We move to agenda item 2. I welcome David Currie and Dick Manson, who are here for our inquiry into NHS Western Isles. Does either of you wish to make a preliminary statement?
Official Report · Committee
Section 22 Report
“The 2006/07 audit of Western Isles Health Board”
Speakers
Choose an MSP to read only their contributions- Dick Manson 147
- George Foulkes Lab 73
- Hugh Henry Lab 71
- David Currie 67
- Andrew Welsh SNP 23
- Jim Hume LD 18
- Stuart McMillan SNP 12
- Willie Coffey SNP 10
- Murdo Fraser Con 7
- Claire Baker Lab 2
The record
432 contributions · showing 1–200Yes.
Yes, please.
We will hear from you in alphabetical order: Mr Currie is first.
Thanks very much for the invitation to appear before the committee today.In all controversies, a lot depends on where the tale begins. The problems in NHS Western Isles go back a long way, and the underlying causes of those problems must be understood before any solutions will be found. There have been a lot of good intentions along the way, and some well-meaning decisions and actions in the past have had unintended consequences.Attempts to address problems have been frustrated by fundamental difficulties. First, I highlight geography. It will always be more expensive to deliver health care in the islands as a cost per head of population. That fact has to be accepted and acknowledged. There has perhaps been a tendency to use remote location as a legitimate reason for incurring additional cost and expecting that cost to be accepted by the Health Department.Secondly, I highlight infrastructure. The two main hospitals in the Western Isles are excellent facilities that enable a very high standard of secondary care to be delivered. However, those resources are underutilised and, if we were designing the most appropriate facilities and services for the islands today, they would look very different. The Stornoway hospital, in particular, has contributed to a certain mindset around building up as big a range of services as possible, which requires a concentration of resource in that hospital. It is important to find the right balance between primary and secondary care.I move on to the lack of management capacity and capability. With a small local pool and a lower rate of churn, recruiting the right level of skills, experience and attitude has always been, and perhaps always will be, a problem. In the past, there was a tendency for people to be recruited into managerial roles on the basis of relationships, which led to confused priorities. Allied to that is the fact that issues tend to become politicised and personalised in the islands, which makes it more difficult to address the fundamentals.When I joined Western Isles Health Board, I found a disconnect with NHS Scotland, particularly at management level, and a lack of understanding or engagement with the national health service agenda. There was a strong perception that financial balance was not an issue and that the health board would always be bailed out at the end of the day.Against all that, and through all the difficulties, staff at the coalface have continued to deliver an excellent standard of service. There are some very good people in NHS Western Isles, who are committed to solving problems and who want progress.
I was interim chief executive and then chief executive at NHS Western Isles from late May 2003 until August 2006. I would like to set out some context about the 2006-07 financial position of the board. NHS Western Isles is a small board in a remote location, as you know. In the past, it has invested heavily in developing consultant-led services, unlike the other island boards. NHS Western Isles has a history of living beyond its means. In the past, it has used capital-to-revenue transfers; it has also used ring-fenced money to try to balance its revenue position.The overspend has been brought into focus more sharply in recent years, as the European working time directive forced the board to end some of its clinical practices. For example, the board used to have quite a number of single-handed consultants, who were on call 24 hours a day every day of the year. That is no longer possible. Bringing an end to such practices has cost the board a lot of money; it has made its current services unsustainable in their present form and, from a resource point of view, unaffordable.The board has been trying to tackle the situation, but it has been hampered in its attempt to come back into balance, because it has not been able to change the models of care in time to absorb the other cost pressures that have come into the system, such as pay modernisation and the cost of medical out-of-hours services. My view is that it has also been hampered by the high turnover of chief executives. I was the seventh chief executive in 10 years and there have now been 10 in just over 12 years. That lack of continuity makes it difficult to keep the appropriate systems up to date and effective, so financial, human resources and procurement systems have had to be developed and implemented time and again.In addition, the lack of management capacity and development opportunities for all staff and board members in a small board is a major challenge in trying to make the necessary changes. NHS Scotland has not yet developed ways of providing support for smaller boards to enable them to benefit from the capacity and expertise of the larger boards. That issue requires to be addressed further.I supplied some written material for the committee by way of context. I am happy to answer questions on it or on any other issue.
Thank you very much.
