I formally open the meeting in public. I say a big thank you to the staff of Dundee City Council. Even though today is, I believe, a Dundee public holiday, the staff have turned out. We much appreciate their assistance.This is the first meeting of a Scottish Parliament committee in Dundee. The Audit Committee thought it important that this meeting should take place in Tayside, due to the widespread concern about the running of the national health service in Tayside in recent years. The committee welcomes the high level of public interest in this subject, which is evident in the number of tickets that have been taken for seats in the public gallery. Members of the public should be aware that this is a formal meeting of the Audit Committee. Members of the Scottish Parliament will take evidence on issues that arise from the Auditor General's report "National Health Service bodies in Tayside". It is not appropriate for members of the public to intervene. I will insist on, and greatly appreciate, the public's co-operation in ensuring the proper conduct of business today.I welcome members of the committee. There are no apologies, as all committee members are present. Other members of the Scottish Parliament are attending. Although they are not members of the Audit Committee, our parliamentary colleagues are welcome to attend and to participate. This morning we have with us Irene McGugan, Shona Robison, John McAllion and Kate MacLean, who is in her old stomping ground of Dundee City Council chambers. I also welcome the Auditor General and his staff, as well as the witnesses and the members of the public, to this historic first meeting of the Scottish Parliament in Dundee.So that everyone knows what is happening, I inform the meeting that the committee will explore the issues behind the financial difficulties of the NHS in Tayside in recent years and will look at the respective roles of the Scottish Executive and Tayside health bodies in resolving them. I point out that the Audit Committee is different from other parliamentary committees, because we deal not in policy, but in the facts of the matter, on which we make recommendations for improvement in the future. Finally, I remind everyone to switch off their mobile phones and pagers.Before we come to the evidence-taking session, I must deal with a matter of committee business. Is it agreed that we hold agenda items 4, 5 and 6 in private?Members indicated agreement.
Official Report · Committee
National Health Service (Tayside)
Speakers
Choose an MSP to read only their contributions- Mr Brett 89
- Andrew Welsh SNP 83
- Mr White 70
- Mr Jones 62
- John McAllion Lab 34
- Margaret Jamieson Lab 30
- Keith Raffan LD 25
- Mr Bates 23
- Lloyd Quinan SNP 20
- Nick Johnston Con 18
- Scott Barrie Lab 16
- Paul Martin Lab 15
- Brian Adam SNP 13
- Mr Aldridge 10
- Shona Robison SNP 9
- Irene McGugan SNP 6
- Kate Maclean Lab 3
- Mr Wells 3
- Mr Peter Bates NHS Tayside 1
- Mr Trevor Jones Scottish Executive Health Department/Chief Executive of the National Health Service in Scotland 1
- Mr John Aldridge Scottish Executive Health Department 1
- Trevor Jones 1
- Mr Tim Brett Tayside Health Board 1
- Mr Paul White Tayside University Hospitals NHS Trust 1
2 more speakers
- Mr Robert Black Auditor General for Scotland 1
- Mr Tony Wells Tayside Primary Care NHS Trust 1
The record
540 contributions · showing 1–200We now come to the evidence-taking session. This is the first occasion on which the committee has taken evidence on the NHS in Tayside, based on the Auditor General's report on NHS bodies here. I understand that the facts in the Auditor General's report have been agreed by the witnesses.The witnesses who are giving evidence to the committee today are Mr Trevor Jones, head of the Scottish Executive health department, and his colleague Mr John Aldridge, the director of finance of the health department. We also have with us Mr Peter Bates, the recently appointed chairperson of the NHS in Tayside. Mr Bates is accompanied by his colleagues Mr Tim Brett, the chief executive of Tayside Health Board, Mr Paul White, the chief executive of Tayside University Hospitals NHS Trust, and Mr Tony Wells, the chief executive of Tayside Primary Care NHS Trust. You are welcome, gentlemen. You will notice that we have invited representatives of every level of decision making, from the national to the specific in Tayside.I wish people to be clear about the format of the meeting. We are dealing with the following issues: first, accountability within the NHS in Tayside in general and the role played by the Scottish Executive health department; secondly, the causes of the financial problems experienced by Tayside Health Board and the action that is being taken to resolve them; thirdly, the financial implications of health care in Tayside, including progress in implementing the Tayside acute services review; and, finally, the Tayside health bodies' approach to governance, leadership and communication and the steps that are being taken to improve those key issues.I understand that Mr Peter Bates would like to make a short opening statement.
Convener, thank you for giving me the opportunity to make a brief statement. As you have said, there has been concern about the health service in Tayside for many years. Indeed, the service's history may be described as turbulent, with many consequences, including, sadly, a loss of trust, particularly in the health board and some constituent parts of our health service. However, in approaching this agenda, we must remember that we have an outstandingly good health service here and a dedicated and committed work force. It is important that we learn from the past so that we can focus on the future.I have spent the past 10 weeks with a number of our consultants, nurses, doctors and general practitioners, with representatives of community groups, patients and local government, and with many others. If I have found one common thread, apart from huge dedication and commitment, it is that there is concern and—I must advise the Audit Committee—loss of morale about the fact that Tayside health service is continually presented as failing. We have to reverse that. I feel strongly that that is a key challenge that I have been set.On behalf of NHS Tayside, I welcome the Auditor General's report, which is fair, measured and accurate. I wish to record formally my appreciation for the way in which the Auditor General and his staff went about preparing the report. Given the nature of some of our difficulties in Tayside, that process could have been damaging, but it was not.As a very newly appointed chairperson on a very steep learning curve, I am determined to lead a process of continuing recovery. Although change has started and will continue—as it needs to do—we face many challenging decisions, as the Auditor General's report covers very well. Indeed, those decisions probably needed to be taken a long time ago.Tayside Health Board needs the support of MSPs, the media, the Executive, the Auditor General and many others to continue the process of recovery. We have made the first steps in a long and complex journey, which must continue in the right direction. That journey is built on the two key principles of far greater honesty and far greater transparency, which is the spirit in which we will approach answering questions and entering into dialogue today.
The committee expects—and will appreciate—honesty and transparency. Committee members and the general public well understand your comments about the dedication of the staff, which accounts for the exceptional interest in today's meeting.My first questions about accountability at the national level are addressed to Mr Jones. Paragraphs 2.1 to 2.5 of the Auditor General's report describe the key roles and responsibilities of the NHS. Can you explain the lines of accountability that have operated between the chief executive of the NHS nationally and the chief executives of the health boards and trusts? What are the strengths and weaknesses of those arrangements?
