Let me go back to the House of Lords and the Supreme Court. One reason why I raise an eyebrow at the stance of the Supreme Court on this issue is that one of its shakiest moments was the General Pinochet affair. General Pinochet came to the UK for medical treatment and a Spanish judge using appropriate international processes arranged for him to be arrested for alleged crimes in the junta in Chile. His case then went up to the House of Lords. At relatively short notice, the membership of the panel that was to hear the case had to change and Lord Hoffmann was brought in as the next most senior judge. The fact that Lord Hoffmann’s wife worked for Amnesty International in some capacity was—we think—known by the senior law lord when they organised the panel. However, it was all done with some haste, and it is not at all clear that the panel was aware—they said that they were not aware—that Lord Hoffmann acted on a committee that raised funds for Amnesty International.
Amnesty International is relevant here because of its views on torture; it had asked to become an intervener in the House of Lords, and this was the very first case in which an intervener had been allowed. That meant that Amnesty International, although not technically a party to the case, was allowed to address the court on issues to do with torture and what had happened in Chile. Lord Hoffmann did not declare that he chaired a committee that raised funds for Amnesty International although his wife’s position, as someone who worked for Amnesty International, was known to the authorities.
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Anyway, the case went ahead, and the vote went three to two against General Pinochet, with Lord Hoffmann in the majority. A little while later, General Pinochet’s lawyers discovered that Lord Hoffmann had that interest but had not declared it, and they asked for a rehearing. It had never happened before, but they got a rehearing, and the court very strongly made it clear that Lord Hoffmann should have declared the interest. Indeed, as I read it, even if he had declared the interest, the parties could not have waived it—it would have led to an automatic disqualification. That is the line that the court took, and another court had to be convened to rehear the whole case.
It all meant a lot of time being taken up, a lot of concern and a lot of bad publicity for Britain and for the House of Lords. Relations among the judges in the House of Lords were quite strained for a number of years thereafter. That one failure to declare an interest had a very substantial impact on a whole variety of issues, and I have never quite understood why the Supreme Court, knowing that lesson—which was hardly 10 years old by the time the court was set up—did not decide that it should have a register of interests.
We can have a debate about whether a register of interests would have caught Lord Hoffmann’s chairmanship of the committee, but I think that it would have, certainly under the rules under which the House of Lords now operates. It is not entirely appropriate, but if you want to see what a possible register of pecuniary interests might look like, you can look on the House of Lords website, where you will find a very detailed series of 12 headings under which interests can be recorded. Not all are appropriate for judges, but some of them certainly are.