I thank the committee for the opportunity to attend this important inquiry and set out the Scottish Government’s position on the matter.
I welcome the inquiry, as I have always encouraged transparency on the matter. I recognise fully the impact that the closure had on the travelling public, local and national business and, in particular, those in the haulage industry who were inconvenienced, and I remain grateful for their patience and support.
As indicated in my parliamentary statement on 8 December, the available evidence and expert opinion provided demonstrate that the truss end link defect could not have been foreseen. I hope that we can agree that the decision to close the bridge was appropriate, reflecting the paramount importance of safety. As the bridge experts agreed, the subsequent response has been “a remarkable achievement”.
As with other organisations with asset management responsibilities, the Forth Estuary Transport Authority’s use of a long-term programme allowed certain projects to be prioritised for funding, reflecting the urgency of the work required and how it would impact on the integrity of the structure.
FETA’s system of general and principal inspections was developed to reflect the Forth road bridge’s unique characteristics. Inspections were based on good industry practice, with an enhanced methodology developed by FETA using a risk-based approach, meaning a more rigorous inspection regime that exceeded Department for Transport guidelines.
Amey has continued to use the same well-tested FETA procedures, with the same experienced staff. The early identification of the defect was as a direct result of that competent regime and the familiarity that the staff had with the structure of the bridge and was a credit to those involved.
Prior to its dissolution, FETA had full responsibility for all operational and maintenance aspects of the Forth road bridge, including the prioritisation of its work programme. FETA’s governance was such that the work programmes were approved by its board.
When tolls were removed and FETA became reliant on Scottish Government funding, it was required to bid for funding through the spending review process. It is clear that FETA had to adapt to new ways of working. Notwithstanding, the Scottish Government ensured that funding was provided to meet FETA’s committed spend and that capital maintenance was delivered on a prioritised needs basis. Funding for safety-critical work was never refused by the Scottish Government and FETA considered issues such as the truss end links to be manageable.
FETA operated independently and employed its own hierarchy of risk. While the bridgemaster’s board papers referred generally to truss end links, the need for associated work was not considered a significant risk nor accorded a safety-critical or high priority.
The inquiry has also heard about Amey’s response. The strengths that the new operating company demonstrated are a direct outcome of Transport Scotland’s thorough assessment of the contract procurement process and the skills and experience of Amey and its partners, which the committee has had sight of and have proved extremely efficient.
The protections afforded to FETA staff and the ministerial commitment on staff pensions, welcomed unanimously by both the FETA board and management, and staff and trade unions, played an important part in providing continuity of experience during the crucial mobilisation period, ensuring that all FETA staff in post in May 2015, including the bridgemaster, transferred to Amey.
From 2007, FETA undertook major works including main cable investigation, cable band bolt replacement, anchorage investigation, viaduct bearing replacement, improvements to deck half-joints and the dehumidification system, and a number of other schemes. FETA deemed virtually all as being more pressing than the postponed and unrelated full replacement of the truss end links.
A total of £107.8 million has been spent on the bridge in that period, equating to more than £110 million, including reserves. That is not a record of underinvestment.
In summary, the evidence presented to the committee, often from witnesses with quite different perspectives, has demonstrated that the structure has been well maintained, using good industry practice, that the defect that resulted in the bridge closure was unforeseen and unforeseeable, and that ministers’ approval of Amey’s proposal to close the bridge for a short period to carry out essential repairs was appropriate and necessary.
Members will be aware that the bridge is fully operational. I would again like to pay tribute to all the staff involved for the swift and dedicated actions undertaken in often challenging circumstances. I welcome any questions from the committee.