Agenda item 2 is evidence on the Auditor General for Scotland’s report “The 2014/15 audit of NHS 24: Update on management of an IT contract”. We will hear from two panels. I welcome our first panel: Ian Crichton, interim chief executive, NHS 24; and Margo McGurk, director of finance, NHS 24. I understand that Mr Crichton has a brief opening statement to make.
Official Report · Committee
Section 22 Report
“The 2014/15 audit of NHS 24: Update on management of an IT contract”
Speakers
Choose an MSP to read only their contributions- John Turner Former Chief Executive, NHS 24 144
- Ian Crichton NHS 24 92
- Paul Martin Lab 86
- Colin Beattie SNP 67
- Mary Scanlon Con 58
- Dr Richard Simpson Lab 25
- Tavish Scott LD 17
- Margo McGurk NHS 24 13
- Stuart McMillan SNP 9
- Nigel Don SNP 3
The record
514 contributions · showing 1–200Good morning. On behalf of NHS 24, I want to make sure that the committee is clear about just how concerned the NHS 24 board is about where we are, and I apologise unreservedly for where we find ourselves.
From the very start, the organisation vastly underestimated the scale of the work and the complexity involved in bringing such an ambitious programme into service, and it has struggled to cope. An awful lot of very good people have spent a lot of time trying to recover the position. I am sure that we will talk more about that today.
Our challenges have been systemic, in the sense that none of the governance around the programme has successfully mitigated the risk enough to deliver on time and to budget. I take you back to what was planned from inception and the challenges in making that happen. Although many mistakes have been made—and I can understand the committee’s extreme concern and dissatisfaction—it is important that you understand that NHS 24 has learned from them. It may not feel like that when you look at the issue from a distance, but if you look at each stage, when we have fallen down, we have picked ourselves up; we have made progress and got to the position today in which the technology works. We were not in that position a year ago.
I want you to be in no doubt about the organisation’s resolve to get the programme right. As I said, we have genuinely committed people who, particularly in the past 12 to 18 months, have worked incredibly hard to get the programme into the state that it needs to be in, so that we can launch it. I expect us to do that in the coming year. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr Crichton. I have a few questions relating to Audit Scotland’s report. Are you the accountable officer for NHS 24?
I am.
Why are you the interim chief executive?
I was asked to take on the role from 1 September 2015. I am also the chief executive and accountable officer for NHS National Services Scotland.
What is your annual salary?
It is in the zone of £134,000.
Do you receive the same annual salary for your other post?
No. I have given you my annual salary for my NHS NSS post. I received a 15 per cent uplift to do the NHS 24 role.
Will you confirm what the overspend position is, from the time that the project was first developed until present?
You have the information on the overspend position as it stands today—
Will you confirm what that is?
Yes—I just need a sec to pull out the figure. A lot of numbers have been bounced around, so it is important to get them right. Let me give the numbers that have been trailed most in the press and elsewhere. There is the £117.4 million figure, which would indicate a £41.6 million variance with the original programme cost. It is important to understand that that is a 10-year estimate for the system. Therefore, the £41.6 million figure is for an overspend over the 10 years. The sunk cost to date is just north of £70 million.
Will you explain what “sunk cost” means?
The amount that we have physically spent.
So you have already spent £70 million.
We have.
The overspend is £46 million—is that correct?
Yes. I have brought my director of finance with me. If you want to go precisely through a lot of numbers, it may be helpful to have her go through them.
Let me clarify this point for the benefit of the public. I cannot think of many people who would argue with the fact that £46 million is a significant sum of money.
It is £41.6 million.
And £41.6 million is a significant overspend. I estimate that about 1,900 nurses could be employed for that money. Do you find the situation unacceptable?
I do.
Do you think not only that you should apologise on behalf of the organisation but that the organisation should be ashamed that it has found itself in this position?
The organisation is not happy that it is in this position.
Should it not be ashamed, though?
The organisation consists of almost 1,500 people. Do I think that those 1,500 are responsible for this situation? No, I do not. Do I think that they provide an absolutely first-rate service and that, over the Christmas period, 75,000 people were grateful to them for the support that they got? Yes, I do. Do I think that the individuals on the board who manage the programme are all very unhappy and ashamed of where we are? Yes.
You were brought into the organisation in September. Who do you blame? Who do you think is accountable for the organisation’s failures? There are 1,500 individuals, and you advised me that not all of them could be blamed. I understand that position, but tell me who is responsible for the failures in the organisation.
Blame is a lot less helpful than learning, but, on the question of who is to blame, I told you in my submission that the problem is systemic. I know that is not what you want to hear—
I will decide what I want to hear. We will ask the questions and you will answer them. Please do not make assumptions about what I want to hear. Today, the committee is seeking evidence based on a report. Following that report, we want to raise issues about governance.
Is the accountable officer responsible for the systemic failures that you refer to?
