Parliament Workbench
Data: Official Report to 19 Nov 2026

Official Report · Committee

Section 23 Reports

“Common Agricultural Policy Futures programme: an update”

Thursday 30 June 2016 Public Audit Committee About 09:00–09:45 Evidence session 86 contributions · 9 speakers

Speakers

Choose an MSP to read only their contributions

The record

86 contributions
Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
link

Agenda item 2 is on the section 23 report “Common Agricultural Policy Futures programme: an update”. We will take evidence from Caroline Gardner, the Auditor General for Scotland and, from Audit Scotland: Mark Taylor, assistant director; Gemma Diamond, senior manager; and Morag Campsie, project manager. I warmly welcome you all to this morning’s committee meeting.

The Auditor General for Scotland and Audit Scotland have advised in advance of this session that they might be unable to respond fully to questions on the conflict of interest that the report has identified on information technology governance, as the matter is under police investigation. The AGS will clarify in her opening statement what she can and cannot say to the committee.

I invite the Auditor General for Scotland to make her statement before I open the floor to questions from members.

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
link

Thank you, convener. I am very pleased to be back reporting to the committee in this new session.

Obviously, a lot has happened in the past week and, however events unfold, the committee’s role in scrutinising the public finances will be even more important in this session of Parliament. Big changes are under way with the Parliament’s new financial powers, and they are sure to be high on the agenda for the committee, and for Audit Scotland, in the months to come. I look forward to building on the excellent work achieved by the previous Public Audit Committee and to continuing to support members in their vital role.

The first report in front of you today looks at the progress that the Scottish Government has made with its common agricultural policy futures programme. This is my fourth update on the programme, and it covers progress up to April.

Before I outline my findings, it might be useful if I reflect briefly on the result of last week’s referendum on the European Union. I recognise that there might be implications for the programme, but it is too early to know what the impact might be. We will continue to keep a close eye on developments over the coming months, and we will consider carefully the implications for our audit. The developments do not detract from the need for the Scottish Government to stay focused on making payments to farmers, crofters and rural businesses as quickly and effectively as possible, both to mitigate the impact on rural businesses and to learn lessons from how the futures programme has been managed to date.

In that respect, the programme’s IT system is central. It is intended to process, to validate and to make payments to farmers. The system is in place and operating, but it has not worked as well as it needs to, and some parts of the system are still being developed and redesigned.

I want to acknowledge the continuing commitment of Scottish Government staff to delivering the programme. However, although that commitment is truly commendable, I am concerned that the level of effort is not sustainable and that there is a real risk of burn-out.

I will briefly summarise the report’s key points. First of all, a number of milestones and ministerial targets for making payments to farmers have been missed. Farmers report that payment delays have affected their cash flow, with a knock-on effect on the rural economy. The Scottish Government announced three loans schemes, paid from the Scottish Government budget, to get some money to farmers more quickly. In spite of that, however, some farmers had not received a payment by April 2016, when they would normally have expected to receive a payment in December.

I reported in April that the Scottish Government was unlikely to meet the June deadline and could incur financial penalties as a result. Since then, the European Commission has moved the deadline for payments from the end of June to 15 October. A later payment date puts back the immediate risk of financial penalties, but the underlying concerns about the programme remain.

I also highlight in my report that estimating the potential financial penalties is difficult. The matter is ultimately subject to assessment by Commission auditors, and that assessment goes wider than just the number of payments made by the deadline to include the quality of the checks and other controls that were in place before payments were made. Our report highlights a risk of disallowance arising from delays and the workarounds that the teams have put in place to enable them to make payments.

A second issue is the complexity of the programme. There is no doubt that the external environment for the programme is challenging. The EC regulations are complex and have been clarified and developed over the life of the programme. At the same time, decisions that the Government has made, in discussion with the farming industry, on how the CAP is designed and delivered in Scotland have added to the complexity.

Thirdly, on decision making and governance, we identify some occasions when significant decisions were made outwith the programme governance structures. The programme board was not given the opportunity to fulfil its role in offering advice and support to the programme sponsor. We also identify occasions when decisions took too long, which affected programme delivery. The IT team and the programme team did not work well together, and basic information on delivery and timescales was not shared with those managing the programme. That led to a lack of trust between the two teams and affected delivery.

Finally, there was, as the convener has mentioned, a significant conflict of interest, which was not dealt with effectively. The delivery director, who was a contractor, was able to benefit financially from recruitment decisions. I should note for the record that a police investigation is under way. The Scottish Government put arrangements in place to ensure that decisions were not taken by a single individual, but the delivery director, as a senior member of the resources group, still had the opportunity to influence decisions.

Overall, the programme will not deliver the full range of planned benefits and the Government now aims only to deliver a system that complies with EC regulations without some of the planned enhancements. There is also a risk that the current programme budget will be exhausted before a CAP-compliant system is delivered. I do not expect the programme to deliver value for money.

