We move to agenda item 2, which is evidence on the Auditor General for Scotland’s report entitled “The 2014/15 audit of NHS 24: Update on management of an IT contract”. I welcome our witnesses from the Scottish Government: Paul Gray is the director general of health and social care, and Sarah Davidson is the director general of communities. I understand that Mr Gray wishes to make a short opening statement.
Official Report · Committee
Section 22 Reports
“The 2014/15 audit of NHS 24: Update on management of an IT contract”
Speakers
Choose an MSP to read only their contributions- Paul Gray Scottish Government 75
- Paul Martin Lab 32
- Mary Scanlon Con 24
- Colin Beattie SNP 12
- Tavish Scott LD 9
- Sarah Davidson Scottish Government 9
- Nigel Don SNP 7
- Dr Richard Simpson Lab 6
- Stuart McMillan SNP 5
- Colin Keir SNP 2
- David Torrance SNP 1
The record
182 contributionsThank you for the invitation to give evidence to the Parliament’s Public Audit Committee. As the accountable officer for the health budget, I both understand and accept the anger and frustration that the committee has expressed at the very substantial delays and cost increases associated with the NHS 24 future programme. I am very sorry indeed about that.
It is not my intention today to seek to deflect criticism or to seek to tell the committee what it should think about the evidence that it has before it already or the evidence that is presented today. However, I wish to provide the committee with as much information as I can in response to the questions that members raise. If neither Sarah Davidson nor I have the information readily to hand, we will provide it as quickly as possible after the evidence session.
I want to assure the committee that we are taking the lessons that have been learned from this process to heart. We have taken a number of steps, working with NHS 24, to ensure that it has access to the leadership and the skills that are required in order to bring the future programme into operation.
The appointment of Angiolina Foster as chief executive of NHS 24 has already been announced. We have commissioned the chief nursing officer, Professor Fiona McQueen, working with John Brown, chair of NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde, and Jeff Ace, chief executive of NHS Dumfries and Galloway, to form an advice and assurance group in support of the implementation plan for the future programme.
I can assure the committee that the NHS 24 board chair, Esther Roberton, and the board as a whole are taking the matter very seriously indeed. NHS 24 has enhanced the governance over the future programme and has brought in additional expertise to ensure that it is now implemented as effectively as possible.
I do not want to take up more of the committee’s time with my opening statement. Sarah Davidson and I will be happy to answer the questions that the committee may wish to put.
Can you confirm what your arrangement is and what the accountability structure is between you and NHS 24?
I am the accountable officer for the national health service in Scotland and its chief executive. I delegate the budgets to the accountable officers of the 22 boards, of which NHS 24 is one. Each of the boards has an accountable officer, and I delegate the budgetary responsibility for the running of the board to those accountable officers. However, I am the accountable officer for the whole of the health budget.
So, when there is a significant overspend of £41.5 million, as we have seen in the NHS 24 budget, you would take responsibility for that, would you?
I would accept that that responsibility falls to me. It falls to the accountable officer of NHS 24, but I am ultimately accountable for all the budget of the NHS in Scotland. That is what I meant when I said that I am not going to try to deflect criticism. I accept that I am the accountable officer for the whole.
For how long have you been the accountable officer?
I have been the accountable officer since December 2013.
So, you could say that, over the period since then, you have had significant dealings with NHS 24. That period seems to have been when the significant overspend started to develop. What kind of action did you take during that time? It does not look as if it has been that significant, given that the overspend has continued.
I have a detailed timeline. I want to be mindful of the committee’s time. How much detail would you like me to go into?
It is okay—we are more than happy for you to proceed. It is a significant overspend of £41.5 million, so I guess that the public would want us to ensure that we take the time.
All right—thank you, convener.
If it is okay, I will start from before I took up the role. In July 2010, the NHS Scotland capital investment group considered the programme initial agreement from NHS 24 and recommended that an outline business case should be prepared, noting that it was to be funded from within NHS 24’s own resources. I make the point that, in my view, the approach of going through the capital investment group was not the appropriate approach, and it would not happen now.
On 16 December 2011, the full business case was considered by the capital investment group and was approved on the basis that NHS 24 engage with other health boards. A contractual process was undertaken, and in March 2012 NHS 24 signed contracts with Capgemini for software for approximately £20 million, and with BT for hardware for approximately £55 million—that is the £75 million starting point.
The go-live date in June 2013 was delayed until September or October 2013—I will say October—because of issues with the performance of the clinical content system, which was the core clinical system supplied by a subcontractor to Capgemini. Basically, the system did not work with 600 concurrent users. In August 2013, the stage 4 gateway review was commissioned by NHS 24 and the programme got an amber rating. In October 2013, the go-live date was deferred again.
In January 2014, I met the chair and chief executive of NHS 24 and sought to understand the issues. Shortly after that meeting, the chair and chief executive alerted me to the fact that they had discovered that not only was the system not performing but the contract itself was incomplete. That was in January 2014.
In February 2014, we implemented our escalation process, following the mid-year review. That was the point at which we jointly commissioned Ernst & Young to report on the state of the system. That report was finalised in March 2014, and in April 2014 the then cabinet secretary, Mr Neil, met the chair and chief executive of NHS 24 to discuss the issues and was provided with substantial assurances on the steps that were being taken.
However, I did not consider that NHS 24 could proceed without an experienced programme director. We identified an experienced programme director, and that person was put in place in June 2014.
There is a lot of detail for the period between then and September 2015, which I will be happy to go through, but the core points are that in June 2014 there was neither a functioning system nor a contract, but by August 2015, when Ian Crichton came in as chief executive from NHS National Services Scotland, NHS 24 had worked with him and others in NSS who had expertise to get to a point at which there was both a functional contract, which could actually be enforced, and a system that provided the functionality that was required. Throughout that period, we ensured that NHS 24 had the support that it needed from NSS to get to that point.
On 7 and 8 September 2015, a system dress rehearsal was conducted—basically, that is a full running of the system. That provided assurance from the staff who were operating the system that it was working successfully. NHS 24 had a successful test of business continuity and undertook a learning exercise from that. It switched on scheduled care services on 28 October 2015, and the scheduled care element of the system worked.
There was a failure, because of a breakdown in the external telecoms, but that was not to do with the core system. However, what became clear when NHS 24 moved to the out-of-hours element—as opposed to the in-hours or scheduled care element—was that although that element functioned effectively in testing, there had not been enough investment in training staff. Staff were not sufficiently familiar with the system to operate it at the speed that was required to give the turnround to patients who were calling in.
I went to NHS 24 to see the system in operation, so I can vouch for the fact that it works. Equally, I can vouch for the fact that I saw staff who had had insufficient training struggling to operate the system at the rate at which it should be operated. I am being completely honest, convener. I see no point in trying to hide any facts here.
At that point, a clinically-led decision was made that although the system was operating effectively, because it could not be guaranteed that the required turnround for ill patients would be provided, NHS 24 would revert to the old system and carry out further testing and training.