The accountable officer is responsible for the performance of the board, and the board has responsibility for delivering the programme. The accountable officer absolutely shoulders part of the responsibility. I will not duck it, and I do not expect that my predecessor will duck it.
However, I want to be very clear that governance involves a series of checks and balances to ensure that the accountable officer is doing their job. Manifestly, those did not kick in as they should have done, otherwise we would not be where we are.
Are you referring to specific individuals who were part of a management team?
No, I do not think that it is about individuals.
There is a £41.6 million overspend. Are you advising me that none of the individuals who were part of the management team, or the accountable officer—the former chief executive—have to look at themselves in the mirror and realise that they may have been responsible for some of the decisions—
I think—
Hear me out.
Do those individuals not have to realise that some of the decisions that they made may have had an impact on this significant overspend? The money was not spent by itself and it was not managed by itself. There was a management team in place to do that work, was there not?
There was.
It was not an information technology system that took the decisions, was it?
No. It absolutely was not.
Individuals took the decisions.
They did.
They were paid to take the decisions. As you have confirmed, you are paid a salary of £130,000, so there is a significant responsibility placed on you.
There is.
Those individuals are paid to do the work. Did those individuals take decisions that effectively resulted in a £41.6 million overspend?
No system should be reliant on individuals to make decisions about that level of money. Individuals contribute to that. The management team owns our current situation. They understand that and they are absolutely gutted.
They are gutted by a £41.6 million overspend. Any other organisation would be bankrupt. If this was Apple or another company, it would find the situation unacceptable.
I absolutely disagree. There are plenty of companies that have had worse overspends than this and they are not bankrupt. That does not excuse the overspend.
But do they provide the funds to keep propping up an organisation that is clearly losing money?
Would it help if I explained what the £41.6 million overrun was? I think that that plays into who could do what about what.
Very briefly, and then I will move on to Mary Scanlon.
All right. The £41.6 million is made up of four core different pieces, the first of which relates to the scope of the redesign change that we needed to make. That represents the business case being weak and not picking up things that we should have picked up at the start. When we talk about overspend, we are talking about overspend against a budget that was approved but which would never have been sufficient to implement the system. That is the £7.6 million.
There are additional 10-year contract costs, which also relate back to the business case—they should have been picked up in the business case and were not.
Who should have picked up on that?
This is what I meant when I used the word “systemic”. To start off with, the accountable officer—the chief executive—and his executive team should have picked up on that, as should the board, which reviewed that document, and the Scottish Government, which also reviewed it. None of them did.
I do not want to duck the idea that a variety of people are responsible, but if we are to learn from what happened, the important point is that we understand the extremely high-risk nature of undertaking such a project and the need for the governance around it to be proportionate.
To finish off the point about the extra costs, the ones that I have mentioned account for roughly half of the £41.6 million. The other half of it is down to the delays. We activated the contracts for the new system, which we planned to move across to, as well as having the contracts for the old system. Because of that, we are incurring double running costs. Therefore, roughly half the wasted money is the cost of having the old system continuing to go and the new system being paid for in part but not yet ready to use.
That accounts for the total amount.
The £41.6 million.
There is one person in NHS 24 who should not be ashamed—that is the person who discovered the omissions in the tender document in August 2011. According to the Auditor General,
“the performance measures specified in the tender negotiation documents”
did not appear
“in the final contract”.
That is the nub of the error. You negotiated a contract, but what you negotiated was not in the final contract. Basically, that is what is costing taxpayers in this country £42 million. Today, councils are considering how they can implement cuts when you have wasted £42 million.
Given that a staff member raised the issue of the contract omissions in August 2011, why did you sign the contract in March 2012? Why did it take 29 months for the NHS 24 chief executive to be made aware of those omissions? What was happening within your organisation? Seven months after the omissions were discovered, the contract was signed. Twenty-nine months after the omissions were discovered, the chief executive was told. That is a bit dysfunctional, is it not?
I do not want to duck the question, but—
I hope that you will not duck the question; we do not have a lot of time.
I was not there. Later on, you will talk to John Turner, who was.
I will pick up the part of the question on the contract and whether the failure to get the specifications in it is wholly why we are where we are. It is definitely part of the reason, and it was a very bad mistake to make, but the—
It was not a bad mistake; it was pretty serious incompetence. You negotiated something and you did not bother to read the final contract, as a result of which you are costing taxpayers £42 million. That is a pretty high level of incompetence.
I do not disagree with you. I think that you need to talk to John Turner, given that he was there.
We will talk to him, but you are the accountable officer and you are responsible for the situation going forward. You did not even listen to a staff member who told you what was wrong.
As a matter of course, I do listen to my staff. I guess that what I am trying to say to you on the contract is that the commercial construct around the contract is also an issue; the issue is not just the fact that these things were missed. One of the challenges that we have had in recovering the position has been to do with the way in which the contract deals with the risk. Each time we have hit problems, the contract has provided more protection to the suppliers than to us.
