mind the fact that the negotiated sum was a negotiation and an estimate, there has been no loss to the public purse. However, it is also true to say that the i6 programme was to be central to achieving many of the benefits of police reform—the savings that would help to close the funding gap on which I have reported to the committee previously and the operational benefits to enable police officers and staff to carry out their work more effectively.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
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As Mr Neil said, the issue is the loss of the benefits.

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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Yes.

Gail Ross SNP Caithness, Sutherland and Ross
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Good morning, Auditor General. Accenture said that the user requirements were increasing but Police Scotland said that they were staying the same. Who was telling the truth?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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Mark Roberts has given you a clear picture of the user requirements, as set out in the contract, being the element that took precedence within the contract. The contract variation embedded that in what Accenture agreed to. There were changes to the programme that went through the contract variation process, as we would expect in any area, but the core of the problem was not Police Scotland continually revising its requirements.

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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There were changes, and the original contract included a change-control process that allowed mutually agreed changes to be made. Accenture argued to the programme board that there was an elaboration of requirements and that Police Scotland was making the project more complicated than it had initially said it would be, whereas Police Scotland said that it had, in its user requirements, been clear about what it expected the system to do. As we have described, that gap was never filled.

Gail Ross SNP Caithness, Sutherland and Ross
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Given those differences of opinion, have Accenture and Police Scotland both accepted the report’s findings?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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Yes. As the committee knows, I agree the factual content of my reports with the people on whom I am reporting. In formal terms, that relates to public bodies—the Government, Police Scotland and the SPA in this case—but, as a matter of courtesy, I sent a copy to Accenture as well and asked for its comments on the report’s factual accuracy.

Gail Ross SNP Caithness, Sutherland and Ross
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We touched on the fact that there has been no detriment to the public purse and that the operational benefits have suffered as a result of the failure. Has it had an adverse effect on the staff?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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There is no question but that it has done so in terms of opportunity cost. I say in the report that police officers and police staff still have to use 130 manual or IT processes, many of which come from the previous forces before Police Scotland was established. There are problems with officers and staff having to enter the same data into multiple systems and to search multiple systems to get information back out again. Time is wasted doing that and there is a risk of errors being introduced when data is entered again. All that makes the jobs of police officers and staff more difficult and reduces the time that they have available to spend providing policing services.

Gail Ross SNP Caithness, Sutherland and Ross
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Have there been any improvements to the IT system at all?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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There certainly have. Police Scotland has invested in a new national network and in replacing outdated hardware, including desktop computers. Other projects have been under way to deal with matters such as managing custody, which is an important part of police business. All that is good and is progress, but it is not a substitute for the benefits that i6 was intended to achieve.

Gail Ross SNP Caithness, Sutherland and Ross
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You mentioned the policing 2026 strategy, which is quite ambitious on use of technology. Do you think that a single national IT system for policing is still viable?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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That is a question that you should ask the SPA and Police Scotland, but their response to my report has been that they would not go about the process in the same way again. It has been quite a salutary experience, with regard to how to procure the necessary IT and how to plan the process. Having learned from that experience and from how things are done in the technology world more widely these days, they would take a more incremental approach.

Gail Ross SNP Caithness, Sutherland and Ross
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You said that there is currently no timescale for an IT system. This might also be a question for Police Scotland and the SPA. Are there any indications that they are even thinking that far ahead at the moment?

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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As the Auditor General said in her opening comments, we will follow up on that through our annual audit process. We heard about the development of smaller components that built on systems that had been used by other police forces elsewhere in the UK or by the previous Scottish forces, but it had been done on a piecemeal basis. We are talking about the development and roll-out of a very small part of the system.

We are waiting to see what the underlying implementation plans are once the policing 2026 strategy is finally agreed. The police’s ICT strategy will be key to its achieving the vision that has been outlined for 2026.

Gail Ross SNP Caithness, Sutherland and Ross
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Do you think that the police and the SPA will have that ready when the policing 2026 plan is finalised?

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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I think that that is a question for the SPA and Police Scotland.

Liam Kerr Con North East Scotland
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Exhibit 1 on page 7 of your report shows the six areas that represent 80 per cent of policing activity. Given that the i6 system was designed to deal with those six areas, if it had worked and was now up and running, would it already—in the light of the policing 2026 strategy—have been obsolete?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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I am sorry to be boring but, again, that is a question for the SPA. What I can say with confidence is that i6 was intended to cover around 80 per cent of the information flows around policing. Many of the case studies that are used in the 2026 strategy, such as those that involve police officers gathering information about a missing person or someone who is acting strangely, would fall within the categories that are shown in exhibit 1, and that information would have been available to other people in the wider criminal justice system. Inevitably, the system would have needed to continue evolving, as our phones and tablets do, but I think that the core of it was absolutely aligned with what the policing 2026 strategy is about.

I see that Mark Roberts wants to add to that.

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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The Auditor General got in before me. I was merely going to say that it would have been hard in 2010 or 2011 to envisage officers being based in police cars and using tablets as a way of recording and sharing information at the origins of the i6 programme, but the fundamental principles of information sharing and being able to do searches across the whole system remain valid.

Liam Kerr Con North East Scotland
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I want to ask a question that the public would like to know the answer to. Accenture seems to have held its hands up and accepted a significant degree of responsibility, but that begs the question whether Accenture should still be able to tender for public contracts and, if so, whether it still has a prospect of winning them.

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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I am sure that Accenture is tendering for public contracts. We are not aware of whether it is actively involved in tendering for any in Scotland or whether it holds any in Scotland; I am afraid that we do not know that.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
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Would you be able to find that out and write to the committee about it? Is that information commercially confidential?

Mark Roberts Audit Scotland
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I suspect that information about potential bids would certainly be commercially confidential. Maybe that is a question for Accenture.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
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We can explore that in Parliament.

Did you identify any operational errors resulting from the failure of the i6 programme?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
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I think that it would be impossible to link any operational failings directly to the failure of the programme. That said, we are all aware of things that have gone wrong with call handling and other aspects of operational policing. The i6 system was intended to make those things more reliable, more efficient and more effective for police officers, staff and—more importantly—for all of us in Scotland.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
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Thank you very much for your evidence.

I suspend the meeting until 10.15.

10:10 Meeting suspended.

10:15 On resuming—

  1. 09:00 Decision on Taking Business in Private Procedure · 1
  2. 09:00 Section 23 Reports Evidence session · 147
  3. 10:00 Section 23 Reports Committee business · 72

The type of each item (debate, statement, questions, members’ business and so on) and the times shown are worked out by this site from headings, the chair’s opening words and the Official Report’s running timestamps. They are not the Parliament’s own classification. Text: the Scottish Parliament Official Report.