I have a question on your opening statement, Mr Currie. You are not from the Western Isles, are you?
No, I am not.
How did you come to be appointed chair of the Western Isles Health Board?
I had lived in the Western Isles for about 10 years and was manager of the Royal Bank of Scotland there. I was appointed as a non-executive director and then the opportunity for the chairman's post came up. I applied for it and was successful in the interview.
Was Mr Manson appointed chief executive while you were chairman?
Yes. He was appointed about 18 months or two years after I had taken up the role of chair.
He was interim chief executive first, was he not?
Yes, he was.
Did you choose him to be interim chief executive?
No. I had asked the Scottish Executive Health Department for assistance. The chief executive was off ill at the time, and the SEHD sent up Mr Manson as interim chief executive.
Did the board then appoint him permanently? Was it a board decision?
Yes, it was. A vacancy became available and there was an appointment process. A number of candidates were interviewed and Mr Manson was the successful candidate.
Why did you demit office as chair of the board?
I resigned in July or August 2006. I had been in post for five years and felt that I had probably taken the role as far as it could go. There were a number of difficulties. Quite an intense media campaign was running and the agenda had become more political. With an election coming up nine months down the road, I felt that I would be unable to take matters forward in such a political environment and that it was probably better if someone else came in, given the extent of the media coverage that there had been.
Mr Manson, why did you leave immediately afterwards?
Like Mr Currie, I felt that it was time to leave and that there was an opportunity to give the board fresh leadership. I had served just over three years as chief executive; those were a stressful three years, so I felt that it was time for me to move on to something else.
It was nothing to do with the accumulated deficit.
No. At that time, the forecast was that the board would come back into financial balance in 2006-07 and would be able to address its accumulated deficit in future years.
You both say that you thought that it was better for the board that you move on. However, an interim chair and an interim chief executive took over your positions afterwards, and I would have thought that, in most boards, a chair or chief executive would stay until a permanent chair or chief executive had taken up the post.
An opportunity for me to move simply arose. As an NHS manager, I can only pursue the opportunities that exist, so I simply pursued the opportunity and was able to be released for it.
So it was more about personal development.
There was something available, I applied for it and moved to it on secondment.
What opportunity did you move to?
Director of national development projects in NSS.
Is that in St Andrew's house?
No, it is in NHS National Services Scotland; I am based in Glasgow.
Mr Manson said that he was the seventh chief executive officer in 10 years. Is that true?
Yes.
It has been put to me that there were three before you. One served for two years, one for four years and one for six years, making a total of 12 years. Who is right?
When I arrived, I was told by the senior staff that I was the seventh chief executive in 10 years. I cannot name them, but the staff named for me six predecessors.
If there were six predecessors, that indicates a great turnover.
Indeed.
Did you not feel that you should check whether the figure was correct?
I am simply relaying to the committee the facts that were relayed to me.
Would it surprise you to hear that the figure appears not to be correct? In fact, there were only three predecessors. Why were you told that there were six?
The director of nursing and the medical director were able to go through my predecessors by name. Jane Adams, the nursing director, told me that she had been there 10 years and she named my six predecessors.
I want to explore the particular skills that Trevor Jones felt you would bring to a situation that was clearly difficult. What was your post before you were appointed as interim chief executive?
I was projects director in the Scottish Executive Health Department.
How long had you been there?
Just over two years.
Where were you before that?
I was the chief executive on the board at the state hospital in Carstairs.
Why did you move from Carstairs to the post as projects director? Was it a career opportunity, or was anything else involved?
It was a career development opportunity. I had been at the state hospital for 10 and a half years and I had stayed on at the request of the Health Department and Trevor Jones.
Was it anything to do with management issues at Carstairs that led to your moving to the Health Department headquarters?
As you know, Carstairs is always a difficult place to run and manage. There are always difficulties, particularly in getting the balance just right between security and care. That raises lots of passions among staff on both sides of the debate.
Had the project development post that you moved to been advertised before you applied for it?
No. It was a development opportunity that Trevor Jones offered me in exchange for having stayed on at the state hospital. It was arranged with his predecessor as well.
Is there any truth in the statement that you faced a vote of no confidence at Carstairs?
During my time at Carstairs, when I was promoting change and forcing it through, votes of no confidence were threatened on several occasions. However, there were no votes of no confidence during my time there.
