Item 4 on our agenda is consideration of a section 23 report, “Police reform: Progress update 2013”, from Audit Scotland on behalf of the Auditor General for Scotland. The Auditor General is here with a team from Audit Scotland, so I invite her to present the report and then bring in her colleagues if they want to comment.
Official Report · Committee
Section 23 Report
“Police reform: Progress update 2013”
Speakers
Choose an MSP to read only their contributions- Hugh Henry Lab 70
- Chief Constable House 59
- Caroline Gardner Auditor General for Scotland 55
- Tavish Scott LD 46
- Vic Emery Scottish Police Authority 41
- Ken Macintosh Lab 23
- Michael Oliphant Audit Scotland 22
- Mary Scanlon Con 18
- George Graham Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary for Scotland 12
- Colin Beattie SNP 9
- Willie Coffey SNP 9
- Bob Doris SNP 7
- James Dornan SNP 5
- Fraser McKinlay Audit Scotland 3
- Miranda Alcock Audit Scotland 3
- Colin Keir SNP 3
- John Foley Scottish Police Authority 3
- Chief Constable Sir Stephen House Police Scotland 1
The record
389 contributions · showing 1–200Thank you. Police reform has involved one of the biggest and most complex restructures in the public sector since devolution, and the biggest change in policing since at least 1967. More than 24,000 police officers and staff, and at least 1,000 properties, transferred to two new bodies, the Scottish Police Authority and Police Scotland, on 1 April 2013.
Much has been achieved during the transition period. Exhibit 1 in the report gives examples of progress towards the objectives of reform. A complex piece of legislation was passed, local policing plans were agreed for each local authority area and specialist national services were established.
Members will recall that the Public Audit Committee took evidence on our report, “Learning the lessons of public body mergers: Review of recent mergers”, in September last year. Following that meeting, the committee was interested in exploring how the recommendations and good practice in the mergers report had informed planning for police reform.
We examined the efficiency and effectiveness of the planning and early implementation of reform, and we commented on the extent to which the recommendations of the mergers report were implemented. We also looked at the costs and savings associated with reform and considered whether the governance arrangements are consistent with good practice.
We did not look at operational performance as part of the audit. It is still early days in the life of the new police service. However, Police Scotland’s reports to the SPA show that front-line services were maintained throughout the very significant changes.
We found that planning for reform was hampered by a lack of baseline information in non-operational areas such as finance and staffing, and by different views on what the SPA’s statutory responsibility to maintain the police meant in practice.
We found that some of the recommendations from our mergers report were implemented. In particular, the Scottish Government did considerable preparatory work to ensure that the chair of the SPA and the chief constable of Police Scotland were in post six months before 1 April 2013, in line with our recommendation.
However, for a number of our recommendations, implementation is still in progress or did not happen. For example, we recommended that robust costs and savings estimates should be developed and regularly reviewed, but the outline business case, which was produced in September 2011, has not been updated. Appendix 2 of our report gives a summary of progress against all the recommendations in the mergers report.
The SPA and Police Scotland estimate that they will need to save £64 million in 2013-14 to stay within their allocated budgets. That is £22 million more than was identified in the outline business case. The SPA and Police Scotland have plans in place to deliver most of the savings in 2013-14, as members will see in exhibit 5, but they have not yet agreed a financial strategy that shows how savings will be achieved beyond 2013-14. We think that that needs to be done urgently, so that the strategy is in place for the beginning of the next financial year.
In part 3 of the report we look to the future and identify the significant challenges and risks that the SPA and Police Scotland will face in delivering the savings that are required. A lack of flexibility in managing police officer and staff numbers contributes to the challenges. We also identify important governance issues that need to be resolved urgently, which include finalising the structure of the SPA and making permanent senior appointments. There needs to be clear agreement between the SPA, the Scottish Government and Police Scotland on their respective roles and responsibilities and how they will work together in future.
Better information is needed to support effective scrutiny of police performance. In particular, the Scottish Government, the SPA and Police Scotland need to agree how they will report on performance and how they will assess and report on whether the objectives of reform and associated benefits are being delivered. Our recommendations are intended to help to ensure that the new police service for Scotland has good service and sustainable finances, so that it can look ahead to achieving the wider objectives of reform.
My colleagues and I will be happy to answer questions from the committee.
Thank you. You mentioned how well staff have made the merger work. That is testimony to the hard work of everyone, from top to bottom, in ensuring that the transition was smooth. The exercise could easily have gone badly wrong, with all sorts of consequences, and credit is due to everyone who has been involved.
It is also worth putting on record, so that there is no doubt about any comments that might be made in discussion with you, Auditor General, or later with witnesses in other evidence sessions, the point that any criticisms of process are not criticisms of our police or their ability and willingness to perform their duty. At the same time, though, I think that questions have to be asked.
One of the things that would be useful to help me, at least, would be to bring some clarity about who is responsible for what. There are times when I am just not sure about who should have done something or why something was not done. It has been suggested that there has been no robust business plan. Who would have been responsible for producing the business plan?
The legislation that led to police reform was based on an outline business case that was prepared by a police reform team that drew together the information that was available at the time. The intention initially was that the outline business case would be updated into a full business case for the option that was chosen. The outline business case looked at three options: having the status quo, three regional police forces or one police service for Scotland. The expectation was that the full business case that was prepared would focus on the preferred option of a single police service. The Scottish Government expected the police service to do that through, first, the eight legacy police forces, then the new Police Scotland, working with the Scottish Police Authority.
That has not happened so far. The intention now is that there will not be a full business case because the reform is already very well under way. Instead, there will be a financial strategy for the way policing will work under the new arrangements. The formal responsibilities are for Police Scotland and the SPA to do that work together, with support from the Scottish Government where required. We think that it is critical that the financial strategy is in place to recognise and support the excellent work that police officers do around Scotland every day and to ensure that the objectives of reform are the focus of future work, rather than the need to make savings to balance the budget.
I think that you indicated that you would have expected a robust business plan to have been prepared. What I am trying to get to is who should have prepared that business plan. Was it the police? Was it the SPA? Was it the Government?
In evidence to the Finance Committee when it was considering the bill and its financial memorandum, the Scottish Government was very clear that it expected the police service to do it: the eight legacy forces; then, as the new arrangements came into place, the SPA and Police Scotland. The SPA has asked Police Scotland to prepare a financial strategy, and we understand that that work is in progress. However, it has not been completed and agreed between the SPA and Police Scotland.
Right. Who is then responsible for driving the financial strategy? You said that it should be done between the SPA and Police Scotland, but when two bodies are involved and each takes some responsibility, there is often the capacity for inertia or inaction. Who is ultimately responsible for ensuring that the financial strategy happens?
The expectation is that Police Scotland will prepare the financial strategy and that it will be approved by the SPA as part of its governance and oversight role for policing in Scotland.
Okay, so it is Police Scotland’s responsibility. Who is responsible for identifying how savings will be delivered beyond 2013-14? Is it the SPA or is it Police Scotland?
That is the main purpose of the financial strategy. It should set out the way in which the new police service will operate in Scotland right across the piece over the years in which savings are intended to be delivered. It gives the opportunity to step back and look at different ways of providing police services and the savings that can be generated by doing that, and to pull all that together into a single picture.
In terms of identifying savings and making decisions about staffing numbers, who would be responsible for that? Would it be the SPA or would it be Police Scotland?
10:15
Again, that is the central purpose of the financial strategy. The financial strategy pulls together the numbers across the years that it covers, but we expect it to be underpinned by a robust workforce plan for staffing numbers, an estates plan for the buildings and other assets that are owned, and an information and communication technology plan for the way in which technology will support new ways of working.
In advance of that strategy being prepared, who would have the ultimate responsibility for those decisions?
It is a shared responsibility between Police Scotland and the SPA, as we say in our report, with support from the Scottish Government where that is needed.
Right. Have you seen progress on your concern about a lack of good data on non-operational areas?
It is too early for us to say that, until the financial strategy is in place. Does Michael Oliphant want to add something?
