We currently have three Scottish statutory instruments that transpose the three European Union procurement directives as well as the Procurement Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 and regulations made under that act. Today, the committee is considering two of the draft instruments that amend those pieces of legislation.
The first draft SSI was withdrawn and relaid to address some minor drafting issues identified by the Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee. It became necessary to lay a further instrument when the United Kingdom Government changed its approach to dealing with international agreements.
The regulations that we are discussing today are designed to ensure that legislation governing public procurement will still function in the event of a no-deal Brexit. The objective is to retain, as far as possible, the status quo on day 1. First, that is necessary because the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 allows for the correction of deficiencies arising from exit and not wholesale policy changes—that point is very important in understanding what we are being asked to approve. Secondly, the intention is to give as much certainty as possible to buyers and businesses in otherwise chaotic times. Thirdly, we anticipate that the UK will be party to the World Trade Organization Agreement on Government Procurement, from which the many requirements of the EU directives arise.
The basics of procurement will therefore be the same as they are today, although public bodies will advertise contracts on a new UK e-notification system instead of in the Official Journal of the European Union, known as the OJEU. Having one site per signatory is a requirement of the WTO GPA. However, in practice, Scottish public bodies will continue to use Public Contracts Scotland, as is required by the Procurement Reform (Scotland) Act 2014, which will forward adverts as it currently does to the OJEU.
Some powers to legislate would be transferred from the European Commission to Scottish ministers. Those would all be subject to negative procedure as they are either simple updating powers or powers that set out the precise conditions under which they can—and, indeed, must—be used, and they offer no scope for discretion or policy change.
In relation to the rights of bidders from other countries, we followed the UK Government’s requested approach in the first SSI. The UK then changed its ask and its own approach, which led to the second SSI. The delays to the Trade Bill mean that it is not safe to assume that the powers in that bill can be relied on to implement the UK’s accession to the GPA or the roll-over of the EU’s other agreements in time for exit. The effect of the two SSIs is to extend the EU’s obligations in relation to public procurement for 18 months after exit, by which time it is assumed that the Trade Bill or another piece of primary legislation dealing with the matter will be law.
We have to do this to ensure that our laws are compatible with the UK’s international obligations. I am sure that the committee will agree that it is a rather unsatisfactory, sticking-plaster approach. However, it is born of the UK Government’s approach to the EU, and our objective is to provide as much stability as possible.