First, I should point out that those relationships are changing, so if I describe the history, it might also be useful to describe how the new world will look.Before the Scottish Parliament was set up, chief executives in the NHS were accounting officers and sub-accounting officers to the chief executive of the management executive in Scotland. As a result, the chief executive of the management executive was the principal accounting officer, with the NHS chief executives acting as sub-accounting officers for the spend within their area. With the Scottish Parliament, that relationship has changed. All chief executives in the NHS in Scotland are accountable officers reporting directly to the Parliament.NHS organisations are obviously accountable to the Minister for Health and Community Care for the performance of their business and for the strategic direction that has been set for the NHS in their area. They are monitored on their performance by the health department, which is responsible for issuing guidance to the organisations to allow them to conduct their business.
Who is in charge? Clearly Tayside health services are in a mess, and have been in one for many years. Tayside is the worst-case financial scenario in Scotland. Who is in charge? Is it the health department, the chief executives of the boards and trusts, or both?
Ultimately, the minister is responsible for the overall direction of the NHS. As principal accountable officer, I am responsible for the £5 billion health service spend. However, NHS organisations are separate corporate bodies, and their chief executives have a direct line to Parliament about how they conduct their financial business.You said that NHS Tayside was in a mess. It is worth putting its position precisely into context. Although there have been problems, which we will talk about later this morning, I should point out that our best estimates of the financial performance in the past financial year—ending on 31 March 2001—is that NHS Tayside has an overspend of 2 per cent of its budget. In other words, although there are still some problems, which are being addressed, NHS Tayside is running at a 2 per cent deficit on its overall expenditure.
However, we are still talking about £11.1 million and the worst record with regard to return on capital.
Yes, indeed.
The health department gives £400 million to Tayside authorities. What is to prevent the situation from recurring?
We are now putting in much stronger lines of performance management and accountability to the NHS. The committee will be aware that we issued "Our National Health: A plan for action, a plan for change" in December; it might be worth spending a couple of moments describing the service's new accountability and performance management arrangements.We are creating 15 new NHS boards, which will be responsible for setting the strategy for an area, for allocating resources to all the NHS organisations within the area and for managing performance. The composition of those boards will include the chairmen and chief executives of all the NHS organisations in the area. As a result, a single boardroom will be responsible for the corporate management of the NHS in an area. That important change will ensure a single agenda, with resources managed to best effect for a particular population.We are in the process of appointing new chairmen to those NHS boards; we have already appointed two—one to Fife, and Peter Bates to Tayside—and the other 13 are being appointed. We want strong leaders to manage the corporate business within an area.We are also moving away from having separate lines of accountability between NHS trusts and health boards and the Scottish Executive. Under the new arrangements, there will be a single local health plan for an area, which will demonstrate not only that national priorities and local issues are being addressed but that all plans are affordable and that resources are being used to best effect in an area.Furthermore, we are introducing a new performance assessment framework for the service, which will address the whole business of an NHS board. As well as addressing financial and efficiency issues, the framework will address how a health board is implementing the health improvement agenda for its population, how it is tackling issues of clinical quality and governance, how it involves the public, how it works with its key partners in the area, principally the local authorities, and how the NHS board manages its staff. That last point is important; as 136,000 people are employed in the NHS, we must send strong messages about how staff should be governed.We will set targets and performance measures in each of the areas that I have described and annually publish every health board's performance against those targets to ensure a public demonstration of the overall performance of a health system.We are also introducing a new, simplified finance regime that will move away from one or two of the remnants of the internal market in the existing finance regime and allow us to take a whole-system approach to managing health service resources within an area. We want to move away from the current situation in which, in some health board areas, one organisation might be in deficit and another in surplus. We want the resources to be managed to best effect for the population through the finance regime.
You are in full flow; however, the answers are getting rather long. As I do not want to pre-empt future questions, I would like answers to be as clear and as succinct as possible. I am falling into my own trap by tempting you into giving such long answers.Your department gives £400 million to the Tayside health organisations. What powers do you have to issue instructions or to take direct action if you have serious concerns about management or performance in a health board?
We have a series of escalating interventions. For all health boards, there is a routine monitoring process to demonstrate how a health system is performing. If there were particular concerns, the minister could issue a direction to a health organisation through Parliament. Finally, if the concerns were very serious, the minister could replace the board of an NHS organisation.
Sending in a task force, or replacing a board or a chairman, is closing the stable door after the horse has bolted. It is the disaster scenario.To quote from the Auditor General's report, "National Health Service bodies in Tayside", the department's role is"to set strategic aims … to issue guidance … on the organisation and management … including corporate governance arrangements."However, the Kilshaw inquiry report showed that the health department failed to ensure high standards of corporate and personal conduct. For example, only three or four years ago, Tayside Health Board officials were trying to interfere with audit reports. The Kilshaw report also says that"independent scrutiny … has repeatedly identified weaknesses in … leadership, governance and communication."The health department has failed to fulfil its role. What is being done to sort that out? What guarantee can you give us that it will be sorted out?
With respect, convener, I do not agree that the health department has failed to fulfil its role. As problems have been identified, action has been taken. In Tayside, there is direct action in the form of the recovery plans that are now in place to put finances on a sound footing.As for the Kilshaw report's recommendations, we asked the auditors to visit every health organisation to ensure that problems similar to those that had been identified in Tayside were addressed. Following that intervention, we received a positive report from the auditors. I do not think that we failed. We took action.If we consider the financial situation in Tayside, the problem escalated relatively quickly—from March 1999, when the former NHS organisations in Tayside were demonstrating, through their accounts, that they were delivering on financial targets, to the early summer of that year, when a significant deficit was being forecast. From that point, we worked closely with the NHS in Tayside to ensure that recovery plans were in place. I am pleased to say that the first two phases of that recovery plan have been delivered.
There were continuing problems over many years. I am trying to find out what mechanism exists centrally to do something about problems. I quote from the Auditor General's report again, which says that the end products of accountability review meetings are"a summary of the key issues"and"an indication of the broad actions expected by the Department in the year ahead."Given the NHS's past record in Tayside, and its current financial performance, is the departmental response good enough? What will your department do to tighten up its accountability reviews and procedures?
I will not repeat the new performance assessment framework because I ran through it in some detail. That new framework will prevent some of the problems that you describe. We are putting in place a new accountability review mechanism for the new NHS boards, which will lead to a much more focused process for NHS organisations to account to the health department.
I welcome what you have said about the new performance assessment framework, which will be much more robust.I would like you to clarify your answer to the convener's first question about who is in charge. You said that the minister was in charge. Obviously, the minister has ultimate responsibility. However, if the chief executive of the management executive is the principal accounting officer, and the chief executives of the board and the trust are the sub-accounting officers, who is in charge of financial management?Regarding your response to the convener's second question, if the chief executive of the management executive was aware that there were problems going back over a number of years, why was action not taken sooner? I realise that you were not in post at the time so I suppose you are in the fortunate position of not being held accountable today.