The report contains a number of recommendations, many of which I have made before in relation to the management of IT programmes. The Government first needs to get the IT system working more effectively, which I know it is committed to doing; it needs to complete a detailed assessment of the risk of financial penalties for all the remaining elements to enable informed decisions about priorities to be made and to manage the remaining budget; and it needs to ensure that appropriate governance arrangements are in place, together with plans for disaster recovery and knowledge transfer.

I have with me the colleagues who prepared on my behalf the report and previous ones on the issue. We are obviously happy to do our best to answer the committee’s questions.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
link

Thank you very much, Auditor General. In opening up the meeting to questions from the committee, I ask members to indicate to me whether they would like to ask a question on the topic. We will start with Colin Beattie.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
link

Good morning, Auditor General. Looking at the report, I have a certain feeling of déjà vu, as we have had several reports on this particular issue. The report seems to reflect the overall problems with IT procurement throughout the public sector. Those problems do not seem to be restricted to Scotland; we have seen large problems with IT elsewhere, most recently with Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, which I think wrote off £2 billion or £3 billion on its system down south.

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
link

I do not want to comment on specifics, but you are absolutely right that the problem is not confined to the Scottish Government.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
link

We have discussed previously the difficulties with skills shortages in the market and the public sector’s difficulty in competing with the private sector in buying in the available skills. We have a critical problem that is multiplied by what is happening outside. On page 6 of the report, just below the six bullet points under “Recommendations”, you say that you found

“common themes and weaknesses in the management of ICT programmes in the public sector”.

You say that you are going to produce a summary of all that, which will be very important. I presume that, when you produce that summary, it will come to the committee.

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
link

It certainly will, Mr Beattie. As you have said, this is by no means the first report that I have made on serious problems with major IT systems, and we expect there to be more in future. We are looking at whether we can take the previous recommendations that we have made further by making them more specific or helpful and at how we can add value in other ways.

Gemma Diamond might want to say a little more about that and about how we bring that back to the committee.

Gemma Diamond Audit Scotland
link

We are certainly keeping a close eye on developments in the Scottish Government. On the back of our update report on managing ICT contracts, Government officials appeared before the committee in the previous session of Parliament and talked about the arrangements that they are starting to put in place to try to help with the skills issue. For example, the Government is setting up a centralised digital transformation service, which is a central hub of skilled people who can go out to Government bodies that cannot get the skills or who can help those bodies to recruit.

As Caroline Gardner has said, we are thinking about other ways in which we can try to be helpful. We are looking at the common themes to see whether we can provide more detail on specific issues, including the questions that programme board members might ask when they see papers for scrutiny. We are also thinking about the kind of information that they might expect to receive. Given that we keep repeating the same recommendations, we are now looking at different ways of breaking the advice down and making it more helpful and of helping people to understand the key issues.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
link

Obviously there are issues in the report that the committee will want to follow up, but we might need to look at the overall picture. Perhaps we can think about how to do that when the Auditor General’s summary report comes out.

This is a big issue. I do not know whether any Administration has been good at identifying the problems and dealing with them, but there might be something that we can learn from elsewhere. It would be helpful if, when the summary comes out, you could make suggestions about where there has been good practice elsewhere in the public sector in managing IT projects. Perhaps we can take that into consideration, too.

I am concerned about what you say in your report about

“a lack of trust and blame culture hindering effective progress.”

You go on to talk about “little accountability” and “ineffective challenge and oversight”. We have heard about that before. Why has this happened? We have previously had uncomfortable reports, but this report seems to be the nuclear option. How did things suddenly get to this point?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
link

The team and I have reflected on that, and our view is that things did not suddenly reach this point and that the seeds of the problem were laid back in 2012 when the original business case was put together. At that point, the business case did not recognise the scale of the challenge that was to be faced. A particular challenge related to the Commission’s requirements at that stage, which were known but were not recorded in the business case and were therefore not built into the thinking about how to plan and manage the programme.

As we say in the report, there was also a significant delay in appointing the key senior people who needed to be there to develop the options, procure the system and put the groundwork in place. All of that meant that, when we reached the point when the system needed to be operating to accept applications and start processing payments, it was behind the pace, and people were very much focused on solving the immediate problems.

We think, therefore, that the roots of the situation lie right back at the beginning of the programme. In a sense, that is the frustration; it is often the case that the initial groundwork has not been done well enough, which leads to late problems in delivery and an impact on the people who rely on the system across Scotland.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
link

The reports on this issue that the previous Public Audit Committee received from you seemed to indicate that, although the situation was uncomfortable and things were a bit tight, resources were being put in and it should be okay. Now it is not.

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
link

I think that people have been doing their absolute best to recover the situation. We know that people have been working very long hours and that extra resources have been brought in. You can see that in some of the exhibits in the report that show, for example, the number of contractors working on the programme. There is no doubt that people were doing their best to deliver it.

At the same time, the pressure to make things right led to some of the other problems, with decisions being made outwith the programme governance structures and the programme board not being given its place to think through the implications of other decisions such as making partial payments to farmers or setting up the loans schemes. All of those things were done for very understandable reasons, but they all added to the sense of tension and pressure between the two teams, the lack of trust and the lack of focus on the bigger picture instead of the immediate day-to-day decisions that were being taken.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
link

Alongside farmers not receiving their payments on time is the issue of disallowance. In paragraph 10 on page 10, you mention that the Scottish Government

“incurred around 69 million euros ... in disallowance”

over a period, which represents

“one per cent of the total CAP payments”.

