I do not have a politics degree and, as everybody knows, I am not a politician, but the important thing when we are dealing with a unicameral system is to set it in context. The context for the establishment of the Scottish Parliament under the Scotland Act 1998 was that the voting system was designed so that no one party would have a majority, which would lead to Government that did not have the ability to effectively get their will all the time.
That meant that, in terms of the Parliament’s founding principles and the consultative steering group’s ideas, the committee system was to work as a robust check on what would inevitably be a coalition Government. Situations change and ideas that were once thought to be graven in stone turn out to be graven in sand. We have therefore got a majority Government that can, if it wants, get its will all the time.
We should consider the relationship between the House of Commons and the House of Lords. Any Government that I have ever dealt with at Westminster has, in some way or another, had a majority. That majority means that, in the House of Commons, the Government can get its way. It is when something comes to the House of Lords, where there is no inherent Government majority among peers, that the fun begins and the checks and balances in that bicameral arrangement are allowed to operate. The question is whether it is structure or behaviour—which I think the convener was leaning towards—that puts a check on Government. It is the structure of the United Kingdom Parliament that puts a check on Government; it is not the behaviours that do that. The behaviours are that power accresces power to itself.
Power, when it is given to a Government by an election, is within the mandate and a Government is within its right to use its mandate. I therefore think that one has to temper behaviours with process and structure. Otherwise, we can get into a position in which a Parliament is supine in the face of a Government that decides that it will not listen.