Let me repeat that NHS organisations are separate corporate bodies. Their officers are directly accountable to the Parliament for the funds allocated to them to manage health services in a local area. Therefore, the local NHS organisation is accountable for detailed operational management and its chief executive is accountable directly to Parliament, not to the chief executive of NHS Scotland.However, as chief executive in the health department, I am accountable for the full health spend—£5 billion of expenditure. I am not pretending that I do not have responsibility. That is why it is essential that we have tighter accountability arrangements in the NHS. The new performance assessment framework will, I think, provide us with that vehicle.
The Auditor General's report says that the central mechanism used by the department to hold health boards and trusts to account is the accountability review meeting. How often do those meetings occur and what is discussed?
There is a formal accountability review meeting once each year, which reviews the performance of an NHS organisation over the previous 12 months and agrees action that should be taken and an agenda for the coming 12 months.
Are performance and financial management issues considered in detail and are full records kept?
Following the meeting, a formal letter is issued from the chief executive of the NHS to the chairman and the chief executive of the health board. The letter records the issues that were agreed at the meeting.
Let me see whether I have got this right. You have an annual accountability review meeting—one per board area—at which general issues are talked about, but no full record is kept and afterwards only a letter is sent out.The health department's role is to"monitor the financial and other performance … through regular performance returns and … Review meetings"and"to issue guidance … on the organisation and management … including corporate governance arrangements."Despite that, we see in paragraph 18 on page 6 of the Auditor General's report, with regard to the £11.3 million Tayside University Hospitals NHS Trust deficit, that"The 1999 Annual Accountability Review meeting did not address in any detail these financial pressures upon TUHT in the first year of its existence."We then find that the 2000 review did not even take place. Did any of that fulfil the department's obligation to"monitor the financial and other performance"?
I cannot comment on those accountability meetings. I was not there, so I cannot comment on the detail of the discussions. The letter that confirms the agreements reached at the meeting sets out all the actions expected of an NHS organisation. It is important to stress that, at the end of the financial year 1998-99, all the NHS organisations in Tayside were demonstrating the delivery of their financial targets. The real problem occurred when the new management team came in to TUHT and identified financial problems between May and July 1999.
It is not very satisfactory to be told in February that all is well and then in July that all is wrong. Do the accountability review meetings highlight performance and financial management problems? Clearly, in the case that you describe, they did not.
They do—if significant problems are identified. We have a monthly monitoring arrangement with each NHS organisation. John Aldridge will perhaps describe that, as he manages that part of the office. There is a detailed monitoring process that identifies the status of each NHS body.
But it did not. The approach is rather hands-off. Given the problems that have occurred, and given previous management difficulties, I would have thought that central Government would have some ability to spot problems before they started. Otherwise, £400 million is being handed out, the stewardship of which is not especially good.
There is a monthly monitoring process. Mr Aldridge will describe how the problem was identified. As I said, that ran through from May 1999 to the July monitoring report.
In addition to the annual accountability review, there are regular meetings—both on the wider performance management agenda and on specific financial performance issues. Those meeting take place regularly throughout the year. They identify problems and we try to work with the local NHS organisations to resolve them.You drew attention to paragraph 18 on page 6 of the Auditor General's report. It points out that the department, at the time of the accountability review, pressed the health board and the trust to prepare a viable financial framework for 1999-2000 as a matter of urgency. That is why the issues were not discussed in great detail at the accountability review itself. Because of the information that we had, we were concerned that a viable financial framework was not in place. We had the opportunity to press the local organisations to prepare such a framework.
What guarantees can you give that such a situation will not recur?
We can never guarantee that parts of the NHS will not have financial problems from year to year. It would be wrong for me to guarantee that. However, as Trevor Jones explained, we are introducing a new performance assessment framework. The new financial regime is designed to reduce the chances of such problems arising again.
Can the committee have copies of the records of the department's annual accountability review meetings with NHS bodies in Tayside?
Yes.
I would like to follow up the previous question. Paragraph 18, on page 6 of the Auditor General's report, mentions that your department urged the trusts"to prepare a viable financial framework".Did you do that in March 1999?
By the summer of 1999.
In February 1999, Tayside Health Board submitted the financial framework, which the management executive approved.
On the basis of the information that we were given at that time, we accepted that financial framework as the correct position. Early in 1999-2000, it became clear—as Trevor Jones explained—that problems were arising. Indeed, that became clear from our monitoring.
How did it become clear? It seems to me that the management executive was entirely dependent on information provided by the boards and trusts. If the managements of the boards and trusts have completely the wrong information, you get bogus information on which to base your assumptions.
To a large extent, you are right.
Any system that depends on local management is suspect if that local management gets it wrong. You should have a different way of dealing with this.
If we want an NHS that is responsive to local need, we must have organisations that have the ability to manage locally. We must have effective monitoring processes in place—
That is the point. How can the monitoring system be effective?
Trying to micromanage the whole of the NHS from St Andrew's House would not be the right direction to go in.
To micromanage is one thing, but what about macromanaging, which should be your job?
We are bringing in the new performance assessment framework, so that we can gauge the effectiveness of each health board area. We will manage the seven fields that I described. That will demonstrate whether health boards are effectively managing the whole of the business—including finance and other areas. That will allow us to identify weaknesses or areas that require attention.
That leads us neatly on to the question of whether the health department could have done more at the time to resolve the emerging financial difficulties in Tayside.
Mr Jones, no one expects you to micromanage, but we do not expect you to pass the buck either. Mr Bates hit the nail on the head—we are raking over the past because we are looking to the future, so that we can avoid such a situation recurring.In February 1999, the health department was given Tayside Health Board's financial framework. The convener was being generous when he said that the finances were all right in February and all wrong in July. By April, it was in fact pretty clear that things were going badly wrong. Why did the alarm bells not start ringing within two months of your receiving that financial framework? Why did you not intervene or take some action?
I do not think that it was clear in April 1999 that there were major problems. There was a new management team—
Sorry, I will intervene before you go any further. We want succinct answers. To avoid my having to come back to you straight away, let me quote from the Auditor General's report. Paragraph 6.3 makes it quite clear that TUHT"expressed concerns about its financial position in April 1999".If it was expressing concerns, it was clear that something was going wrong.
No. Look at the monitoring returns that were coming in. In July 1999, the trust was forecasting a 3.1 per cent deficit in its monitoring return, but the trust indicated in the narrative to the report that the figure could rise as high as £10 million. The department received that return in August and from September the department was working with the trust on a recovery plan to address that issue. In fact, the trust had already put measures in place to reduce its overspending.The first draft of the detailed recovery plan was with us from November. In August, we received the monitoring report, which indicated a significant problem; in November, we received the recovery plan, which was refined. We then had concerns about the deliverability of that recovery plan and in February 2000 the minister announced the introduction of the task force. Action was being taken by the trust as soon as it was aware of its financial problems.