But there are two parties to a contract. You negotiated a contract, but what you negotiated was not in the final contract, so Capgemini has run rings round you. You really have not fulfilled your part of the contract on behalf of taxpayers in Scotland. You have seriously let people down. That is a fundamental flaw, is it not? That is the core of the problem, is it not?
It is a part of it.
10:15
It is a huge part of it.
I have been on this committee now for almost five years. The previous Auditor General spoke to us about IT contracts for Registers of Scotland and various others. He said that there was an issue with governance in Scotland as regards the oversight of IT contracts. The Scottish Government, its digital team and indeed NHS National Services Scotland have all been on hand for the past five years to give you the help, guidance, review, oversight, support and advice that are needed. Either they have let you hang out to dry with the £42 million or they have not given you what we were told they would give you.
What is the Scottish Government’s part in this? Did it let you down? Did you ask for advice and not get it, or did the advice lead to you overspending by £42 million?
As we discussed at the start, as accountable officer, ultimately, I am responsible for delivering and the board is responsible for discharging and executing the programme. For the Scottish Government’s part, it has oversight and it uses various checks and balances to check the direction of travel. It also relies on our external auditors and so on.
As regards support from the Government and NSS, again, John Turner will be closer to the exact history than I am, but we got to a point in 2014 when we went to use the technology and it did not work. That was a seminal point in the journey. That is when we understood the issue around the contract very clearly and that is when help was sought at any kind of scale. We looked for help and at that point in time, the Scottish Government was understanding and helpful and it provided support.
So if the Scottish Government and its digital team are helping you and there is a new chief information officer, why has this happened?
We have been given all those assurances for five years that this kind of mess and overspend was not going to happen again because Government oversight would be sufficient to make sure that people were on the right track. Why, five years later, with all that help and all that understanding, has this happened?
I think—
Why are we still looking at a £42 million overspend?
I think that help is different from a governance framework. Fundamentally, in my view, the governance framework around IT is deficient—
The governance framework is deficient.
Around large-scale IT programmes.
Why is it deficient? That is a serious allegation. We have a lot of money going in to help you guys. Why is it deficient?
I will give you a parallel example. The way that property is managed by the public sector today is very different from the way that it was managed five or 10 years ago. There is a robust framework around it; there is access to significant expertise; and there is the capital investment group, which is expert in that kind of capital investment and reviews all the big things that are coming through. The boards are accountable but there is a route to take. If we look at performance today in relation to capital that the national health service manages through framework Scotland or capital that goes through the non-profit-distributing model and is managed through the Scottish Futures Trust, there are robust checks and balances and significant access to expert advice.
What is in place for IT today is quite different. The picture is variable across the sector. Again, you will need to check this with John Turner but my understanding is that the approval for the programme went through the capital investment group, which is a body that primarily understands property, not IT. The question for me around the framework is whether we have the right framework in place to make sure that these programmes progress safely and that organisations will not be stretched to put them in place.
For NHS 24, this is a once-in-a-decade event. It is not something that we do regularly. We do clinical triage regularly. This is a once-in-a-lifetime event for chief execs or executive teams, so is the framework around it strong enough to be able to compensate for any weakness that will be there? Patently, given the overspend, it is not.
I know that other colleagues will want to pursue this question, but I got quite annoyed when I read paragraph 1.9 of your submission to the committee, where you basically blame Capgemini, saying:
“The failure of Capgemini to meet their commitment to supply a working solution in 2013 manifested these weaknesses.”
Is that fair?
For the avoidance of doubt, I do not blame Capgemini. With that statement I am saying that the issue was brought to a head in the way that it was because we ended up in a position where we could not implement the system because it did not technically work.
That was because Capgemini was fulfilling the contract as it was signed. What NHS 24 had negotiated for—what was in the tender—was not in that contract. Is it unfair to blame Capgemini, as you have done in your submission, for the £42 million overspend?
I have been quite clear that the board has apologised. We would not have apologised if it was Capgemini’s fault. The issue with Capgemini relates to the contract and where, when things went wrong, the risk flowed. That is not Capgemini’s issue; that is our issue.
Your submission refers to
“The failure of Capgemini to meet their commitment”.
Will you retract that statement?
I do not retract it. Capgemini failed to deliver the agreed spec. Although I agree with you that the spec was not in the contract—public sector tendering is a complex process—the expectation around system performance was quite clear from the earlier documentation. It did not deliver what we needed.
The purpose of the Ernst & Young support given to us by the Government was to try to get us and Capgemini to a better place, so that we could work together to resolve the matter and ensure that the technical solution worked. That was difficult, because clearly we were not happy that the technical solution was not ready to go.
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Was there ever a point in the sequence of events when you thought that you should call it a day and start again?