Is that in line with the experience in other countries?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
link

I will ask Mark Taylor to answer that question.

Mark Taylor Audit Scotland
link

Disallowance in other countries is not unusual. The rates of disallowance across Europe have varied quite significantly. The disallowance of £51 million quoted in the report was for a variety of factors that related to the information that the Scottish Government had available about land, farms, individual fields and features in fields. They also related to issues around the quality of the inspection process and wider control weaknesses around checks on eligibility.

The line to be drawn from that to the issue that we face is that there is an indication that with such matters—which are potentially evident in the current system—the European Commission is quite robust in pursuing disallowance and challenging the Government to have in place the controls that the Commission expects it to have in place. In the report, we flag up the fact that there is still a risk of disallowance that relates not just to the deadlines in June and now October, but, generally, to the way in which the system has operated and the robustness of the checking that it has been able to facilitate.

09:15

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
link

In paragraph 3 on page 12, you say:

“the programme will end when the budget is fully used.”

What are the implications of that? Does that mean that if it is not finished, we will just stop?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
link

The Government has made a commitment to deliver a CAP-compliant programme within the existing £178 million budget. As we report, we think that there is a risk that the budget will not be sufficient to deliver the full programme. I guess that it will be for the Government to decide what it intends to do at that point. My expectation is that it will need to continue to invest in delivering a project that is at least CAP compliant, even if it decides not to take forward the other enhancements that are now outside the scope of the programme. That money would need to be found from elsewhere in the Scottish Government’s budget.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
link

I would like to bring in a couple of other members. If time allows, I can come back to Colin Beattie if he has any further questions.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
link

Perhaps I will come back in later.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
link

Okay. I will bring in Alex Neil.

Alex Neil SNP Airdrie and Shotts
link

Auditor General, you said that to finish the programme, money might be required from other parts of the Scottish Government budget. Do you have an estimate of how much additional money from elsewhere will be needed?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
link

We do not have an estimate for that. The Government’s current commitment is that it will deliver a CAP-compliant system within the £178 million budget. If you look at paragraphs 38 to 40 on page 19 of the report, you will see that, when I reported, £46.8 million of the budget remained. Of that, £31 million was already committed to things that need to be in place to deliver a system that is compliant with EU regulations, such as the land-mapping system. That leaves £15.7 million available for all the other things that are needed to get the system fully operating in a way that is quicker and more effective for both the staff involved and the farmers and their agents. My finding is that £15.7 million is tight for that, given the current rate of spend. I do not have an estimate of what else might be needed, because what we are looking at are the Government’s plans. However, there is a risk that £15.7 million is not sufficient.

Alex Neil SNP Airdrie and Shotts
link

When will we be able to establish how much additional money will be required from other budgets to complete the job?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
link

I estimate that the £15.7 million will be exhausted by November at the existing rate of spend. Obviously, it is possible that the system may be complete and fully compliant before then. We are watching that closely through the audit work that is going on. Mark Taylor is also the auditor of the Scottish Government’s budget and will be able to update on progress in September, when he reports, through me, on the Scottish Government’s budget.

Alex Neil SNP Airdrie and Shotts
link

So in September we will have an idea of the order of magnitude of the additional money that might be required.

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
link

I would hope so.

Alex Neil SNP Airdrie and Shotts
link

Last week’s events mean that we will now become involved in negotiations about the United Kingdom leaving the EU that will last up to two years. I know that it is early days, but the project clearly could be affected quite soon. If we leave the EU, the CAP as is will not, I assume, apply to the UK.

If we are going to spend all this extra money, will it be spent on something that we might not need and could be entirely redundant in two years’ time?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
link

That is a difficult question for anyone to answer. The EU referendum outcome casts a doubt across not only this stream of EU funding but other EU funding in Scotland and the rest of the UK. As you say, nobody knows exactly what shape the negotiations might take, or over what timescale they will happen.

We know that the UK will remain part of the European Union for at least the next two years, so the funding will be available to Scotland. To access the funding, the Scottish Government needs to have a system that complies with EU requirements for making payments, so there is no alternative but to complete the system. I imagine that the Government will do that with an eye to what it might need in a range of scenarios in the future for supporting the rural economy. I absolutely acknowledge that the situation is very difficult.

Alex Neil SNP Airdrie and Shotts
link

Will you keep the situation under constant review?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
link

Yes. Like everybody else, since Friday we in Audit Scotland have been thinking about the implications of the referendum result, which apply to CAP funding and the Scottish public finances much more widely. We are working on a briefing on other EU funding that comes into Scotland. CAP funding is a significant source, but it is by no means the only one. We are thinking through what the referendum means for our audit work and how we will support the Parliament in making decisions over the years ahead.