Did you stay in the Western Isles when you were chief executive?
No.
Why not?
Initially, I was there on secondment, so—
Yes, but secondees can move. You were there for three years.
The secondment was initially for three months. I was asked by Trevor Jones to go to the Western Isles for a secondment of about three months to support the board while the chief executive was off sick.
Then, as Mr Currie told us, you were appointed permanently by the board. I presume that the appointment was made for the foreseeable future at the time. Why did you not move to the Western Isles?
For family reasons. I was up front with the board about that. I felt that I could not move my family to the Western Isles. If that had made me unappointable in the board's view, I would have been happy to step back.
Did you fly from Glasgow up to Stornoway every week?
Yes, I commuted weekly.
Did the board cover the cost of that?
The board covered the cost, although the majority of the costs were able to be worked round mainland meetings.
I am sorry, I did not catch that.
The majority of the costs of my travel to and from the mainland were able to be covered round NHS Scotland meetings on the mainland. Most senior staff at director level in the Western Isles Health Board, and in the other island health boards, are required to go to NHS Scotland meetings on the mainland fairly regularly—certainly weekly, and sometimes twice weekly.
Were you in the Western Isles on most weekdays—Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday?
On most weekdays, yes.
You made an arrangement with the board, and on some days there was NHS business, which helped to facilitate that. Once you had the substantive appointment, did the board continue to pay for your travel from Glasgow to the Western Isles?
Yes.
When someone makes a decision to move to a substantive post, is it not unusual that their travel expenses continue to be funded? Mr Currie, you were the chair at the time. Did you consider that arrangement and decide that it was appropriate?
Yes. As I mentioned in my opening statement, we have a very small local pool. It is inevitable that we have to attract people from outside to get the right level of skills and experience. Living in the Western Isles does not always suit the family circumstances of those individuals. There is no way round that.
Is it within the competence of the board to do that? Was it within the board's means?
It was—we can move to financial matters later. It was within the board's means, and I believe that it was within the competence—and certainly with the full knowledge—of the Health Department. People commuting in and out of the Western Isles is a very common scenario.
We move on to governance arrangements and systems of internal control.
Mr Manson, you stated that when you arrived in 2003 there were problems in finance, human relations practice, governance, clinical governance, in relations within and outwith the organisation and in management. What caused NHS Western Isles to move into a cumulative financial deficit in 2003-04?
The main elements in relation to the financial deficit in 2003-04 were the implications of the European working time directive. The health board had a number of single-handed consultants, for example in paediatrics, and as people retired from those posts—which are quite onerous, as they were on call 24 hours a day, every day of the year—the board was unable to continue that practice and had to make arrangements for locum cover.That year, there was a very high locum cover cost of around £1 million. A number of staff were also added to the payroll for various initiatives during that year. A number of centrally funded initiatives were no longer to be centrally funded, and the cost had to be picked up by the board. When I arrived at the end of May, the board was projecting a £1.2 million deficit for the financial year 2003-04, and it had submitted a financial recovery plan to the Scottish Executive Health Department with regard to that.
You arrived, and you were immediately faced with the major problem of an estimated £1.2 million deficit. What did you do to turn that round?
The main focus was on trying to ensure that controls were in place; that where we had opportunities to save money—with vacant posts, for example—we took advantage of that; and that we reduced unnecessary spending on things such as supplies and maintenance projects, which could perhaps be deferred to future years.We considered very carefully how we could save money on locum cover. Locum cover in the Western Isles is very difficult because the place is remote and it is not easy to attract consultants to come and work there. Western Isles Health Board had found that it had to rely on agency locums, who were paid at very high rates. We put a lot of effort into trying to get locums to come and work in the Western Isles at NHS rates.
Was that adequate to stop a £1.2 million potential deficit?
It brought it down in that year. We were forecasting break-even, and in the event I think that it came in at about £295,000 over, of which around £250,000 was an adjustment from the previous year's accounts that the external auditors asked for.
Did the action that you took address any of the underlying problems rather than the surface problems?