If I depersonalise the question and make it about the board, it is clear that, once we understood that there were problems, the board had a long, hard look on at least one occasion at whether we should proceed. Since my arrival, we have gone through a similar exercise around implementation. To my knowledge, we have looked at least twice at whether we should continue or abort.
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Is there a final cost for the project?
I think that it will be between £117 million and £125 million.
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What is still under negotiation at this point?
I want to make sure that I understand your question.
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What elements of the project are still not finalised and are under negotiation with Capgemini or internal bodies?
Having launched before Christmas and having had to go back, we are working on relaunching as soon as it is practicable to do so. The lion’s share of planning and negotiation at the moment is about getting that implementation done.
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At this point, we do not have a final figure, and negotiations are still going on.
I want to be clear on the final figure, because such matters are quite complex. On the cost of the overall programme, there is flexibility around the £117 million figure that we are talking about. We are working on that, because we have a duty to recover what public money we can over the duration. There are tolerances in how the system is used and everything else that afford us some flexibility.
The most concrete matter that we must work up is the cost of implementing the programme from now until the point when we go live, which we estimate to be about £7.6 million. That budget has resilience and provision built into it. I cannot tell you what the exact number will be, but I can tell you that that is what we believe we will need, in the worst case, to launch successfully.
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I am looking at the contract negotiation, which I must confess seems very odd. I was involved in negotiating many contracts when I was in the private sector, and I have never seen a negotiation in which the business side has not read the contract, which is what our papers say.
The lawyers said:
“omissions ‘not an unusual event’ so matter not escalated to Chief Executive or Board”.
How can people sign a document that they have not read?
I find the lawyers’ comment extraordinary. I have dealt with a lot of contracts, and I have not seen that before. That is highly unusual. I believe that people had read a lot of drafts, and I understand that NHS 24’s lawyers drafted the contract. I think that it was read, but I do not think that proper due diligence on the sign-off protocols was gone through. I am not convinced that that was sore-thumbed properly. However, you would need to ask the previous chief executive about that.
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What about the question of truncated text and truncated contracts? I have never heard of that, either.
There were an awful lot of changes and there were a lot of associated change control notes for which accessibility would be normal. We see an awful lot of moving parts around the time that the contract was signed. I was not there, but that is my working assumption.
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How big was the contract physically? Was it 500 or 1,000 pages?
I think that it was just under 1,000 pages.
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That seems extraordinary. Was each and every requirement included in the body of the contract, or was it an overall contract with sub-agreements beneath that?
I am not as familiar with the contract as my predecessor was. I do not know whether Margo McGurk knows about its construct.
There were two documents: the BT contract and the Capgemini contract. The Capgemini contract was separated into two documents. One was the front end, which contained all the clauses around the contract, and the second was the detailed output-based specification. That is the part of the contract in which the omissions occurred.
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Who negotiated the contract?
You will have to check that with the previous accountable officer, but my understanding is that the previous director of finance and advisers did so.
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The director of finance negotiated the technical contract.
Working with advisers.
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Who were the advisers?
There were technical, legal and procurement advisers.
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Who were they? Were they in-house or external?
It was a combination.
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Did we spend money on external advisers to help us to put together a contract that does not seem to have worked?
We did.
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Who were the external advisers?
I was not in post at the time, but I can give the information that comes to mind. I understand that we worked with the Scottish Government, NHS National Services Scotland, Pinsent Masons, which is the solicitor firm that drafted the contract for us, and Deloitte, which is one of the big accountancy firms. Those were the key advisers.
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We would expect a competent lawyer to put together the legal side. Who signed off the technical elements?
You will have to speak to the previous accountable officer about that. I was not involved, as I was not in post in the organisation at the time.
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Who decided that the contract should not be read because it was too difficult and too big?
As Margo McGurk said, neither of us was in post at the time, so we do not know who said that.
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You have said that you are not having a go at Capgemini. You said that its solution failed and that it failed to deliver, but somehow it is not responsible. NHS 24 engaged Capgemini—rightly or wrongly—deeply into the project, basically to act on behalf of NHS 24. Therefore, the supplier was determining to some extent what would be delivered. From an IT point of view, that is extraordinary. Who decided that that was the right way to go?
I do not think that it is extraordinary that an organisation that has not specialised in something relies on the supplier, but I completely agree that we were overly reliant on it. Part of what is bought when such contracts are put in place is the expertise. We failed manifestly to have a good enough construct around Capgemini so that, if it did not deliver, we could do something about it.
10:30
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Did NHS 24 understand what it was proposing?
You should confirm that with Mr Turner later, but I think that we understood what was being proposed, although nobody understood the technical difficulty of getting the two proposed applications to work together.
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Did Capgemini not have the information to enable it to say that the two applications would not work together? Surely that is what you hired it for.
It can do that—that is what it currently does—but it did not do that at that point.
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It did not do that previously. Capgemini, with its technical expertise and the position in which it had been placed—a position of trust to deliver—should have done that but failed to do so.