The question is whether action was taken as soon as possible. From the Auditor General's report, it appears to me that the department was dilatory. The TUHT was expressing concern by April 1999; things had seriously deteriorated by July; you received the report in August; then there was a meeting in September; then the board sent the trust away to draw up a recovery plan by the end of October; then you had a meeting in November. There does not seem to have been a huge sense of urgency when things were going seriously off the rails. Should you not have intervened earlier?
Hindsight is a wonderful thing—
We are trying to learn from the past, are we not?
Absolutely. If one asks whether, with hindsight, the department could have intervened earlier, the answer is, "Yes, we could"—
Is it not, "Yes, we should have"?
Please allow the witness to answer.
Sorry. Is it not, "Yes, we should have"?
I think that you are right. The new performance assessment framework will address that. We have learned from our experiences and have designed the new performance assessment framework to address the whole of the business and produce a much tighter accountability framework for the NHS. That is already happening.One should not assume that nothing was happening between the point when the trust expressed concerns about the financial pressure that it faced and the point when the task force came in to help the NHS in Tayside. Right through the summer of 1999, the trust was taking significant action to identify ways to address the deficit.
No one is saying that nothing was happening. The question is whether it was happening quickly enough and whether there was sufficient sense of urgency.Does Mr Brett feel that earlier, more detailed intervention would have helped the trust to find workable solutions to address the concerns, which the trust had made clear as early as April?
I am sure that that would have helped. As Mr Jones has already said, three of the four previous trusts had met their financial targets. Everybody was a bit taken aback by the scale of the problem that we faced. We knew that in Perth and Kinross we had a serious problem from the previous year, which we had addressed as part of the February plans. Because the other trusts had met their targets, we assumed that the new trust would be able—albeit with some difficulty—to deal with the problems.
To what extent did Tayside Health Board ask the health department for help? To say that you were taken aback makes it sounds as if you were in a state of slight shock. Why did you not approach the department earlier?
Both trusts approached the department to look for assistance.
When?
I think that that was in May 1999. Both chairmen wrote at that time.
It bothers me that problems were detailed in the Kilshaw report and clear warnings were given about financial and other problems, yet the department seemed to stay aloof. The signals were clear. The department does not seem to have the powers or the mechanism to get to problems before they reach the crucial stage, when task forces need to be sent in.How does Mr Jones feel that the department fulfilled its responsibility to monitor the financial and other performances of the trusts and boards to which it gives £5 billion each year? Those problems are in the past, but can you guarantee that the future will be any better?
I can certainly guarantee that the future will be better. I have described the mechanisms that we are putting in place to ensure that. One cannot guarantee that NHS organisations will not face financial problems. However, the control mechanisms are being significantly strengthened.
We will now look at the guidance that the department gives to health bodies.
Why was it that, three months after the financial recovery plan was received from Tayside health bodies, Mr Jones felt the need to issue guidance on what he expected from health bodies?
The guidance was not about what we expect health organisations to do. It is absolutely clear that we expect health organisations to provide quality health services within the resources available to them. Local health bodies must manage their resources effectively. We issued guidance on the detailed information that we required to ensure that the problem was being addressed effectively. The guidance was not about action. All organisations within the NHS know what is expected of them—they must ensure that they are providing services within the resources allocated to them. I do not think that any NHS managers need guidance about that—they all understand that simple concept.
So, the guidance that you issued was specific to Tayside and was not given to other health authorities?
The guidance concerned the type of information that we required to ensure that the problem was being addressed; it was not about the need to live within resources. That is the important point, which is widely understood. It is for local health services to identify the solutions to manage their resources.
Did the fact that no clear guidance was given on the department's requirements for financial recovery plans contribute to the problems? Did that deflect efforts to find a solution to the problems? Could Mr White address that question?
I am happy to answer that question. The problem that we faced was of enormous magnitude, and it shocked me when I realised what we had walked into in Tayside. Four of the executives who came to Tayside, including me and the director of finance, had not previously worked there. We received assurances that the trusts had balanced their books, with the exception of Perth and Kinross Healthcare NHS Trust, which we knew had used one-off moneys. What was totally unapparent to us was the extent to which non-recurring funds had been used throughout Tayside to support recurring costs and the extent to which new service developments had started in the latter part of 1998-99. The full-year cost effect of those developments hit us at the end of the first quarter of the new trust.We immediately set action in train. The concept of working within financial regimes and to these targets was not foreign to me, or to my director of finance; we had managed a trust in Dunfermline for five years and had consistently met our targets without recourse to non-recurring funds. The extent to which such funds were used in Tayside was a shock to us. I knew what we had to do, and the executive team was clear about the magnitude of the task that faced us. We immediately set about alerting budget holders, senior clinicians and senior managers in the organisation to the fact that we faced a very large problem.We were hopeful that the problem was not as big as the early figures indicated and we doubted whether the split of the previous trusts had been undertaken correctly. As the Auditor General indicates, Tayside faced the most complex of reorganisations, with two existing trusts being split between the two new trusts. Our first reaction was to question whether there had been an error in the apportionment of budgets. Research into that was quickly carried out and it became evident that no such error had been made and that the budgets to which we had been told the previous trusts were working—which Tayside Primary Care NHS Trust and Tayside University Hospitals NHS Trust now manage—were correct. However, the budgets were not underpinned by recurring income to support the level of costs that were being incurred against them. Budget managers in the organisations were working under the false premise that they had more funding available to them than was the case. Therefore, the fact that the guidance from the management executive was not available from the outset and the way in which it later appeared did not slow down the implementation of any action that we felt had to be taken.
You say that you were aghast when you recognised the extent of the problems. Were the accounts that were available from the previous trusts qualified or unqualified?
The audit comments on the accounts were unqualified technically: they presented a true and fair account of what was happening in the organisations. What was not apparent was the extent to which non-recurring funding was being used to balance the books. Neither did the accounts show—the auditors would not have been expected to pick this up—the way in which new services were developed in the latter part of the financial year, the full cost consequences of which hit in 1999-2000.
Was no consultation or negotiation undertaken with the health board, regarding the services that were being introduced towards the year end to ensure that they were necessary or that they provided best value for the people of Tayside?
Mr Brett may be able to answer that. I was not working in Tayside at that time, so I am not fully aware of what dialogue was entered into.
In Perth and Kinross, the attitude was taken that if something needed to be done, additional staff were appointed and the health board was expected to find the funds. I felt that that attitude was totally wrong. That explains some of the difficulties that we got into.
That leads to the question: are the same people still running the show?
They are not in chief executive positions in Tayside.
I hope not anywhere else in Scotland. To what extent was the absence of clear guidance from the department a problem for you in finding the appropriate solution to the financial difficulties that you faced?