I can give you a considerable amount of extra detail about what we did in the interim period, if the committee would find that helpful, but that is the broad summary to October 2015. Subsequent to that, the committee has had access to the lessons learned report and has heard the evidence from Ian Crichton and John Turner.
10:15
We have now put Angiolina Foster in place as the chief executive. Angiolina has considerable experience in running organisations, particularly organisations that have gone through periods of difficulty, which is why she was selected. One of the members of the assurance group is John Brown. Before he took on the role of chair of NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde, he had experience in the operation and turnround of major call centres.
Thank you. We do not normally give witnesses such an extended period to respond, but given the concern and the significant sums that we are talking about, it was helpful to do so.
You have referred to the three-year period for which you have been responsible as the accountable officer. One of the actions that you took in that period was to encourage NHS 24 to employ a programme director. Is that correct?
That is right.
Is that not something that the chief executive of NHS 24 could have considered for themselves? Does it need Paul Gray, the accountable officer for the NHS nationally, to lay out the kind of discussion that should take place? Is that the level of detail of your involvement?
To answer you frankly, that level of involvement would not normally be required. I would expect a chief executive of a health board to see that through. However, what we were able to help with was finding the right person from somewhere else in the NHS and expediting the process so that they were in place quickly.
When was the programme director appointed?
That was in June 2014.
Significant losses were still incurred despite the appointment of the programme director, so it did not have the desired effect.
The issues that you referred to were the need for a programme director and staff training. Where is the connection? You said that the system was delivered, but that there was an issue with the staff being trained to operate it. Given that the appointment of the programme director was made in 2014, the recommendation that you made to the organisation did not have the desired effect, did it?
It had some of the desired effect, but it did not have all of it. That plus all the other assistance that we provided had the desired effect of getting us to the stage of having a viable contract and a system that functioned.
I would like to speak about one of the lessons learned, which is in two parts. Part 1 concerns what in contracts and information technology systems is called optimism bias. The initial contract had a degree of optimism bias. In other words, it was optimistic in its prediction of how complicated the new system would be and how much it would cost. It did not include an allowance for inflation and it did not include any contingency. Again, I believe that both of those decisions were wrong.
Part 2 is that, if a system is tested using the most experienced staff with one-to-one support from experts, it will inevitably be better and faster than it will be when there are less experienced staff with less direct support. For example, when I was in NHS 24 on one occasion, the ratio of staff to support was 25:1—in other words, there was one person supporting 25 staff. NHS 24 misjudged the amount of training that would be needed and it took too much confidence from the effective running in testing.
The other point to make is that the system was tested on one site, but it runs across multiple sites. Systems that run across multiple sites never perform exactly the same on every site.
You have confirmed that you are the accountable officer. Ultimately, you are responsible for the £41.5 million. Is that correct?
I am responsible for the £13 billion that the NHS has. However, the decisions to increase the funding for the programme were taken within NHS 24.
We will come on to that.
Therefore, I did not allocate additional funding from within central funds for the programme.
We agreed brokerage, but that is to be repaid. I did not go to the finance director for the NHS in Scotland and say, “Could you please give NHS 24 another £41 million?”
You are responsible for the oversight of the leverage.
Absolutely.
You have appeared before the committee on other issues concerning leverage. We are talking about an organisation in which there has been an overspend of £41.5 million. It is an organisation that has cost the public purse significant sums of money, which have been spent not on the delivery of services on the front line but on an overspend, which the public do not see—what they see is cuts that are being made locally. Cuts of £69 million are being made by the health board for the area that I represent.
That £41.5 million of overspend could have been prevented. You are the accountable officer who is responsible for that. Do you not feel that you have let down the Scottish Government by allowing the overspend to take place over the past three years?
I have been the accountable officer for two years and two months, but that does not alter the fact that, ultimately, I am responsible for the total sum. The decisions that were taken in relation to what got us here were taken before I was the accountable officer, but I am the accountable officer now and I accept responsibility.
Far be it from me to correct the convener in our second-last meeting, but I note that Audit Scotland now says that the final cost is likely to be £125 million. Given that it started off at £75.8 million, we are now talking about an overspend of £49.2 million—is that correct?
That is potentially the overspend, depending on what the ultimate implementation date is.
I do not like to exaggerate; I always like to present my case on the basis of fact.
The convener made a point about cuts. I looked at my emails this morning and there is a woman up a Highland glen who cannot get two hours of integrated home care a day from NHS Highland. The cost of that care is about £20 a day. I look at that and think, “Oh gee, what can I do?” NHS Highland and Highland Council are up against a wall with the cuts.
Mr Gray and Ms Davidson, do you understand how angry members feel when we have to look constituents in the eye and say, “I’m sorry your mother cannae get care to get her out of bed in the morning and back to bed at night,” even though the cost of that is only £20 a day? Then we come here and learn that the common agricultural policy futures programme IT system is £70 million over budget and that we are £50 million over budget here. Those figures just slip off the tongue, but the reality is that the cuts out there are horrific. Do you really understand how angry and frustrated members of this Parliament are about the constant overspends on information and communication technology?
I do, Ms Scanlon. I sought to acknowledge that in my opening statement, and I meant it—I was not saying it for effect.
I appreciate that. I have always taken you at your word—you are one of the very few whom I respect, Mr Gray.
I would leave now.
Quit while you are ahead.
I intend to come back to you giving your word here a few years ago, but, before I do so, I point out that we have been here before. In August 2012, in its report entitled “Managing ICT contracts: An audit of three public sector programmes”, Audit Scotland said that the Scottish Government was “unable to provide” the advice that Registers of Scotland, Disclosure Scotland and the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service sought, so it did not do too well in that regard.
Despite all the recommendations that were made in 2012, “Managing ICT contracts in central government: An update”, which came out three years later, in 2015, tells us that, despite not being able to get staff for IT, the Scottish Government
“did not perform a skills gap survey across the public sector until August 2014.”
You were so worried about ICT and staff that it took you two years to do a skills gap survey.
I turn to your letter to the committee from October 2012, which is three and a half years ago. As the accountable officer, you told us that a
“strategic review of current ICT skills availability within central government”
was to be carried out. We all sat here, naively, taking you at your word. You then went on to say that “Scotland’s Digital Future” set out plans to develop the workforce and ITC skills and that you were working on an action plan to ensure that the central Government ITC workforce would be in place by March.
We received the next Audit Scotland report in June 2015. I do not know whether Audit Scotland is as angry and frustrated as I am, but it keeps coming up with reports and we are no further forward. Part 1 of the Auditor General’s report says:
“The Information Systems Investment Board’s role was to oversee the implementation of the framework but it did not have sufficient information or capacity to perform this role effectively. It did not receive all the ICT investment and assurance information required from the Scottish central government”.
That is your role as the accountable officer, but you are getting very little support from what I can see after nearly five years on the Public Audit Committee. We are not even looking at the CAP futures programme IT system, which is £70 million over budget.
