I agree with much of what has been said. I recognise that the issues and the challenges are formidably difficult to address, both from the civil service point of view and with enhanced scrutiny by the Parliaments. The amount of effort and endeavour that would have to go into having an effective system is pretty enormous. Civil servants can, of course, act only within the authority that ministers give them, but I think that, in the Scottish Government and, I suspect, Whitehall, there are different parameters and pressures that create difficulties with regard to establishing effective intergovernmental relations. They can probably all be summed up effectively by the concept of bandwidth. I have already mentioned the challenges that I see for Whitehall civil servants in coping with different devolution settlements. Even for Scottish civil servants, there is pressure, be it legislative or otherwise, to put legislation through. The focus is always on this place—rightly so—and on stakeholder engagement. We are delivering Scottish devolution, so wider implications and the extent to which there is an ability to look beyond and think about the implications elsewhere, or even to think about how implementation will work—certain issues can arise in a bill as to make that effective once the bill leaves here—can be extremely challenging.
Philip Rycroft will know more. Again, my experience is now slightly elderly, but I have to say that my experience of dealing with Whitehall civil servants is mixed in many ways, but there were circumstances in which they were extraordinarily sensitive and respectful of the different devolution settlements and understanding of the pressures and circumstances that we are under. It can be difficult for them to understand fully the nuances of the different settlements. I had better not think about giving you examples, but, sometimes, the hostility that I saw between UK Government departments was way in excess of any antipathy that I felt directed towards me in my dealings with them.
People need to recognise that Whitehall is a beast. It is a large set of different organisations, all working together in a way that the Scottish, Welsh and, previously, Northern Ireland Administrations do not have to deal with. My personal experience has been positive, although, as I say, I cannot speak for more recent times. I was certainly a believer that Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland actually did better out of dealings with the UK Government than the English regions did—Philip Rycroft can tell me whether he agrees that that is still the case. There was more of a recognition of the separate nature of the Administrations, and sometimes we actually did better than places in England did.
There are challenges, undoubtedly. Going back to Sarah Boyack’s first question, which was about recognising the difficulties that there are and what can be done about them, I again point to Professor McEwen’s evidence that the number of times that the dispute resolution processes, through ministerial interventions, have been triggered is relatively few. Indeed, in my time, there were fewer still. The only real engagement was JMC(E)—the joint ministerial committee on Europe—because of EU membership.
The referral to dispute resolution does not seem to provide an incentive for civil servants to work more closely together. It leads me to the question of whether parliamentary scrutiny—the prospect, if they do not co-operate, of having to come and answer to parliamentarians to explain why things have gone wrong or have not worked as well as they ought to have done—may, as much as anything, provide a cultural incentive to get it right in the first place. It may be that parliamentary committees do not end up having to ask a huge number of questions—it depends on the circumstances—but the fact that you could be called to committee in a much more structured and developed way to explain why you have allowed certain things to happen and why intergovernmental co-operation has not worked may end up providing an incentive. It seems to me that there really is no incentive just now to make this work. The question is whether those backdrop potentials to do so could encourage better behaviours, because trust and culture are very hard to develop.
I will make a last point on trust. The trust thing is very difficult for civil servants. There is an institutional inertia, and there are legitimate reasons why information cannot be shared. As a lawyer, I had that issue with regard to knowing what legal advice I could share, not least for fear of breaching legal professional privilege in those discussions. Civil servants need clear guidance on what they can share, but the reason why the transparency and trust issue is so important is that it does not relate only to discussion between civil servants. If there is not a controlled measure of scrutiny, by a Parliament, say, of information within Government, the risk is that you get a less controlled examination. I give the example of the Covid WhatsApp leaks of the past week. In a good sense in some ways and in a less good sense in other ways, that is not a controlled way for information to get out to the public. It is all the more important that the Parliament think about ways in which, in a more controlled environment, proper scrutiny takes place, because the alternative is a less controlled environment where those matters can be dealt with and looked at in ways that may create their own challenges, if I may put it like that.