That was not a material issue. The problems that we needed to address required us to work out with clinical staff and managers sustainable solutions on the ground. The management executive was rightly looking for a way of presenting the action plan that would give it reassurance and confidence that the health system in Tayside and its managers were addressing the real issues and that they had confidence that the route map that was being set out would take us to the destination that we needed to get to.
Are we not dealing with something beyond guidance? All the guidance in the world could not prevent bad budgeting or bad management practice. The problem for the department lies in finding a way to intervene before bad management practice produces massive deficits and problems. What powers do you have? Who is in charge?
We cannot intervene in advance of the occurrence of a problem. Mechanisms must be in place to assess the relative performance of NHS management, and information must be monitored to satisfy us that all the business is being managed appropriately. The new performance assessment framework will provide those mechanisms.
We have heard about the shock that people felt when the extent of the financial situation became apparent. People have said that they were not around at the time; but Tim Brett was around then. Paul White raised the issue of the use of non-recurring funding to balance the books. Was Tim Brett aware of the extent of that practice?
Yes. Non-recurring funding had been used in a number of trusts in Tayside over a number of years.
Were you comfortable with that?
No; I was annoyed and angry about it. In Perth and Kinross, the problem was being disguised. We were not aware that that was how the trusts were balancing their books. I felt that external auditors should have been asked to refer to the practice if it was taking place. I am pleased to say that they have done so in the past year, but that was not the practice at the time. Year after year, meeting the three financial targets was what was required.
You are telling us that you had concerns at the time. Did you not feel in a position to raise those concerns?
Yes, we did. In 1998, when the scale of the Perth and Kinross problem emerged, there were detailed discussions with the existing four trusts, the incoming chief executives and finance directors of the new trusts, and the department, which led to the recovery plan of February 1999.
We are going to deal with that issue in detail later. Keith Raffan has a question.
I want to return to a point that Mr White raised, to give Mr Jones a chance to comment. Paragraph 4.5 of the Auditor General's report comments on the reconfiguration of the trusts and their disaggregation, which was more complex in Tayside than elsewhere in Scotland. In view of that, Mr Jones, was the health department particularly sensitive to the situation in Tayside as reconfiguration there was more major than it was elsewhere?
I cannot answer that, because I was not in the health department at the time. Mr Aldridge may be able to comment.
It is true to some extent, but it worked both ways. We were very sensitive to the position in Tayside—it was the most complex of the reorganisations in Scotland. That led us, early in 1999-2000, to believe that there would be a possible period of uncertainty as the new system settled down. In retrospect, perhaps we allowed that period to go on too long before we started taking more seriously the emerging financial difficulties.
Paragraph 6.6 of the report says that the draft recovery plan that was submitted in November 1999 identified certain savings. However, the report adds:"Further efficiencies depended on proposals for changes in the delivery of clinical services which could not be implemented until the Tayside Acute Services Review was completed."At what stage was it determined that the acute services review would be cost driven? Do you accept that that was not how the situation was presented to the public at the time—in November 1999? I want to know when, why and by whom the decision was taken that the acute services review would be an integral part of making up the deficit in Tayside.
I am probably best placed to answer that. When the acute services review began, we were not aware of the scale of the financial problems that we faced. You are correct to say that the remit for the review was such that it needed to be undertaken within the board's available resources for acute services. However, it became clear during the first phase of the review that the present pattern of services in Tayside needed to change and that some of the things that needed to be done and some of the cost drivers could be considered only as part of the review. As members probably know, one of the final outcomes was that, if the review is to be implemented, it must be implemented within the allocated resources rather than the spend on acute services.
We have adopted a structured approach so that we can deal with each topic in depth. We will return, specifically and in detail, to the issue that you have raised.
My question is for Mr Jones. You said at the start that relationships are changing; that the accounting officers used to answer to the management executive; and that accounting officers now report directly to the Parliament—presumably, they have done so since the Parliament was set up. I do not want to stray into areas of policy, but Kilshaw does not seem to have led to any great improvement in monitoring of the accounting officers by the management executive. Do you feel that accounting officers being directly answerable to the Parliament will lead to better governance and to greater control of public money?
I do not think that the change in accountable officer status has made a significant difference to governance at all. It is much more important to develop stronger relationships between the health department and NHS bodies, as well as a much more rigorous, effective control mechanism between the health department and the NHS. That mechanism is being put in place with the formation of the new NHS boards.
Why was that mechanism not put in place when the realignment of the trusts took place?
I cannot answer as I was not in the health department at the time.
Is that information available?
"Designed to Care" was published to deal with the consequences of the end of the internal market by simplifying the ways in which the different parts of the health service related to each other. It was intended that it would lead to improvements in governance and to a less competitive culture within the NHS. Experience has shown that, although "Designed to Care" made very useful and positive improvements in how the NHS in Scotland operated, it did not go far enough. That is why "Our National Health: A plan for action, a plan for change" takes things a stage further by introducing the unified NHS boards.
Words that I do not like to hear are, "I wasn't here." They might lead the committee to ask the person who was there. I believe that Mr Geoff Scaife was around at the time.
Please do not think that I am refusing to answer the committee's questions. Mr Johnston asked me about what was happening in the health department at a time when I was not there. I am unable to say what was going on in the department then. I hope that you do not believe that I am passing the buck.
No—it may be that we will have to direct our questions to the person who can give the answers. Margaret Jamieson has further questions, but first I invite Brian Adam to speak.
To what extent was the practice of funding deficits from non-recurring moneys prevalent? When did the department become aware of it, and what steps did it decide to take? We have heard today that it was happening in some parts of Scotland but not in others.
I will pick up on the point of principle, and Mr Aldridge can pick up on some of the detail. Whether we should use non-recurring funds as part of a financial strategy is an important issue. It is critical that every health system has a viable financial plan for a three to five-year period. We will propose that in the new finance regime. I do not think that there is anything wrong in using non-recurring funding as part of the long-term financial plan, but it is acceptable only in the context of a recurring financial solution. Part of expenditure every year is non-recurring, and there is no reason why non-recurring income should not be used to meet non-recurring expenditure. The critical thing is to have a long-term financial plan over three to five years that demonstrates that an NHS board's plans are affordable. John Aldridge may wish to pick up on the detail.
Is it not true that the use of non-recurring moneys was fairly common practice across Scotland at that time and that it was not so much a long-term plan to make things work as a short-term measure to breach the gap, to meet a whole series of deficits that were around at the time and to meet the 6 per cent target for return on capital?
I think that it is right to say that, in the past, control has tended to be annual control. I strongly suggest that we need to develop longer-term plans that demonstrate the affordability of the system and to move away from the annuality that has existed in the past.