Yes. We identified that there was a lack of good baseline data in relation to not only finance but human resources, procurement and estates. I will take procurement as an example. We know that around 1,500 contracts that have been pulled together from the legacy forces are in place and that some of the contracts that can perhaps be looked at over this year are currently being worked on. Obviously, some of the contracts from the legacy forces have some time before they expire. Therefore, a limited amount can be done with the contracts that are currently in place on when they can be brought together and looked at on a national basis to drive efficiency savings.
Okay. Finally, the Auditor General said, I think, that the change is one of the biggest, if not the biggest, of the service changes that have been introduced since devolution. Would you expect the process for any future significant service change not to involve a robust business plan? Would you expect the efficiency and other targets to have been clearly identified?
In my introduction, I referred to the report that Audit Scotland published in early 2012 on managing public sector mergers, which made a very clear recommendation on the need for good information about the costs and savings that are expected from mergers and on those costs and savings being reviewed regularly as the reform progresses. We think that that is important in any merger and that it is particularly important in a merger that covers a service of such great public interest in which one of the drivers for reform is the need to maintain front-line services while making savings.
So business plans should be prepared well in advance and all the detail should be clearly identified.
link
The first thing to note is the remarkable progress that has been made within a very short time. Maintaining the front-line services must have been quite a challenge during that period.
I want to touch on what the Auditor General said about certain information not always being available for things such as HR. That gives every good reason for creating a single body to bring all of that together. Has much progress been made on pulling those areas together? I think that you mentioned 10 HR functions.
I will ask the team to come in in a moment, but one of the report’s findings was that the lack of baseline information and clarity on roles and relationships made some of that progress more difficult than it might otherwise have been. That really adds to the sense of urgency to get the financial strategy in place and make progress on those things now.
Does Michael Oliphant want to add a bit of detail on that?
Yes. With HR, procurement and finance, obviously, many of the strategies are underpinned by having the correct ICT systems in place. Both SPA and Police Scotland are working towards getting the information technology infrastructure in place, and I understand that they plan to have an ICT strategy approved before the end of this year.
link
I want to touch on something that is perhaps a little more sensitive. The problems or frictions between the SPA and Police Scotland are obviously well documented, and the report touches on them. Do they seem to have been resolved, or are they still an issue?
We mentioned in our report the difficulties caused by poor relationships between all four parties—the Scottish Government, the SPA board, SPA senior staff and Police Scotland—and some of the reasons for them, which are primarily to do with different interpretations of what is meant by the SPA’s duty to maintain the police service.
We know that agreement was reached on roles and responsibilities in June this year, and that there is agreement on the operating model that will be in place. That obviously represents progress, and we understand that the people involved are working hard to lay the groundwork for effective working relationships in future.
We need to see that bearing fruit in the form of an agreed financial strategy so that everyone can be clear on how these challenging circumstances will be managed in future.
link
The report does not specifically say anything about it, but I assume that the Scottish Government intervened strongly in order to bring all that together and resolve the frictions.
We do mention that in the report; my colleagues will give me the paragraph reference in a moment.
In January this year, and again in June, the Scottish Government worked with the SPA and Police Scotland with the support of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary for Scotland to clarify what the preferred governance option would be and to agree the SPA’s role. The Government had previously taken the view that it was for the SPA and Police Scotland to move that forward, but it intervened at two critical points when the process appeared to be taking longer than anyone had expected.
Do we have the paragraph number?
Yes, that information is at paragraphs 42 to 44 in part 1 of the report.
link
I associate myself with the convener’s remarks at the start of the meeting about the excellent job that has been done in making the merger and the development of a single force happen in Scotland. However, we should rightly scrutinise the mechanisms by which that has happened to ensure that it has been done as appropriately as possible.
First, I want to ask about the speed of reform. I appreciate that, as has been mentioned, there was an interim business case, but a full business case was never published. I do not think that any assumption was made that there was a lack of robustness or otherwise—we just do not know, because a full business case was never produced. It is important to put that on the record.
You mention in the report, Ms Gardner, that one of the reasons for speed was the need to make efficiency savings as quickly as possible and, with the Commonwealth games on the horizon, to have a stable and embedded Police Scotland to provide security and management. Is there a degree of mitigation in those two factors that explains why Police Scotland moved from an interim business case straight to a financial strategy without producing a full business case? That is not an excuse—frankly, we would rather have a full business case—but is there at least an understanding of the reasons why Police Scotland did what it did?
We recognise in the report the achievements of the reform process so far and specifically that some of the work—in particular the passing of the legislation and the appointment of the SPA board and the chief constable—was done against a very short timescale. I am sure that that is one of the reasons for the failure to update the outline business case to a full business case and for the decision to move straight to a financial strategy instead.
As you say, there were pressing circumstances, including the Commonwealth games and the financial savings that needed to be made, which was one of the real drivers for the reform. In my view, however, that highlights the importance of getting in place a financial strategy that demonstrates how those financial challenges will be met while front-line services are maintained. That challenge is as strong as it ever was.
link
It is helpful to put that on the record. It is clear that a judgment call had to be made on whether to move to a full business case or to implement reform, and the decision was made to implement reform and move to a financial strategy.
In relation to the move to a single police force, one of the things that I found most interesting in your report was that it highlights the emergence of a lack of local data for the previous forces. It might be worth putting some of that information on the record.
Paragraph 36 on page 15 of the report states:
“The police-led reform team had a lot of operational information from individual forces before reform but they did not have sufficient data on non-operational areas such as finance, assets, the workforce and contracts.”
It goes on to list a variety of things on which no robust data was held pre-reform.
Paragraph 37 shows that that was verified by PricewaterhouseCoopers in its review, which explored baseline data. It is difficult to create a baseline where one does not exist and where forces are moving quickly to a single police force.
Given that there was no baseline data, because no such data existed pre-reform, what progress has been made on auditing savings in this financial year? How confident are you that Police Scotland is getting its financial strategy right?
There are two aspects to that. First, it is clear that differences in the information held, and in the way in which it was held, by the eight legacy forces contributed to challenges in getting the baseline that was required in making significant decisions. That is the case and will continue to be so. Secondly, there is a challenge around the Scottish Government putting measures of success around the objectives of reform. The objectives are threefold: maintaining front-line services in the face of financial reductions; increasing access to specialist and national police services; and better engagement at a local level in policing. I ask Fraser McKinlay to pick up on some of that.
I will be brief. Mr Doris rightly pointed out that paragraph 37 says that we picked up the issue as part of our earlier work for the Accounts Commission on baseline information, when the police were still the responsibility of local authorities. He is right that the lack of information made the work difficult.
Our document is designed to be helpful, and we hope that it will inform future mergers. However, perhaps our challenge to everyone in the system is to recognise up front that, with an outline business case that informs a financial memorandum to an important bit of legislation, it is important that people are aware as early as possible whether there are gaps in data. That should be properly understood at the outset, rather than when something has already been launched. We are very clear that we are not looking for perfection in any of the processes, which are necessarily difficult and complex. However, I suppose that the lesson for the future is that people should be as clear as they can be about what information there is, and if there are gaps it is important that those are flagged up as early as possible.
link
I asked about the future, and it seems that a financial strategy is emerging. Ms Gardner, how do you feel that that is going? Of course, we will ask the police that when they give evidence later. Do you have a view on the financial savings that are being made in the current financial year?
We go into the financial savings that are being made in the financial year in some detail in part 2 of the report. I will ask Michael Oliphant to pick that up in a moment, if that would be useful. In relation to the financial strategy, I think that it is still too early to say. We know that the SPA has asked Police Scotland to prepare the financial strategy but that it has not yet been discussed with the SPA or agreed as a way forward. We will keep an eye on that through our annual audit of the SPA and we will report back to this committee at the appropriate time.
I draw the committee’s attention to exhibit 5 on page 23, which outlines the progress that the SPA and Police Scotland are making towards the savings target of £64 million in 2013-14. At the time of our audit, we identified that £8.5 million of savings in relation to the target had still to be identified, but we understand that since the audit work was completed, subsequent reports to the SPA board show that the gap is now down to just under £3 million, so progress has been made in identifying the savings. It will be the end of the financial year before a picture can be obtained of whether the savings have been realised.