Alex Neil SNP Airdrie and Shotts
link

I will follow up some of the answers that you gave Colin Beattie on project management and will make a couple of observations. Under successive Governments—in London and Edinburgh—our management of IT projects has been problematic. As a former procurement minister, I compare that with the successful procurement projects that we have undertaken, of which the most notable is the Queensferry crossing project, which is worth more than £1 billion—more than five times the cost of the CAP IT project. We have had comparatively few problems with that massive engineering project, but we have got into all kinds of difficulties with a project that is a fifth or a sixth of its size.

Do we have lessons to learn about project management from non-IT projects, such as those under the Scottish Futures Trust’s direct management, in which procurement and project management have run much more smoothly, which have often been well under budget and which have certainly finished on time and to the original specification? Do we need to have a broader canvas for managing IT projects so that we do not end up in such a mess in the future? That is my first point.

My second point is that, to the best of my knowledge, the problems in the CAP programme were not highlighted to the Cabinet until something like October last year. Is something fundamentally wrong when the civil service and the project managers do not flag up difficulties the minute that they arise in a project of such a size? Should we put in place procedures fairly urgently to ensure that the situation is not repeated? If ministers had collectively been aware much earlier of the scale of the problem, that could have forced corrective action much earlier.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
link

A question, please, Mr Neil.

Alex Neil SNP Airdrie and Shotts
link

Should we not have such procedures? At the end of the day, ministers carry the can for other people’s incompetence.

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
link

Mark Taylor will pick up your second point in a moment. Your first point is good and it replays some of the ground that we covered with your predecessors on the committee in the previous session, when we looked at another programme for which it had been difficult to attract people with the right skills and the right seniority to manage a significant investment in IT. Across Scotland, there is a shortage of people with those skills.

We pointed to the parallel with the Scottish Futures Trust, where an investment has been made in building the expertise and bringing the right people together on a scale that can look across projects throughout Scotland. We can see an improvement in how such projects are being managed to cost and to time.

In setting up the new Government digital service, the Government intends to take exactly that approach, but it is too early for us to see the impact of that. As I said, the CAP project started back in 2012, which is when many of the seeds of the problem were sown.

We will watch the situation closely, not just because there is the immediate cost of such systems going over budget and not delivering what is intended but because there is a much bigger dividend in the potential to transform public services through good digital use, which will help with the financial pressures that we face. As you said, we need to get right a wider question of trust in government.

Mark Taylor will pick up your point about risk management of the project.

Mark Taylor Audit Scotland
link

In paragraph 2 of the report on page 7, we highlight that the fact that the project was a risky one had been identified by Scottish Government officials through their inclusion of it on the risk register. It was initially identified as a risk issue within the Scottish Government in February 2013. As things escalated, I guess that the question was at what point it was appropriate to bring ministers into that discussion. We have not looked in detail at the mechanics of how that process worked or at whether that happened at too early or too late a stage.

Mark Taylor Audit Scotland
link

One of the things that we are very mindful of in our work on the Scottish Government is how the risk management processes work. As we think about how those risk management processes need to be developed in the new environment—whether that is Brexit or new financial powers coming to Scotland—we will be very interested in how those processes work more generally and in the relationship between them and ministerial involvement.

Alison Harris Con Central Scotland
link

Good morning. I hear what you say and acknowledge where you estimate we are with the budget and what is left of the spend.

What immediately came to my attention were the potential financial penalties, which are significant and material: they range from £40 million to £125 million. What is being done to ensure that we keep the penalties at the lower end, given that it is a fair assumption that penalties will come into play?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
link

We have assessed the potential penalties. There is still a possibility that there may be no penalties, particularly in light of the extension of the payment deadline. I do not want to prejudge that.

The most important recommendation that I have made in my report is on the need for the Scottish Government to step back and do a close assessment of which parts of the system comply with the EU’s requirements and which do not, and to use that information to prioritise the spending of the remaining budget that is available. The Government is trying to balance a range of things, and I recognise the difficulty and the complexity of that process. The range of potential penalties is wide. The penalties could be significant, particularly in the current climate. Prioritising the work to minimise the risk is the most important thing that needs to be done at this point, alongside continuing to make payments to farmers.

Alison Harris Con Central Scotland
link

Who would pay the penalties? I assume that it would be the Government.

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
link

The money would come from the Scottish Government’s overall budget.

Alison Harris Con Central Scotland
link

So the cost would not be passed on to farmers; that is fine.

Liam Kerr Con North East Scotland
link

I want to follow up on the point that Alison Harris has just made. It is clear that the emergency loans that have been made will not have been budgeted for, nor will it have been anticipated that there would be fines, so they will not have been budgeted for, either. Therefore, I presume that work is being done to put a contingency in for various levels of fines. Has any indication been given of where that money would come from?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
link

The answer depends on whether we are talking about loans or penalties. I ask Mark Taylor to deal with that.