Yes.
It would be helpful if I make it clear to all that the witnesses can provide an opinion on what happened previously, but it will be for the next panel to give specific factual information about the project.
I appreciate that neither of the witnesses on the panel was in post when much of the work went on. You have taken on a somewhat poisoned chalice.
I will concentrate on a couple of areas. The Government’s August 2013 gateway review said that the programme was
“a particularly strong exemplar of good practice that would be transferable to other programmes”.
As the incoming interim chief executive, you will have looked at that review. I find it difficult to understand that that was the situation then when, by March 2014, we were into the Ernst & Young review, which was looking at whether the project could go ahead.
This is not the first programme that has gone badly wrong. The eCare programme was supposed to solve all our data communication problems in the health and social care service, but it was abandoned completely after seven or eight years at—we are told—a cost of £56 million, although I suspect that the cost was substantially more.
Here we are with another set of circumstances in which the governance has been wholly inadequate. When you started in September 2015, you were expecting the programme to function in October. It was tried for a weekend in October. At that point, I presume that the system was being tested in parallel. Will you explain what went on then? What failed? Why did it fail?
There was a lot in that, so let me know if I miss anything. I will start with the gateway review. I am not sure that people always understand what gateway reviews do—they have their limitations. The gateway review did what I believe it should have done: it looked at the programme construct, satisfied itself about the general approach and made recommendations.
A gateway review is not in itself an effective form of governance of a project of such complexity and scale. From memory, I think that two people carried out the review. Their expertise would definitely not be in call centre implementation. They would be in a position to form a view on, if you like, the general programme construct but not much more than at. However, on the broader IT governance, much more than that would have been required.
Did the Government look at the review and think that the programme was okay and functioning? In the past few months, the Government has given us—after the Auditor General’s second critical report—a new governance system. That is so complex that I do not know who is responsible for what. If I had been the responsible minister and I had seen the gateway review, would I have said, “This NHS programme is doing fine. It’s an exemplar of good practice. I don’t need to worry about it; I can cross it off my list of worries when I go to sleep at night”?
What the minister thinks is a question for the minister. A lot of different set pieces were done that people took comfort from but, because they were individual pieces that sat in isolation, that comfort was misplaced. That is what I meant when I made my point about the programme’s governance. The question is how to have sufficient checks and balances that, taken together, allow people to be more comfortable.
The point that I made about the Capgemini issue is that, if its solution had worked when we looked at accepting it into use, a lot of the other things that subsequently happened would not have happened. That is why the issue is so stark.
As I said, the Ernst & Young review focused on what was needed to get the programme moving forward.
You needed to take that approach because the system had not worked at that point.
Yes. We needed to solve the technical problem and we managed to do that. A solution architect was brought on board and did a phenomenal job of solving the problem in a way that Capgemini had not been able to. Good progress came out of that. Another thing that needed to change was the relationship with the supplier because, having looked at the withdrawal options, we realised that, if we were going to continue, the idea that we would continue to fight our way through that process made no sense.
That was in the Ernst & Young review. On the launch and implementation, an awful lot of the risk management and the concerns were about the technology, because that is what had failed. When we went to implement, we had done dress rehearsals—we had done testing at a reasonable scale—but hindsight makes us all very smart and, unfortunately, it is clear that that testing was nowhere near good enough. When we went live, the system essentially halved our productivity, and because of that we did not have enough people to staff it safely. I therefore took the decision to roll back.
It was a high-risk decision to launch in winter, which as you will know is our busiest time of the year. Had the system worked as intended, we felt that we could have toughed it out. In our view, it was worth taking the risk, given the costs of double running for a continuing period. However, it became patently obvious that we were not ready, which is why we rolled back. That lack of readiness was not to do with a technological failure. We need to make sure that the way in which the system works and the way in which my staff need it to work dovetail better than they do.
I understand why you do not want to relaunch in January or February, but you are talking about June. If there is no technological problem, why do we have to wait until June to relaunch, particularly given that there is a cost for every month of double running?
I agree that it seems like a long time. The challenge is getting the system teed up right so that it works. The board has not yet agreed on when we will launch, and I am sure that board members will ask me a similar question when I meet them at the end of the month. The challenge is that our priority needs to be patient safety. We have adjustments to make to the system. Any member who is familiar with IT will know that, once a system is adjusted, it needs to be tested.
One of the few advantages of having let you down by not launching the system before Christmas is that we have now done a very large test—more than 30,000 people went through it—and we have a comprehensive list of what went wrong. Because the technology works, we know that we can get the system to work but, this time, we need to take enough time to test it properly and get it right. The running cost is not the only cost of doing an implementation; there is also the cost of getting people trained, lined up and ready to go. We need to take enough time to do that. June seems like a long time away but, for the programme, it is quite a short period, given the need to get things teed up right.