If it is sustainable, using capital spend for revenue or using non-recurring money for revenue purposes can be all right. It is exceedingly bad budgeting practice for capital spend to be used for other purposes. That is what happened in the cases that we are discussing. How can the department prevent that happening in individual authorities? That is extremely bad budgeting and is at the heart of some of the problems that we have heard about.
I agree absolutely with those sentiments. That is why, in the new finance regime, we must demonstrate that we have financially sustainable plans for each NHS board.
You will also hope that the information that you get is accurate and does not change within three months.
Under the health plan, we are not to go in for the quick-fix accountancy measures that we have had in the past. You will be reviewing the accountability arrangements. Do you think that the arrangements that you are currently considering are sufficient and will deal with some of the issues that have arisen in Tayside?
I think that they will be sufficient. We are developing the detailed arrangements now. They need to address all the concerns that the committee has raised this morning. It is critical that we demonstrate that the NHS in Scotland is financially sustainable and that resources that are allocated to the NHS produce the best results for the patients who are using the service.
To take that a stage further, the vast majority of the discussions that we have been referring to today have been conducted in private by the department, the health boards, the health trusts and so on. To a significant extent, the public in Tayside whom you serve have been left outside, wondering what is going to happen. That compounds the difficulties that you face. In terms of the accountability review process, I think that financial management and public involvement are of equal status. Will that come through in the accountability process?
Yes, it will. We say clearly in the plan that the performance management system and the record of the accountability review meeting will be made public.
Will they be available to the elected members for the area?
Yes, indeed. They will be public documents.
We look forward to that new day.I have some questions for Mr Bates in his role as the chair of the new unified board in Tayside. What do you think about the accountability arrangements that are proposed for the new set-up?
I think that they will be a significant improvement. However, as has been said, the issue is to a large extent the competence of senior managers and the culture of governance that the new body establishes. The new board must be clear that it has to be transparent and open with the public and that it has to share its information. Indeed, as a member said in relation to the acute services review, we are reaping the harvest of the lack of transparency and honesty. In my experience during the past 10 or 11 weeks, the one consistent message that I have been given by staff, trade unions, members of the public, patients, councils and everyone else is, "Please tell us what is going on. We know that difficult choices have to be made."I agree with Mr Jones that we have to strike the right balance with the critical role that the health department has to play, but that does not excuse—nor should it excuse—the new bodies from establishing high standards of governance. I am very positive about the proposals.
I am delighted that accountability to individuals in Tayside is high on your agenda, but you mentioned something that worries me, which is the competence of managers. In the new unified board, you will be required to ensure that high standards of stewardship are always achieved. If you have doubts—you have been in position for only 10 weeks—what action will you take to assure MSPs and the people of Tayside that you are giving it your best shot?
I can assure you that I will give it my best shot. Whether that will be good enough will be a matter for others to judge. I am the fifth chairperson in five years. I intend to make, to the best of my ability, a success of the opportunity and privilege that I have been given as the new chairperson.My answer to your question is in three parts. First, the three chairs will work as a team and will give clear signals to the chief executives and senior managers about the standards of competence that we will demand. The general public have a right to ensure that we do that. Secondly, the culture of accountability that we must establish has to be visible and transparent, so that we can re-earn some of the trust that has been lost. The three of us intend to work as a team to secure that. Thirdly, we have to apply the same degree of scrutiny, questioning and searching analysis that members of the Audit Committee have applied to probe what is going on.I hope that this does not in any way come across as arrogance on the part of the new boy on the block—I apologise if it does—but the culture of accountability is not as visible as I intend to ensure that it will be.
Thank you. We will check what you say against delivery.
I will give it my best shot, convener.
I am a bit concerned. In the past, when there were three boards and three sets of officials, the wool was pulled over the eyes of the boards. Now there is one unified board, but still three sets of officials. Can we guarantee that the wool will not be pulled over the eyes of those who are publicly responsible in the new unified set-up?
The construction of the new unified board represents a significant change. Let me emphasise three points. First, the involvement of local authorities round the table is important to secure the partnership arrangements that we need. We have not yet touched on that issue, but a number of the solutions that we have to put in place in Tayside will require us to secure clear partnership arrangements with each of the three local authorities. Secondly, the three chief executives and three chairpersons sit round the same table with the same agenda and the same responsibility to ensure good governance and accountability. Thirdly, the reconstruction that Mr Jones outlined put a clear duty on the new unified board to hold to account the accountable officers. It is our job to do that.As I said, I am on a steep learning curve. I am working my way through understanding the complexities of the way in which the health service is financed—I know that I will need an immense amount of assistance to understand it. However, accountability in public around the unified board table will, I hope, give committee members the assurance that, as MSPs, they quite rightly want.
The work of the unified board will depend on the quality of information that it receives. Will there, for example, be strong and effective local audit committees in the new system?
Absolutely, yes. The role of the committees that support the new unified board—the audit committee, the governance committee and others—will be important. It is important that everything that takes place in those committees is in the public domain; it is important that people know what is going on and that what is happening is available and visible to everyone. Sometimes things have not been visible in the past, as the Auditor General's report says. That is an important piece in the jigsaw.
Scott Barrie will ask whether poor financial control was a contributory factor in Tayside University Hospitals NHS Trust's failure to meet financial targets.
I have a series of questions for Paul White. I refer to the final bullet point of paragraph 7.3, which mentions the monitoring processes undertaken to try to reduce the deficit. I find it somewhat strange that you did not give priority to standard budget reports that would have provided regular information on what was happening across all expenditure. Why did you employ that method and what indicated that it would be the best approach?
I refer back to some of the comments that I made to Margaret Jamieson. It became evident early in the life of the new trust that the budgets that we had been told we had inherited were underfunded. The budgets therefore gave an incorrect impression of the funding that was available to individual managers to run their services. We were then faced with trying to find out what the right budgets should be and where cost savings could be made. We quickly set in train a process to establish where we could reduce costs and set in place benchmarking—on which the Auditor General comments—as a way of comparing costs in Tayside against those in other parts of Scotland.Simply to have reported against the budgets that we had inherited would have falsely reassured the board that we were on target. The information systems that we put in place quickly highlighted the fact that there was a fundamental problem. The budgets themselves would not have given a reliable basis on which to track performance against targets.
Are you still employing that approach?
No. For the financial year 2000-01, we put in place budgets throughout the organisation to deliver the whole organisation's target against the end-year position. Obviously, the final month's figures still need to be taken into account, but our tracking to the end of February shows that we have delivered the efficiency savings that we set and that our financial targets are on track to be where we agreed with the management executive that they would be by 31 March 2001.
Paragraph 6.5 of the report says that the trust has been producing recovery plans since September 1999 but that none of them has progressed as you expected them to. Why has it been difficult to identify a way out of the financial difficulties that you appear to have inherited?
