Parliament Workbench
Data: Motions & questions to 19 Nov 2026

Written Question · S1W-28916 · Session 1

With regard to paragraph 1.10 of the Draft Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Bill: Partial Regulatory Impact Assessment, on what basis it de…

Answered Asked by Richard Lochhead SNP Lodged 4 Sep 2002

The question

To ask the Scottish Executive, with regard to paragraph 1.10 of the Draft Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Bill: Partial Regulatory Impact Assessment, on what basis it determined that an absolute right to buy for tenant farmers could result in a legal challenge under the European Convention of Human Rights unless it compensated landlords for the cost of lost investment and how it calculated the exemplified total cost of such investment.

The answer

Answered by Ross Finnie on 25 Sep 2002 · 21 days after it was lodged, 7 days after it was due

The Executive believes that the creation of an absolute right to buy could result in landowners incurring loss in the value of their assets. We also believe that a court of law might view provisions introducing an absolute right to buy as amounting to an interference of the enjoyment of the landlord's possessions. As such, the provisions would be unlikely to comply with the provisions of Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention of Human Rights if the Executive did not also ensure that landlords were reasonably compensated for their losses. Blight on the property would arise from the creation of the absolute right to buy because it would materially affect the private right of a landowner to determine how long they owned, used and obtained income from that holding. We believe the price a potential purchaser would be prepared to pay for such a holding would decrease in such a situation. This would reduce its value to the existing landlord. A cost of the order of £100 million was estimated initially by the Land Policy Review Group in 1998. It was used to illustrate the likely scale of compensation involved. While we cannot exactly quantify the extent to which an absolute right to buy could depress land values (as the group could not), we estimate that each reduction of 1% in the "marriage value" of holdings with traditional secure tenancies could attract a potential compensation bill of around £20 million. This is based upon estimates of the area of land under traditional secure tenancy arrangement and appropriate average land valuations. The actual figure may be higher, depending upon the fall in value experienced and the type of tenant eligible to exercise the absolute right to buy (e.g. if general partners in a limited partnership holding a secure tenancy were included).We believe that the costs of compensating a landowner would fall to the Executive following the creation of an absolute right to buy. While it might theoretically only fall to be paid when the landowner chose to realise the value of his or her asset or when a tenant chose to exercise the right, the blight would cover all affected land, even if a tenant did not seek to exercise this right. When the landowner's loss fell to be paid, it could not be transferred to tenants who did not wish to exercise their absolute right to buy. We believe it could also be very difficult if not impossible to devise a mechanism which transferred the landlord's loss to a tenant exercising this right in a way that guaranteed, over a long period of time, that landowners would be adequately compensated for the loss in their asset value without this being reflected in the price a purchasing tenant might have to pay. It is also worth noting that the tenant could have to pay for any transaction costs incurred by a landlord selling against his or her will as well as for any injurious affection.

In the Official Report

No contribution in the Official Report cites S1W-28916 by reference.