So there is a small gap for this financial year—the gap is not £8.5 million.
Reports to the SPA board in October show that the gap is now down to just below £3 million.
Have you had any indication of how the £1.1 billion will be saved? The figure of £64 million is substantial, but it pales into insignificance compared with £1.1 billion. Is there any plan for how the £1.1 billion saving will be achieved?
Again, that is absolutely the purpose of the financial strategy that is in preparation; that is why we think that it is so important. The purpose of the financial strategy is to show how those savings can be made while protecting front-line services.
10:30
Do the SPA and Police Scotland accept the figures you have identified and that there will have to be real-terms savings of up to £68 million in 2014-15 and £63 million in 2015-16?
We clear all our reports for factual accuracy. I think that, in this case, the £68 million figure came from the SPA and Police Scotland, but Michael Oliphant will keep me straight.
In the absence of a financial strategy our analysis involved making some projections beyond 2013-14 up to 2018-19, to see what the additional pressures were. I believe that the evidence submitted to the Justice Committee by the SPA and Police Scotland shows that they have done similar analysis that covers the next couple of years. I think that they identified £139 million in the next two years, which is pretty close to what we identified, which was about £133 million in the next two years. The figures were pretty close, but the analyses were done independently and there will always be slight differences in methodology and assumptions.
Is the £1.1 billion a real-terms cut?
The £1.1 billion comes from the outline business case in the financial memorandum. I am not sure of the basis on which that was prepared, relative to our figures, but Michael Oliphant may be able to tell you more.
The £1.1 billion is the net recurring savings over the period to 2026.
I would like to pick up on a point that the convener made about who does what. It seems that who did what on 1 April was different from who did what on 26 June. Three months into the single force, there was a very significant transfer of responsibilities. I am looking at paragraph 44. After trying to get our heads around the roles of the SPA and Police Scotland, we discover that
“the Scottish Government and HMICS became ... concerned that the focus on delivering support services was distracting the SPA board from its ... strategic ... governance role.”
We then find out that
“The SPA ... agreed that responsibility for all support functions, other than those”
in
“the Act, would be transferred to Police Scotland.”
We are only seven months into a single force, yet after three months a significant tranche of responsibilities was transferred from the SPA to the police. Is that on-going, or have we now settled into who does what and what the responsibilities are of Police Scotland and the SPA? I know that there have been media reports about job descriptions and so on.
Three months into a newly merged single police force, people were still arguing about who does what and a significant change was made. Is that in the past? Are we now moving forward to people accepting their responsibilities, or are there still questions about who does what?
While I am at it, there is a recommendation in paragraph 46, which says:
“Considerable work is now required by the SPA board, the SPA senior management team, Police Scotland and the Scottish Government to build mutual confidence, trust and respect.”
I am asking two questions: have all the roles and responsibilities settled down, and have the bonding sessions and the team building started yet?
You are quite right that there were very different interpretations of what was meant by the requirement in the legislation that the SPA should “maintain the Police Service” in Scotland. Some of those differences have been very well rehearsed over the past few months. As we say in the report, the Scottish Government intervened in January and then again in June to resolve that. Agreement about roles and responsibilities is now in place and the SPA and Police Scotland are moving forward on that basis.
We understand that work is now going on to ensure a common understanding of all the roles and responsibilities—not just those of the SPA and Police Scotland, but those of people in Government and HMICS—to make sure that the whole system works properly. You may want to explore that in questions later this morning.
We think that that work is really important, to help the new service move forward with the financial strategy and the other things that will need to be in place to ensure good governance of policing in Scotland.
On your recommendation on the bonding sessions, are you confident that the parties are merging into a single police force and singing from the same hymn sheet?
It is early days. We hear that people are working hard on the issues, which is good. You will need to explore the matter with the witnesses from whom you will hear later this morning.
We talked about the savings gap. In paragraph 66 you say:
“around 800 police staff will need to leave through voluntary redundancy and early retirement”.
Your report was published this month, but I appreciate that the research was probably done a month or two ago. Are you talking about 800 redundancies being needed between now and the end of March?
I refer to Michael Oliphant for the detail, but I think that 800 is the total figure for 2013-14. Further on in paragraph 66, we talk about progress so far—up to the time when the work was done.
The estimates are from the SPA and Police Scotland and not from Audit Scotland. Exhibit 6 gives a wee bit more detail on the profile. When we did the work, 542 applications had been received in the year, of which 314 had been accepted by the SPA and the employee. That is not to say that 314 people left at that point; people might have agreed to leave later in the year.
The figure of 800 redundancies applies to the period from 1 April this year to 31 March next year. You are not saying that there must be 800 redundancies starting from now.
The figure is for the financial year, as you will see in exhibit 6.
On the need to make savings, I will not go over the point about lack of data or a business case. I was concerned by the example that you give in paragraph 96. You say:
“Police Scotland prepared a business case for a new policing centre in Dalmarnock, identifying the significant savings which could be generated by enabling a number of existing buildings to be sold. The SPA board has been reluctant to make a decision specifically on Dalmarnock without knowing how it would fit into a longer-term strategy on managing the police estate across Scotland or whether it meets the requirements for Scottish Government approval. This delay reduces the opportunity for making the early savings identified in the original business case.”
Are people just passing the buck by saying that they need a long-term strategy and cannot do things? It seems to me that Police Scotland and the SPA are not working together and that there is more internal wrangling than there is a focus on savings. As you said, the project could make “significant savings”, but it has been thwarted because Police Scotland and the SPA cannot agree with each other.
That is a good example of why the long-term financial strategy is so important. On the one hand, we know that the service needs to make significant savings, which will be challenging—that was one of the drivers for reform. On the other hand, we all know that it is easy to make savings that are not in the best long-term interests of the service.
By developing a financial strategy that is underpinned by workforce plans, estate plans and so on, people can start to balance options for different ways of providing the service and consider potential costs and benefits and different scenarios for the savings that will come through. The strategy provides the framework within which individual decisions about service provision can be made. Fraser McKinlay might want to add to that.
I just emphasise why we think that the financial strategy is important. The longer-term efficiency and effectiveness of the new service will be sustained by the service’s doing things differently. It is not just about cutting things; there must and will be a discussion about redesigning how police services are managed, some of which will potentially involve investing up front, in a spend-to-save scenario.
That is one of the reasons why it is important that the SPA and Police Scotland are clear about not just what they can do immediately but how police services will be delivered differently in the new set-up in the longer term, to improve the service for communities throughout Scotland and deliver the savings that they know that they need to make.
My point is that there are opportunities to make savings, but savings cannot be made because of the lack of a financial strategy and lack of agreement between the two parties. Is that correct?
As Fraser McKinlay and I have both said, the reason why the financial strategy is so important is so that those decisions can be made with a long-term, rather than a short-term, focus.
Paragraph 84 of the report states that
“police reform could save more than £1.1 billion over 15 years”,
which the Auditor General has mentioned. What was the financial basis for that figure?
That figure is drawn directly from the financial memorandum that accompanied the legislation, which was drawn from the outline business case that was prepared in considering options for reform. Those options were the status quo, three regional police forces or a single police service for Scotland.
Are you confident that that figure was accurate at the time that it was presented?
We believe that the figure was accurate for the purposes of the outline business case, which at that time was examining—at a very high level and in broad terms—three specific options for reforming the police service. We do not think that it is accurate enough to inform current planning for the single service that is now in place.
It was initially expected that the Government would update the outline business case to a full business case, but the decision was taken not to do that, which is why the focus on the preparation of a financial strategy by Police Scotland is a critical part of the reform.
As you say, it was a high-level figure, but what was the financial basis for it? How was the figure constructed?
The figures in the outline business case covered three options, based on the best information that was available at the time. I ask Michael Oliphant to take you through more of the detail on what was available, and what was not, at that stage.