Mark Taylor Audit Scotland
link

In relation to the loans, the Government was able to identify that there was scope to make advances to farmers with a view to getting that money back once the payments had been made, recycling it within the current financial year and using it for its original budgeted purposes. That money comes from a financial transactions pot. Such transactions are essentially loans from Government to private sector individuals, housing associations and bodies outside the public sector that it is anticipated would be repaid to Government in the future.

The risk that we highlight in the report is that that will not be able to happen as soon as it was planned to happen. If payments are made to farmers too late to enable that to happen quickly enough, there is a risk that other loans will be delayed. The Government has given us an assurance that it is working to make sure that it manages that within the same financial year. In the report, we highlight that there are risks in that approach and that it is contingent on the payment system being in place and the final payments being made to farmers in time to enable those loans to be recovered, recycled and allocated to their intended recipients.

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
link

In relation to financial penalties, the first thing to say is that one of the key elements of the business case for the futures programme was to reduce the risk of penalties and disallowance in future. Mr Beattie mentioned the £51 million that was disallowed under the previous programme. The Government had the clear aim of minimising that in the current programme, for very obvious reasons.

At the moment, there is no provision for financial penalties, were they to be levied. I would expect that the Government is doing its own assessment of how likely penalties might be and what the range would be, and then looking at how they could be funded. However, I stress that the amounts have not yet been agreed or finalised—they are still potential penalties.

09:30

Liam Kerr Con North East Scotland
link

I have a follow up question on loans. I recollect Fergus Ewing suggesting that farmers might have to pay interest on those loans. Is that correct? If so, does that not seem a little harsh?

Mark Taylor Audit Scotland
link

I think that it would be best if detailed confirmation about the Government’s plans came from the Government.

Our most recent understanding is that Mr Ewing has indicated that he is reviewing the need for those interest payments.

Monica Lennon Lab Central Scotland
link

I will pick up the issue around staffing. Auditor general, you said that there is a real risk of burn-out, which is addressed on pages 36 and 37 of your report, but it has not come as an overnight surprise. There have been warning signals and the gateway reviews throughout 2015 highlighted some of those risks. It is evident that people are working very hard, but mistakes are being made, so there is a real issue around quality. To what extent are you concerned that there is scope for further problems in this area? I note that

“There is also a risk that staff will leave the programme”

before we get to the end. I also note that you recommend in the report that

“The Scottish Government needs to put plans and processes in place immediately”.

That is a very clear statement, but I wonder how confident you are that action is being taken as we speak. Also, what might a reasonable timescale be for those transitional plans?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
link

First, we all recognise that this is a very difficult position to be in for the staff involved. I heard Mr Ewing giving evidence yesterday to the Rural Economy and Connectivity Committee, during which he recognised the commitment and the efforts of the staff involved and the risk of errors being made and burn-out and so on. Clearly there is not an easy answer to that while people are working so hard to get payments made on time and the appropriate controls and checks in place.

The Government’s recognition of that risk is an important first step. If people feel that their efforts are being recognised, it is easier to keep up that level of commitment for a period than it otherwise would be. I also think that the immediate short-term efforts going on must not get in the way of recognising the importance of having a plan for transferring knowledge from all the contractor staff who are still employed to the Scottish Government staff who will have to run the programme in the future. Whether that is the long-term future or for a period after the triggering of article 50, we still need a system that can do this and a plan for transferring knowledge is very important. I take comfort from the fact that that is recognised at the highest levels in Government and it is a challenge that all of us completely recognise from managing organisations ourselves.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
link

Okay. Do any other members have points that they want to make?

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
link

There are a couple of things that I want to come in on.

Auditor general, you referred to that other project—presumably you meant NHS 24 and the issues around that. Within NHS 24, there was clear evidence of concealment of the true situation in relation to the contract. That was very evident and that came out in your report on NHS 24. You have not mentioned anything about concealment in relation to this programme and yet, as Alex Neil mentioned, the Cabinet was not aware of it until October 2015.

Was there an element of concealment? Was there an element of, “We hope it’s going to be okay—let’s keep it quiet until it comes out”?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
link

As Mark Taylor said, the risk posed by the programme was included on the Scottish Government’s risk register from its early days so it was recognised as being risky at that point.

My strong sense is that the governance problems around the project that I highlight in the report—the programme board not being able to carry out its full role; difficulties in getting hold of information about delivery, timescales and costs; the programme board decisions being made around it or decisions being delayed—made it much more difficult for the checks and balances that you would expect to have been in place to work effectively and for a clear picture of how bad the situation was to be apparent to the programme sponsor and then, through the permanent secretary, to ministers. I do not have any evidence of deliberate concealment, but I think that those governance failings made it much more difficult.

Gemma Diamond said earlier that we were looking at whether we can help through, for example, providing clear guidance to members of audit and risk committees about their role and the questions that they should be asking about the assurance that they should be seeking. Before the election, I had a session with the Scottish Government’s non-executive directors as part of our regular contact, and it was clear that they were asking the same questions about what they should have known, the extent to which the matter should have been brought to their attention and how far they should have been questioning what they were being told. It is a really clear example of why such governance arrangements matter. They are not just a tick-box exercise; they are the way in which people can understand what progress is being made, what the risks are and what needs to be escalated in very good time.

