Item 3 is evidence on the Auditor General’s report, “The 2015/16 audit of NHS 24: Update on management of an IT contract.” The Auditor General is now joined by Carol Calder, senior manager for Audit Scotland, and Nick Bennett, a partner at Scott-Moncrieff. The Auditor General will make an opening statement before I open the meeting out for questions.
Official Report · Committee
Section 22 Reports
“The 2015/16 audit of NHS 24: Update on management of an IT contract”
Speakers
Choose an MSP to read only their contributions- Nick Bennett Scott-Moncrieff 13
- Caroline Gardner 10
- Colin Beattie SNP 7
- Liam Kerr Con 6
- Jenny Marra Lab 5
- Alex Neil SNP 5
The record
46 contributionsThank you, convener. I bring two further reports to the committee this morning that highlight matters of public interest in NHS 24 and NHS Tayside. I have prepared the reports under section 22 of the Public Finance and Accountability (Scotland) Act 2000. I highlight at the outset that, in both cases, the external auditors gave unqualified opinions on the accounts of the organisations, which means that they are satisfied that the accounts provide a true and fair view of the bodies’ financial position.
I have prepared reports on the boards because I believe that there are issues of public interest that should be brought to the attention of Parliament through this committee. I will start with NHS 24. The report on NHS 24 provides an update on implementation of a new information technology system called the future programme. I reported to your predecessor committee in October 2014 and again in November 2015 on how weaknesses in contract management had led to delays and escalating costs in the programme.
In October 2015, NHS 24 attempted its planned launch of the new system. Following a serious deterioration in call-handling times as NHS 24 staff struggled to use the new system, NHS 24 reverted to its previous system in order to protect patient safety. NHS 24 now plans full implementation by December 2017—four and a half years after the original intended implementation date of June 2013.
Last year I reported that the total cost of the programme had risen by 55 per cent to £117.4 million, in comparison with an outline business case cost of £75.8 million. NHS 24 now estimates that the total cost of the programme will be £131.2 million, which is 73 per cent more than the cost in the original business case, mainly as a result of additional double-running costs. The Scottish Government provided additional loan funding of £20.75 million to NHS 24 over the period 2012-13 to 2014-15 to help it to manage the additional costs. Of that brokerage, £20.35 million is still outstanding.
Over the past nine months, under the leadership of its new chief executive, NHS 24 has undertaken a fundamental look at what needs to be done to implement fully the new system. Although significant challenges remain, I believe that the board is now taking reasonable steps to reduce the risk of further delay.
I am joined today, as the convener said, by Nick Bennett from Scott-Moncrieff, whom I appointed auditor of NHS 24. Between us, we will do our best to answer the committee’s questions.
Thank you. Colin Beattie has the first question.
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Auditor General, I accept what you have said about patients not being impacted. However, what you have outlined about the NHS 24 information technology contract is part of an on-going story with information technology projects. The committee has repeatedly heard evidence about their being mismanaged—the NHS 24 IT contract has clearly been mismanaged.
Do the measures that are outlined in paragraphs 22 and 23 on page 7 of the report not seem like overkill? It seems that, immediately following the realisation that there was a problem with the contract, umpteen management groups were formed to oversee it and—I presume—trip over each other. At one time when I worked in the private sector, I had an IT division reporting to me—I could not imagine having to work through the sort of complexity that is outlined in paragraphs 22 and 23. What is your take on that?
I will ask Nick Bennett to comment in a moment, but my view is that most of what is outlined in those paragraphs was almost certainly required. The review that the new chief executive undertook when she took up her post highlighted—as we note in the report—that some problems came from failure to engage with people in health boards who need to join up services with what NHS 24 does. A great deal of the new architecture that is highlighted in paragraph 22 is about ensuring that those relationships are in place and are working effectively. Nick Bennett is closer to that and might have a perspective that you will find useful.
I agree with the Auditor General’s point. The groups that have been set up provide the scrutiny and challenge that are required for the project. There are highly experienced senior individuals in the groups who will be involved in a sign-off process for any subsequent phased development of the project. The groups are certainly a useful development in governance.
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Are they not compensation for the fact that we do not appear to have people with the right skills to manage the contract, with the response therefore being to form a committee?
In the past, we have commented on the lack of appropriate skills in NHS 24. In response, the board has brought in outside experts to scrutinise and challenge.
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Are we paying money for people from outside the NHS to sit on the groups?