The development of the outline business case was based on work that was done by the sustainable policing team back in 2010—
Sorry—what is the sustainable policing team? Is it part of the Government?
It was a project that was led by senior police officers to look at opportunities for future savings in policing.
The team developed a target operating model—excuse the jargon—based on the optimal idea of policing in the future and produced high-level figures for savings that could be made. The Scottish Government used those figures to inform the outline business case, which—as the Auditor General mentioned—was deemed to be fit for purpose at that time. It was still expected that the options would be examined in more detail so that more robust estimates could be made from a full business case.
But a full business case was never delivered.
No.
Therefore, no one knew whether there was any accuracy in those high-level figures.
The full business case was not developed from the outline business case. The Government then moved on, with an expectation that a financial strategy would be developed by the service to provide that information. That work has still not been completed or agreed.
That is the situation now, but we were told at the time that the reform would save £1.1 billion. It is clear that there was no detailed assessment of whether the figures were accurate. As the last sentence in paragraph 69 of the report notes, the alternative models that you have described were never—correct me if I am wrong—properly financially scrutinised.
As you say, there were high-level figures in the outline business case to enable a decision to be made between the three options that were being considered at that time. The Government felt that those figures were good enough to inform the financial memorandum that accompanied the legislation. That was the subject of a fair amount of discussion with the Finance Committee when that committee was scrutinising the financial memorandum.
At that point, the Government gave a commitment that a full business case or financial strategy would be developed by the service. That has not happened at this point, although we understand that it is under development.
So, in short, Parliament was told over the whole period that the reform would save £1.1 billion, but there was no basis for that figure whatsoever.
I cannot agree with that. We know that broad high-level figures were pulled together in the outline business case that the Government felt were sufficient to inform the financial memorandum—
Which we do not have.
The Government made a commitment at that stage that the full business case would be prepared; that commitment has now moved on to a financial strategy—
Which we still do not have.
We are still waiting to see it.
Okay, I take that.
When paragraph 80 of the report states that
“It is therefore not clear which costs are a direct consequence of introducing a single service and what savings could have been achieved by delivering services differently”,
would it be fair to say that we will never know? We will never know, because Audit Scotland has not come across any figures that would allow us to understand whether those options were properly financially explored at the time.
10:45
One of the recommendations that we make in the report is that there should be a full post-implementation review—again, apologies for the jargon—to look at those questions. It is obviously harder to do that by collecting data in retrospect than by using data that has been collected at the time. Our point now is about looking ahead to ensure that policing is sustainable and has proper governance in place with the new arrangements, so having the required information is critically important for the future.
I understand that, but my contention is that we were told that something was going to happen and that it was based on the financial figure that was quoted. I am trying to understand where that figure came from, but that is not clear, as you have said.
The last sentence in paragraph 79 states:
“the Scottish Government does not distinguish between the costs specifically associated with restructuring and those arising from wider police reforms as identified in the Financial Memorandum.”
Would you be so good as to explain what that means?
I will ask Michael Oliphant to do that, as he is the person who is absolutely on top of the figures.
The financial memorandum splits out the costs and savings associated with reform into costs and savings associated with the restructure into a single police service, and costs and savings associated with what would have happened with wider police reforms regardless of the structure. What we say in the report is that we have not seen from our monitoring and reporting a comparison made with the split that is identified in the financial memorandum.
And why is that?
There are two components to it, the first of which is the costs and savings that the SPA and Police Scotland must deliver, which, as we discussed earlier, are the £64 million and so on. Secondly, in terms of the Scottish Government’s police reform budget, which is outlined in exhibits 7 and 8, there are costs of reform that are not necessarily factored into the costs and savings that Police Scotland and the SPA must deliver, so we need to pull those together to get an assessment of the overall costs and savings associated with reform.
Is it your contention that it is very difficult to understand from an audit point of view what is a cost of reform and what is a saving that was layered on to the organisation right at the start in the OBC?
In the information that we have received, we have not seen a definitive split between savings associated with the single police force and savings associated with reform.
So in terms of the audit, we cannot tell what the saving is.
We cannot see the differentiation.
That is very helpful indeed. Thank you very much.
Paragraph 72 states that the SPA and Police Scotland have not yet agreed a financial strategy. First, why have they not agreed a financial strategy?
I think that that question would be better addressed to Police Scotland and the SPA. We say in the report that we think that the process was hampered by a lack of good baseline data, by a lack of clarity about what was meant by the SPA’s responsibility
“to maintain the Police Service”
and by the time that was spent on dealing with those difficulties and putting good relationships in place.
I apologise for asking that question, which was unfair. One of the sentences in paragraph 72 states:
“The police-led reform team did not agree to provide financial information to the Government before the chief constable was appointed.”
Does that mean that the reform team refused to provide the information?
There was a lot of discussion about how the information would be brought together and agreed. Again, I will ask Michael Oliphant to talk you through what we know about that.
As we say in paragraph 72, in July the Scottish Government’s portfolio direction board, which was overseeing the reform process, requested a financial strategy from the police-led reform team. The team provided some high-level savings information around the time that the chief constable was appointed but did not go into any detail about how the savings would be generated or go into any of the assumptions used. It was high-level information, but it was not a financial strategy as we would see it.
Yes. You have been very clear indeed about that evidence.
Sorry, but just before you leave that point, can Mr Oliphant just clarify something? Did the police-led reform team refuse to provide that information to the Government?
They were reluctant to provide it in advance of the chief constable being appointed.
Remind me again who was in the police-led reform team.
The police-led reform team was senior police officers. The Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland had a role in it.
We had the Scottish Government bringing in the biggest change in service delivery since devolution, the Scottish Government underpinning some of the finances associated with that and the Parliament being asked to approve the changes. The Scottish Government believed that it needed information in order to deliver the fundamental change that it was committed to and the police-led reform team refused to provide that information to the Scottish Government.
We see in that issue some of the challenges that came from the previous police governance arrangements, in which we had eight separate police forces around Scotland, which were local authority services reporting to either a police board or one of the two committees of the unitary authorities and in which the chief constables were the people with access to the detailed information that was needed. They led the work that informed the outline business case and the decision about which options for reform would be taken forward, and they were the people who had the information that was needed to inform the full business case and is now needed to inform the financial strategy.
This is not a criticism of the Scottish Government, but how can the Scottish Government do its job, provide information and be accountable to the Parliament when we have a police-led reform team that refuses to provide essential information to the Scottish Government at a critical stage in the process? Is that not an outrage?
It certainly hampered the planning for reform, as we say in the report. The lack of baseline information made it much more difficult to plan for how the savings would be achieved and is one of the factors that has contributed to the delay to a financial strategy being in place.
I think that it is scandalous that when a democratically elected Government that is accountable to this Parliament is bringing in a controversial change, on which Parliament is being asked to make a decision, a police-led reform team refuses to provide information to allow that democratically elected Government to engage with Parliament.
The issue goes much further than your report and the finances involved. There is an issue about democratic relationships and whether those who have information can refuse to provide it to Government, which needs it to make a decision. It is not about allowing Government ministers to interfere in operational decisions; that is a separate issue. It is about allowing the Government and Parliament to make a decision.
Under the previous governance arrangements for policing in Scotland, the Accounts Commission reported on some of the challenges that came from the tripartite structure and the ambiguous role that ACPOS played in managing and planning for policing in Scotland. The arrangements that we have now should make it more straightforward to see that through.
I ask Fraser McKinlay to come in.
I will make a similar point, convener. It is worth remembering that the primary line of accountability for police services at the point that we are talking about—back in 2012—was still joint boards and local authorities. That is important. You made a reasonable point about it taking place at a critical point in the process, which I am sure you will want to explore with those who were much more closely involved in it.
We do not want to suggest that people were not giving the information out of badness. We were just about to embark on the biggest change to police services that there has been, as you said, and a new chief constable was about to be appointed. I think—the team can keep me right on this—that there was a sense of wanting to ensure that everything was all lined up for the new chief constable as he came into that new job.