Okay—
This is your final question.
I will leave it, then, and maybe come back in later, to allow other members to come in.
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Paragraph 1.9 of your submission highlights that the programme’s governance was
“ineffective, commercial management was weak, too much reliance was put on suppliers promises and the organisation had insufficient understanding of call centre system implementation to successfully launch.”
What research did NHS 24 undertake in putting together the requirements for a new system? To get an understanding, did representatives of NHS 24 speak to other large call centres in the public or private sector—particularly those in companies or organisations that had recently upgraded their systems?
I am not aware of what was done on that back at inception. That is a matter for my predecessor to comment on.
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The third bullet point in paragraph 1.13 says:
“expertise is being used to provide effective commercial management and expertise is currently being sought to support system implementation at launch.”
Will you provide further information on that? We have not heard much about it today.
NSS, which is my other organisation, provided procurement advice to the NHS 24 board, but it was limited to what the board asked for. The board tried to manage the programme commercially. My view is that it did not have the right expertise to do that, and in particular to negotiate a contract of such a scale. It is unlikely that the executive team would have had such expertise for a once-in-a-lifetime event that was not part of its core business. You can check that with my predecessor, but I think that that would have been the fundamental failing. When I talk about the need for support and governance, that is what I mean.
NSS has significant commercial expertise. It belongs to the public sector and it exists to support organisations such as NHS 24. However, whether an organisation seeks that help is completely at its discretion. I guess that I question whether that is a sensible approach. Sitting in NSS are some of the best contract lawyers in Scotland, who understand the public sector and can help managers to manage contracts; people with expertise in the national integration of IT who can help with difficult IT problems; and a procurement department that spends more than £1 billion a year and understands what is necessary to offset, if you like, private sector expertise in contract management and negotiation. That expertise was not used in the way that it could have been and, from where I sit, I cannot see evidence that the team in NHS 24 had that expertise.
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The aim in the immediate future is to get the system operational and delivering for NHS 24, but what will happen after that? As you said, the project is a once-in-a-decade event. Once the system is operational and you are satisfied with how it is working, at what point will planning start for the next IT roll-out or the next improvement?
We were asked earlier about expertise in call centre implementation. NHS 24 has expertise in spades in running a call centre, but that is not the same as implementing a call centre. The board of NHS 24 is now extremely strong, but the same board has not been in place throughout the project. The committee has asked me from the start how bad people feel about where we are, and the answer is that they feel extremely bad. That is a credit to them, because they are not part of the reason why we are where we are. They absolutely recognise the need to get very good implementation expertise in place, and that work is under way.
The intent has been to have a staged implementation. There is an awful lot of discussion about the money, which I understand, but the big idea behind the system was not just to save money but to provide a much better service to patients. It was to provide a safer service that is less repetitive in the questions that we ask people when they are at their most vulnerable. Rather than just being an IT system like the old one was—that was basically a call centre system—the new one has potential to be a decent digital platform that we can build from. That is one reason for the complexity that has been incurred in getting us to this point.
We have a programme team that is well blooded and knows what it is doing. I hope that you have picked up the fact that we are learning a lot of lessons from this, which will be incorporated into how we formulate the business case for the next stage. That stage clearly needs to be more incremental and different from what we have done over the past five years.
The board is absolutely committed to ensuring that the asset is sweated as hard as it can be for Scotland. I hope that it will be a significant period before we are back on the marketplace to procure something new. We need to think about how we can make better use of NHS 24 and provide a much more effective service to the people of Scotland.
10:45
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I accept what you have said, but I understand that IT software and hardware can go out of date extremely quickly. As soon as hardware leaves the factory it is out of date, because of the pace of the sector.
I heard what you said about lessons being learned for the future, but I urge you to be very aware and vigilant about the software and the hardware. In 10 years’ time, the world of IT will be a totally different place.
I agree that technology ages quickly. However, the NHS is a very bad place to cut teeth on brand new things. We need to focus on using tried and tested technology, evolving and making the best of it. What we have procured from the market is very current. At the beginning, we were overly ambitious about what could be achieved, so we have path found. One of the few benefits of that is that what we have is fairly current and will serve the NHS very well through the next decade.
As Richard Simpson did, I acknowledge that both of you were not there at the outset of the project. Ian Crichton said at the beginning of his remarks that the project went wrong at the very start. Can you clarify that?
I encourage the committee to ask my predecessor about the matter; if he says something different I will agree with him.
From where I sit, looking back I say that the business case was not broad enough in scope, it did not work through all the things that a system of that scale would require, so the amount of money that was asked for was well short of what it should have been, and there was no provision in case things went wrong. Those kinds of things were the problems.
Did that lead you to the point that you made to Colin Beattie about the Scottish Government’s assessment process being aimed more at dealing with property issues than with IT issues? Did I misunderstand that?
I was not in post at the time. The interesting question for me is whether the project would go through were it subject to current processes. I am not convinced that it would.