No, it did not.I will outline the underlying problems. There were two hospitals that were first-class facilities for the local community but which did not operate at optimum capacity. Some 30 per cent of the beds in the Western Isles hospitals were empty at any one time; consultants' productivity was fairly low; and we needed to have a minimum of three consultants in each specialty under the working time directive arrangements. There had to be three surgeons, three anaesthetists and three physicians, while the consultants' workload did not keep them fully occupied. Consultants tended to do work that other clinical staff could have done, simply because they were there and they wanted to be occupied.I thought that the key issue was that we needed to consider redesigning the clinical services to make them more affordable and to partner up with people with expertise on the mainland, in Inverness and Glasgow, to avoid the need to have consultants on site all the time. The board agreed with me about that.
We will consider more fundamental issues in a moment.You were an interim chief executive. I presume that you were in the post on a temporary basis.
That is right.
In your submission, you state that the action you took on finance included producing"a further refined recovery plan which reduced staff travel"and establishing"a vacancy control committee to put the brakes on staff recruitment"and"a strengthened audit committee to implement audit value for money recommendations".In other words, you simply introduced a series of cuts and value-for-money measures as opposed to tackling an immense problem that affected the whole organisation. Was that approach adequate?
We did two things. First, as you rightly said, we implemented several immediate measures to try to put the brakes on spending. I outlined those measures in my submission. Secondly, we tried to set up a review of clinical services—I also mentioned that in my submission. That review had been started. Before I arrived, the board had invited an academic to come to the Western Isles, review its clinical services and make proposals on progressing a review of them. I operated on two fronts. First, I took immediate action to try to rein in expenditure and put in place control mechanisms. That was prudent management. Secondly, I tried to accelerate the review of clinical services to address the underlying difficulties in the Western Isles.
In your submission, you say that clinical services were redesigned, replanned and refocused, and that there was re-engagement. However, it is the reality that matters rather than words.There was no finance committee. There was a finance recovery plan and a finance team, but a finance committee did not arrive until 2005. A sub-committee with staff representation arrived in 2006. Surely there should have been a finance committee much earlier. Rather than having only a finance team to consider the massive problems that existed, a fully equipped and fully operational finance committee should have fulfilled the task at hand.
The view was taken at that point that the whole of the non-executive team and the whole board should be engaged in the financial recovery process, and that financial recovery was a matter for the board rather than a matter that should be delegated to a finance committee.
Mr Currie, as the chairman of NHS Western Isles, did you take any steps to set up a finance committee or did you think that financial recovery was the responsibility of the whole board?
The board talked about that in considerable detail and reviewed the best way to handle matters. At that time, we thought that the board approach was better, but in 2005 we realised that a finance committee would give us a better result, and we therefore established one.
Obviously, finance is your background—you were a bank manager. You were still in position when the 2005-06 budget was set. Did you set a budget for more money than was available to you?
No. I set a budget that would be challenging to deliver, but I do not remember its involving more money than was available to us.
You did not overset to the tune of £1.7 million?
Not to my knowledge. I do not recall that.
Okay. We will check whether that happened in 2006 or 2007.Did either of you request additional funding from the Scottish Executive at any time?
Yes, we did. We asked the Scottish Executive for both financial support and help from financial experts—qualified accountancy staff.
In each of the financial years for which you were there?
We asked first in 2003-04 and again in 2005-06. Although the Health Department was sympathetic regarding some of the financial challenges that we faced, we were of the view that it could not be seen to be bailing out Western Isles Health Board. It felt that the board's allocation was adequate and it was prepared to discuss brokerage that could be repaid in future years.
So, you knew that no additional money would be forthcoming.
Yes. We knew that there would be no additional money. That is correct.
Mr Manson, can you provide any evidence that the board had, historically, spent more than its allocation before your arrival?
Because I no longer work for the board, I do not have that evidence to hand, but I am sure that that information can be provided to the committee.
The deficit rose, but you introduced these plans. Did you identify the underlying causes of the deficit? The deficit went from £495,000 in 2003-04 to £444,000 in 2004-05 and more than quadrupled to £1.746 million in 2005-06. When you introduced the initial measures, they were clearly not adequate because the accumulated deficit began to mount up.