I take your point, convener, but, as Caroline Gardner says, the issue reflects the complexity of the situation. We were merging not just Scottish Government bodies but local authority bodies, in effect, and completely changing the accountability framework around that. The issue is another example of the complexity that that threw up.
I do not think that anyone is suggesting badness—I am not ascribing any particular motive. I am concerned that a police-led reform team is telling a democratically elected Government to go whistle when it tries to get information. That is not a healthy situation.
I will stay on paragraph 72. Mr Oliphant helpfully mentioned the information on high-level savings that was submitted, but the report states:
“This did not include details on how Police Scotland would achieve the savings or any assumptions used.”
Did you understand why there was no detail or any information on the assumptions behind the detail?
As the Auditor General mentioned, there was difficulty in getting good baseline information on policing costs, which is why not enough detail was provided in the information on high-level savings that was submitted at that time.
Would it therefore be fair to note that answer in the context of the big figure of £1.1 billion that was trotted out at the start of the whole process?
Yes—as we have said in previous answers, enough analysis was done at the time of the outline business case to inform the process at that stage but, as we now know, a full business case was not developed. We would have expected more robust estimates on costs and savings to be provided at that time.
That is helpful—thank you.
I have one last question, on paragraph 106 and the governance issues, which strikes at the convener’s latter point on accountability. The report states:
“As the chief constable controls most of these resources but does not report to the accountable officer, it is particularly important that effective financial controls are in place”.
Do you find it curious from an audit point of view that the chief constable controls the resources but does not report to the accountable officer?
No. Committee members will know that the question of what the SPA’s role meant—specifically its duty “to maintain” Police Scotland—was at the heart of a lot of the discussions and disagreements on how the new arrangements would work in practice.
We think that it is quite possible for the new arrangements to work: for the chief executive to be the accountable officer and for the chief constable to be accountable for delivering policing in Scotland. However, for that to work well in practice it is critical that good financial and performance information is available—and is agreed by the two officers to cover the important things—and, more widely, that there is good governance in place with good internal controls, internal audit and so on. As our report says, there is more to be done on all of that.
Indeed, and the lack of a financial strategy does not exactly command confidence that those things are in place, does it?
A financial strategy is important for a whole range of reasons—
But in the context of this—
It is at the heart of that relationship.
Okay—thank you.
As well as highlighting the lack of a financial strategy, the report highlights the lack of a workforce strategy. By that, do you simply mean a plan to identify how redundancies will be managed, or do you mean a strategy for the division of responsibilities within the overall police service—in other words, between police officers and civilian staff and so on?
We mean the latter, and more than that. As Fraser McKinlay said, the reform provides a real opportunity to look again at the way in which policing is delivered in Scotland, and to look at opportunities for making savings and improvements in efficiency and effectiveness.
At the heart of that are people’s jobs: what they do and how they are organised. The workforce strategy should be looking ahead to changes that are needed in the way that police officers are deployed, and at the relationship between different ranks in the command structure and between police officers and police staff. It needs to look at the way in which the savings will be made and, much more important, the way in which policing will be delivered in future to maintain front-line services.
A decade back, there was a drive towards civilianisation—I think that that was the term used—to get police officers to deliver front-line services with some of the back-room services being delivered by civilian staff. At paragraphs 89 and 90, the report implies that a disproportionate burden of the savings—if I may put it in that way—will fall on the civilian staff. Am I reading that correctly?
11:00
No; what we do in those paragraphs is state, as a matter of fact, that a large proportion of the police budget is accounted for by staffing costs—for police staff and police officers—and the need to make the savings that underpin the reform means that it will be important to look at staffing costs as well as property costs, information and communications technology costs and so on.
Elsewhere in the report, we make the point that the Government’s commitment to 17,234 police officers and a policy of no compulsory redundancies limits flexibility in looking at staff costs. It is entirely appropriate for this or any Government to make such commitments, but that means that the long-term look at how financial savings can be made and front-line police services maintained becomes important.
I entirely agree that those are appropriate decisions for the Government to take. However, I want to be clear about what you are saying. You say that 64 per cent of the budget is accounted for by police officer costs, and that
“Some savings will be achieved through reducing the number of senior police officer posts”,
and you say that only 11 per cent of the budget goes on property and supplies. You seem to be pointing a finger at the 20 per cent of the budget that is accounted for by police staff costs.
We are simply recording factually the make-up of the police budget and what the money is currently spent on and highlighting the importance of a financial strategy that clearly sets out the changes that are envisaged to achieve the savings that are required.
It is envisaged that 800 civilian posts will go this year. There is a lack of a financial strategy, so we are not clear about where future savings will be made. Are you aware, from the outline business case or elsewhere, that future savings are envisaged in the same area?
That is very much a question for Police Scotland and the SPA, when you ask them about their overall thinking about how savings will be achieved and front-line services maintained.
Is it clear to you whether civilianisation has been reversed?
We have not looked at that so far and, in the absence of a financial strategy, it is too early to say whether civilianisation has been reversed.
You flag up a number of worrying issues in your report. An issue that does not have the highest profile in your report, but about which I think that the public will be worried, is the use and reporting of crime statistics. In paragraph 114, you say that there is a concern about consistency, and you go on to say:
“performance reports to the SPA board are now more selective and have less trend and comparative information”.
Should we be worried about that?
I will ask Miranda Alcock to talk you through some of the background to that. We are clear that the information that is currently being reported to the SPA covers less ground than was covered in the information that was previously reported, before Police Scotland was established.
Members might be aware that the previous forces all reported their performance against the Scottish policing performance framework, which covered a wide range of performance indicators. With the creation of a new force, it is perfectly appropriate for police performance to be reviewed and for consideration to be given to what performance data the SPA now needs if it is to ascertain whether the objectives of reform are being met, what changes there are and what benefits are accruing to communities.
An approach has still to be agreed between the SPA and Police Scotland and, in the absence of that, the performance reports that the chief constable presents to the board tend to focus primarily on crime and detection rates and road safety and do not address some of the wider performance indicators that were in the Scottish policing performance framework.
Can you think of examples of areas that are not covered which parliamentarians and the public might be concerned about?
Indicators that were previously reported on included answering times for emergency calls, diversionary measures for young people and reports to the procurator fiscal. Forces reported on a wide range of activities. It will be important that the SPA and Police Scotland agree what measures they want to use to assess whether Police Scotland is delivering on the objectives of reform. Whether they use the measures that were formerly used or new measures that relate specifically to reform is for the SPA and Police Scotland to decide.
The Scottish policing performance framework had been going since about 2007, so we had quite a few years’ information, which could be used to identify trends, make comparisons and consider improvements in performance.
One of the things that we want to measure is change. After all, if you want to measure the success of the reforms, you want to be able to see how things—not only Crown figures but localism, efficiency and so on—have changed. Are you suggesting that at the moment the picture is not entirely comprehensive?
The final “Scottish Policing Performance Framework Annual Report, 2012-13”, which has been published by the Scottish Government and goes up to March 2013, provides a good baseline for the eight previous forces, among which were, of course, the unitary forces for Dumfries and Galloway and for Fife. However, although good baseline information on operational matters is available, the SPA and Police Scotland need to agree how they will report that and make it consistent with the Scottish Government’s statistical publications on recorded crime and detection rates. It is important that they reach that agreement so that they can start to collect the information from April and report it the following year. Basically, the systems for collecting the information have to be in place and collecting it in April.
My final very brief question relates to paragraph 53 and Bremner house, which has recently drawn a lot of attention. You say that
“The Scottish Government rented Bremner House”
but I am not clear about who took the initial decision or who should unpick or follow up the matter. Who is to blame here? Is it the Scottish Government, Police Scotland or the SPA?
We have included Bremner house as an example of difficulties that have been caused by the delay in agreeing the roles and responsibilities of the players involved, especially the SPA and Police Scotland. We have already discussed the fast pace of reform; as part of the preparation for the new arrangements the Scottish Government rented Bremner house before the SPA had been appointed. In considering how it wanted to carry out its crucial role of maintaining the police service, the SPA felt that the accommodation was not suitable for its needs. It is one of the issues that need to be resolved now as part of the SPA’s establishing its permanent structure, recruiting permanent staff and getting geared up to fulfil the new role that was agreed in July and August. We have highlighted the issue as being symptomatic of the uncertainties about roles and responsibilities.
