We jotted down a number of themes before we arrived, and I will be happy to give you a note of them. I will restrict my comments to four themes.The first theme is administrative data, and is underlined by what Roger Halliday was saying. The question is where the boundaries of Roger’s empire are. An awful lot of important data is produced by administrative systems. We came across an example recently when we were looking at procurement. There is a database service and a portal has been set up, for administrative purposes. The portal does its job excellently, but it is also being used to produce statistics, although it is not fit for purpose in that regard.An administrative system can be perfectly successful but it does not necessarily collect data to the common and scrutinised standards that are necessary for statistical purposes. If we want to use data from administrative systems for policy purposes, we need professional input—that is a plug for Roger Halliday’s people to get out there and get their hands on administrative systems before misleading inferences are made from the data that come out of such systems.The second theme is openness. It is incredibly important that the statistical system is open, so that insiders and outsiders can dig down and assess the quality of data. A classic example is the old PESA database, which had a big input into GERS. The Treasury ran the PESA database and did not let the public or even other departments, such as the old Scotland Office and the Scottish Executive, have access to it.On the advent of freedom of information we requested access to PESA; we were the first people outside the Treasury to get access to the database. We found horrendous things. For example, we found that £4.4 billion of expenditure in England was being classified as non-identifiable expenditure, when in fact it was expenditure on prisons and so on. The spend was non-identifiable only within the regions of England, but it had been classed as non-identifiable overall, which completely distorted comparisons with identifiable spend in Scotland. When GERS was done, we got a share of the English non-identifiable expenditure on prisons—the whole thing was ridiculous. That emerged as soon as the database was opened up to public scrutiny. Only after we got hold of it did the Scottish Executive get hold of it.Openness is an essential part of quality of data. If a system is not open, we really cannot believe in the high-level figures that we are given. It is unfortunate that the tide is against openness. The move towards greater privatisation—I am thinking of the private finance initiative and utility privatisation, for example—meant that much of the stuff that previously took place in the public sector moved into the private sector and disappeared under the shield of commercial confidence.That has been the most retrograde step, and it need not have happened. If the public sector is the client, it is perfectly open for it to insist that it is written into the contracts that information should be made available, perhaps after a decent six-month delay when the issue is no longer red hot and sensitive in terms of commercial confidence. The public sector should be able to insist that decent information is available so that things such as PFI can be adequately analysed and scrutinised.The third theme, which is dreadfully important, is the careful specification of output measures. One example of that is PFI. An awful lot of the party-political heat that surrounded the issue of PFI—and much of the big public policy mistake that was made—was related to the fact that the public sector was using completely inadequate output measures to scrutinise the process.That was the fault of the Treasury, which effectively said, “We are happy if the equity funders in PFI are earning a 15 to 20 per cent return.” The Treasury was taking the rate of return on equity as a basic performance measure. One side in the PFI debate was saying that the funders were earning only 15 to 20 per cent, while the Treasury was saying, “That’s fine—everything is okay.” Actually, that measure—the rate of return on equity—fails to encapsulate the degree of profit that the private sector equity holders can take out. It is not the measure that those funders use themselves: they use a measure that is based on net present value at a lower discount rate.We wrote that up in a paper that has just been published in Critical Perspectives on Accounting, if you are interested in the detail. The fact is that the measure that the public sector was using was understating the potential profit to the equity holders by 30 or 40 per cent. That fact contributed to a vast public policy mistake, and meant that the debate that was being conducted divided on party-political lines in a way in which, if the facts had been known, it should not have done.The fourth theme is a gap, as we see it, in the available statistics at present. A lot of the debate about Scotland concentrates on GERS, which is an analysis of the Government account in Scotland. The fact that we concentrate only on the Government account is a nonsense. For the UK as a whole, one would look not only at the Government account, but at the pink book and all the flows in and out of the UK economy. Similarly, we would argue that GERS should be broadened into a proper overview of all the inflows and outflows from the Scottish economy.That is difficult to do, because it means getting a proper grip on exports and imports, but an awful lot of the effort of the statistics and economic section is put into the input-output tables. Those tables must arrive at an estimate for the export-import balance. If they are not arriving at an implicit estimate that is reasonably accurate, we should not be producing them. If they are arriving at such an estimate, we should be using that to build at least a broad-brush approximation of the overall flows in and out of the Scottish economy. That would transform the political debate. That is one suggestion of a gap; I will leave it at that.