Absolutely. The main pressure that led to the £1.7 million deficit was the fact that we simply had not made good progress. Changing round clinical services is a long-term project, and we simply had not made any quick progress that would have made significant change to those services. Because of that, the board was unable to make the savings that were necessary to meet the cost pressures of pay modernisation—the medical out-of-hours service, which hit Western Isles Health Board disproportionately because of its geography. Because of the geography of the Western Isles, the board needed to have general practitioners on call in different locations in the evening, which it had to pay for. The board simply was not able to change its clinical services quickly enough to make the savings to meet those cost pressures, and that is what led to the £1.7 million deficit.
Did you feel that the board had the confidence and expertise to overcome its massive, continuing and growing problems?
I felt that we needed additional expertise in the board. As Mr Currie and I have said, the board is small and has limited management capacity. We felt that we needed additional clinical support as well as additional financial and HR support from elsewhere in NHS Scotland.
On a similar theme, Jim Hume wants to ask about the financial position in the board's briefing.
Mr Currie said that he cannot recall oversetting the budget, but there was an overset because there was a £1.75 million deficit in 2005-06. Coincidentally, you both decided to seek different careers in the middle of that year, and the board had five months of interim chairs and chief executives. Can you recall how you kept the board briefed on the financial position, and what action it took when the position was worsening?
Which period are you talking about?
In general, how did you keep your board briefed?
That was done through regular monthly board meetings. Finance was always high on the agenda for those meetings and was discussed in considerable detail. Once a finance committee was set up, we had executive and non-executive leads involved in that, as well as staff representation. The committee reported fully to every board meeting.
Looking back, would you have handled the situation differently?
It is difficult to say—situations evolve and change. We always recognised that solving the difficulties of Western Isles NHS Board would be a long haul. It was not going to happen overnight—it was going to take a number of years, and would require building up the governance structures and the expertise around the board table. I do not know. Hindsight is a poor counsellor.
Okay, but when the position was worsening, what did you do differently? Was it just a case of doing what you did before?
It was that, and trying to ensure that we had full engagement from the staff and an understanding of the need to monitor and manage expenditure. That is my recollection. Dick Manson perhaps has more detail.
We had fortnightly discussions on finance at our executive team meetings and our board meetings. We moved to board meetings, and increased the number of such meetings per year. At every board meeting we had a discussion on the financial position and on the areas for financial recovery. We majored on trying to crack the service redesign issues and on trying to get more sustainable, and therefore more affordable, services. At that point, about 10 per cent of our staff were engaged with the public in service redesign working groups to consider how we could provide surgical, anaesthetic and maternity services and so on in the future, not only with a view to making them sustainable under the working time directive and ensuring that we had properly trained and skilled clinicians, but with a view to ensuring that we played to the strengths of the whole clinical staff rather than simply looking for an expensive consultant-led solution.
Did you fully inform the board of corporate governance? Did it go through all the briefings on its responsibilities under corporate governance?
We had two board away days on corporate governance issues: on the role of executive and non-executive directors, and on the role of non-executive directors in holding the executive team to account. I presented a report to the board in 2005 on how it could rebuild and improve its governance arrangements. That included clear roles, remits and outcomes for each committee; clarity about the role of the executive and non-executive directors; a clear corporate plan that set out the deliverables that were expected of NHS Western Isles and which the board should review at every meeting; and how the board should tackle issues that were raised by the auditors to do with lack of financial controls and lack of follow-through on some audit recommendations.We asked the Scottish Executive whether it could support us with further development and training for non-executive directors to help give them more confidence, but we were unable to deliver that during that year.
Did you not see that as being part of your joint roles?
Yes. The chairman and I, with some colleagues who were not on the board, held two development seminars for the board, but we felt that there was a need for people to have mentors from elsewhere in the NHS—non-executive directors—to help to bring skills. We facilitated colleagues' going to other boards to see how things were done and to pair up with non-executive directors.
For the record, the overset was for 2006-07 and not 2005-06. I apologise.
Mr Manson, in your opening remarks, you said that"NHS Western Isles Board has a history of living beyond its means."I understand that you took up your post in May 2003. My information is that, in April 2003, no deficit was reported by the board. My question is really for both witnesses. When you left office in July or August 2006, the cumulative deficit was £2.5 million, which means that the health board went from having no deficit to having a deficit of £2.5 million just three years later. Are you asking us to accept that that deficit was entirely attributable to matters that were outwith your control? I would like both witnesses to answer.