What you set out nearly four years ago was intended to ensure that the problems with Registers of Scotland—which were minimal compared to this—would never happen again. How can we take you at your word today?
When I gave evidence to the Public Audit Committee in my previous role, I told you honestly and as clearly as I could what I expected to happen. What actually happened—Sarah Davidson may have further information to provide—was that, when the skills survey was undertaken, it did not produce the results that were necessary to allow us to take a coherent approach, so we did something else.
It took you two years to do it.
I accept that. I am not disputing what you say, Ms Scanlon; I am simply saying that the skills survey did not produce something that would be effective in allowing us to tackle the problem, so we took a different approach. Does the committee wish to hear from Ms Davidson what that approach was?
I am putting all the blame on you, Mr Gray. What responsibility does Ms Davidson have for the £50 million overspend?
On NHS 24?
That is what we are talking about.
That responsibility is mine.
What is Ms Davidson here for, then? What is her role?
To put it simply, she is here because the committee asked her to come.
What responsibility does she have?
Perhaps that should come from Sarah Davidson.
I have responsibility for the assurance framework that governs the central Government sector, which is similar to but different from the assurance framework that governs the NHS. I have responsibility for the digital transformation service that supports the central Government sector. Therefore, the skills gap survey that Ms Scanlon alluded to a moment ago is my responsibility. The arrangements that we have put in place to respond to what we learned from the skills gap survey, which did not take place as early as it should have done, as I acknowledged the last time that I was here, are also my responsibility.
It took two years. Just so that we can get through this today, can you tell us what responsibility you have for the £50 million overspend on NHS 24 ICT?
None at all.
Okay.
For the record, the request was made for Ms Davidson to attend the committee in relation to the skills gap, as there was a discussion at a previous meeting in response to that. There will be other questions for Ms Davidson.
10:30
Yes, I am sure there will be.
Let us return to Mr Gray. I found it hugely concerning that you said that staff needed training. Are you saying that the ICT failure was partly due to a lack of staff training? We understand that the revised framework that was introduced in April 2015 provided “clearer instructions and guidance” and that the assurance framework, for which I think Ms Davidson was responsible, “lacked clarity”. What were you saying about the staff? Were the staff not fully trained? Did you not give them full training in the IT system?
In the future system—
There are so many systems, I do not know—
The training that I was talking about was for the NHS 24 future system. All the staff who used the system were trained in using the system. However, the training was not sufficient and the support that was provided when they were using it in live operation turned out to be insufficient. That is what happened in that particular case.
That is pretty disappointing. That is also what the Auditor General says.
One final question bothers me. In April 2012, it was an NHS 24 member of staff who discovered that some of the negotiated sections were missing from the signed contract. That is pretty poor. It was nearly two years later before the chief executive and the director of finance were aware that what they had negotiated was not in the written contract. Did that member—or those members—of staff employ the services of Pinsent Masons between April 2012 and January 2014 in order to renegotiate the contract without your knowledge and without the knowledge of their director of finance and their chief executive?
I do not know the answer to that question, Ms Scanlon. I do not know the specific member of staff by name.
Are you aware that it was a member of staff who identified that some of what had been negotiated was missing from the written contract that had been signed? Are you also aware that the director of finance and the chief executive of NHS 24 were not made aware of the missing terms in the contract?
That led to an action in the Court of Session, to having to pull out of the Court of Session and to huge embarrassment for the Government and the civil service in Scotland. At the end of the day, Capgemini was right about the contract, and it would appear that it was fulfilling its written terms.
I am aware that knowledge of the deficiencies in the contract was with staff in NHS 24 some time before the chief executive and the chair were told.
It was nearly two years before.
I cannot say that absolutely, Ms Scanlon, but I do not dispute it.
Audit Scotland has said it.
I am happy to accept that. I am aware that the chair and the chief executive did not know until January 2014. I met them in early January 2014, and at that point we were talking about the deficiencies in the performance of the system. When I met them again in January 2014, they had become aware that the contract itself was incomplete. I can confirm that they did not know until then, and I am happy to accept Audit Scotland’s evidence that someone in NHS 24 knew in 2012.
In terms of project management, not only did you not know that part of the verbally negotiated contract was not in the written contract but NHS 24 did not do a page-by-page check, so it did not even know what was in the written contract that it had signed.
Are you not concerned that not only did you not know that NHS 24 was running towards a £50 million overspend but the director of finance and the chief executive did not know? A member of staff employed a leading legal company to try to negotiate the contract and you, the director of finance and the chief executive were unaware of it. Does that not cause you a bit of concern?
It causes me grave concern.
Are you sorting that out for the future?
Convener, I could give a substantial answer to that question if you wish, but I am happy to be guided as to the committee’s time.
Please give as brief a response as you can with as much detail as possible.
An organisation in which a member of staff knows something of that significance and does not escalate it immediately to the board is a dysfunctional organisation. It is therefore my concern to ensure that no organisation for which I am responsible behaves in such a way that a member of staff feels that they cannot escalate an issue of that significance to the board. That is as brief an answer as I can give.
That is fine. Thank you.
I find interesting the material that we have had today from Lee Evans about IT, in response to other questions. He says that NSS has considerable experience and that
“NHS organisations in Scotland already work collaboratively in the commissioning, procurement and implementation of IT systems within an established eHealth Governance framework.”
If we have an “established eHealth Governance framework”, what was it doing in relation to this particular contract? One of the problems with the NHS as a whole has been, and is still, that we have allowed NHS 24 and, indeed, all 22 boards to go off and commission IT themselves, although they do not have the experience to do that. For example—referring to the Health and Sport Committee’s 2010 report on clinical portals—one result is that we still have a major problem five years on with access to clinical portals between different boards. My questions to the Government on that, which have been answered, demonstrate that clearly.
For as long as I have been in Parliament—I include session 1—we have had a pretty dysfunctional system for IT procurement. I am not convinced that we have got any better at that.
I will move to the other point that I want to make. Why do we have to employ Pinsent Masons to do the legal work for the contract, when Lee Evans states in his report to us that
“NHS National Services Scotland (NSS) has considerable procurement expertise and works with and on behalf of NHS Boards providing, for example, contract management support and legal services”?
We have spent £500,000 of Government money on a private firm whose software did not upload the tender document properly, and which then advised somebody on the board that that is quite common. I find that alarming. It said, “This happens all the time—we’ll just have a memorandum of understanding and it’ll be okay.” Then, it repeated the mistake. Why are we employing external people?
The Government, with all its different bits—not just the NHS—is a pretty big procurer of IT. Why have we not got a core legal service, a legal framework and core expertise in IT that allows every programme of procurement to be directed to an oversight board that examines it at every step of the way? I include call centres in that. We have call centres for the police, for the fire service and for the NHS. Why do we not have that expertise?
I ask colleagues to try and keep their questions as succinct as possible. That will ensure that we get answers.