Colin Beattie SNP Midlothian North and Musselburgh
link

It seems to be a serial issue that we do not learn from the most recent disaster. Here we are again, being told—it is in paragraph 77 on page 27 of your report—that the people running the project

“relied on the skills of the IT delivery partner and external advisers to succeed.”

How often have we heard that? We have been told that about almost every project that we have looked at.

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
link

There is no doubt that these problems are still coming to light. As I touched on earlier, I expect to report on at least another one or two projects over the coming months.

The challenge for us and for the Government is in unpicking what problems are still current and what is coming out of problems that were laid when the projects were started three and four years ago. My view is that the problems with this programme originated back in 2012-13, when it was first set up. The Government has given the committee a commitment that its new arrangements will make those problems much less likely to happen in the future, but it is too soon for me to say whether those new arrangements are having the effect that they are intended to have. I hope that they are, but I cannot give you that assurance yet.

Alex Neil SNP Airdrie and Shotts
link

I appreciate the issue about the problem not having been escalated, but we have director generals in the Scottish Government who are, in effect, the chief executives of their departments. Surely, they should be personally monitoring projects of this size or ensuring that they are being monitored on their behalf. Although, rightly, the matter should have been escalated at a much earlier stage, surely, had the director general been doing their job properly, they should have picked up the problem much earlier than they did.

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
link

You are absolutely right that there is a very clear system of accountability from the permanent secretary, through the director generals and, for outside bodies, to the accountable officers of those bodies. The challenge in this case seems to have been whether the arrangements that were in place to give the director general the assurance that he needed that the programme was progressing as planned worked properly, and there is evidence that they did not work well because of the governance problems that existed. We have also seen, in IT systems across Government and further afield, a strong optimism bias—people hope that it will all turn out okay and pile the resources in. You can see evidence of that here.

Alex Neil SNP Airdrie and Shotts
link

Yes, but my point is a different point. With all due respect, surely any director general worthy of the name and the salary should not always rely on escalation. They, themselves, should be making sure—proactively—that a project of this size is going to plan. That clearly did not happen. It seems to me that the chiefs have something to answer for as well as the people on the ground floor, as it were.

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
link

They are certainly accountable to Parliament for their use of public money—there is no question about that. I would, however, make a slight distinction between their seeking out evidence of progress and their putting in place arrangements that give them the assurance that they require. They should be accountable for having a system in place that gives them accurate, reliable and fair information about progress that is a basis for their digging down when problems arise. That clearly did not happen in this case, and they are accountable for that—such is the nature of the accountable officer role.

Liam Kerr Con North East Scotland
link

In answer to Monica Lennon, you talked about contractor staff and knowledge transfer. Has the Scottish Government done any analysis of the split between employed individuals and contractor staff and has it done any risk assessment based on that, particularly in relation to the inevitable cost overruns that a contractor will now seek to pass on?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
link

Gemma, do you want to take that?

Gemma Diamond Audit Scotland
link

Certainly. The majority of staff on the programme were contractor staff. There is an exhibit in the report that shows a high number of contractors working on the programme. They came through the main partner, CGI, but the report makes the distinction that, for the calendar year 2015, they were under the direction of the Scottish Government. The Scottish Government took accountability for IT delivery for that calendar year, so it provided the direction on how many staff it needed and what it wanted them to do. It simply asked CGI for the resources that were needed and CGI provided the staff, but they worked under the direction of the Scottish Government.

The risk assessment of what knowledge transfer needs to be done forms part of the plan to which the Auditor General referred. It is necessary to identify the key staff with the key knowledge, what knowledge needs to be passed over and the critical points for that of when people will leave.

Liam Kerr Con North East Scotland
link

If a contractor is providing services, it will presumably have provided them against an initial specification that is now likely to be exceeded and the contractor will not bear that cost without seeking to pass it on.

Gemma Diamond Audit Scotland
link

The contract that was set up at the start was not a fixed-price contract. It was made on the basis that the specifications would be developed as the Commission regulations became clearer. As I said, for a year of the programme—2015—the contract did not operate as a partnership agreement as intended because the Scottish Government had taken accountability for IT delivery.

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
link

You are absolutely right about the broader point, Mr Kerr. In exhibit 10 of the report, we show the number of contractors who are employed at the rate that was set in the original framework contract, those who are at discounted rates and those who are at rates above those that are set out in the framework. Significant numbers are being paid above the framework rates simply because, with the style of contract that had been put together and the urgent need to have a programme up and running, there is no alternative but to have the staff available and market conditions shift from month to month.

In many ways, it is not surprising to have a contract that is not a fixed price at the beginning of a large and complex programme such as the one we are discussing. We have seen it elsewhere. However, if a body has a programme that is designed to flex as the requirements become clearer, it needs to be very clear about how the changes will be managed. We did not see evidence of a clear challenge about the number and type of staff who were being used and how much they were costing. Those are the sorts of governance problems that we set out in the report.