The answer is no—I am not asking people to accept that matters were entirely outwith my control. My submission tries to explain that, in the past, Western Isles NHS Board was able to cover its revenue deficit by capital-to-revenue transfers. In 2002-03, the year that Mr Coffey mentioned, the board had used a capital-to-revenue transfer of about £0.5 million to support its revenue position and to break even. It had also used some one-off ring-fenced money from the Scottish Executive to cover its revenue position. It had done that to varying degrees in previous years. In common with other health boards, it had been able to support its revenue position with capital-to-revenue transfers.As the ability to cover capital-to-revenue transfers began to reduce, with a view to its being phased out, the situation became difficult for the board because already its revenue allocation could not meet its revenue position. That was a challenge. Given that the vast majority of the expenditure was going on people who provide services, and that there was a low turnover, the health board was in a different position to boards elsewhere in the country that have higher rates of turnover because there are more jobs so people can move around.The board started from the base of not living within its revenue allocation. We have tried to explain the pressures of the European working time directive and of having to maintain consultant staffing in the Western Isles hospital under that, and then having to hit £1 million in 2003-04. The health board was already £0.5 million overspent: it was difficult to pull back from that.I suppose that we could have done more by being clearer and much harder in saying that we were not going to appoint locum consultants, but that would have meant that we would have had to shut down some clinical services for long periods, which would have been an unacceptable price for the public to pay. While we had to maintain services at broadly the same levels, there was a period between 2003-04 and 2005-06 when we tried to work through new models of care, and we had to accept that we had to bear high costs. That is one of the reasons why we asked the Scottish Executive Health Department for brokerage.It is fair to say that we did not expect the deficit to be £1.7 million in 2005-06, but during that time, a number of long-standing NHS consultants retired and, because of the difficulty in attracting consultants, we were able to fill those posts only with locum consultants, who were much more expensive than NHS consultants.
It was clear to us early on that we faced a difficult challenge. We tried a number of ways of resolving it. We spoke regularly with the then Scottish Executive Health Department and kept it informed about what we were doing and the steps that we were taking. It acknowledged our difficulties and was very supportive of the actions that the board was taking. At no stage did anyone say that they were not happy with what we were doing or that they thought that we had got it wrong. It was very much a case of, "We support what you are doing and hope that it will work out."The situation was complicated by a number of issues that were building up and by the European working time directive, as Dick Manson said. It was a case of responding year on year to such changes and hoping that we could build up skills and experience and turn the situation round.
You said that finance was always high on the agenda of your monthly board meetings. At the meeting on 26 May 2005, do you recall an underspend being reported?
I do not recall—
A surplus of £131,000 was reported to the board on 26 May 2005. Do you recall that? You said that finance was high on the agenda.
I do not recall that.
You were chairman of the board, but you do not recall that.
No, I do not.
Does Mr Manson recall it?
Yes. The underspend was for the financial year 2004-05, if I remember rightly. It had been reported consistently during the year that the board was broadly on target. We started the year with an overspend, but the financial reports to the board and the executive team started to show that the overspend was declining, and then forecast a surplus at the end of the year. However, when the end-of-year accounts were produced, the board discovered that expenditure of about £280,000 or £290,000 had not been reported to the board at any time during the year, or included in any budget statement.
Is it the case that the draft accounts that were produced before the accounts went to the board showed a £700,000 deficit?
I do not think so. I have not—
Did you not meet the board's then director of finance, Marion Fordham? Were not the accounts changed so that instead of reporting a £700,000 deficit they reported a £131,000 surplus?
I do not recall that at all. As chief executive I would certainly want to question our finance director on the figures, but I would not ask her to change figures that were going to the board.
Are you saying categorically that if someone published an accusation that you changed the figures you would regard it as wrong and defamatory?
Yes.
Can you tell us about the Cook report?
Sorry—I do not know of a Cook report.
Are you not aware of an internal report to your management that was called the Cook report?
I am sorry—I am not.
Do you remember Keith Craig and Donald Mackenzie, who were in your finance department?
I do indeed.
Why did they leave the service of the board?
Keith Craig retired on the ground of ill health. I think Donald Mackenzie retired.
You "think" he retired.
My recollection is that he retired.
Did either man make a complaint to you about how the accounts were drawn up and presented to the board?
No.
Neither of them, ever, on any occasion, did that?
No.