What happened should not have happened. There is no nicer way to put it. NHS 24 should have used the expertise that is available in NSS. We have now instituted with the chairs and chief executives an approach that we call “once for Scotland”, which says that, if boards are doing certain things, this is how they must do them—they cannot just go off and make personal choices about what might suit, but are obliged to make use of the available skills, capability and experience. If the board chooses not to do that, the accountable officer must explain why. There may be circumstances in which not enough resource is available centrally—NSS can to procure that resource through its contracts.
How do I put this? I sought to persuade NHS 24 to use NSS, but I quickly gave up on that approach and simply told it to do so. That is as brief an answer as I can give you.
That is helpful. The problem is that boards can go and do things themselves. I know that we have tried to prevent massive expenditure on a centralised records system, for example. Look at what happened in England: billions of pounds were wasted there. We have avoided that. However, we now have a fragmented system that is totally dysfunctional between boards. If a person uses one board area, they are probably okay, but if they have to go from NHS Fife to NHS Tayside, for example, the Tayside clinicians will not have access to basic information, such as Scottish care information lab stuff. We are five years on from the Health and Sport Committee’s telehealth report.
The fact that you stepped in and did what you did is very welcome, but should the boards not have to account to you, as the accountable officer, at every step of the way if they do not go down a certain route? An example is that the 14th board is not procuring TrakCare—one board. Why is that board being allowed to do that and to have a system that is not compatible with those of every other board?
My question is really about how you are controlling things. What reporting mechanism to the centre is there that would prevent, at each step of the way, a dysfunctional system?
In January this year, responsibility for the e-health programme overall transferred to John Connaghan, who is the chief operating officer. It was a deliberate step on my part to put that under the aegis of the chief operating officer. In other words, it is concerned with the operation of the health service as a whole. I have asked John Connaghan to provide me, by the end of March, with an analysis of all the major ongoing programmes and the risks that are associated with them, with particular reference to the points that I mentioned to the convener earlier.
I am referring to programmes in which we think there may be optimism bias: we hope that the programme will work, but we are not absolutely sure, or we hope that it will cost a certain amount, but experience tells us that it probably will not. When I was a member of the infrastructure investment board in the Scottish Government, one of the starkest pieces of advice that we got, via the Scottish Futures Trust, was that, in some capital building programmes there is optimism bias of 40 per cent. In other words, the outturn cost is underestimated by about 40 per cent.
I was the chief information officer for the Scottish Government, where my analysis was that optimism bias in IT programmes ran in the range of 20 to 25 per cent—we routinely had to build in about 20 to 25 per cent contingency. We did not just say, “That’s a pity, but we’ll wait and see what happens” because there was evidence for what would be likely.
I asked a question about a gateway report in Parliament and was told that they are not Government reports. Can somebody explain to me what gateway reports are about? The particular gateway report that I mentioned highlighted an example of best practice, although there was an amber alert related to possible delays. What are gateway reports? Are they the mechanism by which the Government’s central body looks at what is going on with projects being run by individual health boards or other organisations, and confirms that a programme is on time, that the optimism bias is acceptable, that it is being developed appropriately and that the correct training is being put in place?
As I understand it, gateway reports consider governance and contractual arrangements. On the face of it, that appeared to be sufficient. I am seeking to answer the question cautiously. A number of gateway reports have been excellent and insightful, and I do not want to undermine the gateway process in the eyes of the committee, because I think the process is valuable.
However, for a programme of such complexity as the one that we are discussing—and one that is reviewed once every 15 years—my analysis, which I have conveyed, is that a review or report would need to be done by individuals who have experience in similar systems of similar complexity. That was not the case in this review report. If a gateway report is to make sense, it must be carried out by people who have sufficient experience, seniority and capability.
10:45
The review process ran over about two days. Again, there is a question in my mind about whether, with a programme of such scale and complexity, that would do any more than simply give a top-level set of assurances. Your points about deeper assurance are germane, in that context.
Can I ask for information that would be sent to us later on?
Briefly.
Can we have a note from Sarah Davidson or Paul Gray on all the costs of external consultants that had to be brought in on any IT projects, such as PricewaterhouseCoopers and Ernst & Young? The Ernst & Young costs were not in the latest report. We have spent three quarters of a million pounds on external consultants on this one project. I know that the projects are not all NHS projects, but can you relay my request to the appropriate information officer?
We can do that. If it helps, I am happy to tell the committee now that the cost of the Ernst & Young report was £58,700. If the committee wants information on every single IT project in the public sector, that will be a massive piece of work, so is there any context that the committee would want to put around the request? We will do that if that is what the committee wants, but I want to alert members to its being a substantial piece of work.
We will come back to you with further details on that.
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I do not think that we can look at the issues around NHS 24’s IT problems in isolation, because they are part of a broader issue about Government ICT procurement. I am sure that our successor committee will want to pursue that matter.
There are all sorts of problems here about industry, skills shortages and how the whole service is managed. We are looking back at all the problems, but we still have a service to deliver to the public. Will you give us assurances about delivery of the service? What are the milestones and what reassurance do we have that those will be adhered to?
That is a fair question. I would like to allow the incoming chief executive, Angiolina Foster, to review the lessons learned and to come to a view, with the support structures that we have put in place, on the likely implementation programme. I have heard nothing so far that takes me away from believing the proposition that the system will be implemented by the summer, but I want to give the new chief executive the opportunity to review what has been done so far and to assure herself, given the expertise that we have put in to allow her to get that assurance, before giving absolutely fixed points in time by which certain things will happen. I hope that the committee will understand that that is a reasonable stance to take.
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With hindsight, did we choose the right system for NHS 24? Is it overly complex?
Those are two separate questions. Let me, as a way of saying that I think that it is a suitable choice, give you a brief description of what the system will do. It will allow emphasis to be placed on triage rather than on consultations; in other words, patients will be fully assessed and sent to the most appropriate service or provided with information as quickly as possible. The system will speed up that process and it will reduce the need for repeat questioning and duplication—folk get annoyed if they have to answer a set of questions and then have to answer virtually the same ones all over again. The system will reduce that. There will be a single sign-in for all staff to all the systems that they require, which will reduce the time that is needed for a call and make it safer.
The knowledge management system, which is used to signpost the services, will give real-time information on what services are available at the time of the call. In other words, a patient will not be signposted to something that is not available at that time of the day. That facility is an improvement.
There will be a single patient record for all services, so NHS 24 staff will immediately know whether a patient has made an earlier call to the service in a different place. All that will be drawn together.
There will be improvements to the patient journey, and a modern IT platform will be provided on which new digital health and care services, such as video-supported services, can be provided. That simply could not be done with the existing platform.
The system is therefore appropriate for NHS 24.
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Was the system built from the ground up? In other words, did we invent it ourselves, or did we take advantage of comparable systems elsewhere?