Overall, the Auditor General’s report is extremely positive—Laughter. I beg your pardon?
The Auditor General’s recommendations are positive. In my opinion the main recommendation is the focus on the financial strategy, which is very important. The rest of Audit Scotland’s recommendations—important though they are—do not seem to me to stand out particularly from other reports that I have seen over many years. Given the Auditor General’s opening remark that this is the biggest change in Scotland’s police forces since 1967, involving 24,000 staff, 1,000 properties, eight forces, eight chief constables and 32 councils, I think that the police’s achievement is absolutely remarkable.
Much has been made by members around the table of the full business case. Can you say, or speculate on, where, with regard to audit, we would have been had we had that full business case? Would we be in a better place than we actually are? I feel that you have been—correctly, in my view—leaning us towards the importance of the financial strategy as the focus of our attention.
We are reflecting the current state of play. As you said, a lot has been achieved and we now think it critical that we get a clear picture of how the savings that are needed will be achieved while front-line services are protected. As I have said many times this morning, that is one of the drivers of reform.
We know that the full business case was not prepared from the outline business case, and what is needed now is a detailed financial strategy that sets out how savings will be achieved and how the service is going to be delivered. That will be critical not just for audit but because it will underpin a sustainable Police Scotland for the future, and good governance—on behalf of us all—of a crucial public service.
Thank you for that. A comment was made earlier by, I think, Mary Scanlon that savings cannot be made without a financial strategy. Of course, that is not the case; savings can be made without a financial strategy. Paragraph 63 of the report shows that in the financial memorandum, which was based on the outline business case, savings were estimated at £25.4 million, which the Auditor General just mentioned. However, Police Scotland actually made savings of £34 million. So, even at that stage, with the outline business case, Police Scotland was making savings. Is that correct?
The importance of a financial strategy is that it helps to ensure that savings that are made are the right ones and that they will deliver sustainable policing for the long term, rather than their being easy savings in the short term. We have not reviewed that at this stage, so I am not making any value judgments about the way in which the savings have been made.
However, we talked earlier about the example of Dalmarnock; the Scottish Police Authority—for reasons that I entirely understand—is reluctant to make decisions about one significant investment without having the wider context for how it fits in. The financial strategy should produce that wider context as a basis for making decisions about staffing, estates, ICT and so on. It is what helps us to ensure that the long-term decisions are sustainable and will support effective policing for all of us.
The point that savings cannot be made without a financial strategy is therefore just not true. I presume that we all, no matter our walk of life, could make savings without having a financial strategy.
The financial strategy helps ensure that they are the right savings.
Okay. Paragraph 82 of the report is about VAT. We know that Police Scotland has been required by the United Kingdom Government to pay VAT, which could amount to £22 million every year being paid to the UK Exchequer. Previously, the eight separate Scottish police forces did not pay VAT, and my understanding is that the Police Service of Northern Ireland, which is a unitary police force, does not pay VAT. Do you have any information for us about why a single police force in one part of the United Kingdom does not pay VAT but a single police force in another part of the United Kingdom does pay VAT?
Our understanding is that the position in Scotland relates to the type of body that Police Scotland is compared with the predecessor forces. On the whole, local authority bodies can reclaim their input VAT but central Government bodies cannot. The police forces’ transition from being local government bodies to being a central Government body is the underpinning factor in this case. However, I stress that we are not tax experts, so that point might be worth exploring with other witnesses.
I hope, convener, that we will explore that in our subsequent discussions about what we decide to do. It seems to me that the two unitary police forces in the United Kingdom should be treated in the same way in respect of VAT; our force is being asked to pay a substantial sum of money to the Exchequer. Perhaps our Conservative and Liberal colleagues could help us with an explanation of why it is appropriate that the unitary police force in Northern Ireland does not pay VAT but the one in Scotland does.
Oh, come on.
Can I just stop things there for a minute? This is a committee of the Parliament and we are supposed to be here doing a job on behalf of Parliament, so I am not going to indulge tit-for-tat exchanges between members of parties about what the other parties should be doing. We have plenty of opportunity—
It is an audit issue.
Excuse me. We have plenty of opportunity to take that up. Willie Coffey is right that there is an issue that we need to explore about VAT and whether there were options available that could have avoided VAT. We will do that as an audit committee, so let us leave the party-political bickering out of the discussion and just do our job as a committee.
Thank you for that, convener.
I think that what has happened since the inception of the idea of a single force—I will back up Willie Coffey on this one—has been absolutely remarkable. Having sat on the Justice Committee, I know that the process was incredibly complex. I commend for the record each and every person who was involved in the considerable amount of work that was done on the issue, because it certainly was not easy.
In developing the single force from the previous forces, the police-led reform team was reluctant to give information prior to the chief constable being appointed. I feel that that was relatively understandable, because I do not believe that it had all the information to enable it to give definitive answers. That is not in the report, but it was explained at a meeting of the Justice Committee—members will be able to find it in the relevant Official Report. That takes us back to the comments that the Auditor General made about the baseline problems.
I have just one question. The general problem in the back of my mind has been that of different forces using different ICT systems. In a practical sense, how easy has it been to merge the reporting of costs that come from that?
11:15
Obviously, the previous eight forces had different systems for all sorts of things including finance, HR and operational management. That cannot be fixed overnight. Michael Oliphant will give a quick update on what we know so far about progress in that area.
We understand that progress has been made on a number of those issues. I mentioned the importance of IT in relation to being able to develop good information on HR by bringing together the data from the previous forces. It is not the case that the information cannot be obtained; it is just a bit time consuming to go through all the different systems to bring together consistent information.
We know that the board approved an IT blueprint a few months ago. As I said earlier, that approval mentioned the hope that a more detailed ICT strategy would be brought to the board for approval by the end of this year.
That takes me back to the issue of speed in moving from the legacy forces to the single force. The fact that we are just getting that information now helps to explain why the reform team might have been a bit reluctant to provide incomplete information at the time.
As we say in our report, we recognise that it takes time to rationalise and amalgamate systems and to create new support systems that will be fit for purpose for the SPA and Police Scotland in the future.
I echo the point that was made earlier about the importance of understanding what data are available and where the gaps are so that we can look at ways of compensating for that.
I am just trying to defuse the situation in which a lot of heat has been generated over use of words such as “refuses” and “reluctant”. In my opinion—for what it is worth—there were valid reasons for the reform team’s reluctance to provide information that, because of the speed issue, was incomplete. It was felt that it would be better for something of that magnitude to come from the chief constable, who was to be appointed shortly thereafter.
I thank the Auditor General and her colleagues for providing useful back-up information.
11:18 Meeting suspended.
11:24 On resuming—
I welcome to the meeting Sir Stephen House, who is the chief constable of Police Scotland; Vic Emery, who is the chair of the Scottish Police Authority; John Foley, who is the interim chief executive officer of the Scottish Police Authority; and George Graham, who is Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary for Scotland.
You have heard us explore some issues with the Auditor General. Clearly, some are the responsibility of Police Scotland and some are the responsibility of the Scottish Police Authority, but we have identified a number of issues where there is an overlap.
I will start by asking about Audit Scotland’s report. Chief Constable, you were reported as saying that you think that the report is “naive”. Is that correct?
Yes.
In what way is it naive?
The report is not naive in its content. I was very clear in saying that; I checked the clarity of my message afterwards with Miranda Alcock and Michael Oliphant, who were present at the meeting at which I gave that input.
The point that I made is that a limited number of people—a handful—with particular interests will read the report from cover to cover. They will pay a great deal of attention to it and will pick out the issues of concern, because clearly there are such issues in the report, but they will also see a balanced picture that makes positive comments about the progress that has been made and says that we have carried out a number of the recommendations in relation to public merger bodies.