So would an allegation that they were forced out of their jobs by you because, in effect, they were whistleblowers about the accounts be entirely false?
Yes. There is no question of anybody having been forced out of their job.I think I now understand which report you were referring to.
Ah! You recall it.
I have never heard anyone call it the Cook report.
How would you describe it?
Significant expenditure was not reported to the board and, in effect, was kept from the board during the year—
By whom?
The expenditure was simply not reported. It was kept from the board during the year—
By you?
Sorry?
I do not understand. You, as chief executive, had not reported it to the board.
No, I as chief executive had not been informed, and neither had the board, of significant expenditure—I think that it was in the region of £280,000 or £290,000—which had been incurred. That had not been included in our financial reporting to me, to my executive colleagues or to the board, and it put us in the position at the end of the year, when the annual accounts were prepared, of suddenly discovering that expenditure was significantly more than we had thought.I asked Audit Scotland to carry out a review to find out how that could have happened. As a result of its report, I asked Marion Fordham, the new finance director at that point, to consider the report, the changes that needed to be made to internal mechanisms and whether there was a case for any disciplinary action. Marion Fordham reviewed the situation, thought that there might be a case and appointed community services general manager Michael Cook to carry out an internal investigation. I did not see the results of that investigation.
You did not see the results.
No, I did not see the results before I left.
But there is a report.
I presume that Michael Cook finished his report—a long time ago now—but I have not seen it.
You said that you considered whether there was a need for disciplinary action for the unauthorised expenditure. Did you determine who had authorised it, and what was your conclusion on disciplinary action?
On a point of detail, the issue was not "unauthorised expenditure" but the non-reporting of expenditure. The expenditure had been kept out of the accounts and from the board.
Who was responsible for that, and what was done?
The ultimate responsibility would be the finance director's. I reported it to our audit committee and the board. We then asked Audit Scotland to carry out a review of what had happened because, as you will imagine, it was a huge concern to us. On the basis of the Audit Scotland report and in accordance with NHS processes, I asked Marion Fordham, as finance director, to review what needed to be done in the finance section to avoid the same thing happening again and to consider whether any disciplinary action was appropriate.
But she was the person who was responsible.
She was not. Marion Fordham had come into post in April, so the previous finance director was responsible. An interim finance director had been seconded for some time from the Scottish Executive to support the board. The simple questions were: what needs to be done, and should any disciplinary action be necessary? The NHS rules were that it was for Marion Fordham, who was line manager as finance director and who had not been involved, to appoint an appropriate investigating manager at senior level in the organisation. They were to review the facts from Audit Scotland, talk to the internal auditors, get the view of the finance team and then make a recommendation to her.
What happened?
That recommendation had not been made by the time I left.
I have a couple of other questions on the Cook report. Have you really not seen it?
I left, so I have not seen it.
It is reported that the Cook report chronicled dubious accounting practices, profligate expenditure and exorbitant expenses claims. Are you aware of it, Mr Currie?
I was aware that that investigation was being undertaken, but like Dick Manson I left before it was finished, so I do not know its outcome.
What would have happened to the report? To whom would it have gone?
It would have been presented to Marion Fordham as finance director.
Would it have gone to the Scottish Executive?
It would have been for Marion Fordham as finance director to decide whether she discussed it with the Scottish Executive.
We were told that irregular payments were made to consultants in the Western Isles. Are you aware of that?
To medical consultants?
Yes.
The only regular payments of which I am aware that were made to medical consultants were their salaries and legitimate expenses, in accordance with NHS rules.When locum consultants came for short terms, there would be negotiations, as there are throughout the country, about whether payments for accommodation and subsistence were appropriate. Those would be decided between the medical director, the human resources team and the locum doctors, depending on how long they came for. If a locum came for three days, he or she would expect accommodation to be provided.
And no one in the finance department drew your attention to the matter and complained that irregular payments were being made.
No.
Ever?
No.
And there was no machinery for picking that up.
Irregular payments?
In this meeting
Everything on 27 Feb 2008 →- Scottish Parliament Audit Committee Wednesday 27 February 2008 Committee business · 1
- Decision on Taking Business in Private Procedure · 1
- Section 22 Report Committee business · 432
- Scottish Futures Trust Committee business · 34
- Audit Scotland (Work Programme) Procedure · 4
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