The Arezzo core is a clinical triage system. It was not built from the ground up, but it had to be adapted to fit with all the other telephony and scheduled care services. It was built not quite from scratch; rather, it was built using components that already existed, but it is unique to NHS 24.
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I presume that there is a comparable system south of the border. Was simply transferring that system here considered as a possibility?
I cannot answer that, but I am happy to get that information for the committee, if it would be helpful.
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I think that you said that you came in as the accountable officer towards the end of 2013.
Yes.
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At what point did you become aware of a problem with NHS 24?
I became aware of it in January 2014, five weeks or so after I took the post.
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When were the Scottish ministers advised that there was an issue?
Let me go through my timeline. I can give the committee the assurance that I certainly advised ministers as soon as I knew. On what they were told before that, there was, for example, the stage 4 gateway review, which gave an amber alert. That was in August 2013; it would certainly have been drawn to the attention of ministers. However, I am not about to try to invent points at which ministers were told; I can simply tell the committee that I told ministers in January 2014. I cannot imagine that senior colleagues would not have told ministers before that; indeed, they would have known about the gateway report. That could not have not been known.
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There is a great deal of talk about the increasing costs, which are substantial. You said that there was an optimism bias in IT contracts of 25 per cent or thereabouts.
That was roughly the figure when I was involved.
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You said that no contingency was built in, at all.
No.
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What is the 25 per cent optimism bias constructed from?
When I was chief information officer, that analysis was based on reviewing a large number of systems, from small ones to great ones, and comparing the outturn expenditure with the planned expenditure. Of course, some of the amount is because of specification changes after the contract is let, which clearly increase the cost. However, that was an average that we worked to. If a programme came to us with no contingency having been set, we would send it back and say that a proper business case had not been done because no contingency had been thought about.
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I presume that the overrun in costs is being met by brokerage.
Yes.
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Given that overrun, what are the implications for future service delivery and funding? Can that be coped with?
It can. However, the convener and the deputy convener have made important points about that £50 million not being spent on something else. I accept that point. It will not bring the NHS in Scotland to its knees, but that £50 million could have been spent on something else.
Thank you for your frankness this morning, Mr Gray. On your final point, you say that this will not bring the NHS to its knees, but I was told last night that NHS Shetland is facing cuts to primary care—general practices—of £300,000. That is going to be pretty damaging. That £50 million could have helped the Highlands, the convener’s constituency and all our constituencies. Some things will be brought to their knees because of the NHS 24 IT failure, will they not?
It is £50 million that could have been spent on something else—I am not going to try to argue my way round that. However, it is not that we took money from the primary care budget or from another board; in effect, it is £50 million that NHS 24 could have spent on other things. It has not actually removed money from other places.
Can you clarify whether the £50 million overspend is on capital expenditure—on BT and Capgemini—or on training? I am a bit puzzled because, in your initial remarks, you rightly highlighted the failures of training. Is the £50 million—or whatever the figure currently is—split between those budgets? How would you like to break that down?
It is largely on contractual payments. The training element is not a significant part of the overspend. Again, if the committee would like a detailed breakdown, I am more than happy to provide it.
I am sure that that would be helpful.
There is another thing that I would like clarified. You have mentioned, very fairly, the new chief executive whom you have appointed. Is that a permanent appointment, or is she coming in for a temporary period of time so as to take care of the troubles that are currently in the organisation, as I think you pointed out?
The appointment of Angiolina Foster is to the end of this calendar year. That was deliberate rather than a happenstance. It seems to us and to the chair of NHS 24 that once NHS 24 is through its current set of issues and has a successfully implemented system—once it is a stable organisation—that will be the time to seek a permanent chief executive. At the moment, we have brought in a chief executive who is experienced at taking an organisation through a period of difficulty, but a particular skill set will be needed later for a steady-state organisation and that will be somewhat different.
That is fair enough. Is it your expectation that the new system will be operational in June, as we were told earlier?
I have said the summer, so I am being slightly less—
A civil servant’s summer is many months, Mr Gray. I seem to remember using that term in the past as well.
My wedding anniversary is on 3 September, so it is always summer then.
So are we to take it that it might be operational by September?
I am not trying to give the committee a hint. I am simply saying that I expect that the system will go live in the summer. I think that it is very important that it does, Mr Scott, because we will come to the winter and the busy period, with all the pressures that that places on us, and we really do not want to be—
The reason why I asked about the summer is that if the chief executive is leaving and you are recruiting in the autumn for a new appointment at Christmas or the new year, which—as you rightly just said—is the busiest time for the whole national health service, is that the right time to be making an appointment, given that pressure?
What I do not think that we will do is create a further burden on NHS 24. If our new chief executive is appointed and cannot start until January, we are certainly not going to take the current one away.
Good morning. I would like to take this discussion up a level to ask some of the questions that are occurring to me.
If I can start with you, Mr Gray, I think that you implied just now that it is perfectly possible that somebody would bring forward a project that did not include contingencies. As a factory engineer 30 years ago, I would not have dreamed of putting forward a proposal that did not have the relevant contingencies. It would not have had contingencies only if it was something that was buyable off the shelf and I could take it off a price list. Why are we in a position where people are putting forward projects without contingencies?
I do not suppose that it would be sufficient for me to say, “Well, I wouldn’t.” I was not a factory engineer, but I was an IT professional and I would never put forward a project without some level of contingency that I had assessed properly.
Why does it happen? It happens for three reasons. First, I think that people feel that it is very important to get all their estimates right the first time. We all know that that does not happen.
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The second reason is that we are somewhat guilty of making people produce business cases that are not really business cases. What do I mean by that? I have described some of the benefits that the new system provides, but the business case for the new system is also that the old system is going to run out of support pretty soon. Frankly, if you are trying to construct a discounted cash flow that says that a new system will produce this much saving over this much time, you are always being pushed to make the cost as lean as possible so that the saving can emerge as quickly as possible. We need to get more sensible about business cases and say that the business case for this is that our building is going to fall down if we do not do something, so we need to do something; it is not because we will save £20 million over a period of time.
The third reason is that we place undue weight on very precise numbers. We need to look at a system in the round and look at the evidence that we have about what has happened in the past when people have tried to implement such systems. We have to look at the cohort of people whom we are serving and the cohort of people whom we are going to have to train and think hard about what they know and what it is going to take to get them into the new system.
One of the things that the training did not cover was what the new system did not do. That may sound like an odd thing to say but if you are used to a system that does one thing when you press button B and all of a sudden, when you press button B, it does not happen, that is a bit of a shock.
That all requires us to think in a contextual way about what it is that we are trying to implement. Once we have done that, we move away from what all the software and hardware will cost to what the total cost of implementing the system will be. Then we get a much better estimate of what the real cost is.
Thank you for that exposition. I am wondering whether there is somebody listening who could tidy that up, write it on one side of a piece of paper and send it to every single civil servant, because you have just expounded how to get some intelligence into the process.