Unfortunately, the media do not read such reports from cover to cover and, in publishing what they think it is all about, they do not provide the subtle in-depth analysis that is required. They simply go for headlines, some of which have been, in my view, very misleading. We wrote to a number of newspapers and tried to correct what they had said, because it has an impact on the public and on my staff. People would see the report differently if they had a detailed understanding of it.
You are not critical of the report, but of the media coverage.
I made it clear—I stress again that I checked this with Miranda Alcock and Michael Oliphant—that what I said was not an attack. I went out of my way to say that the report is welcome, that we accept the recommendations and that we will, as we would always do, work towards achieving them. That is not to say that I agree with everything in the report—far from it. I do not agree with everything in it, but I accept that it comes from a positive position and that it tries to help us to move forward. The reporting on it has not come from the same direction.
Right. What do you not agree with?
In the report?
Yes.
I heard the Auditor General say that it was not the report’s role to look at operational performance. I accept that, although the report comments on the fact that since Police Scotland has been in place violent crime has gone down by nearly 14 per cent and general crime across the country is down. However, I do not think that it gives enough credit or space to the efforts of everybody who has been involved across all the agencies to create a single police service, with an oversight body, under new legislation in such a short timescale.
I also do not think that the report accurately reflects the situation in relation to performance, which you discussed with the previous panel. Miranda Alcock mentioned that when she was invited to come in by the Auditor General. The report makes huge references to the Scottish policing performance framework and it seems to suggest—I am pretty sure that Miranda Alcock said this, although I do not claim that I am quoting her—that every police authority used it as a measure of performance. That is not accurate. I was the chief at Strathclyde Police for five years before I came to Police Scotland, and although we had regard to the framework, we reported on a monthly performance framework, which seemed to satisfy the board members over the five years.
A performance regime exists within Police Scotland on which it is perfectly possible to report to the Scottish Police Authority at every meeting. The data exist and can be presented, and I am happy to do that reporting, but we are in a three-way debate with Government because of statisticians’ concern that the figures that we would choose to put before the public would not be officially certified because we are not a statistical body. I am held accountable by the Scottish Police Authority for the performance of the organisation and I am keen to report that performance in a consistent and comprehensive way at every monthly meeting—or more regularly, should the chair and members of the authority want that. At the moment, I cannot do that. That is why there are some concerns, but I do not think that the report quite makes that clear. It seems to suggest that we are in some way unwilling or unable. We are neither.
11:30
Who produces the SPPF?
The SPPF has been produced by an amalgamation of the police services, because it covered all eight forces. It has been under significant review and I would not want anyone to think that it is a management tool. It might be an auditing tool, but it is certainly not a management tool because it is not produced regularly enough. The reports that we run on Police Scotland are produced every week; we manage the organisation by looking at performance almost daily because we cannot afford to wait for quarterly or annual reports.
Also, the SPPF does not go into sufficient detail on violent crime and does not include any input on organised crime or counterterrorism. It does not do very much on child protection, nor does it do an awful lot on sexual offences or sexual assaults. It does not give a complete picture. It does give a broader picture of the health of organisations, but we produce that and seek to do so through our human resources reports to the Police Authority. The SPPF provides information on response calls, which is of interest, but the public are far more interested in knowing that the police are being responsive than they are in hearing about minute-by-minute or second-by-second response times. The UK police service has moved away from using response times as targets because of concerns about putting too much pressure on officers who attend emergency calls.
So did you not rate the SPPF?
The SPPF is a useful tool for auditing purposes, but it is not a performance management tool.
Okay.
Are you committed to delivering the £1.1 billion of savings that have been identified? How will that be done?
I am committed to achieving those savings. The difficulty with the £1.1 billion—this came out during your earlier evidence session—is that it does not include inflationary pressures, so it does not include pay inflation or incremental general economic inflation. If the committee was to ask whether we are confident that we will save £1.1 billion over the next 12 to 13 years, I would say that we believe that we have already made a pretty good start on achieving it. You heard the earlier witnesses say that we are about £3 million away from balancing the budget this year.
We can do a lot more. The difficulty is that we are also faced with finding savings around inflationary pressures, which is going to be a challenge for us.
How will the savings be achieved?
We are already considering significant restructuring of the organisation. I completely understand why the earlier panel of witnesses and the Auditor General made a significant and central point about the lack of a financial strategy. I would have been delighted to go into 1 April this year with a fully formed financial strategy, but that was simply impossible.
We are now working very closely with the Scottish Police Authority and the Scottish Government on developing the general approach to saving the money that we need to save at the same time as we reshape the police service. We are therefore looking at all aspects of the service; we are looking at the shape of the workforce and at our property strategy—Dalmarnock was part of that—and we are looking at our vehicle fleet and procurement policies to see whether we can save money on contracting. The report mentions that there are 1,500 separate procurement contracts across Police Scotland, but we inherited those and are working to reduce that number every month to make it more rational.
We are looking at all aspects of policing in order to provide as good a service as we possibly can while saving, and while hitting what the Auditor General said is a challenging target.
I will come back to this later because other members want to come in. However, could you just clarify who determines what front-line policing is? Is it the SPA, you, or the Scottish Government?
I do not mean to be difficult, but the answer depends on what we mean when we talk about front-line policing. We have to define that.
What is your definition?
My definition would be services that impact on the public and that the public care about. That goes all the way from police officers patrolling in public to control rooms where people receive our 999 calls, to the specialist units who provide specialist support, air support teams, firearms teams, roads policing teams, child protection teams and so on. The vast bulk of that is delivered by uniformed police officers, but they can do that only because of support from their police staff colleagues.
Under your definition, is it you, the SPA or the Scottish Government that makes the decisions about that?
I would divide up matters slightly differently. I would much rather look at operational decisions—which are mine to take—tactical decisions; and strategic decisions. In the main, it falls to the Police Authority to take strategic decisions about the police service’s direction of travel and big investment decisions, such as those about Dalmarnock, control rooms and IT systems such as i6, which has not been mentioned and is an IT solution that will bring the country together on one platform. I take a positive view of how the strategy is being developed, because we are developing it together and the authority is asking for our input.
I heard people say on a number of occasions during the previous evidence that we produce the financial strategy for the authority, but we do not. We will not produce a financial strategy for the authority, but are working with the authority—with officers and members—to develop a financial strategy that will meet the needs of the organisation and the country. It is not up to us to write that and to say to the authority, “There you go—we think that’s the right thing.” We want to take a much more joined-up approach than that.
Is it you, the SPA or the Government that decides what a visible police presence is?
All three have a part in that. It is clear that the Scottish Government has decided to have 17,234 officers, with the intention that as many of those officers as possible will be visible to the public and will provide a direct service to the public. The authority wants to scrutinise us to ensure that we are translating the officers that we have—they form 65 per cent of our budget—into people on the street and people who deliver a direct service to the public in whatever way. Exactly how officers are deployed to deal with particular issues and emerging problems is part of my remit. I do not do that on my own, but with my team.
link
The convener has pursued an interesting line of questioning. It is worth mentioning that when Sir Stephen House was the chief constable of Strathclyde Police, a significant restructuring of community police shift patterns took place in Glasgow. The Scottish Government had a political strategy to have more high-profile visible policing, with 1,000 additional police officers, but it was for Sir Stephen to decide how best to deploy the extra officers on the ground in Glasgow, where police visibility dramatically increased. That is a nice example of the interaction between politicians and operational policing.
A couple of points emerged from the previous evidence session. An interim business plan was produced, then the Government and agencies went to full delivery of Police Scotland instead of producing a full business plan. Audit Scotland’s report says that the two reasons for that were the need to make financial savings as quickly as possible, which might have been compromised by awaiting a full business plan, and the need to embed the new integrated Police Scotland as quickly as possible in order to ensure a seamless transition for security and safety, with the Commonwealth games on the horizon. Do our witnesses believe that those were the reasons for not producing a full business plan? If not, what were the reasons?