It has been difficult in part because of the complexity of the organisation. We inherited three differing systems, cultures and organisational structures. For example, we had 40 clinical directorates running principal budget holders. A process of rationalisation has reduced that number to seven clinical and one non-clinical principal budget holders. It was difficult to get a handle on the extent to which new service developments and the expansionist policies of Tayside Health Board had triggered cost drivers. The finance staff spent the first few months in the new trust trying to understand what the cost drivers were within the overall system so that we could set budgets that were appropriate to the services that we were trying to deliver and introduce efficiency savings where they could be delivered. The benchmarking exercise was a significant factor in our targeting of the areas in which we believed costs could be reduced.
Am I right in thinking that one of the difficulties was that there was no clear scheme of delegation for budget managers? Is that one of the reasons for the reduction in their number from 40 to seven?
That was one of the reasons. The other was that we were trying to bring together three different organisations across Tayside. We had opportunities on the clinical as well as the financial front to build organisational arrangements within the trust that would help in the clinical delivery of services. We also wanted to bring about better financial control and better overall use of resources.
In the attempt to ensure better financial control, was there a difficulty with people not being accountable for the extra expenditure that they were incurring? If so, who was ultimately responsible for the extra expenditure that was incurred?
Ultimately, as Mr Jones said, the chief executive of the trust is the accountable officer. I speak with the benefit of hindsight, but the evidence showed that, before we became involved with the trust, there was insufficient accountability. Developments took place on the basis of conversations between senior officers in the health board and the trust. I put in place an arrangement with Mr Brett to ensure that the only developments that could be progressed were those that were signed off by me or the director of finance. The point of that was to ensure that one of us was in a position to be certain that funding was coming into the organisation to underpin service development. That regime did not seem to exist as robustly in the past as it now does.
For the sake of clarity, will you say whether the problems arose because of poor financial control of the on-going budget or because of the arrangement of the base budget? Is the real problem to be found in the management of budgets or in the decision making that produced the budgets?
It is a mixture of both. In his report, the Auditor General refers to the extent to which, without an epidemiological base, Tayside is relatively over-providing in terms of services compared to the rest of Scotland. There are questions about whether too many services are being provided in the acute sector and about the method of service delivery—whether the configuration of service in Tayside is beyond what is affordable. The service base may be running ahead of the funding that is available to support it. There is also a cultural and behavioural question about containing expenditure within set budgets. It was evident that in Tayside there was a culture in which accepting an explanation for something was deemed to be sufficient. It is not sufficient. Explaining why something is happening is the right way of diagnosing the problem, but taking action to do something about the problem is the next step that must be taken.
I acknowledge what you say about a certain culture having existed. I hope that it no longer exists to the same extent. Are you saying that people who were in charge of designated budgets were largely ignoring those budgets if they felt that they could justify to someone—presumably those in the health board—that spending was needed and that the money would come from somewhere in the future?
It would be wrong to say that all budget managers behaved in that way, as many kept to the budgets in their spheres of responsibility. However, some service developments took place before budgetary funding was available to support them. Many of the major spend problems occurred in those pockets.
That is interesting. Paragraph 8.2 says that the trust improvement plan that you produced in June 2000 forecast the elimination of your accumulated deficit by the financial year 2005-06, but paragraph 8.5 tells us that two months later you appeared uncertain about where savings could be made. Why does financial planning in the trust remain problematic?
Financial planning in the trust is not problematic now. Since 1999, we have had a clear handle on where the problems are. The trust implementation plan that paragraph 8.2 mentions was based largely on the information derived from the previous trusts. Before the plan could reach the trust board in June, a significant amount of work needed to go into it, in discussions with clinicians, budget holders and others. That work built up over several months. The trigger for that happened before Tayside University Hospitals NHS Trust was created on 1 April. The TIP to which paragraph 8.2 refers was based on false information and a misunderstanding or lack of understanding of the full extent of the cost pressures that were inherited.
I will return to a comment that was made earlier—I cannot remember by whom. Am I correct in understanding that one of the difficulties between the positions set out in paragraphs 8.2 and 8.5 was the integral nature of the Tayside acute services review? Is that one of the difficulties that is making planning difficult for the trust?
Yes. It is fair to say that at the beginning of 1999 and in the latter part of 1998 the acute services review had been expected to complete—to go through its public consultation—much sooner than has transpired. Cost assumptions were built into the trust's implementation plan that presumed some changes that would flow out of the acute services review. Those changes could not be documented but, for a range of clinical reasons and to stay within Tayside's financial envelope, it was fair and reasonable to assume that the acute services review would produce an affordable and clinically sustainable configuration or range of options. That fundamental assumption was built into the implementation plan.
We are about to consider the inherited problems. I detect a sense of confusion here. You mentioned cost drivers, but it strikes me that cost drivers would drive services. We have heard that services were driving costs. Nobody seems to know exactly what has been going on. Was poor financial control a major contributory factor to the failure to meet financial targets?
The financial systems that we inherited were not sufficiently robust to enable us to meet our financial targets. That became clear early in 1999 and we flagged up the issue. When I referred to cost drivers, I meant services that were incurring costs in the treatment of patients and the payment of staff wages that were not supported by recurring income to the organisation.
I get the point about services driving costs, but I also get the impression that costs were driving services. It seems to have been a combination.
The services must be clinically sustainable. Patient safety is paramount. The quality of patient care is an important factor. As has already been said, Tayside receives around £400 million per annum. We deliver safe, good-quality services, sufficient to meet the needs of the population, within that financial envelope. Services must be clinically driven, but they are delivered within a cash envelope.
Are you satisfied that there are sufficient financial controls to ensure that there is no repeat of what happened?
The trust's financial control systems are sound. The audit of last year's accounts recognises that. The fact that we are accurately tracking expenditure within the organisation is evidence that our financial systems are robust. I am pleased that we have introduced them.
Mr Aldridge is nodding in agreement.
Mr White just said that services must be clinically driven but within cost limits; that is an ominous phrase—it sounds like health service rationing to me. The trouble with all this is that we degenerate into jargon that only the specialists and the managers understand. It is almost a way of—unintentionally, I am sure—covering matters up to the public.
I am sorry if I gave that impression. An issue for us, as a nation, is how much of our gross domestic product we spend on health. It is for the Scottish Parliament to allocate a resource. That resource is given to health boards and to organisations such as mine to deliver services. We have a responsibility—which is largely why we are here today—to live within that resource. Chief executives carry a number of statutory responsibilities, of which financial accountability is one. Another is responsibility for the quality of clinical care. The other chief executives and I have a responsibility to ensure that the systems that we organise to deliver services, and the quality of care that clinical staff deliver, are clinically sound and meet the best current clinical practice.