I am sorry, but that is how we should do these things. Why do your colleagues not understand that? What is the point of having a cash-flow analysis if they have not even built in the contingencies? That is obvious to those of us who look at these things. Why does the civil service not understand that? That is a question that you cannot answer, but maybe Alyson Stafford is listening. I guess that my next question is for Alyson—forgive me, I mean Sarah Davidson.
I think that Ms Davidson does understand. I will leap to her defence on this one.
I am sorry; I picked the wrong name.
Can I come back to the general issue of governance? I do not want to get remotely personal about this, but I have been through a period on this committee listening to people explaining how a lot of projects have not worked very well.
Of course, a lot of projects have worked well and we have not covered them, which is part of Mr Gray’s point about what systems do not do. We have been through a diagram that I think had nine different boards on it for the governance of such things. I am not the only member of the committee who has commented that that may not be a very good way of operating. However, what were the governance organisations doing while this was going wrong? What have the governance organisations learned to make sure that it does not happen again?
Paul Gray will answer first and then I will answer the point more generally.
You asked what the governance organisations were doing. I cannot speak in detail about what they were doing before I was in post. However, what I have said before—and I will repeat it—is that the way in which this was put through governance was not right. It did not touch the right bits of the governance organisations. That was part of the problem.
However, what the governance did in February 2014 was to act in relation to what we call our ladder of escalation. That is our process for escalating things. That ladder of escalation was what ultimately brought about the appointment of a new programme manager and the restoration of the contractual position. It meant that we got to a system that was at least functionally operational. From 2014, the governance stepped in and that produced some results, but it did not produce a system that functioned in November 2015. I am not trying to glide away from that point. The governance was there and when it operated, it produced a result. However, because the programme started off in the wrong place, it was not touching the right points of the governance as it went along.
There was internal governance within NHS 24. The committee has already explored some of that and Audit Scotland reported on it. As I have already mentioned, I am very anxious to understand whether there are systems being developed locally that have national significance but are not touching the governance in the way that they should. That is why I have asked John Connaghan to do that work.
Although NHS projects and central Government projects are managed within different frameworks, what they have in common—as Mr Gray has explained—is that the responsibility and assurance for them runs through the senior responsible officer to the accountable officer. In the central Government sector we have increased our focus on the need for escalation quickly through those systems so that we use the governance frameworks well—we can take from what we have heard this morning that the same is true for health in the light of the recent Audit Scotland reports. In central Government, we are also using the assurance framework to act immediately if problems are flagged up, rather than leaving them to be dealt with by individual organisations within their own assurance. That is the way in which the broader governance system can support the assurance that takes place within individual organisations.
I will dig into this subject. If I am hearing you both right, you are suggesting that governance exists and the problem is pushed up to it, so that it is the responsibility of those who are aware of an issue to escalate it. Would it not be altogether rather safer if governance were seen as being an activity that went down and periodically dug deep enough to check whether there were problems? That is what governance is all about. We do not want to wait until the plane falls out of the sky before we check whether the routine maintenance of the engines is good enough.
Absolutely. Within individual organisations in the central Government sector, I would expect the governance of an individual project to be doing exactly what you describe, Mr Don. Provided that things are going well, that type of iterative, virtuous-circle governance ought to keep things on track. The strengthening that we have put into the assurance system over the past couple of years is to pick up things in cases where that governance is not working as virtuously as it should, so that the problem does not just remain hidden in the local governance but is escalated to the senior accountable officer, or ministers if necessary, and action can be taken.
Part of what we want to do is to build a culture in which organisations and internal governance are far more comfortable with flagging up the fact that they have difficulties and need help, rather than thinking that they need to resolve everything themselves.
Okay, but that is working against human nature, which is not about to change.
I have a letter here that is unrelated to the project, but it is about a performance board that has been set up by the Government—I am sure that you will be aware of it. Looking down that list, I see that there are directors and two non-executive directors, but there is no personal information at all. I have no idea who the non-executive directors are, but I suspect that they are what we would describe as “usual suspects”. To what extent is there a real non-executive challenge within the organisations that you represent, which are rather important parts of the Scottish Government? To what extent are those virtuous circles able to be virtuous, with people asking the right questions and not just being on the golf course together?
I do not play golf, which is probably a mercy for many people.
If I take NHS 24 specifically, I can tell you from personal experience that the non-executive directors are now exceedingly focused on their task and take it very seriously indeed. The non-executive members of the board have also been significantly refreshed—there are new members.
You ask a fair question, which is how we get the necessary level of external challenge so that we are not sitting comfortably assuming that it is all going fine while Rome is burning. The answer is that we go through pretty careful selection processes to appoint non-executive directors. I have certainly been faced—quite properly so—with some pretty uncomfortable challenge to what I do and how I go about it. I do not want to name names, but I assure you that I have a number of non-executive colleagues on the health and wellbeing audit and risk committee who are completely fearless in asking questions and are not too worried about whether I like them. That is absolutely right, and I do not think that the non-executive directors who have been asked to take part in the broader sphere of the performance board will do so in an automatic or anodyne way.
I was not trying to pull you up on that. My point was simply that there are only two of them. They can be the finest available, but if they are seriously outnumbered, they can quite easily get overwhelmed.
I will add one point about the investment that we have been making in the digital transformation service, which again relates to the central Government sector but will be available to health. The service provides other individuals who can stand separate from executive responsibility in an individual body while bringing quite a deep expertise in the structure and delivery of the digital transformation programmes and IT projects, and who are able to ask the kind of questions—or to support non-executives in asking questions—that will get to the heart of the matter. That is another contribution that we can make to the analysis.
Have you reflected at all on the general governance structure on which we have commented previously, which seemed to be very complicated? It suggested to me, from my experience elsewhere, that people would just be having meetings, as there would be so many people that they would have to hold a meeting to decide when the next meeting would be.
There is an important distinction between the governance of individual projects and programmes and the governance of the Government’s overarching digital transformation strategy. The latter is about ensuring alignment—for example, the overall digital transformation sponsor board ensures that all sectors across the public sector are developing public services in a digital way that aligns with the vision for that. That task is quite different from the governance of individual projects and programmes.
I am satisfied that the former does not contaminate the latter—in other words, that the landscape that is required to engage in the more reflective piece of alignment is not getting in the way of the good delivery and management of individual projects. However, as I think I said when I appeared before the committee in the autumn, and as the permanent secretary iterated at Christmas time, we are going to review the overall operation of the assurance framework—and necessarily the governance that goes with it—in spring or summer this year. We will take stock of that, and take on board the views of those who are involved as to whether they feel that it genuinely hinders or helps them to achieve what they are trying to achieve.
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My question is directed at Sarah Davidson. Are we going to ensure that the skills and expertise are there in future ICT contracts so that we are not back in the same boat two years later with people sitting in front of this committee? It was interesting that you said that issues were flagged up when organisations needed help. Should we not have the correct procedures and expertise in place at the beginning of the contracts, rather than having people come running to flag up that they need help and are in trouble?