What Bob Doris has said is correct in general. The situation is indicative simply of time pressure. A lot of people say that the reform was 18 months in the planning, and I accept that timetable. However, I was appointed from 1 October 2012, so I had six months to get this up and running. A huge amount of work had been done beforehand by the Government and the police reform team, but six months is not a great deal of time to get such a thing going. As has been mentioned, an aspect of that was ensuing that both Scotland and the UK were confident that we were preparing effectively for the Commonwealth games. What the Audit Report mentions is really shorthand for the compressed nature of the time involved.
From day 1, Vic Emery and I engaged on how to make the financial savings and get a balanced budget. We were called before the Justice Sub-Committee on Policing fairly early on—it was within a couple of months of Police Scotland being set up—and we were asked whether we accepted the budget and whether we would achieve it. We both said—I can speak for Vic on this matter—that we accepted and would achieve it. To do that at the same time as the restructuring and maintaining performance across a wide range of measures meant that we had to put our foot on the accelerator. The view was taken that time would be too compressed to convert the outline business case into a full business case and then to move towards agreeing a financial strategy. We simply would not have had the time or the people to devote to that, although it might have been the ideal approach, had we had an 18 month or two-year lead in. I accept the concerns that that was not done, but that was a feature of time and complexity. We were bringing together nine budget, financial and HR systems into one, which was particularly challenging.
Some of the evidence that was given this morning was very helpful in its recognition of the complexity and the amount of work that has gone into this. That was very positive.
I do not have any details about why the work did not move on to a full business case. Once the bill was going through Parliament and the decision had been made to create a single police service, the focus necessarily needed to change, in my view at least, to look at the interdependent business strategies—the things that connect to make policing possible—and to continue the most significant achievement, which is that service delivery still goes on. We are thinking about a finance strategy, an ICT strategy, an estates strategy—all of those things ultimately lead to a business strategy, underpinned by the finance available. It is important to recognise that all those things are interdependent and need to be put together in a very short timescale while we still deliver. Whether we took time to create a full business case was less important in my view, because my focus was on the operational delivery around getting the finance, estates, ICT and people development strategies right and then the delivery strategy underpinned by the finance available.
link
The Auditor General said that there is £61 million in reported efficiency savings in the current financial year against a £64 million target. If the gap between the interim business plan and delivery had been extended by, for example, three to six months to allow for the development of a full business plan, could those efficiency savings have been met in this financial year?
In responding, I will try to adopt the words and tone of the report. That would have been even more challenging, because of the compression of time. In addition, we were restructuring as we were going along.
The previous panel mentioned that a number of people have left the organisation under voluntary redundancy or early retirement. Some disappointment is expressed in the report about the length of time that that takes. To be blunt, it takes the time that it takes. We must work within the law, and we must consult the unions and individual members and listen to their concerns, views and suggestions about what we should do. It all takes time, and time is the factor that I will talk about. The more preparation and reporting time that we had spent on the matter, the less time we would have had to engage with hitting the budget target. Had we done that, we would have been sitting here in front of you trying to explain why we were not going to balance our budget, whereas I am confident that we will balance our budget this year.
11:45
link
That is very helpful. With apologies to other members whom I know are keen to ask questions, I have a final question.
Under the previous agenda item, much was made of paragraph 72 of the Audit Scotland report and the Scottish Government’s request in July 2012 to the police-led reform team for financial strategy information. Paragraph 72 states:
“The police-led reform team did not agree to provide financial information to the Government before the chief constable was appointed.”
Sir Stephen, you are the chief constable, but in July 2012 there were eight chief constables across Scotland and 32 local authorities with an input. We have heard that there was very uncertain baseline data because there was no alignment of the collection of statistics by each joint board and police authority. Do you think that it was right that the police-led reform team held off in that way until you were appointed? Did it make a difference to the quality of the data that was available once you were in post? What was the significance of the delay? Was it necessary, or was it simply wrong?
It was certainly not done out of badness or a disregard for the requirements, but you are quite correct in saying that the situation was much more complex then, with eight chief constables and the local authorities. The Convention of Scottish Local Authorities in particular had a strong central role in how policing was rolled out in those days pre Police Scotland.
Again, we must look at the situation that people faced, because nobody knew in the July who the chief constable was going to be. I think that I was interviewed for the job only the week before that. Kevin Smith was leading the police reform at that time; he was the president of ACPOS and he had stood aside as chief constable of Central Police to take on the full-time role of leading the police reform. It must be recognised that he was asked at the time to provide more detailed information than he had. Half of the report that is before us talks about the fact that we struggled to get baseline data and financial data, so it is not surprising that the data was not easy to produce. It was not a case of just pushing a button on a computer, getting a print-off and passing it to the Government—that simply was not the case.
The outline business case took months to produce and was a complex piece of work. I think that what happened was not a refusal but an inability. Kevin Smith expressed loudly and clearly his concern, which the chiefs supported, that someone should be in place leading the organisation so that there could at least be a dialogue between an operational leader and the chair of the SPA—the members had not been appointed at that time—to assess what the future looked like in very broad parameters before the organisation started giving detailed information that might turn out to be wrong because the organisation had gone in a slightly different direction.
There was a compressed timescale, which meant that we missed the step of completing the business case, but we are now going straight towards developing a joint financial strategy.
link
Would you have been concerned about the quality of the data that would have been provided to the Scottish Government in July 2012, given what you know now? I would be interested to know that.
Finally, you said that you do not think that the delay was a snub to the Scottish Government and that there were reasons for it. I think that it is fair to check that the police-led reform team was not asking anyone to go whistle but was just trying to get the baseline data sorted to get a coherent plan to give to the Government.
I want to be accurate about this. It is quite clear that civil servants wanted the data; they required it, and asked for it in written format. However, I think that it was simply not available at that time. Had it been created, I think that it would have been false and would just have reflected a moment in time. When I took up the job four or five months later, I would have looked at the data and said that I did not recognise it. Things move fast in such situations, so the more reports that are produced, the more of the moment they are. There was an evolving process and I genuinely believe that the work that we are doing now to produce the overall business plan for the organisation is the right thing to do going ahead.
I would like some clarification on that point with regard to concerns about data quality and whether the data even existed. How was the Scottish Government able to justify the biggest change to services since devolution if the information did not exist or there were concerns about the data quality?
With respect, convener—I heard Caroline Gardner say this before—you would have to ask the Scottish Government. It is not my role to tell you how the Government was able to do that. I am on record as being—for a variety of reasons—-a strong supporter of a single service, and I remained so throughout the lead-up to the change, but I cannot answer that question.
I do not doubt your support for a single service, but justifications were made for its creation that were based on cost savings, which were based on efficiencies. According to you, that information was either not of sufficient quality or did not exist. Given the facts—and leaving aside your belief in a single police force—how could you justify that? How could the Scottish Government come to a conclusion if that information was not there?
I need to draw a distinction here and be clear in what I am saying. It is quite clear—it was clear early on—that a single service will save money. There will be efficiency measures in it, and I believe that it will produce superior performance and protection for the public in Scotland.
If the Government had been happy with me writing that as a detailed business case on 1 October when I got the job, I would have written it, but that is not what it wanted. The outline business case is a pretty thick document, and it is clear that the developed full business case would have been an even weightier and more detailed document.
The thrust of the Auditor General’s report is that baseline data has been difficult to come by across the board because it is collected and maintained in different ways. As was mentioned briefly, a couple of the authorities were unitary authorities, and the way in which they reported information and held data was completely different because they were part of a unified council delivery service. The picture is much more complicated.
Again, I stress that we were—and Kevin Smith was—not trying to resist. Civil servants wanted the data, and it was their job to want it, but I cannot give you any detail on what the Government should have based its decisions on. I just know that there are some fairly obvious big-picture points about how a service will work. It will save money—indeed, it is on course to save £64 million in the first year.
In this meeting
Everything on 20 Nov 2013 →- 09:30 Decision on Taking Business in Private Procedure · 1
- 09:30 Section 23 Report Committee business · 389
The type of each item (debate, statement, questions, members’ business and so on) and the times shown are worked out by this site from headings, the chair’s opening words and the Official Report’s running timestamps. They are not the Parliament’s own classification. Text: the Scottish Parliament Official Report.