The people are all internal to the NHS or are from wider public sector bodies. They are highly experienced senior individuals and are all from the public sector.
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Okay. One of the big concerns is the financial obligations in the IT project. On “Financial implications”, the report says that it is unlikely that any of the additional costs can be recovered. Do we have a feel for what the total additional costs will be over the period?
I think that NHS 24 is confident that it can deliver what is required within the figure that is included in my report. A significant amount relates to the double running costs of implementing the new system while keeping the old one up and running. Clearly, there might be change over time, but what is in the report is the latest estimate from NHS 24 regarding its projection of what the project will cost. In my view, it is based on a more thorough understanding of what is required than was the case in my previous reports.
10:00
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The reference to additional costs is purely about the double running.
We have tried to break that down in exhibit 1, where we compare the original business case, the projected costs last October and the projected costs in June from NHS 24. You will see that most of the increase has been in the implementation costs, including the double-running costs, which have gone up by £39.1 million to 132 per cent of the original estimate. The on-going support costs for the contract itself have gone up by a relatively much smaller amount.
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You seem to be confident that, now that NHS 24 has a grip of the project, it will be delivered within the timescale and budget indicated—is that correct?
I am now much more confident that the board understands the scale of what needs to be done and has put in place appropriate mechanisms for doing it. It is for the board to provide assurance and deliver that. However, I now feel more comfortable about the project’s prospects than I was a year ago.
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Clearly, there is a bigger issue that I hope the committee will address in due course.
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I appreciate that you have looked at the matter a couple of times previously, but I was not about then and I want to explore the contractual arrangements. In the report, you state that the contractual arrangements were “flawed” and you provide a useful chronology on page 12, in appendix B. The omissions in the tender document were discovered in August 2011 and a contract was awarded two months later. Six months later, NHS 24 staff identified that things were missing and, two years later, the matter was reported to those in charge. To me, that was an enormous failure. Who was found to be responsible and what were the consequences?
You are right—it was a very significant failure, and it was of serious concern to your predecessor committee. None of us likes to see an IT system getting out of control. However, what the audit work and the inquiries uncovered, which was that a member of staff was aware of omissions in the contract documentation that were not brought to the attention of the chief executive until much later, was a serious failure of governance and accountability.
Nick Bennett will keep me straight on this. There have been significant departures of staff, from the chief executive down, among those people who were originally responsible for the project. NHS 24 is now in the final stages of appointing a new permanent chief executive, who has been involved in turning the project around and will be accountable for taking it forward from here.
That is correct. A new chief executive has been appointed. Most of the senior management who were involved in the original procurement of the future programme have now left the organisation, and most of the non-executive directors have changed as well.
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That is encouraging, but we are now running under various letters of intent, and contractual documents are not due to be signed until December despite the fact that the contractual review has been running since January 2015. What is your view on that? Is it good business to be running the whole project and changing the senior management when there are not even any contracts in place?
It is an area of risk, for sure. The board is trying to finalise the contracts. The new contracts have been sent to Cap Gemini and BT, and negotiations are going on to finalise those direct contracts. It is an important area that needs to be finalised pretty quickly.
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You mentioned that a final cost will be available only at launch. In paragraph 27, the report states:
“A final, definitive cost for implementing the system will only be available once it has been launched and is operating successfully.”
As auditors, are you comfortable with that?
Because the whole project has been beset by problems and delays, we are not going to know whether the final implementation is in accordance with the timetable that is laid out until it happens. Also, given that a lot of the costs are costs of double running the existing system, the final cost is not going to be known until the new system goes live successfully.
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That is extraordinary. You have said that the total projected cost is £131 million. I appreciate that we are talking about a complex system, but it cannot be unique. Fundamentally, things look like each other. Do you have any idea, or is there any way to establish, what an equivalent cost would be in the private sector? If the private sector commissioned a system to do something similar to what the NHS 24 system is supposed to do, what would be the cost of that? Has that comparison been done?
Not as far as I know. The outline business case was originally for £75 million but, to be fair, the new system has progressed significantly since that. One of our recommendations is that a business case be prepared on what the new system delivers—not only what it costs but the benefits. Once the business case has been prepared, the board will be in a better position to answer that question.
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To prepare the business case must be a good recommendation but, meanwhile, the contracts are still being negotiated and the systems are still being progressed in the absence of that business case. At what point does it become a good idea for NHS 24 to step back, hit pause and say that, because the system has not worked, it needs to review what is going on and what it needs the system to look like rather than trying to negotiate in the background and run the system?