Absolutely. The way in which the assurance framework and the transformation service—which is the skills service—work together is intended to do exactly that. In the central Government sector—I am sure that there is a parallel process in health—a particular part of the sector will, if it decides that it needs a particular project, be required to engage with the office of the chief information officer in Government and to have the initial proposition assessed by that office in order to determine—picking up all the points that we discussed earlier with regard to contingency and other aspects—whether the budget looks right; whether the right skills are in place to deliver a project of the scale and complexity that is envisaged; and whether the timescales that are envisaged are realistic.
If any of those points is deemed to be inadequate, the project will get an amber rating. If more than one of the points is deemed to be inadequate, the project will get a red rating. That triggers the active involvement of the office of the chief information officer, which will work with the project and programme management centre of expertise and the digital transformation service to remedy the issue, or—more correctly—to support the SRO and his or her team, and the accountable officer, in remedying it.
When I was last at the committee, the digital transformation service was only in its first weeks of operation, but already, in the quarter since then, it has staffed up considerably, has applied exactly that type of support to projects at inception stage and is currently working with, I think, five organisations at early business case stage to identify the skills that they need. If they need skills, the service will help them to go and get those skills from the market.
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That is absolutely what we need to be doing. Envisaging, as we are at the moment, the increased responsibility that comes with the devolution of additional powers, some of which will require significant IT and digital capability, we are already thinking about the skills and the types of individuals that we will need to find from the market to ensure that we can deliver those powers well. In doing so, we absolutely learn the lessons of projects that have gone well and those that have not gone so well in the recent past.
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Mr Gray, you spoke about the staff training being insufficient. Before I was elected to Parliament, I worked in a private sector organisation, and a huge change took place in software implementation. It was quite a feat. Our department doubled in size even though software is supposed to facilitate matters and make things a bit easier. The point that struck me then also strikes me in relation to the NHS 24 contract, and it is about staff accessing training. With the numbers of people who work at NHS 24, not everyone will be able to go to training at the allotted time. Did NHS 24 face any particular issues with staff accessing the training? If individuals did not fully understand the software, were they able to go back on multiple occasions to get further information and assistance?
It is a fair question, Mr McMillan. My understanding of what happened is that the issue was not so much staff being able to access the training, but the time that was provided and the floor walkers—the on-floor support. If somebody has, say, three hours of training to come to terms with a new system, it probably feels okay at that point, but then it comes to live running. If, in testing—NHS 24 did this—there are actors describing symptoms, that is, to be frank, rather different from being in a live situation with someone on the end of a phone describing symptoms that you know are serious and need urgent attention while you are struggling with a bit of software in front of you.
The issue was more to do with the amount of training and, as I said, the fact that colleagues needed to know what the system did not do as well as what it did do. Also, the amount of support that it was necessary to provide on the floor was underestimated. It was all those things together that created the effect.
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I take it that, as NHS 24 goes forward with the system, that will be fully addressed. In particular, when new members of staff come into the organisation, will their IT competence and any additional training that they require be taken on board?
Certainly. That is why I want to give Angiolina Foster time to ensure that she is satisfied that space has been allowed to address all those additional issues.
Perversely, it might be easier for someone coming in who has never used the old system, because they will not have approaches and ways of doing things that are aligned with the old system; they will simply become familiar with the new one from scratch and will go ahead with that.
I am very clear that NHS 24 has a strong commitment to ensuring that people who come in to use its systems are properly trained on them. At times, it is genuinely a matter of life and death, so that cannot be left to chance.
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Is the new system that is being introduced being asked to do the same job as the previous system but just a bit differently or is it being asked to do something totally different?
It is a bit of both. For example, I spoke about the reduction in repeat questioning and duplication, which is about doing what the old system did but doing it better. However, the switch in emphasis from consultation to triage is a new approach that has strong clinical support. The real-time information on the services that are available at the time of a call is a new feature, as is the single patient record. It is about doing some things better, but also about doing some things differently.
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Okay. We received from the Scottish Government a copy of NHS 24’s lessons learned report, and under the heading “Recommendations”, the second bullet point in paragraph 6.7 states:
“The Executive Management Team should secure effective call centre implementation support from both Capgemini and other independent sources to support the Future Programme.”
Who do you envisage that the “other independent sources” will be? Will they be from other private sector providers that have high volumes of calls every day or from other areas of the public sector?
I can give you two examples of what the board has done on that. It has just recruited someone on a contract who has expertise in delivering call centre implementations and is working with the programme director, so she has direct personal access to that level of expertise. Also, I mentioned earlier John Brown, the chair of NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde, who has direct personal and very recent expertise in the area, and that is why he is part of the assurance. There is, therefore, assurance from both a public sector expertise angle and a private sector expertise angle. That is in place and is not just something that we hope will happen.
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Okay. Thank you.
Good morning, Mr Gray. Something that you said earlier about the method for financing the contracts and the like got me animated in my thinking, if you like, particularly on optimism bias and contingencies. Your answers to the questions from David Torrance and Nigel Don addressed some of the aspects that I wanted to ask about, but I want to go back to the need for complete clarity about what is required.
You talked about an acceptance that there will be specification changes in any programme, which means thinking about working within the contingency. However, if the optimism bias is so low, the contingency really means nothing. It comes down to who is keeping a hold on what the contractor is being asked to produce in the end product that will be used.
Who is keeping a hold on the decision on what specifications will change and when? It seems to me that there should be somebody who is completely aware that there is a change in what is being asked for and in the specs that are coming in. Who is keeping their hands on the technical difficulties and the cost overruns that would necessarily happen? It seems to me that, every time an ICT project comes up, there is a lack of knowledge about what is being asked for and how it will change from beginning to end.
I will try to be brief in my response. Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the programme director, not just in the NHS 24 programme but in any programme of its size and style, to ensure that any changes that are asked for are actually required. I say that because sometimes, when we get through the process of system design and then see the system in operation, people say that it would be nice if it did something else as well. My response to that would be that it might well be nice if the programme did something else, but it was not in the original specification and paying more money for something that would be nice is not a good use of public funds.
We might get to a point—I will deliberately use an invented example—where we have a clinical system that allows us to record three conditions but, in practice, people turn up with more than that. In that example, to require the system to deal with people who have four or five conditions would be a necessary change. If we ask for a system that can record a certain number of conditions but it turns out that that will not work in practice and we have to change it, that will be a required change.
Each change ought to be the subject of a change control notice. In other words, it should not involve someone saying on a whim that they would like a change to happen. The change control notice should go through the governance framework so that the programme director can be assured that the change is necessary and cost effective.
It is also important to bundle changes rather than making them in a piecemeal way, because it adds hugely to costs if people make a little change followed by another little change. Furthermore, if people do not bundle changes, they can end up with adverse interactions between the changes, which can create situations that they did not want. It is important that that is properly controlled from the point of view of the expenditure of public funds and not undoing the good that has been done in the development of the system.