Alison Harris Con Central Scotland
link

Is there any indication of the level of loans that have been issued to farmers and what has been done to assess that risk? My understanding is that loan payments were made to help farmers because they did not get their CAP payments, but if the farmers do not get paid, what happens to the loans? How has that been considered? Do we have an idea of how much it could be if farmers do not get their money and do not repay the loans?

Mark Taylor Audit Scotland
link

We have a summary of the loans that have been made in paragraph 51 on page 20 through to paragraph 53 on page 21. You will see the main thrust of that in paragraph 52, which gives the position at the end of April 2016: 5,119 loans were made to individual farmers and crofters and those were worth around £91 million at that point. The Government is best placed to give you an update.

The expectation is that individual farmers will be paid at some point and, at the point at which they are paid, they will be able to repay those loans.

Alison Harris Con Central Scotland
link

The loans are based on the expectation that the farmers and crofters will be paid. It is quite a substantial sum, £91 million. We are hoping that they will be paid and that the loans will be repaid to the Government.

Mark Taylor Audit Scotland
link

The expectation is that, at the point at which individual farmers are able to receive payments that are equivalent to their loans, the loans will be repaid from those payments.

Alison Harris Con Central Scotland
link

Okay. What provision has been put in place in case of farmers not making the loan repayments?

Mark Taylor Audit Scotland
link

We highlight in the report that there are risks to the Government.

Alison Harris Con Central Scotland
link

It is just a risk. The potential is not calculated yet.

09:45

Mark Taylor Audit Scotland
link

It is worth highlighting that we are auditing the Scottish Government accounts for the year ending 31 March 2016 and are exploring with the Government how it accounts for its expenditure during the year and the loan balances and other balances that it has at the end of the year.

Alison Harris Con Central Scotland
link

I was thinking more of the farmers’ accounts in the longer run and how the loans would be repaid if the farmers were not here a year or two years from now. However, thank you.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
link

I will pick up on a couple of issues. I want to go back to something that we talked about at the start of the meeting. The Auditor General admitted in response to Mr Beattie that problems with IT projects are not confined to Scotland. Obviously, the CAP payments need to be made right across the European Union in all member states and they all have very different requirements in terms of their rural economy. Have you come across anything from the IT systems used in other member states that Scotland could have learned from? Has the Scottish Government already been looking to other member states to learn lessons?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
link

One of the challenges is that although all member states are entitled to apply for funding under the common agricultural policy, they are not all starting from the same place. Members might recall the significant problems in England, for example, with the Rural Payments Agency under the previous CAP programme that caused problems for the rural economy there. At that point, Scotland’s payments proceeded much more smoothly, but this time round it looks as though—I stress that it looks as though—payments in England are going more smoothly and Scotland is having more problems.

My hunch is that one of the reasons for that is that, for the previous programme, England did some of the difficult things around land mapping and having much more of the process digitised. Scotland must now do that for the new programme. That said, there are also differences in the schemes that have been agreed. For example, after discussions with farmers in Scotland, the Scottish Government agreed to additional schemes for sheep and beef here, and added a third category for land payments. All that is designed to reflect Scottish circumstances, but it also makes the system more complex.

There is a limit to how much learning there can be among member states. Mark Taylor is closer to this issue than I am and might be able to give you a sense of exactly how that learning has played out in practice.

Mark Taylor Audit Scotland
link

All that I can do is emphasise the point about different contexts in different places and how much that influences the extent to which experiences can be shared. The other little detail that is probably worth sharing is that one of the things that the Scottish Government considered was using a system that was in operation in a number of other countries as not quite an off-the-shelf option but an alternative to building its own system from scratch. Ultimately, the Government ruled that out. We highlighted some delays around decisions on what we call in the report the contingency option. I think that the decision that the Government took in that regard emphasises that the context is different in different places in terms of both the detail and the way in which the overall principles of the schemes are implemented in individual bodies and what their starting point is.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
link

Thank you. The second point that I want to pick up on is about something that we have rehearsed a bit this morning regarding escalation, responsibility and accountability. Alex Neil said that the issue did not come before the Scottish Cabinet until October 2015. However, Mark Taylor said in one of his responses that the issue was on the risk register with the Scottish Government in February 2013, which is quite a long time ago now. At what point were ministers brought into this? Alex Neil referred earlier to a director general having to be responsible for what has happened. I am not under any illusions; the previous cabinet secretary, Richard Lochhead, spent a lot of time with farmers in Scotland over the past few years and was well aware of the issues with the system. In terms of accountability, if the issue was on the risk register with the Scottish Government, should there not have been much earlier ministerial involvement in asking for briefings and updates on how the project was progressing?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
link

There is no question but that ministers are responsible for setting policy and civil servants deliver that policy on their behalf. Government is big and complex, with a range of policy priorities to be delivered across the whole programme for government.

At an early stage, as Mark Taylor said, it was identified that the CAP programme was complex and had significant risks associated with it in terms of both the costs and the impact on farmers and the rural economy. It was included on the Scottish Government’s risk register for that reason.