Great. However, there is another phrase that I sometimes find difficult to understand. I have got to grips over the years with efficiency savings, which means different things to different people, but what is your definition of over-provision of services?
Two or three sentences are probably all that we require.
The only way in which over-provision can be defined is relative to what is happening in the comparative population, whether that is Scotland, the UK or other European countries. We are talking about whether Tayside is over-providing or under-providing in certain service areas relative to the average in the rest of Scotland.
Are we talking about better services, or just more expensive ones?
Our clinical staff and I would argue that in many services the quality of our clinical service is better than that elsewhere. The approach of the Clinical Standards Board for Scotland is to ask: what is an appropriate quality of clinical service? Lord Patel, the chairman of that board, who is employed by Tayside University Hospitals NHS Trust, speaks about setting not platinum or gold standards, but an affordable, appropriate standard, and then trying to ensure that that standard is adopted throughout Scotland as the norm rather than the exception.
I am sorry to labour this point, if you have already explained it to me. You have told us that there was a difficulty with the historic spending patterns in the health service in Tayside. Coupled with that, there was the difficulty that certain budget managers did not regard staying within budget as a priority. Has a combination of those two factors led to the seriousness of the trust's deficit?
Yes, and the delay in implementing the acute service review has led to the continuation in the system of costs that we might not have if we were at the implementation stage of the ASR.
If I heard you right, in an answer to Scott Barrie you said that, in certain areas, service developments occurred on the basis of a conversation between people in the health board and people in the trust. Could you expand on that? Is it right that a new development can occur on Tayside on the basis of somebody phoning somebody else up, without the matter going before a board or the chief executive sanctioning it?
That would not happen now.
Did it happen?
Yes; it happened.
Can you give us an example?
Yes. In Perth, around £300,000 was spent to recruit additional nursing staff. The then director of nursing services believed that she had an understanding with the then planning director of Tayside Health Board that funding would follow an agreement that they reached to recruit the extra nursing staff. That funding did not follow. Moreover, there is no record in either the health board or—that we could find—in the trust to support the contention that there was to be a funding transfer from the health board to the trust to support that recruitment.
So the trust committed itself to spending £300,000 and employed a number of nurses without the trust board or the health board knowing anything about it?
I am getting into a matter on which I do not have the exact details. I hesitate to say that I was not there.
It seems that nobody was there. Everybody who was there when the key decisions were taken has gone missing.
I will help Paul White by saying that there was no acknowledgement of that at the health board. I can confirm that what Paul said was the case.
It beggars belief that the health board, which is charged with the responsibility for the health service across Tayside, did not know that one of its trusts was spending £300,000 to take on nurses. I cannot believe that any management system that allows that kind of thing to happen could be supported for a minute. People should be sacked for that.
I remind members that the culture at that time was of self-governing trusts, which had autonomy and responsibility for providing services locally. Therefore, the information that one might have expected to be passing between the trusts and the health board was not doing so at that time.
Even within the trusts, somebody should have had to sanction the recruitment.
I mentioned that I was very concerned when I became aware of what Paul White has described. The culture was that we must appoint more nurses, perhaps on safety grounds or for other reasons, and that the board would find the money.
Perth and Kinross has been named. Did the same thing happen in either of the other two trusts?
In Dundee, there were issues around the pace at which new cancer services were developed and came on stream. There had been an agreement with the trust that we wanted the development of cancer services but again, if my memory serves me rightly, I had cause to express concern to Paul White at an early stage that, in appointing additional staff, the trust was going quicker than the resources that were available would allow.
Once it became apparent to those in charge, whoever they were, that decisions had been made that should not have been made, was the matter addressed with the people who had made the decisions?
Those people are no longer in Tayside. They were not employed by the trust when I took over on 1 April 1999.
Were they never tackled about making those decisions outwith their competence?
I cannot answer for what happened at the time when they were taken on. That was under the previous trust.
I know that les absents ont toujours tort. It is just a pity that those people are not here to be answerable. Perhaps that is what we should be looking at.
At the end of the day, Mr Jones, you are responsible. I appreciate that you were not in post at the time of the previous reorganisation. We have heard a lot about the self-governing culture that was prevalent, but it is quite clear that there were individuals who took decisions that they were not allowed to do within their competence or their level of delegated powers. Can you assure us that those individuals are no longer in the employ of the NHS in Scotland? If they are, what action will you, as chief executive of the NHS in Scotland, take?
I do not know who the individuals are. Obviously, I need more details about the issue that we have just heard about. What I can say very clearly is that the principle of committing expenditure without having a funding source is quite unacceptable. The whole point of bringing all the chief executives into the same NHS board with corporate responsibility for the total resource is to stop such things occurring again. It is quite unacceptable management behaviour.
Although I accept that you say that it will never happen again, the situation in Tayside is allegedly the fault, not of anyone at this table, but of individuals who have gone to other airts and pairts. Surely it is incumbent on you to ensure that those individuals, some of whom are referred to in the Auditor General's report, are not replicating what they have left in Tayside in other parts of Scotland. I hope that they have not gone to Ayrshire—I am looking out for my own area.
It would be absolutely unacceptable for that behaviour to be replicated anywhere in the NHS.
If you do not have that information, Mr Jones, there are people sitting beside you who do. Will you be pursuing those matters?
Yes, indeed.
Has any disciplinary action on those matters been taken against any of the individuals in the previous trusts?
I am not aware that any disciplinary action has been taken.
Would you expect to be aware of any action that was taken?
Yes.
So I think that we can assume that no disciplinary action has been taken.
Concerns were drawn to the attention of the finance director then, before Mr Aldridge was in place, but I do not know what action was taken.
What kind of message does that give to officials, and what kind of system are we running if that can happen?
May I respond to that as I have done before? It is important to put on record to MSPs some points that have perhaps not been explained. I emphasise that I do this with a degree of hesitation, as it is based on talking to people, reading documents and looking at what I think has gone on. My view, for what it is worth to the Audit Committee, is that Mr McAllion put his finger on one of the key issues: organisations were pulling apart instead of pulling together, and they did not communicate and were secretive in a way that was not helpful. As Mr Jones said, the sort of accountability in governance that would have meant that senior management executives understood quite clearly that they did not have that authority was absent. I hope that members do not mind my balancing that view by reminding them that we are talking about a very small number of people. The nurses, doctors, dentists, physiotherapists and all the other members of staff were delivering, and continue to deliver, high-quality patient care services. However, my assessment is that the key factor, which Mr McAllion was driving towards, and which the new arrangements will substantially address, is that organisations were pulling apart rather than pulling together.
In this meeting
Everything on 2 Apr 2001 →- Scottish Parliament Audit Committee Monday 2 April 2001 Committee business · 2
- National Health Service (Tayside) Committee business · 540
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