It will be very challenging for any Parliament. The European Parliament is probably in pole position on this, because it regards itself as a player and wishes to have information, and also because it has a vote at the very end of the process. The European Parliament has to vote by simple majority on the conclusion of the negotiations.
Having spoken in particular to Guy Verhofstadt, the European parliamentarian who has oversight of the process—he is not the negotiator—I know that his view, echoed by other views that I have heard in the European Parliament, is that that Parliament will take an active role in looking at what is taking place and in ensuring that constitutional due process is observed. That means that the committees of the Parliament will take evidence and there will be discussion of one sort or another.
I cannot speak for the UK Government but, clearly, it is presently involved in a legal action around the rights of Parliament with particular regard to the royal prerogative. The Scottish Government has indicated that it wishes to participate in and join itself to that action, and the application to do so has been submitted by the Lord Advocate. It is the view of the Scottish Parliament that we should take a view on the article 50 process and that the Scottish Parliament should have a legislative consent motion, and we will argue for that.
That takes us up to the triggering of article 50. Beyond that point, the parliamentary process will be a reactive one. For example, the great repeal bill is promised for the next parliamentary session in Westminster. There are considerable issues arising from that for Scotland, and there would have to be an involvement from Scotland. Would that require a separate Scottish bill? If not, it should require a legislative consent motion. All of those issues will have to be dealt with.
It would be inconceivable if there were not also a process in which I was able to report to the Parliament on the progress that we are making, particularly with regard to the devolved issues, on securing a position in the UK Government’s negotiating strategy. We do not know what that strategy is and we do not understand the higher principles that are guiding it, as I said yesterday in the debate. We are clear about the principles that guide the Scottish Government’s strategy, and we raise them in debates regularly in the Scottish Parliament—some people do not seem to enjoy that as much as I do. They include issues around the single market, free movement and a range of other issues that we wish to be addressed—we will have more detail on those later.
The picture is emerging and mixed and changes fairly rapidly, but I hope that the process will be transparent. I do not mean that the terms of the day-to-day negotiations should be transparent—I accept that people do not negotiate in the full spotlight. However, those who negotiate have to be open about their principles and they have to offer reassurance to people. That reassurance must, in part, be public. The Nissan letter is an example of private reassurance, which rings alarm bells and makes people wonder whether they have been excluded rather than included, and whether, for example, there are implications for state-aid rules and the present Commission rules. There has to be a consideration of such matters.
In the wider context, early on, the Japanese sent a very cogent letter saying that one of the big issues at play was transparency—the letter specifically mentioned that issue.
We have to do our best to ensure that transparency is observed, excepting some issues around the negotiating process.