Do you mean that the project would not have been sanctioned?
Yes. However, we are talking about the situation five years ago and I am not sure what was in place then. I do not know that the project would get through what is in place today, and I know that the outline business case definitely falls short of what one would expect it to look like for such a programme.
Is that because of Stuart McMillan’s point that the project was far too ambitious and was quite the opposite of being off the shelf—a bespoke solution that no part of the NHS had ever tried before?
The very ambitious concept was part of the problem and another part was lack of understanding of the risks around something that is so complicated because of all the moving parts. The project grew arms and legs as it went along. Once people had started, they rightly realised that the project is not just about IT, but about the service that we design and how things work. That expanded the scope of the project. The question is whether there was ever a requirement to come back, once the scope had broadened, to take another look before spending all that serious money and development resources.
If we build a new sports centre, as we are about to do in Shetland, and we add lots of things as we go along, the costs will go up and up. The builder, architect and other professionals would love us for it. Is that what happened?
We have talked about Capgemini; there is an element of what you suggest, but there is also a huge cost to us not getting it right and therefore having to run two systems. There is also a huge cost to us in picking up things that were not in the original outline business case. For me, the two big things are the initial failure to scope out the project properly and the failure to get it in place when we thought we would. Those two things are the cost drivers.
You helpfully told the committee that the project could still cost £125 million. Is that the top end of your expectation of what the budget might end up being?
Yes. I was serious about the quality of people who are working on it, so I believe that it can be done for less, but I think that the committee has had enough unpleasant surprises.
That would mean that the overspend would end up being £50 million.
Other colleagues have asked about lines of responsibility for the public sector. I have a lot of constituents who have just lost their jobs in the oil and gas industry—they have not lost £41 million, but they have lost their jobs. Did anyone lose their job over what happened?
I guess that that depends on how you define “lose a job”.
Did anyone get sacked because they wasted £41 million of public money?
Various people have left and the bases for their leaving is a matter for them. The chair of the board is no longer there, the chief executive is no longer there, the director of finance is no longer there and there have been six programme managers.
You and Margo McGurk were brought in to improve or, rather, to sort out the situation. Were you both given that specific remit by your board and by ministers?
My job is to get the new system launched and to protect the public purse as best I can.
Thank you very much.
I have some brief final questions. Have you put in place measures to ensure that the errors that were made are never made again? We have discussed the contract flaw. Can you give us an assurance that for as long as you are the accountable officer there will not be a recurrence?
I can absolutely assure you that for as long as I am the accountable officer there will not be a recurrence. The committee needs to reflect on the fact that at some point the system will need to be reprocured. I am more optimistic than Mr McMillan. Let us say that the system will last for another 15 years: in 16 years there will be a need to reprocure.
As the accountable officer, how many contracts have you signed since September?
Do you mean for NHS 24?
Yes.
None. I have signed adjustments and amendments to the present contract to get things done.
Have you personally reviewed every document that has been signed that is similar to the flawed contract with Capgemini?
Yes.
What has been put in place to ensure that your director of finance, who is with you today, provides you with necessary information?
The director of finance not providing me with the information that her role requires her to provide me with would be unacceptable.
How do you prevent that? Can you?
I think that it is possible to do that. In any organisation, it is necessary to have checks and balances, but it is also necessary to have a decent values set and to have people who are pulling with you, as well as a degree of team spirit. Checks and balances, effective audit and effective risk management are all necessary.
I asked a specific question. If the director of finance, who is sitting next to you, decided not to provide you with information because of a contract flaw that she thought it would not be in her interests to report, what would happen?
That would be a failure in me, because public service requires people to do the right thing. There is no check or balance in the world that can stop someone hiding something from you. At the end of the day, the question would be why they would want to. Things that drive that kind of behaviour include blame.
I have no doubt that the director of finance who is sitting next to me would not do that. I have absolutely no doubt that, since she took up the post—she has been there longer than I have—she has done an amazing job in putting in place the right kinds of checks and balances to ensure that things involving much smaller sums of money are properly supervised and that financial control in the organisation is good. One of the fundamental requirements of the accountable officer is to ensure that that is the case; I can give you that assurance.
If the Scottish Government were to say, “We’re not giving you the money”, where would you go from there? Would the organisation be bankrupt?
No.
As we know, the Scottish Government has asked a number of boards across the sector to make cuts. I know that £60 million-worth of cuts have been proposed in the budget of NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde over the next five years. How can the Government possibly guarantee that you will be provided with the necessary funding? What would happen if it were just to turn off the tap and say, “Sorry, we’re not going to provide it”? Where would you go from there?
