I refer members to my entry in the register of members’ interests, which notes that I am a member of the Faculty of Advocates.
The phrase “freedom of expression” is used the world over. Like many well-worn phrases, it perhaps suffers from overuse, with its meaning sometimes being lost. Freedom of expression is something that we all support but do not often debate. What does it mean? I would say this, but in my view the best exposition is a legal one and is found in article 10 of the European convention on human rights, which says this:
“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.”
It is not an unlimited right—Patrick Harvie was right to say that—because, like many fundamental rights, it is qualified and there are circumstances in which the state can impose restrictions. In short, there is a balance to be struck between allowing free expression and constraining it at certain moments. However, the right’s purity as both a guiding principle in any democracy and an essential liberty that we all enjoy is paramount. It is a human right in the original, basic sense of those words and a fundamental freedom to be cherished by every human being. Given that, we have to be cautious and careful about legislating in that area, as it is difficult territory.
In recent years, there have been a number of public protests in Scotland that illustrate those difficulties, whereby the conduct of protesters might have been abusive or threatening and intended or likely to stir up hatred. For example, we have seen banners at the border saying “ENGLAND get out of Scotland” and banners at independence marches saying “Tory Scum Out”. The former example could, arguably, be caught by the bill, given that it is related to race. However, the latter example would not be caught because, as I would be the first to accept, the bill does not seek to criminalise conduct by reference to political opinion. I, for one, would defend to my dying day the right of those people to carry that banner without threat of criminal sanction, notwithstanding the offensive message that it contains to someone of my political persuasion. However, they are examples that reveal not just the importance of freedom of expression but the complexities of the legislation when it is applied to real life. The problems of enforcement that they would bring make it clear that we are sailing close to the wind here.
The strength of feeling about the bill is palpable, and we have heard criticisms of it from many. The free to disagree campaign has conducted opinion polling on the bill and says that over two thirds of Scots agreed that, for a criminal offence to be committed, there must be a proven intention to stir up hatred, which is a point that I will return to shortly. As others have noticed, there are widespread concerns among many in civic society about the impact of the bill. The Faculty of Advocates, a body whose detailed response on the bill I commend—I note that John Finnie quoted from it—has warned that the bill will restrict freedom of expression and might cause the invasion of privacy and domestic life. The Scottish Police Federation has said that the bill could affect the legitimacy of the police in the eyes of the public. That is a stark comment. Those are not anxieties from the fringe and they are not minor worries; they are serious, legitimate, credible concerns posed by many in society.
As others have said, there are some parts of the bill that are not objectionable. The bill attempts to consolidate the plethora of hate crime offences into one act and seeks to abolish the common law of blasphemy, which are sensible measures. However, the issues in part 2 of the bill are many and, in our view, are fatal to the bill’s prospects. They fail the test of being simple and clear; they are, instead, vague and confusing.
Forgive me for veering into some of the more technical legal issues, the first of which is that the offence can be committed by intention but also if it is likely that hatred can be stirred up. In other words, it is an offence that can be committed without the requisite mens rea: the mental element that the criminal law usually requires. That is not terminal, because Scots criminal law contains several offences that have no mental element. However, given the absence of the statutory defence that the 1986 act contains, it is a concerning omission. Both Willie Rennie and Murdo Fraser made that point, and I note the cabinet secretary’s commitment in that regard. [Interruption.] I am sorry, but I am already limited in my time.
Secondly, there is the fact that stirring up hatred in terms of race includes the word “insulting” but stirring up hatred in terms of other characteristics does not include it. The bill must be consistent; that is one of the Bracadale review recommendations that, I regret, the Government has ignored.
Thirdly, the reasonableness defence reverses the burden of proof, which is a significant step in terms of the criminal law because the onus is placed, albeit partially, on the accused to prove that they acted reasonably. As others have said, that is inappropriate.
Fourthly, the references to freedom of expression in sections 11 and 12 are insufficient. Why are only two protected characteristics—sexual orientation and religion—singled out? Why does the Faculty of Advocates say:
“The current wording does not appear to afford any significant protection”?
There were many good speeches in the debate, including those of Rhoda Grant, Johann Lamont, Liam McArthur and Ruth Maguire, to name but a few.
I take entirely at face value the Scottish Government’s motivation behind the bill. I have read carefully what the Cabinet Secretary for Justice has said and written about his own experiences, and I acknowledge that, above and beyond his personal experiences, he rightly sees hate crime as a blight that exists across wider society—as do we all.
Willie Rennie said that hate is poisonous and that hate crime is pernicious and intolerable and causes deep harm to its victims and the wider communities that are indirectly affected.
I have never doubted the sincerity with which Humza Yousaf has pursued the issue, and I have never questioned his commitment to wanting to eradicate hate crime from Scotland. It is in that spirit that members on the Conservative benches make the appeal for the Scottish Government to reconsider at this stage, before we enter the mechanics of parliamentary process, which, as Liam Kerr pointed out, might be rushed and affected by a number of external factors. It might simply be that the time left before dissolution is inadequate.
We appeal to the cabinet secretary to pause, draw breath and pull back from the brink, because, as drafted, the bill goes too far. It is, undoubtedly, an attack on free speech. The bill is too broken to fix. Public confidence in it is critical, and a damaging narrative has built up around it that, sadly, has obscured the good intentions behind it. Ultimately, the bill has lost the confidence of the public, which is why we must start again.