How confident are we that the people who are in place from procurement to management and the gateway reviews are the right people to be doing those jobs? You talked about how carefully issues are looked at and so on, but with regard to the problems that have been faced and the £41 million overrun, are we really sure that we have the right people in place to identify what you have described?
I have considered that carefully. I met the person who is being employed from the private sector because I took that issue seriously, and he has excellent credentials and strong evidence of success in the relevant areas. I interviewed John Brown, the chair of NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde, as part of the appointments process and I have real confidence in him and understand the account that he gave of his personal expertise, which is the basis on which I selected him.
We have put in place the strongest team. I do not wish to give the committee the impression that I wish that we had a stronger team. We have a very strong team. The chair has been incredibly assiduous in the way that she has assembled around her a team of people who can support the implementation, and I pay tribute to her for that. She has worked extremely hard to get the right people in place and I am as confident as I can be that this will work. We have put in place the necessary resource.
Paul Gray has answered questions in a straightforward manner and with a degree of common decency. I am grateful for his apology for what went wrong.
Ms Davidson, given that you have been in your position for nearly two years and have had oversight of a £50 million overspend on NHS 24 and oversight of the CAP overspend of nearly £70 million, would you also like to take this opportunity to apologise for not learning lessons from the past? Can you say that, in the future, things will be better and that our successor committee—I will not be in Parliament by then—might look forward to not having to address on three separate occasions critical overspend on ICT?
As Mr Gray explained earlier, I do not have personal responsibility or accountability for NHS 24 or the CAP futures programme. However, I absolutely do have personal responsibility for ensuring that lessons are learned from all IT and digital projects and programmes across the whole of government, and not just the central Government sector. I can absolutely give an assurance that we will continue to learn from those projects and that we are constantly improving the relationships and engagement between people who are responsible for delivering programmes and projects in various places, and we will particularly be looking to learn lessons from the experience of NHS 24.
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Okay, so you are failing to apologise.
Mr Gray, the NHS 24 project has been seven years in the making—it started in January 2009. I apologise for giving you a wrong figure earlier in respect of your previous appearance before our committee in 2012. The estimated cost for the Registers of Scotland ICT project was £66 million and the final cost was £112 million, so there was a significant overspend at that time—the price doubled—and there are continuing concerns about ROS.
Given that you have been very honest today and that it is Audit Scotland that has brought the millions and millions of pounds of overspend to our attention, will you as the accountable officer be looking to cabinet secretaries and ministers to take some responsibility in these difficult financial times for our councils and our health service? Is it not reasonable to expect our ministers to take some responsibility, too? I have heard no apology or acceptance of responsibility for the huge overspends. Is that a reasonable request for an about-to-retire MSP to make of a democratic Government?
You had done so well up to that point.
We can live in hope.
Let me say three things, Ms Scanlon.
First, in fairness to Ms Davidson, she should not be asked to apologise for things for which she is not the accountable officer. I am the accountable officer for this. Ms Davidson had no responsibility for the overspend in NHS 24. I did, and I have accepted it and apologised.
Secondly, ministers are rather dependent on their civil servants. Any colleagues here who have been ministers will know that. I am the accountable officer. I am responsible and I am apologising.
Thirdly, what is reasonable to ask of ministers? I think that a lot is asked of ministers—I do not mean ministers of this particular Government—that is not reasonable, but I have never found ministers of any Government slow to apologise for things that they got wrong. I do not think that ministers got this wrong; I think that we did.
They still have to accept responsibility.
I have a final question. We recognise the humility that you have shown, but we know what the situation would be if you were running any other business that was running at a loss of more than £50 million—the differentiation in some of the figures has been mentioned. When can we hope that the losses will come to an end? What is the five-year or 10-year plan to ensure that they will not continue? No business out there could continue with those losses, and the Government should not think of this in any other way.
That is a fair point, convener.
Can you give me a five-year plan? When can we expect to see a return that says that NHS 24 will not be running at a loss?
NHS 24 has a plan to return its brokerage. When that brokerage is complete, NHS 24 should not be running at a loss.
To be fair, that is not the answer to the question.
Sorry.
You have provided brokerage to NHS 24, but surely you cannot continue to write blank cheques. That would be unacceptable and no organisation could continue to do it. If NHS 24 was a business, it would be bankrupt and somebody else would be taking over. You have given NHS 24 a blank cheque, because you have said, “Here is the leverage.” Surely the condition attached to that is that the organisation stops running at a loss to the public purse. Facilities across the whole of Scotland are being closed down because of the overruns in this organisation’s budget.
I am sorry if I misunderstood—
Let us forget about humility. You have apologised and we have heard all the apologies. Now is the time to deliver. When will you deliver to ensure that NHS 24 does not keep receiving blank cheques? Nobody else receives blank cheques. Like others, NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde has been advised to make £69 million-worth of savings. It does not get blank cheques, so why should NHS 24 get them?
NHS 24 has to repay what it got. It does not simply get it.
I understand that, but tell me when.
NHS 24 should implement the system in the summer and, from that point on, it ought to be financially sustainable and not to require further brokerage. From this summer, I expect NHS 24 to be financially sustainable. Can I predict what might happen in two years’ time? I cannot, convener, and I will not try to do so, but from the summer I expect NHS 24 to be financially sustainable.
Let us put this on the record. You are the accountable officer. You are the person who came here today and had to apologise, and we accepted that apology. However, let us forget about that.
Any other business would be expected to do exactly the same thing. Organisations across the NHS have been asked to make cuts, ensuring that they cut their cloth accordingly and that they do not find themselves with a budget overrun. They have all had to do that. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde has been advised that it must have a five-year financial plan to make £69 million of savings. Can you confirm what the financial plan is for NHS 24? What is the plan to ensure that it runs according to the budget?
NHS 24 has to submit its draft financial plans in March of this year, and they need to be finalised by me. That is the point at which we will have clarity about that matter. In seeking to answer your question, I will say that I do not expect that we will have to provide—
That is not the question. I am asking you whether it will ever break even on the budget. When can we expect that?
It should have a break-even budget by May of this year.
Thank you.
I am sorry if I misunderstood you.
By that point, it will have a break-even budget and the Government will not have to provide any more leverage to allow it to exist.
The answer that I will give you is that there will be no additional brokerage.
That is the position that you expect in this financial year.
Yes.
I thank the witnesses for their time.
11:36 Meeting suspended.
11:41 On resuming—
In this meeting
Everything on 24 Feb 2016 →- 10:00 Decision on Taking Business in Private Procedure · 1
- 10:00 Section 22 Reports Committee business · 182
- 11:45 Section 22 Reports Committee business · 255
- 12:45 Section 22 Reports Committee business · 15
The type of each item (debate, statement, questions, members’ business and so on) and the times shown are worked out by this site from headings, the chair’s opening words and the Official Report’s running timestamps. They are not the Parliament’s own classification. Text: the Scottish Parliament Official Report.