If the Government turns the tap off, we will need to consider what we will do. It would be a decision ultimately for my board, but pragmatically it would mean having to stay with our previous system until such time as money became available to do something. The Scottish Government would need to reflect on the £70 million of sunk investment, the fact that no more than another £7.6 million should get us home, the fact that once the system is in place its recurring cost will be less than that of the system that it is replacing, and the fact that there will be an increasing role for NHS 24 in trying to help the rest of the system cope with the increasing demand that we know the ageing population is generating for us.
I want to ask a very brief but important question. In paragraph 1.9 of your submission, you mention Capgemini and state:
“the organisation had insufficient understanding of call centre system implementation to successfully launch.”
That is a rather brutal and defamatory statement against a global company. Do you wish to apologise for or retract it?
I do not think that I said that Capgemini did not have that understanding.
What organisation were you talking about?
NHS 24.
So NHS 24 “had insufficient understanding of” call centres.
Of “call centre system implementation”.
You talk about Capgemini in the first part of the sentence. Are you saying that NHS 24 does not have sufficient
“understanding of call centre system implementation”?
NHS 24 is a call centre. Did NHS 24 not actually understand itself?
I think that NHS 24 understood itself very well, and it delivers a first-rate service.
That is not what you say in your submission.
What I say in the submission is that, as far as implementing call centres is concerned, that is not what NHS 24 does.
So, that is why you wasted seven years and £42 million.
Again briefly, convener, I want to ask a question that has not been asked yet. You served a default notice on Capgemini and the case ended up in the High Court up the road, but you withdrew from it, having already spent £38 million. Why did you withdraw?
My second question could be covered in written evidence. Pinsent Masons, PricewaterhouseCoopers and Ernst & Young were all called in, which incurred, I presume, substantial legal costs. Can you give us—if not today then in writing—the costs of bringing in all the experts to try to sort this out? First of all, though, can you tell us why you withdrew from the court case after serving a default notice on Capgemini?
You can ask my predecessor, who will be up next, because he is the person who made the decision.
As for my perspective on why NHS 24 withdrew, I think that it was because the contract construct would have meant that any damages that were secured in court would have been very small relative to the investment that had been sunk. My predecessor would therefore have understood that he was better off reaching an agreement with Capgemini on how it and NHS 24 could make a solution work instead of fighting it out in court, which would have meant another couple of years’ delay and everything else.
So that was another waste of time and another delay to the project that led to legal costs, but to no advance in implementation and no benefit to people in Scotland.
I think that you would need to ask my predecessor the reasons for that.
I, too, have a very brief question. We have talked a lot about Capgemini and the software, which is obviously the main issue, but can you confirm that there have been no problems at all with the BT side of the project, which actually amounted to £55 million compared with the £20 million for Capgemini?
There absolutely have been problems with BT, and we have had to work our way through them. This takes me back to my point that I do not think that you can blame Capgemini for why we are where we are; after all, we own this project.
As I have said to you, commercial management is one of the things that were deficient, and the scoping in total of what would be required was not where it should have been. The BT element that has been particularly challenging for us is the post-go-live model, by which I mean the idea of what the world will look like once this thing is finally in place and how the costs and contracts work. That has been challenging, because of how contracts and so on were established and the up-front business case.
However, although we have had challenges, they have been easier to manage. Indeed, this brings me back to the point that I was trying to make about Capgemini. With BT, there has been nothing that, if you like, absolutely cannot be done; with Capgemini, when we came to use the solution it just did not work.
11:00
You said that there was expertise in NSS. I wonder, though, whether something needs to be done about one-off projects involving subsidiary organisations, including NHS boards. I am thinking in particular of the problems with the TrakCare contract, as a result of which clinical systems can be closed down for 24 hours for routine upgrades. That seems to me to be a disgraceful contract—not for TrakCare, of course, which is perfectly entitled to do these things. It is just ridiculous that someone in the first place signed off a contract that leaves clinicians without their electronic back-up for 24 hours just for a routine upgrade.
Should not all such contracts be signed off by NSS Scotland? Should not it be the repository of expertise? After all, this sort of thing is just going to continue. We have a devolved system that tries to prevent major losses, although it has not done so, and we have what I think is, to be frank, a fractured and dysfunctional system across the whole NHS. The NHS Education for Scotland portal system is a disgrace and a complete mess; it is shocking for the clinicians who have to go in and out of it. Given how far we are behind in IT, should NSS not have much greater control of and say in signing off of contracts? Should it be the case that no one can undertake a contract without agreement from the centre?
For contracts of scale, NSS should definitely play a more involved role. We should also give thought to private sector expertise; sometimes the public sector tends to think that the private sector is bad or that only the Deloittes of this world can be used, but there is a range of expertise out there that would never be worth bringing in-house to NSS because it would not be needed often. That expertise exists; companies that are bigger than NHS 24 use such people.
The question is this: what is the checklist that you would need to go through with such a programme, and how would you, as accountable officer, be able to assure your board that you had complied with it? What expertise would you need? I do not believe that at the inception of this project there was such a checklist.
In this meeting
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