One of the things that we as auditors look at in any body that we audit is how well the risk management arrangements are working. It is not enough just to capture the risk and carry on with business as usual. There must be another step in which people ask, “How do we know what is really happening here?”

The way in which any accountable officer aims to exercise that accountability is by having in place a system whereby people know what they are responsible for. Those people within the organisation are monitoring good, robust, reliable, fair and balanced information about costs and progress and where the risks currently are. They understand when they should escalate those risks to their manager, the director general, the permanent secretary and ministers.

Our view is that in this case the governance arrangements did not work as they needed to or were planned to, because decisions were being taken outside the programme board, and because decisions were being delayed because of the tensions between the programme team and the IT team, with information not being passed on properly.

It would be worthwhile for the committee to explore that area with Government at an appropriate point. As Gemma Diamond said, we are thinking about how we can help people to apply such arrangements better in complex situations such as this case, particularly with regard to the role of the non-executive directors, who felt that they were not necessarily in a position to understand what progress was being made and where they should be applying the challenge that is at the heart of their role.

Is there anything that my colleagues want to add to that?

Gemma Diamond Audit Scotland
link

No.

Mark Taylor Audit Scotland
link

I will add one bit of detail. It would be wrong to characterise the project as one in which things were going wrong locally and nobody at the top, in Government or the civil service, knew what was happening. There was awareness, as was illustrated by the inclusion of the project on the strategic risk register for the organisation. There was an escalation process that made it clear that issues were emerging.

The Auditor General has spoken before about optimism bias, and that was one of the issues. In raising a concern about risk and saying, “There is a problem here and we are dealing with it, and this is how we are doing so,” people are inevitably open to the suggestion that an issue is able to be fixed.

The Auditor General has touched on how the project was constructed at the start, but it was evident throughout that the priority and pressure in the project was to get payments made to farmers. We understand why that was, but there was a tension between that aim and the need to ensure that the systems were in place, that teams worked well together and that the approach was sustainable in the longer term.

We highlight a number of times in our report what the effects of that were. We are not suggesting for a moment that it is not important to get payments out to farmers—of course it is. However, the pressure on the team and on the organisation throughout the project made it very difficult for people to get out of the here and now, and to raise their heads and look at how the system would move forward in the future.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
link

Given the experience—to which Colin Beattie referred—with other public sector IT projects such as NHS 24, was the original Scottish Government estimate of £50 million too low an estimate for how much the CAP project would cost?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
link

With hindsight, it is clear that it was, but hindsight is a wonderful thing. It is difficult to untangle how much of the current projected cost of £178 million has arisen because of the delays and problems that have been encountered along the way.

Mark Taylor touched a moment ago on one of the points that we make in the report: the original decision about which route to take, which was made in 2012, took too long. At that point there were other options such as buying an almost off-the-shelf system that is used by other EU member states, or designing and building a new system. Other options were available, but the time that was taken to make that decision meant that, in effect, the only decision that was left on the table at the point that the decision was made was the option of designing and building a new system.

I do not have a crystal ball that allows me to say what the cost would have been had one of the other options been chosen, but some of those options were ruled out simply because of the time that was taken to make the decision. There is no doubt in my mind that the cost of £178 million has come about at least in part because of the delays in making those early decisions and in getting the right skills in place, and the consequences of that over the past four years.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
link

I have one final question. You have referred a couple of times to the skills shortage. Is that something that you have identified in other IT contracts? Can you give us a flavour of the extent of the IT skills shortage in Scotland?

Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland
link

Yes. There are two dimensions to that. First, you are absolutely right: we have referred to a skills shortage in other reports on IT systems that have failed. Colin Beattie referred to NHS 24, and there have been other smaller-scale failures.

There are two dimensions. First, across Scotland we do not have the number of highly skilled IT professionals that we need, not only in the public sector but for private businesses and the wider economy. That is a recognised priority in the Government’s economic strategy that needs to be taken forward.

Secondly, specifically in public sector projects, one of the recurring problems that we have seen is a failure to get the really good commercial and programme skills in place right at the beginning to enable the Government, NHS 24 or another public body to manage the project tightly themselves, rather than being held hostage by very skilled private companies that specialise in negotiating contracts and delivering.

That is why we think that the Government’s commitment to developing a highly skilled Government digital service is the right way forward. We can do that once for Scotland and invest in getting the highest-level skills in place for all public bodies to use. However, it is too early for us to say whether that commitment is having the intended benefits in practice.

Jenny Marra Lab The Convener · North East Scotland
link

I thank all of you for your evidence. I will suspend the committee for a couple of minutes while the Audit Scotland witnesses swap over for the next agenda item.

09:56 Meeting suspended.

09:59 On resuming—

  1. 09:00 Decision on Taking Business in Private Procedure · 1
  2. 09:00 Section 23 Reports Evidence session · 86
  3. 09:45 Section 23 Reports Committee business · 62

The type of each item (debate, statement, questions, members’ business and so on) and the times shown are worked out by this site from headings, the chair’s opening words and the Official Report’s running timestamps. They are not the Parliament’s own classification. Text: the Scottish Parliament Official Report.