We reported to your predecessor committee that there had been a detailed review of whether NHS 24 should progress with the system. The last time the system failed to go live, there was a deep-dive review of whether the board should abandon it, which concluded that it should continue to develop the system on which it was working.
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Right. This is not the first time that the committee has considered the matter or that it has considered IT projects. Do you have any idea who is taking the macro learning from it? Various IT projects are in significant trouble; do you see any evidence that that is being acknowledged and that the process for future IT projects is being future proofed?
You are absolutely right that, sadly, it is not an isolated incident. I have reported a couple of times on the bigger picture for developing major IT systems in the public sector. The Government has made some changes: it has appointed a chief information officer and has plans in place to develop capacity within Government that can support smaller bodies such as NHS 24 when they make large investments in IT. We have also made some recommendations about the importance of focusing effort at the beginning of a project to be clear what the body intends to achieve, what the right contract structure is and how we will know that good progress is being made.
The committee has taken evidence on that overall strategy a couple of times. It is too soon to be clear that it is having the desired effect, but it must be the right approach to invest in a central core of expertise at the right level to undertake IT projects and to ensure that bodies do not start off such projects without the right expertise, understanding, IT skills and legal skills to make them work.
I hope that we will not see a situation similar to that in NHS 24 again. It is too soon to say that the changes that the Government has made will deliver that.
I have two questions. The first concerns the outstanding loan of more than £20 million that NHS 24 has to repay to the Government. That is on top of the normal requirements for efficiency savings. I appreciate that the repayment period has been extended, but £20 million is not an insignificant amount to take out of such an organisation. What other services will be cut back to enable NHS 24 to pay the £20 million to the Government? Something has to give.
The project has now been running for four or five years and the point was to introduce new, leading-edge technology. Given the pace at which technology changes, is the technology still leading edge? Is it up to date? What will be the life-cycle of the technology, given that the system is five years beyond the date when it should have gone live?
I will start off by saying that repaying £20 million to the Government would obviously be very significant for a board of this size. It is also worth noting that the revised repayment plan has been agreed between the board and the Government. Nick Bennett might be able to add more detail on where the board intends to make savings in order to deliver that, or it might well be a question that should be directed to NHS 24.
Inevitably, savings will have to be made to repay the brokerage and the additional costs that will be required to be met. A number of the initiatives that had been planned have had to be put back, but it is probably best to address the question of the other savings that the board will have to make to the health board itself.
We should write to the board and ask those questions.
On the issue of technology, one of the reasons for asking for a full business case is to identify the changes that have been made to the original future programme and any benefits that have been brought that were not envisaged when the original business case was drafted. After all, significant changes have been made to the technology over this period.
Will this technology be fit for purpose and, if so, for how long?
I think that that is another question for the board.
Well, you are the auditor, so you should surely have a view on the matter.
We would like to see the full business case prepared, because that will identify the benefits that will come to the board over the next 10 years.
I think that we should take that up with the board, too.
Has the total cost of the future programme changed since the AGS’s report was published?
No. The board is projecting £132 million as of June this year, I think, and there has been no change to that of which we are aware.
The estimated total cost is now £55.4 million higher than that envisaged in the business case, and the Scottish Government has loaned the £20 million as discussed. Does that mean that there is a deficit of £34.7 million, and have the auditors discussed how that might be met?
The difference in the cost between the £20.35 million that has been provided in brokerage and the £55 million total has been and will be met by the board itself from its overall budget during the period. As Nick Bennett has said, that has meant delaying some projects that the board had planned to undertake and making efficiency savings elsewhere, but the board has not run a deficit with the brokerage available from Government. It has hit its tight financial targets.
It is also worth pointing out that the £132 million includes £62.5 million for on-going support costs, which are, in effect, the support costs over the 10-year period hence. In other words, those costs have not yet been but will be incurred.
Thank you very much. I suspend the meeting for a five-minute comfort break before the next item.
10:12 Meeting suspended.
10:19 On resuming—
In this meeting
Everything on 3 Nov 2016 →- 09:00 Decision on Taking Business in Private Procedure · 1
- 09:00 Section 23 Report Committee business · 74
- 09:45 Section 22 Reports Committee business · 46
- 10:00 Section 22 Reports Evidence session · 113
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