One of your challenges today, convener, is to get me and Johann Lamont to disagree with each other. I disagree with nothing in what Johann just said. I do not appear in front of you as a politician. I am not a politician any more. I carry the flag for no political party. Two of you might be upset about that, and three of you might be relieved.
I was a member of this Parliament for a while. Before that, for a longer while, I was an adviser to the House of Lords Constitution Committee. I therefore have quite a lot of direct professional experience of working in and with Parliaments. However, I have also been a student of Parliaments for 30 years. I teach and write about Parliaments. Most of what I have to say to you this morning, therefore, will be from that professional perspective rather than any party political perspective. I hope that my evidence will be received in that spirit, and I hope that it will be useful.
I will go right back to the beginning—back to basics. In a parliamentary democracy, Parliaments exist to do three things, albeit that, first and foremost, they represent constituents. Johann Lamont is always very strong on that. I remember her last speech in the chamber, when she gave advice to anyone who was listening that they should follow their postbag. That is exemplary advice and is typical of Johann.
Parliaments exist to represent people, but, within that, they have three functions. The first of those is to debate issues of public importance that are faced by the nation. The second is to hold the Government to account. In this country, we do not elect Governments; we elect Parliaments, and Governments emerge out of and are accountable to Parliaments. Parliaments exist to hold Governments to account. Thirdly, Parliaments exist to make law. You are all law makers—legislators.
When it comes to committee effectiveness, effectiveness is not a free-standing value. We need to consider what it does or achieves, and holding in mind those three different functions of a Parliament is a useful way of thinking about measuring effectiveness.
Committees do not really have anything to do with the first of those three functions. They do not exist to rehearse arguments that should be heard downstairs, in the chamber—debates on general matters of public policy or those that affect the nation. That is not the function of committees. I agree with Johann Lamont that anybody who uses a committee meeting to rehearse some kind of party political debate is misusing that committee.
Committees exist to help Parliament with the other two functions, however. They are central in the task of trying to hold the Government to account for its policies, administration, decisions and mistakes—for what it gets right and what it gets wrong—and, particularly in this Parliament, they exist to help Parliament to make law. In fact, the burden of legislative process in this Parliament is with committees: stages 1 and 2 take place primarily in committee rather than in the chamber. Of course, there are stage 1 debates, but they are—or, at least, are supposed to be—debates about a committee report.
When we think about the effectiveness of committees, we want to think about that in relation to their helping Parliament to hold ministers to account. Separately, we want to think about the effectiveness of committees in relation to their helping to make good law.
Although there are, of course, exceptions to both things that I am about to say, my view is that, generally, the committees of the Parliament are absolutely lousy at helping to hold the Government to account. It is one of the great failings of devolution that, after 25 years, we have a Parliament that really does not do that job very well, particularly in comparison with what happens down south. However, this Parliament should be proud of its record on making good law. Of course, occasionally, bad laws slip through and some laws have to be corrected by the Supreme Court—we can talk about that if you want—but, by and large, the law making process in this Parliament is really quite impressive. I have one or two specific criticisms to make about it, but they are not particular to committees.
The law making process is certainly much more impressive here than it is in the House of Commons, but it is less impressive than the process in the House of Lords. The House of Lords is the best legislature that we have in the United Kingdom, because it does not do anything else. It does not spend much time holding the Government to account; it is really just there as a revising chamber for legislation. Johann Lamont mentioned the absence of party loyalty. In the House of Lords, there is not the absence of party loyalty but it is not so important and very little is whipped—certainly, committees are not whipped. That lends the air of an ability to think about legislative policy in its own terms rather than that always being filtered through or distorted by a party political lens.
On the mistakes that the Supreme Court has corrected—if I can put it like that—the provisions of legislation that have been quashed by the Supreme Court have been quashed not because of any failure of legislative process in this place, really, but because political will has carried the day in a manner that has allowed legislators to sign into law provisions that go beyond competence or infringe rights, or whatever it is. It is not a failure of process; it is a failure of politics.
I hope that that helps with the thinking about what it is that we want committees to be effective for. I am gloomy about the prospects of committees in the Parliament being useful in relation to one of those constitutional functions—namely, holding the Government to account—but I am quite optimistic about the other. I seek to paint a rather mixed picture.