I will make a couple of points. If we were to speak to the UK Government, those in the industry and academics who have been looking at the matter, they would also argue that round 4 was not just slightly out of kilter but an extreme outlier compared with other rounds across the UK. In that sense, we have to be very careful about treating that as the benchmark that we are measuring against.Indeed, as you have heard from Crown Estate Scotland, our conditions are very different, as are our costs of operation. You will see in the annex to the Audit Scotland report the number of floating projects being planned; it is a very nascent and higher-cost technology, we operate in tougher environments and so on. In that context, the overall costs are higher in Scotland than in England.Why did ministers not sign off on a higher number? Again, I come back to this question: where does the real value sit? At the moment, we are very much focused on the one-off up-front option fee, and we have gained about £755 million from it. Had we gone for something two, three or four times that, we might have got, say, £1.5 billion or £2 billion instead, but what if that had essentially increased the costs of doing business? We need to remember that buying access to the seabed—that is, the option—does not necessarily lead to an operational project. There are three parts to this: you have to buy access to the bed; you have to go through the planning and consenting process, which is where many of the current projects are at the moment; and then you have to go into a competitive auction in order to get access to the market. We have projects that will be bidding against other projects across the UK; if you put very high fixed costs up front, they become less likely to get through those auctions and get access to the market and, as a result, you end up with a much lower number of operating projects.Again, we might have made another £2 billion or £3 billion, but if we had lost 30 per cent of the projects because they turned out not to be viable, we would have lost £10 billion of economic benefit to Scotland. That was the trade-off that we were trying to make. We did not take massive fees up front, because it would have put fixed costs on the projects; it would have led to increases in electricity prices, which, in a cost of living crisis, would not necessarily have been a good thing either; and it would basically have damaged the long-term economic benefit. That was the balance that we were trying to strike at the time.